1852. Re STUART V. JONES Forster's Case (a), Williams v. Pritchard (b). Stat. 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 42. s. 17. authorizes the sending a writ of trial to "any judge of any court of record for the recovery of debt." It has been held in the Exchequer Chamber that this enactment does not extend to the Judge of the county court; Owens v. Breese (c). Lord CAMPBELL C. J. I have listened to the able arguments of Mr. Pollock; but I am only confirmed in my first impression that the county court has jurisdiction in this case. By stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. xxxiii. s. 18. an action is given to recover the rate in any of Her Majesty's Courts of record at Westminster. Then, by a subsequent statute, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 58., "all pleas of personal actions, where the debt or damages claimed is not more than 207, whether on balance of account or otherwise, may be holden in the county court, without writ;” and there is a proviso making some exceptions. This action, given by stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. xxxiii., is a plea of a personal action; and the sum claimed does not exceed the specified amount: then it comes within the enacting clause of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 38. It does not come within any of the exceptions: and I see no reason why such an action should not be brought in the county court, where, no doubt, it will be very well tried. COLERIDGE J. I go so far with Mr. Pollock's argument as to agree that, after the statute had provided that the rate should be levied by distress, no action would have lain had it not been given by express words: (a) 11 Rep. 56 b. (b) 4 T. R. 2. (c) 6 Exch. 916. but in this statute there are express words giving an action, which certainly is a plea of a personal action. Then stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 58. gives the county court jurisdiction over "all pleas of personal actions." How are these words to be got over? It is suggested that the Legislature gave a remedy in the Courts of record at Westminster, and that the intention, to be implied from this, was to guard against local prejudices by confining the remedy to an action in a court of general jurisdiction. But all this is an assumption. It is quite as likely that the action was given in the Courts of record at Westminster because there was no court of record having jurisdiction over the spot. We cannot speculate either way: the words of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 58. give jurisdiction over such a plea to the county court; and there is nothing to restrain them. WIGHTMAN J. The question is not as to the right but as to the remedy. The remedy might, by stat. 1 Vict. c. xxxiii., be by a personal action in the Courts of record at Westminster. The subsequent act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95., gives the county court jurisdiction to hold that personal plea; and the remedy may now be in the county court. ERLE J. concurred. 1852. Re STUART V. JONES. Rule refused. 1852. Monday, A bill of costs, 6 & 7 Vict. shew in which Courts the business took place. Held: That the bill was sufficient. Cook against Gillard. EBT for work and labour &c. as a solicitor. DEBT Pleas. 1. Never indebted. 2. As to 167., parcel &c., payment. 3. Set-off. 4. No signed bill delivered. 5. As to part, the Statute of Limitations. Replication issue joined on the first plea; Nolle prosequi as to the 167.; and traverses of the 3d, 4th and 5th pleas. On which traverses issues were joined. On the trial, before Wightman J., at the Westminster of the Superior sittings in Trinity term 1852, it appeared that the plaintiff had in due time delivered to the defendant a bill, headed “Richard Gillard Esq. Dr. To George William Francis Cook;" and signed by the plaintiff. The items in the bill were divided into four parts. The first part was headed "Yourself and Ransom." It consisted of a charge for attending the defendant and consulting as to slanderous reports; and then, under a fresh head," Hilary term 1846," there were charges for "Letter before action," "Instructions to sue," "Writ of Summons," and "attending settling." The amount of this first part of the bill was 27. 19s. 8d. Except in so far as might be inferred from the items above quoted, there was nothing to shew whether the suit of Gillard v. Ransom had been pending in any, or which, of the Superior Courts. The second part of the bill appeared from the items to be for conducting the defence of a case at the Middlesex Sessions; it amounted to 97. 1s. 6d. The third part appeared on the face of it to be for conducting a prosecution at the Middlesex Sessions; G. W. F. Cook 12 Feby. 1852 Old Saint Pancras Road St. Pancras Middlesex." The The bill had, before trial, been sent to taxation without prejudice and it was agreed at the trial that, partly from the amount struck off, and partly by an admitted set-off, the plaintiff's claim was reduced to 1007.; which was the sum he was entitled to recover supposing that the bill was sufficient. 1852. Cook v. GILLARD. 27 1852. Cook V. GILLARD. It was contended for the defendant that the first and last parts of the bill were insufficient, as they did not shew in what courts the business there charged for was transacted; and therefore that the bill, being one entire bill, was not sufficient as to any part. For the plaintiff it was contended that the bill was sufficient for the whole; or, if not, that it was divisible and good pro tanto. The learned Judge directed a nonsuit, with leave to the plaintiff to move to set it aside, and enter a verdict for 1007. or such portion of the bill of costs as the Court should think reasonable instead thereof. Keating, in Trinity term, obtained a rule nisi accordingly. Atherton and Milward now shewed cause (a). Stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 37. is the enactment now in force requiring the delivery of a signed bill by an attorney before action. Stat. 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23. was the statute in force before the 22d of August 1843, when stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. received the Royal Assent. The (a) Before Lord Campbell C. J., Coleridge, Wightman and Erle Js. |