1853. V. Inhabitants of payable after the term was expired: effect was given to this consideration in Ackland v. Lutley (a). The red- The QUEEN dendum must controul the habendum. [Wightman J. How do you reconcile that with the case of a forehand rent?] That may be reserved: but a rent payable after the expiration of a term is unintelligible. Lord Denman C. J., in Ackland v. Lutley (a), says that the whole anniversary of the day from which a term is granted is included in the term: on any construction of this demise there was no occupation by the lessce for the whole of such anniversary. In some instances, the computation begins the instant an act is done from which the time. is to be reckoned, as in the case of a life insurance; Anonymous (b) case in Lord Raymond. The rent here was at any rate not due till the end of 29th September 1851, supposing that to be the last day of the term; Duppa v. Mayo (c). [Lord Campbell C. J. In some sense that is so but it may be demanded at sunset.] Then as to the receipts signed by the deceased clerk of the collector. [Lord Campbell C. J. Have you any chance of success on that point? I was counsel in a case of Doe dem. Patteshall v. Turford (d), which seems to be conclusive against you.] The question is, whether this be not a delegation of a delegation: the collector must have been appointed by order of the Poor Law Commissioners. [Wightman J. Is not this evidence, especially when coupled with that of Croydon, from which a jury might infer a receipt by Croydon himself?] If the Court take a decided view on this point, it will not be pressed. [The Court intimated that they had no doubt.] (a) 9 A. & E. 879, 894. (b) 1 Ld. Raym. 480. (d) 3 B. & Ad. 890. 1853. The QUEEN V. Inhabitants of Isaac Spooner, contrà. The question is now confined to the first point. It was said in Dyer (a) that a quarter of a year consists of 91 days, half a year of 182, but the year of 365 days, and that to the six hours over the law pays no regard. Where an indenture of lease, habendum "for three years from henceforth," was "delivered at four o'clock in the afternoon of the said 20th day of June, it was resolved, that this lease should end the 19th day of June in the third year, for the law in this computation doth reject all fractions and divisions of a day for the uncertainty, which is always the mother of confusion and contention"; Clayton's Case (b) and the same principle is laid down in Henning v. Brabason (c). Lester v. Garland (d) is an authority for the respondents; though it is true that each case must be governed by its own particular circumstances. As far as any general rule can be collected, it seems to be this: that portions of a day will be reckoned as whole days unless where injustice will result from doing so. The cases of hiring and service are also in favour of the respondents: one of them has been mentioned from the Bench: they are collected in 1 Nol. P. L. 358 (4th ed.). It is said, on the other side, that the words of stat. 1 W. 4. c. 18. are peculiarly stringent: but those of the Hiring and Service Act, 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 30. s. 4., are equally so: "shall continue and abide in the same service during the space of one whole year." Statutes establishing a settlement are construed liberally in favour of the settlement; Rex v. Fifehead Magdalen (e), Rex v. Ellisfield (g); in both of which cases the Court refused to make (a) 3 Dyer, 345. a. pl. (5). (c) Bridgm 1.8. (e) Burr. S. C. 116. (b) 5 Rep. I a. a fraction of a day. (He was then stopped by the Court.) Lord CAMPBELL C. J. I am glad that we have decided cases, on an Act of Parliament similar to that before us, in favour of the only view which is consistent with common sense. Any one, talking of these facts in ordinary language, would say that the pauper occupied for a year. I would abstain from so holding, if any recognised rule or direct decision militated against it but really law and sense concur. The general rule is that the law does not regard fractions of a day. Well then, here is an occupation which begins on the 30th of September and continues through a part of the 29th of September following: there are therefore 365 days of occupation, which make a legal year. Then is the case within any of the exceptions in which it has been held that the fraction of a day may be regarded? I think not. You must indeed regard the fraction in cases where you have to determine the rights of contending parties, each insisting on their portion of the time: but this is not such a case. Then we have an Act of Parliament in pari materiâ, and in words almost identical. I know no practical difference between the words of stat. 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 30. s. 4., " shall continue and abide in the same service during the space of one whole year," and those of stat. 1 W. 4. c. 18. s. 1., "actually occupied" " for the term of one whole year at the least." Now under stat. 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 30. s. 4. it has been often held, and very properly, that a hiring on one day to the day next before the anniversary of that day, and a service for that time, are a hiring and a service for a 1853. The QUEEN V. Inhabitants of 1853. V. ST. MARY, year, although, during a fraction of the first and last The QUEEN days, there is no actual service. Apply that to the Inhabitants of renting and occupying of a tenement. Here, by the very form of the instrument, the hiring is for one year commencing on 30th September. Was there then an occupation for that year. The occupation began on the 30th of September and ended on the 29th of September; so that, including those two days, there were 365 days, making up a whole year. It seems to me, therefore, that there was a renting for a year and an occupation for that year; and that a settlement was acquired. WIGHTMAN J. I am of the same opinion. There is nothing to take this case out of the general rule, unless the words "one whole year at the least,” in stat. 1 W. 4. c. 18. s. 1., have that effect. But that phrase does not mean more than the phrase "one whole year," which we find in stat. 8 & 9 W. 3. c. 30. s. 4.; and, as to the last mentioned statute, it has been expressly decided that a fraction of a day is not to be regarded in computing the year of hiring and service. Really the language of the two statutes is practically identical; and the construction of the one determines that of the other. ERLE J. I also am clearly of the same opinion. The rule, that the law does not regard fractions of a day, is applicable to this case. Collins occupied for only portions of days; 365 days, two of the days being CROMPTON J. The only question is whether the portion of a day is, for the purposes of this computation, to be reckoned a whole day. It appears that this is the rule in cases of hiring and service, and in reckoning the period of a demise. That being so, the present case is clear. Order of Sessions quashed. The QUEEN against DENDY and another. MAN Wednesday, of Mandamus to ANDAN AMUS to Arthur Ilyde Dendy, Esq., lord the manor of Charlton in Middlesex, and Samuel Frederick Dendy, gentleman, his steward of the same manor. The writ suggested that the manor is, and from time whereof &c. hath been, an ancient manor, within which said manor there are, and during all the time aforesaid have been, divers copyhold estates and hereditaments, descendible, and which have descended, from ancestors to heirs, as of the hereditary right of the tenants of the said manor, respectively, held of the lord of the said manor for the time being, by the rod and by copy of Court roll, at the will of the lord according to the custom of the said manor, and by certain rents, heriots, lord and stew ard of a manor. The writ suggested that the manor con tained copy holds descend able to heirs as of the hereditary right; that T., the of P., was maternal uncle admitted to a to copy copyhold hold to him and his heirs, according to the custom, thereof and P., as heiress, at law and according to the custom, of T.; and that P., having become entitled to an estate of inheritance therein from T.'s death, had demanded admittance, which was refused; and the writ commanded the defendants to admit. : Return that the copyhold did not descend to P., as heiress, at law and according to the custom, of T.; that P. is a stranger in blood to T.; and is not and never was entitled to the estates and hereditaments. : Pleas 1. That the copyhold did descend to P., as heiress, at law and according to the custom, of T.; 2. That P. was not nor is a stranger in blood to T.; 3. That P. was, on the death of T., entitled to the estates and hereditaments: all concluding to the country. On demurrer to the 2nd plea, held: That the plea was bad; for that it must be taken by itself, and, so taken, was no answer to the return, inasmuch as, if it were found for the prosecutrix, it would not support a peremptory mandamus. |