VII. Time for pleading.

Where it has not expired on the 10th
August. App. iii. 9.

PLEADING OVER.

Irregularities cured by, 723. Particulars, I. 1.

PLEADINGS.

I. Several pleadings on same ground. App. lxxix. 2. 3.

II. Service of. App. xxvi. 162.-166.

PLURIES WRIT.

Amendment.

POLICY.

Pleading.

Averment of interest. App. lxxx. 9.

POOR.

I. Property rateable.

1. Floating pier as accessory to land.

By stat. 10 G. 4. c. cxxix. Trustees were empowered, "for the better lighting and watching the several roads, streets, squares, lanes, alleys, courts, yards, and other public passages and places" under their jurisdiction within a district (part of Lambeth parish in Surrey), to cause the roads, &c. to be lighted and watched as they should think fit. And, "to defray the expenses of watching, lighting, and otherwise improving the roads, streets, lanes, courts, alleys, and other public passages and places," "and for removing and preventing nuisances, annoyances, and encroachments therein and incidental thereto, and for other the purposes of this Act," the Trustees were authorized to make a rate upon all persons "who

do or shall inhabit, hold, use, occupy, possess, or enjoy any messuage or tenement, land, shop, warehouse, or other building, wharf, yard, storehouse, ground, cellar, hereditaments, or premises within any part" of the said district "under the jurisdiction of the said Trustees," according to the annual value.

The appellants, an unincorporated Joint stock company, were proprietors of steam boats plying on the Thames : and, for embarking and disembarking passengers, constructed a pier or landing place in the Thames, opposite to premises abutting on the Thames, which they held by lease of S., and which consisted of the ground floor and cellar, being part of premises called The Mill, of which last mentioned premises the remainder was occupied by S. himself. The pier or landing place consisted of barges, moored by anchors in the bed of the river, and connected by wooden bridges with each other, and with a platform resting on an abutment which was bolted into the wall of the premises held of S. by the appellants. Passengers using the pier passed through the appellants' part of the premises, which were used also for a pay office, and contained other rooms, a warehouse for ropes, &c., and the cellar.

The Trustees rated the appellants by the words," tenement, land, landing place and premises, and the brow or brows, barge or barges, dummy or dummies, lying upon, fixed to or connected with the same tenement, land, landing place or premises, and the easement or easements, anchorage or anchorages, held, used or enjoyed therewith." In the same rate S. was rated for a "Mill and premises" "exclusive of the steam boat pier." On appeal to the Sessions (which had jurisdiction by the Act) the rate was confirmed; and a case was stated for this Court, reserving the question as follows.

"If, upon the facts stated, the Court should be of opinion that no rate can be maintained, the judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions to be reversed. If the Court should be of opinion that the rate can be main

tained, irrespective of its amount, the judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions to be affirmed."

Held: That the rate was good, being substantially made on the land occupied by the appellants, and the other items mentioned being merely accessories, shewing the mode and purpose of such occupation, and adding to its value.

That S. was not rated for the land so occupied by the appellants. Regina v. Leith, 121.

2. Tolls, how considered as enhancing the value of land.

By stat. 10 G. 4. c. xcviii. a company was authorized to maintain a ferry by boats between N. and S., the towns on opposite sides of the Tyne (which is there a navigable tide river), to erect ferry houses and offices on each side of the river for the habitation and use of the ferrymen managing the ferry, and the convenience of persons using it, to make and repair causeways at the landing places, and to make roads from the ferry on each side of the river, and purchase lands necessary for the purposes of the act; and to receive tolls for the passing to and over the ferry.

The Company constructed landing places in two townships, on opposite sides of the river, with a toll house and gate on each; their boats passed from one to the other, across the river, the bed of which was not in either township: the tolls were collected entirely on the south side. No tolls could have been earned for the transit on the river without the use of the landing places, nor for such use without the transit.

The Company were rated to the poor of the township on the north side, as occupiers of a ferry, landing and tolls," in a sum including half the net value of the tolls.

Held: That the tells could not be rated, either directly as being connected with real property occupied in the township and as thus ceasing to be incorporeal, or indirectly by taking them into account as profit of the lands.

But that the land should be rated on an estimate of the rent which might be obtainable for it in consideration of its being available for the purpose of earning the tolls. Also

That the rateable value of the land in question could not be ascertained by dividing the profits in the proportion of the land occupied in the two townships and the length of the transit. Regina v. North and South Shields Ferry Company, 140.

3. Floating dock, when not accessory.

M. occupied a ship building yard on the bank of a tidal navigable river; on the river itself was a ship dock belonging to M., which floated at high water, and grounded at low water upon a part of the bed of the river. Owners of land on the bank, who used the adjacent bed of the river, paid an acknowledgment to the Conservators. M. used the floating dock for the repair of ships; and his workmen passed to it by a plank which rested on it and on the land of the yard, and was fastened by a staple to the dock. The dock was moored to the bed of the river by chains, and was also attached by chains to the yard. The chains were capable of being slackened, to enable the dock to be taken into deeper water, which continually occurred; and sometimes the harbour master removed the dock altogether.

M. was rated to the poor for his "river frontage, with floating dock attached," at an amount which was the aggregate of the separate value of the yard and the dock." The Sessions, on appeal, held that the floating dock was not rateable, but that the value of the yard was enhanced by it to the amount assessed; and they confirmed the rate.

