Judge of either of them," may refer the bill, to be taxed by the officer of their own Court. It will be contended that the effect of this change in the enactment is to render the decisions on the former statute no longer applicable, and that the decisions on the present statute which are favorable to the defendant are founded on a mistake. It is true that one reason why the attorney was required to state in what court each item was transacted has ceased; for it is no longer material in what court the greater part in value was transacted; but the authorities do not proceed on that ground alone. In Lewis v. Primrose (a) Lord Denman C. J., speaking of stat. 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23., says: "The very object of the enactment is, that the client, if he likes, may take the bill to another attorney for his advice upon it. Why is the client to be forced to ask questions? And how can we say that he is told in respect of what business the charge is made, when he is not told where the business was done." In Martindale v. Falkner (b) there was a difference of opinion amongst the Judges, as to whether the bill, in that case, did shew by necessary inference in what court the cause was: but all the Judges agreed that it was necessary it should do Sargent v. Gannon (c) recognizes the same rule. In Engleheart v. Moore (d), which was a decision on stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 37., Alderson B. gives the reason. The statute requires the delivery of the bill, he says (e), "for the express purpose of giving the client a full opportunity of ascertaining whether the business was done, and whether the charges are reasonable.

so.

(a) 6 Q B. 265. 268.

(c) 7 Com. B. 742.

(e) 15 M. & W. 552.

For this

(b) 2 Com B. 706.
(d) 15 M. & W. 548.

1852.

COOK

V.

GILLARD.

1852.

COOK

V.

GILLARD.

purpose it is very material that the bill should shew in what court the business was done, because the fees are different in different courts: and how can an attorney advise a party as to the propriety of taxing a bill, unless he knows in what court the fees were paid? Without such information, he could not know whether, upon taxation, one sixth of the bill would be struck off or not." In Ivimey v. Marks (a) the Court of Exchequer, following up the reason just quoted, decided that a bill, if it did not disclose in what Court the legal business was done, was bad altogether. Maule J. thus lays down the rule in Dimes v. Wright (b): "Whether a bill which does not expressly shew the court and the cause where the business has been done, would be a compliance with the statute, is, perhaps, a thing which is not yet altogether settled. It is, however, settled, that, if the bill is deficient in that information which is essential to enable the party charged to know the court and the cause, with respect to any of the items, it is insufficient." In Anderson v. Boynton (c) these cases are approved of. The plaintiff probably relies upon Keene v. Ward (d). In that case the Court seem to have proceeded on the ground that it sufficiently appeared that the business was in one of the Superior Courts, and that, as the scale of costs is now the same in all the Superior Courts, it was immaterial in which: but in the present case it does not appear by the bill that the cause was in one of the Superior Courts. There are writs of summons in all borough courts of record; stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 27. s. 3. [Erle J. I see there is a charge for attending in Court when a rule was made to

(a) 16 M. & W. 843.
(c) 13 Q. B. 308.

(b) 8 Com. B. 831, 835. (d) 13 Q. B. 515.

refer the cause and all matters in difference. Could
that be in an inferior court?] In the Passage Court at
Liverpool such rules were drawn up at every sitting
when Crompton J. was Judge of that Court. It was
a proceeding which he much encouraged. [Erle J.
The plaintiff appears by the signature of the bill
to be an attorney resident in Middlesex. He is at
the same time conducting cases at the Middlesex
sessions for the defendant; and in his bill there are
charges for getting evidence in one cause at Hatton
Garden and Tottenham Court Road. It is not strictly
impossible that there may be places of that name in
Liverpool, and that this cause may have been in the
Passage Court there: but are we to suppose that, if it
was so, the defendant would not know it? I think there
is a recent decision of the Common Pleas, Cozens v.
Graham (a), much against that.]
be in part deficient, it is bad

Supposing the bill to altogether; Ivimey v. may be relied on for

Marks (b). Waller v. Lacy (c)
the plaintiff on this point: that case, in the judgment in
Ivimey v. Marks (b), was considered to be no authority on
the later statute; but in fact the point was abandoned by
the defendant's counsel in Waller v. Lacy (c). [Lord
Campbell C. J. In my mind the fact that the counsel, Mr.
Bramwell, abandoned the point makes Waller v. Lacy (c) a
very weighty authority. Erle J. The Court, in Waller
v. Lacy (c), were not passive instruments in the hands
of counsel: they gave judgment that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover part.]

Keating, contrà.

The question has been fairly

(a) 16 Jurist, 952.

(c) 1 M. & G. 54.

(b) 16 M. & W. 843.

1852.

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V.

GILLARD.

32

1852.

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GILLARD.

Coleridge J. And

brought before the Court. Whilst stat. 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23. was in force, it was at first doubtful whether the name of the court need appear; Lester v. Lazarus (a). It was afterwards decided that it must appear, for reasons depending on the machinery for taxation given by stat. 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23. Then came stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 37., changing the machinery for taxation, and consequently removing these reasons; and the question now is, how far, with the change of reasons, the law should change. The bill may now be taxed in any court. [Wightman J. But there is another ground for the rule assigned in some of the cases. The bill, it is said, should give the information necessary to shew whether it is advisable to tax at all. give it so that a person to whom the client handed the bill for advice would not have to seek it aliunde.] Both reasons are answered by the judgment in Keene v. Ward (b). Stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 37. does not require that the court should be named; and, as the fees in all the Superior Courts are the same, there is no reason for requiring it. It is not easy to see why the bill should give formally every piece of information to the client, or why it should be supposed that this defendant might be in doubt whether he had been suing in the Passage Court at Liverpool or not. [Lord Campbell C. J. The cases seem to me to proceed on an assumption, contrary to the fact, that a client knows nothing about the litigation in which he is engaged except from the bill. Erle J. It is put upon the necessity of enabling a person of competent skill to decide whether the bill is likely to be reduced one sixth, with

(a) 2 C. M. & R. 665.

(b) 13 Q. B. 515.

proper

amount

out requiring information aliunde. Now I apprehend
that a great many items in all bills are such that it
cannot be known whether they are of the
without information dehors the bill. For instance, a fee
of 51. 5s. for a conference may be excessive if the
business is simple, and very reasonable if it is compli-
cated.] It is to be remarked that in Ivimey v. Marks (a)
the Court had not their attention drawn to the uniform-
ity of taxation in all the courts, which, as remarked in
Keene v. Ward (b), now renders it immaterial in which
the business was. In the other cases cited the difference
between stat. 2 G. 2. c. 23. s. 23. and stat. 6 & 7 Vict.
c. 73. s. 37. does not appear to have been adverted to.
Cur. adv. vult.

Lord CAMPBELL C. J., on a subsequent day in this term (November 20th), delivered the judgment of the Court.

In this case the question was, whether an attorney's bill, intended to be delivered according to stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. s. 37., was sufficient. The bill related to several transactions, all of which were properly described, except that there were items, to a small amount, in two actions, for writs of summons and other proceedings such as would occur in actions in the Superior Courts; and there was nothing to indicate in what court these actions were brought. The defendant objected that the bill was therefore invalid; Ivimey v. Marks (a), Engleheart v. Moore (c), Dimes v. Wright (d), were cited, in which the rule was laid down, that a charge for an item in an action, without specifying in what court the

1852.

Cook

v.

GILLARD.

(a) 16 M. & W. 843.

(c) 15 M. & W. 548.

VOL. I.

D

(b) 13 Q. B. 515.
(d) 8 Com. B. 831.
E. & B.