1853. TALLIS V. TALLIS. therefore of opinion that the plaintiff had a good cause of action in the breaches of contract which he has assigned. We have limited our judgment to the parts of the contract to which these breaches relate, because, if these are valid, the invalidity of other parts of the contract is immaterial; Mallan v. May (a). But, by so doing, we do not intend to suggest doubts about the validity of the other parts of the contract not now under judg ment. The question raised by the demurrer to the pleas remains to be decided. And, even if the facts therein stated arc taken to be admitted by the demurrer, and that the reasonableness of the restriction in question is to be considered with reference to those facts together with the facts alleged in the declaration, still we think the pleas bad. For, although the books capable of republication may be almost infinite, still the number of subscribers to such republications coming out in numbers is limited: and, although, if the defendant's books are excluded, it does not follow that the plaintiff's books would be purchased, still we cannot ascertain that the number of subscribers to the plaintiff's books would not be diminished if the defendant competed with him by offering other books, especially if they were of a similar character. And, unless the defendant made it plainly and obviously clear that the plaintiff's interest did not require the defendant's exclusion, or that the public interest would be sacrificed if the defendant's intended publications are excluded, according to the general rule before referred to, we ought not to hold the contract (a) 11 M. & W. 653. void. The facts of the case are strong to shew that the general rule may be well applied in respect of the present defence. The defendant, as retiring partner, was probably acquainted with the business to which the covenant relates. He stipulated for and obtained a large price for consenting to the restriction: and, as far as we can perceive, he is endeavouring to keep that price without making the return for which it was paid; and he is attempting to support this proceeding on the ground that the public interest would be sacrificed if his publications are not brought out. It is clear there would be evil if the law justified such a breach of contract: but it is by no means clear there would be any compensating good to the public from the publications intended by the defendant to be so made in violation of his promise to the plaintiff. As we have come to the conclusion that the pleas are bad though the facts stated therein are assumed to be true, it is not necessary to consider the further objection to them on account of referring to a jury the reasonableness of the restriction, which in Mallan v. May (a) was decided to be matter of law for the Court. We agree that the question, whether the contract is void as contrary to public policy, is for the Judge, when the circumstances raising the question are conceded. Yet, if the plaintiff may by averment of circumstances not appearing on the contract maintain the affirmative of the restriction being reasonable (which has been mentioned in some judgments on this point), it seems to follow that the defendant ought to have the corresponding right, by averment of other circumstances, of main 1853. TALLIS V. TALLIS. (a) 11 M. & W. 653. 1853. TALLIS V. TALLIS. taining the negative of the same proposition: so that pleas upon the principle of those demurred to ought to be allowed. However, as we think that these pleas, if allowed, do not constitute a defence, the point of form need not be further adverted to. Judgment for plaintiff. Wednesday, January 12th. A rule to strike an attorney off the rolls of this Court was IN In the Matter of JOHN SMITH. last Trinity term, J. P. Wilde obtained a rule calling upon John Smith, an attorney of this Court, to shew cause why he should not be struck off the roll. The rule was obtained on an affidavit verifying an order of of an order of the Lord Chancellor striking him off the roll in Chancery. The rule was enlarged, to wait the result of a petition to the Lord Chancellor. granted on an affidavit verifying a copy the Lord Chan cellor striking rolls in Chan him off the cery. The the Lord Chan- store him. In Gray now informed the Court that the result of the petition was, that the Lord Chancellor had restored Mr. Smith, but debarred him from practising for six months; the result, the and he moved that the rule be discharged. Lord Chan cellor restored him, but debarred him J. P. Wilde, contrà. The rule should be made absolute from practising to the same extent as the Lord Chancellor's order, that in Chancery for six months. is, it should debar him from practising in this Court for The rule in this Court was six months. discharged on payment of costs. Lord CAMPBELL C.J. The rule was properly granted on an order of the Lord Chancellor striking the attorney off the rolls of the Court of Chancery; for that shewed that the Lord Chancellor had decided that he was not fit to be a solicitor: and, if not fit to be a solicitor in that Court, he is not fit to be an attorney in this Court. We give credence to the Lord Chancellor's decision. But now the Chancellor has decided that Smith is fit to practise as a solicitor in Chancery, but that still he deserves, as a punishment, to be debarred from so practising in Chancery for six months. If we were to inflict a further penalty by debarring him from practising as an attorney in this Court, we might frustrate the intentions of the Lord Chancellor; for there is nothing to shew that the Chancellor did not think the punishment which he inflicted an ample one for the offence. But, as the application to strike the attorney off our rolls was proper under the then circumstances, the rule must be discharged on payment of costs. COLERIDGE, WIGHTMAN and CROMPTON JS. concurred. JOHNSON against GIBSON. DEBT. day named, being a quarter day, for so many quarters "then elapsed," plaintiff, on an issue upon Nunquam in debitatus, must shew that rent accrued in respect of the quarters ending on that day, and cannot insist upon rent accruing for earlier quarters. 1853. JOHNSON V. GIBSON. assigns, to pay the rent. That A. K., to wit on 12th August 1836, entered and became possessed for the term. That, after the making of the indenture and during the term, to wit 9th May 1850, all the estate, right, title, interest and term of years, then to come and unexpired, property, profit, claim and demand whatsoever, of A. K. of and in the demised premises, by assignment thereof then made, legally came to and vested in defendant. And, although plaintiff hath always &c. (general performance by plaintiff), that, after the making of the indenture, and during the term, and after defendant became such assignec, "and while he continued such assignee, to wit on the 25th day of March a. D. 1852, a large sum of money, to wit the sum of 227. 10s., being the sum above demanded, and being parcel of 301. of the rent aforesaid, for three quarters of a year of the said term, then elapsed, became and was, and still is, in arrear and unpaid to the plaintiff," contrary to the tenor of the indenture. There were no particulars of demand. Plea. As to the causes of action in the declaration, except as to 72. 10s., "parcel of the sum above demanded, and the causes of action in respect thereof," that defendant "never was indebted in manner and form as in the said declaration is alleged:" conclusion to the country. Issue thereon. Payment of 77. 10s., parcel as aforesaid, into Court, and also of 1s.; and averment that defendant never was indebted in a greater amount than the 77. 10s., and that plaintiff had not sustained damages to a greater amount than 1s. Which plaintiff took out of Court, and accepted in satisfaction as to so much. On the trial, before Jervis C. J., at the Hertfordshire Summer Assizes 1852, it appeared that the defendant |