suit for the personal judgment of the Bishop, he is to consult him and have his consent to the decree. The Court, therefore, is in style the Bishop's Court, as this is the Queen's: and the Chancellor is the Bishop's Chancellor, as we are the Queen's Judges. By a special provision, at the prayer of the party, the Bishop's judgment may be invoked; in which respect the analogy fails. But, where this prayer is not made, the Chancellor, or Official Principal, seems to be an independent Judge: nor is he the less so, because some cases are excepted from his jurisdiction, nor because that jurisdiction ceases, or is suspended, when the Bishop is present. If absent, the Bishop cannot interfere: the parties are never supposed, by the citation or other proceedings, to be before him; nor is there any appeal from the Chancellor to him. Ayliffe (Parergon 160) says: "A Chancellor as distinguished from a Vicar General, Commissary and Principal Official, is he, that has that cognizance of all causes both of voluntary and contentious jurisdiction committed to him; whereas properly speaking, a Vicar General has only all causes of voluntary jurisdiction delegated to him ; and a Principal Official, only causes of contentious jurisdictions granted him." And, again, p. 163, he says: "It has been said, that a Bishop's Official or Chancellor, is he, to whom the Bishop delegates the cognizance of causes in a general manner; and as such, an Official or Chancellor, has the same consistorial audience with the Bishop himself that deputes him: an appeal does not lie from such an Official to the Bishop himself, but to him only unto whom it ought to be appealed from the Bishop himself: But 'tis not the same thing in Commissaries, who are not principal officials, tho' deputed 1853. Ex parte MEDWIN. 1853. Ex parte to an universality of causes in a certain part of the diocese; because a principal official is an ordinary, and the other only a delegated Judge." This passage is not very accurately expressed: but the meaning is sufficiently clear in one sense. The Chancellor, or the Official, has a delegated power as much as the Commissary; because they equally receive from the Bishop a power which was originally in him, and which originally he might have exercised himself, and probably often did. But it was a power to be exercised in a Court, open to the subjects of the diocese, for the trial of all causes over which he has jurisdiction. And of this Court he appoints the Chancellor or Official to be the ordinary Judge, to act therein independently of his controul, with no special instructions, according to ecclesiastical law. Whereas the Commissary is deputed specially, his powers varying according to the limits of his commission, as to subject matter, time and place, and is purely the deputy of the Bishop. The Bishop must appoint a Chancellor or Official Principal, and may be compelled to do so by the Archbishop: it is at his option when, upon what occasions, and for what purposes, he will or will not appoint Commissaries. This distinction, Bishop Gibson observes (a), the common law Courts have recognised. And a strong instance is the case of The Bishop of Lincoln v. Smith (b), in which a prohibition was moved for because the Bishop sued for a pension in his own Court held before his Chancellor; and it was refused by the Court of Queen's Bench, consisting of Keyling and Twisden, who decided (a) Codex, vol. 2. p. 986. note (1). (2nd ed.). Title xliii, c. 2. that, "being held before the Chancellor, and not the Bishop himself, he might sue there." The objection being thus disposed of, it is unnecessary to examine more attentively the affidavits to see whether in truth the interest in the Bishop was such as would have warranted the application, or whether the parties have not waived it by delay. On these points we express no opinion. Rule refused. 1853. Ex parte MEDWIN. The QUEEN against The Mayor and Assessors of Thursday, the Borough of HARWICH. January 27th. O'MALLEY, in Michaelmas term 1852, obtained a A burgess rule nisi for a mandamus commanding the Mayor and Assessors of the Borough of Harwich to revise the The list of Burgesses of the said Borough of Harwich, so far as regards the vote of James Broom the younger. affidavit shewed that the name of "James Broom the younger, of Currants Lane, in the parish of St. Nicholas," was inserted in the burgess list. He was objected to. The notice of objection left with the town clerk was in the terms following. objected to the name of J. B. of A. being retained on the burgess list for the borough of H. He had given notice of the objection to the town clerk in the precise form given in No. 3, Sche dule (D.) to stat. 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 76. The notice delivered to the "To the town clerk of the borough of Harwich. "I hereby give you notice that I object to the name person objected to was "To Mr. J. B. I hereby give you notice that I object to your name being retained" &c. The mayor and assessors refused to hear the objection, on the ground that this latter notice was insufficient. Held, that the notice was to the like effect with the form No. 3. Schedule (N.), and that the objection ought to have been heard, of James Broom the younger, of Currants Lane in the 1853. The QUEEN V. Mayor of HARWICH. parish of St. Nicholas, being retained on the burgess list of the borough of Harwich." That left with the person objected to was in the following terms. "To Mr. James Broom junior. I hereby give you notice that I object to your name being retained on the burgess list of the Borough of Harwich." The Mayor and Assessors thought the notice insufficient, and refused to hear the objection. Shee Serjt. now shewed cause. Stat. 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 76. s. 18. requires the mayor and assessors to retain on the lists "the names of all persons to whom no objection shall have been duly made." Sect. 17 shews how the objection is to be made: the objector is to "give to the Town Clerk of such Borough, and also give to the person objected to, or leave at the premises for which he shall appear to be rated in the burgess list, notice thereof in writing according to the form number 3. in the said schedule (D.) or to the like effect." The form number 3. is as follows. "To the Town Clerk of the Borough of [or to the person objected to, as the case may be]. "I hereby give you notice, that I object to the name of Thomas Bates of Brook's Farm in the parish of [describe the person objected to as described in the burgess list] being retained on the burgess list of the borough of The notice given to James Broom was, not that an objection would be made to retaining the name of James Broom the younger, as described in the burgess list, but to retaining "your name." That is not to the like effect. [Lord Campbell C. J. This notice gives all the information which the Legislature intended to be given by the form in schedule (D.), and is therefore" to the like effect."] PER CURIAM (a). 619 1853. The QUEEN V. Mayor of HARWICH. Rule absolute (b). (a) Lord Campbell C. J., Coleridge and Wightman Js. (b) In Regina v. Mayor, &c. of Harwich, 1 Low. & M. 95., Crompton J., in the Bail Court, on a similar case, had given a decision contrary to that in the text. MELLOR against LEATHER and CLOUGH. REPLEVIN, for taking the cattle, &c., to wit one Upon an issue cream coloured horse, of plaintiff, and unjustly plea of Non detaining, against sureties and pledges, &c. Pleas by Leather: 1. That Leather did not take &c. in manner &c. Issue thereon. 2. That the cattle &c. were the property of Leather, and not of plaintiff: verification. Replication: that the cattle &c. were the property of plaintiff and not of Leather: conclusion to the country. Issue thereon. joined on a cepit in an action of re plevin, defend ant, under stat. 5 & 6 W. 4. c. 76. ss. 76., 133., may shew that he was a constable appointed for a borough under sect. 76., and took the goods Plea by Clough. That Clough did not take &c. in within the manner &c. (by statute). Issue thereon. On the trial, before Wightman J., at the Liverpool Summer Assizes 1852, it appeared that Clough was a policeman for the borough of Liverpool. The defendant county wherein the borough is situate, but without the borough, on a charge that stolen. Replevin lies for goods unlawfully they had been taken the remedy is not confined to the ca.e of goods taken by way of distress. |