entirely disregarding the value it bestows. It must be presumed that the Sessions have allowed for this. Secondly, it is not necessary that what enhances the value should be permanently attached, nor that it should be attached at all. The cases already cited illustrate this. Similarly, in Regina v. Leith (a) the occupiers of land to which a floating pier was attached were held rateable for the value of the land as enhanced by the use of the pier. There the rate, on the face of it, appeared to specify the floating pier, consisting of barges, as rateable per se: here that is expressly excluded by the finding of the Sessions. The attachment there was effected only by planks laid from the floating pier to the land. In Rex v. Bradford (b) the rateable value of a house was held to be enhanced by its having the privilege (not even a corporeal subject) of being used as a canteen. It is unimportant how the annual value of the land is increased. A house would earn a higher rent from its commanding a fine prospect: but such enhancing of the rent could not be excluded from the rateable value. J. C. Heath, contrà. The attempt is to rate the floating dock. It is true that the Sessions state that they have held the dock not rateable, and that they consider the value of the building yard enhanced by the dock. But it appears that they have estimated the value by adding together the values of the two as if they were independent subjects of rate. They have taken "the aggregate" of the values. The Court will therefore not be bound by the express terms of the (a) Antè, p. 121. (b) 4 M. & S. 317. 1852. The QUEEN V. MORRISON. 1852. The QUEEN V. MORRISON. finding, but will look at what has in effect been done; Rex v. St. Mary the Less (a), Rex v. Tedford (b). The substantial question therefore is before the Court. Now, as stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 89. (continued to the present time) makes the profits of stock in trade or other property not rateable, the question is, whether the appellants have been duly rated in respect of an occupation of a corporeal hereditament. The dock is not rateable as part of the yard: it is not a fixture. In Rex St. Nicholas, Gloucester (c), the value of a machine was indeed taken into consideration; but there the machine was considered to be part of the house. Machinery has been held rateable, only where it has had the character of a fixture, or at any rate has not clearly had an opposite character; Rex v. Hogg (d), Rex v. Lord Granville (e), Rex v. The Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Company (g), Regina v. Southampton Dock Company (h) (the case of the cranes). A similar principle prevails in deciding whether a thing be that of which the occupation confers a settlement; Rex v. Londonthorpe (i), Rex v. Otley, Suffolk (k), Rex v. St. Dunstan, Kent (1). [Lord Campbell C. J. Is it contended, on the other side, that the floating dock is rateable as a fixture? Otter. Certainly not.] The value cannot be added to that of the land, unless there be a necessary connection between the two, as in Regina v. Leith (m), Rex v. The Proprietors of the Liverpool Exchange (n) (where the connection was by virtue of (a) 4 T. R. 477. (k) 1 B. & Ad. 161. (m) Antè, p. 121. (b) Burr. S. C. 57. 1852. a statute), and Regina v. Bradford(a) (where the value was enhanced by a privilege attached exclusively to the The QUEEN house). This dock could not have been distrained for No the rent of the land; Capel v. Buzzard (b): nor could it be taken into account in estimating the double value of the land, under stat. 4 G. 2. c. 28. s. 1.; Robinson v. Learoyd (c). The dock cannot even be said to create an occupation of the spot where it lies, as it is liable to be moved away at the pleasure of the harbour master. settlement would be gained by the occupation of the dock as a tenement; Rex v. Dodderhill (d), Rex v. Mellor (e). If the land belonged to one person and the floating dock to another who had only the right of way to it, the former would be rateable for the land alone, the latter would not be rateable at all. How then can the owner of the two be rateable for the aggregate value? But, further, the floating dock is not permanently within the rating township: it is as much within the parish of St. Nicholas. That this prevents it from being a subject of rate in such township appears from Regina v. The Cambridge Gas Light Company (g). In Regina v. Leith (h) the question as to the parochial locality was not raised. Cur. adv. vult. Lord CAMPBELL C. J., on a later day in this term (November 17th), delivered the judgment of the Court. We are of opinion that the rate in this case, as laid, cannot be supported. The Sessions very properly held V. MORRISON. 1852. The QUEEN V. MORRISON. that the floating dock per se was not properly rateable under stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 1.: and the only question is, whether the rateable value of the ship building yard is to be considered as enhanced by reason of the floating dock. Looking to the manner in which the floating dock is constructed and used, we think that the Sessions have come to an erroneous conclusion in point of law upon this question. This floating dock exactly resembles a ship at anchor, which occasionally grounds when the tide ebbs, and which may be approached either by a boat or by a plank. It has no necessary connection with the yard. The two might easily be in the separate occupation of different shipwrights, carrying on business separately; and the accidental proximity of the one to the other is for this purpose immaterial. If words had been introduced into stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 1. making the floating dock rateable, the floating dock and the yard being in different parishes, there would have been as much reason for contending that the yard was an accessory to the floating dock as that the floating dock was an accessory to the yard. This does not appear to us to come within any of the cases in which it has been held that the rateable value of real property may be enhanced by circumstances which increase its profitable value to the occupier. The decisions respecting machinery and other fixtures of course can have no application. The steam tug in the Southampton Case (a) was not made the subject of the rate; and the only question there was, whether the appellants, the Dock Company, should not, in estimating their profits, be allowed a deduction in respect of the (a) Regina v. Southampton Dock Company, 14 Q B. steam tug which was necessary for carrying on their business. Regina v. Leith (a) comes much nearer the present case: and some expressions there used by the Court would in their generality countenance the doctrine for which the respondents now contend. But those expressions must be taken in reference to that case, which is materially different from the present. The pier there was permanently fixed to the landing place; and the one could not be used without the other. Besides, that case did not turn upon the construction of stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 1., but of a recent local act, which contains words much more extensive with respect to property made rateable. This being our opinion, it is unnecessary for us to consider the effect of the floating dock being sometimes in one parish and sometimes in another: and we have only to direct that the rate be amended by reducing the rateable value of the appellants' premises to the sum of 577. Rate reduced accordingly (b). 1852. The QUEEN V. MORRISON. (a) Antè, p. 121. (b) The decision in Regina v. North and South Shields Ferry Company (ante, p. 140) was pronounced between the day on which the case in the text was argued and the day on which the above judgment was given. |