being so, I am not restrained from applying to the question before me such understanding as I may possess: and it appears manifest to me that the notice conveys all the requisite information.

ERLE J. (a). I think this notice is abundantly sufficient. Many cases decided since Solarte v. Palmer (b) go as far as we are going now. We cannot reverse that decision; but, subject to it, it seems to me that any words are sufficient which plainly convey the information that the bill has been presented and dishonoured, and that the party addressed is looked to for payment. Rule discharged (c).

(a) Wightman J. had left the Court before the commencement of the argument.

(b) 2 Cl. & F. 93.

(c) Crompton J. was absent.

1853.

EVERARD

V.

WATSON.

CHARLES PAUL BERKELEY against WILLIAM

ELDERKIN.

COUNT: for that plaintiff, on 4th February 1852, in the County Court of Northamptonshire, holden at Oundle, by the judgment of the said Court recovered against defendant a certain debt of 497. 8s. 11d., as also 91. 12s. 10d. for his costs and charges by him about his suit in that behalf expended, whereof defendant was convicted, as by the record thereof remaining in the said Court fully appears; which said judgment still remains in full force unreversed and unsatisfied.

1853.

BERKELEY

V.

ELDERKIN.

Field, for the defendant. An action will not lie on judgment of one of the county courts created by stat.

9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. That Act contains special provisions as to the way in which execution shall be obtained. They are contained in sects. 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100 and 101. These are inconsistent with the execution which must issue if there is a judgment of the Superior Court. The case is within the principle, that, where a new right is created with special remedies, those are the only remedies. There is another objection here; the count does not shew that the cause of action was within the jurisdiction of the county court; but that should be shewn wherever the judgment pleaded is of a court of limited jurisdiction; Read v. Pope (a), Williams v. Jones (b).

Milward, contrà. An action lay on the judgment of a county court under the old system; Williams v. Jones (b). The special provisions for enforcing the judgment of the county court are cumulative. [Lord Campbell C. J. No: some are restrictive; under sect. 96 the wearing apparel and tools of the debtor, to the value of 5l., are privileged from execution; and under sect. 99 the period of imprisonment is limited to forty days.] The power of imprisonment is not in the nature of an execution. Under the first county court Act, the amount was limited to 207. (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 58.), for which there was no execution against the person: but the Act gave a power of imprisonment under the fraud summons (sect. 99), which, by sect. 103, is not to operate as satisfaction. And, now

(a) 1 C. M. & R. 302.

(b) 13 M. & W. 628.

that the amount which may be recovered in the county court is raised, by stat. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61. s. 1., to 50%, it is important that the party recovering there should have some means of getting an elegit so as to be able to take the debtor's lands. [Crompton J. There is no doubt that the case is within the general principle that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction creates a duty to pay, on which debt will lie and the question is, whether there are prohibitory words, or words from which we can see the intention of the Legislature sufficiently to enable us to say that the remedy by action on the judgment is taken away.] The sections referred to do not shew such an intention. They all apply to judgments obtained in the courts abolished by stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95., as well as to those obtained in the county courts. It would be very strong to say that by implication the vested right of action on judgments obtained before stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. was taken away.

Field was not called on to reply.

Lord CAMPBELL C. J. I am clearly of opinion that an action cannot be maintained on the judgment of a county court. Primâ facie, an action lies on the judgment of every court of competent jurisdiction: but I think it quite clear, when we look at the provisions of stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95., that the intention of the Legislature was to confine the remedy on the judgments of courts constituted under that Act to the remedies specifically provided in the Act. The policy of the Act was to give an easy and cheap remedy for the recovery of small debts. The intention of the Legislature will

1853.

BERKELEY

v.

ELDERKIN.

1853.

BERKELEY

V.

ELDERKIN.

be entirely defeated if the creditor is at liberty to adopt
this course.
The Act provides special remedies for
enforcing the judgment, both as against the property
and as against the person of the debtor. As to his
property, that is in part protected from execution; for
sect. 96 excepts "the wearing apparel and bedding of
such person or his family, and the tools and implements
of his trade to the value of 51, which shall to that
extent be protected from such seizure." That protection
would be entirely lost if this action were maintainable;
for on the judgment in the superior court a fi. fa. may
issue, under which the tools of the trade of the debtor
must be taken and sold by the sheriff; and so the debtor
would be deprived of the means of earning his bread
reserved to him by the county court Act. Again, as to
the debtor's person. He can be imprisoned, under the
Act, only for forty days; and then it is not by way of
execution, but as a punishment for contempt. But, if
this action lies, he may be taken in execution, exactly
as if the creditor had sued in the superior Court in the
first instance, without availing himself previously of the
facilities given by the county court. I think this brings
the case within the principle, that, where new rights are
given with specific remedies, the remedy is confined to
those specifically given. But, further, an action can
be maintained on a final judgment only, not on an
interlocutory one. Now sect. 100 enacts "that it shall
be lawful for the judge of any court before whom such
summons shall be heard, if he shall think fit, whether
or not he shall make any order for the committal of the
defendant, to rescind or alter any order that shall have
been previously made against any defendant so sum-
moned before him for the payment, by instalments or

otherwise, of any debt or damages recovered, and to make any further or other order, either for the payment of the whole of such debt or damages and costs forthwith, or by any instalments, or in any other manner as such judge may think reasonable and just." This shews that there is nothing in the nature of a final judgment in the county court. The judge has still jurisdiction over this very judgment on which the action is brought. He might now rescind or alter it, and make a new order to pay by instalments or at another time. That power given to the judge would be defeated, if the action lay. These considerations are sufficient to shew that the Legislature did not intend this action to be maintained. I rejoice that we are able to come to this conclusion by the established rules of law; for there can be no doubt that it is most desirable that such actions should not lie.

WIGHTMAN J. I agree that the action does not lie. For, if an action in a superior Court lay on the judgment of the county court, the provisions of the Legislature as to execution would be defeated; and there would also be this strange inconsistency, that the judge of the county court could alter the judgment of that court whilst an action was still pending on it in the superior Court. That would be so absurd that the Legislature must be understood to prohibit the action.

ERLE J. It seems to me that a judgment in the county court is placed on a different principle from an ordinary judgment. The new remedies given by the statute must be pursued; and they would be defeated if this action lay.

1853.

BERKELEY

V.

ELDERKIN.