This Court reduced the rate to the separate value of the yard, holding that the floating dock could not be considered accessory to the yard. Regina v. Morrison, 150.

4. Market tolls, what rateable and what not rateable.

Appellants were rated to the relief

of the poor on "the Market House, with the grounds belonging thereto, used and occupied for the tolls of the markets and fairs." It was admitted that under this description they were in fact rated not only for the Market House, but also for the tolls on merchandize sold in the market, and for payments made to the lord and his lessees for goods not sold but exposed for sale on stalls and otherwise; which payments, from time immemorial, were charged according to the situation of the stalls and other circumstances, according to the discretion of the lord and his lessees; and also for payments made for leave to use temporary theatres and shows. None of the stalls &c. were in any way affixed to the soil. The lord was owner of the soil of the market. The tolls were from time immemorial received in the Market House. The appellants were lessees for a term of years under the lord. On a case stating the above facts: Held, that the tolls on goods sold were not the subject of a rate, and that the fact that such tools were paid in the Market House made no difference: but that the other payments were in the nature of compensation for the use of the soil, and that they and the Market House were properly rated. Roberts v. Aylesbury Overseers, 423.

5. Receipts in one parish, landing places &c. in two, 140. Ante, 2.

6. Market house; not for non-rateable tolls paid there, 423. Ante,

4.

a

II. Rate persons rateable or rated. Several occupiers: what is not double rating, 121. Ante. I. 1.

III. Birth settlement.

Bastard, after the age of sixteen.

A bastard, born since the passing of stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76., attaining the age of sixteen without having acquired any settlement of its own, is settled in the place of its birth, though the mother is settled elsewhere, and the bastard, till sixteen, had and fol

lowed the mother's settlement. Per
Lord Campbell C. J., Coleridge and
Wightman Js.; dubitante Crompton J.
Bodenham Overseers v. St. Andrew's
Overseers, 465.

IV. Settlement by renting a tenement.

1. Secondary evidence of contents of written agreement.

On the trial of an appeal, the Quarter Sessions decided that there was not sufficient proof of search for a written agreement by P., to let a tenement, to make secondary evidence of its contents admissible, and rejected the evidence, subject to a case: by which it appeared that the document was traced to the custody of P., and that a witness deposed that he asked P. if there was such an agreement; and P. answered, "I cannot say for a certainty;" and that P. then sent his clerk and witness to P.'s office to search, which they did; and the document was not found. P. was not called as a witness.

Held: 1. that the decision on a point of this kind might be reviewed; but that the onus was on the party objecting to the decision: 2. that it was not necessary to call P. if there was proof of the search having been made in the proper place of deposit; but that it did not appear that the Court below was wrong in deciding that it was not proved that the office was the proper place of deposit. Regina v. Saffron Hill, 93.

2. On what day the year is completed.

A building was let at 30l. per annum to C., by a written agreement, stating that C. had taken it "from the 30th day of September 1850;" "the tenancy is for one year, commencing on the 30th day of September, instant" (1850). C. entered at noon on 30th September, 1850, and quitted at 4 in the afternoon of 29th September 1851.

Held, that C. gained a settlement by renting and occupying a tenement "for the term of one whole year at least," within stat. 1 W. 4. c. 18. s. 1. Regina v. St Mary, Warwick, 816.

V. Removability: five years' residence. What absence of head of family is not merely temporary.

F. was resident in the parish of S. with his wife and family, in a house rented by himself. He was then hired: and the terms of his hiring required him to dwell in the parish of C. He went to C. and slept there every night whilst his hiring continued, which was for four years and four months; but he left his wife and family residing in the house in S., for which he continued to pay the rent. He was then discharged from his hiring, and returned to his house in S. where he continued to reside till removed to a third parish by an order made within five years of his return to S. His wife and family had never quitted the house in S. On appeal against the order, the Sessions decided that he had resided in S. for five years next preceding the order, but subject to a case, in which the above facts were stated: and the Sessions found that, whilst he dwelt at C., he intended to return to S. whenever he should leave his situation, but did not wish to leave it, and did not do so willingly.

Held: That the question, whether on those facts F. resided in S. whilst dwelling at C., was not concluded by the finding of the Sessions; and that his absence at C., under a hiring which made it his duty not to return to S., though he intended ultimately to return to S., was not a mere temporary absence consistent with residence in S., but a permanent residence in C.: and, consequently, that stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. s. 1. did not prevent his removal from S. Regina v. Stapleton, 766.

VI. Removal: notice of chargeability. Want of, when not a ground of appeal, 711. Post, VII.

VII. Appeal; right of appeal.

Grievance notice of chargeability.

Under stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76. s. 79. and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31. s. 9., the ses

sions have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against an order of removal, where notice of chargeability has not been served on the parish to which the removal is ordered.

Before stat. 4 & 5 W. 4. c. 76., there was no right of appeal (except in the case of suspended orders) till actual removal. Regina v. Recorder of Shrewsbury, 711.

VIII. Appeal: finality of decision.

1. On appeal against order for maintenance of lunatic pauper.

On appeal against an order of maintenance of a lunatic pauper, under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 126. s. 62., upon an adjudication of settlement under sect. 58. a prior order of sessions adjudicating on the settlement, upon an appeal, between the same parties, against an ordinary order of removal, is conclusive as to the settlement at the time of such prior order: there being no difference, as to this rule of evidence, between orders of maintenance of lunatics on adjudication of the settlement and ordinary orders of removal. Heston v. St. Bride's, 583.