the Church and State are two distinct independent societies, each having a distinct government of its own, self-sufficient and authoritative in its own province, and with reference to its own functions and objects. If this can be proved, then no valid argument against the application of the doctrine can be derived from mere inconveniences or embarrassments that may occasionally arise, especially if it can be further proved, as it can, that collision and embarrassment may be easily avoided by settling the limits of the respective provinces or spheres of the two powers. And there is no such great difficulty in doing this as is sometimes alleged. Our Saviour has enjoined His followers to "render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's;" and this implies that there are some things which belong to the province of Cæsar, or the civil magistrate, which are subject to his jurisdiction, -with respect to which he has rightful authority,—and is ordinarily to be obeyed; reserving, of course, the great principle which is of universal application, namely, that "we must obey God rather than man." It implies, also, that there are some things which are God's, in such a sense as not to belong to Cæsar at all—not to belong to the province, or to be subject to the authority, of the civil magistrate. There is no great difficulty in settling what these things are, respectively. Cæsar's things are the persons and the property of men, and God's things are the conscience of men and the church of Christ. The civil magistrate has rightful jurisdiction over the persons and the property of men, because the word of God sanctions his right to the use of the sword, and because jurisdiction in these matters is evidently indispensable to the execution of the functions of his office, the attainment of the great end of civil government, namely, the promotion of the good order and prosperity of the community. He has no jurisdiction over the conscience, for "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and has left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men." He has no jurisdiction over the church of Christ, because "Christ alone is its King and Head,”—and because, by His own authority in his word, He has made full provision for its government, for the administration of its affairs, through other parties, without vesting any control over it in the civil magistrate. The civil magistrate, we believe, is bound, in the exercise of his proper authority, in his own province, to aim at the promotion of religion and the welfare of the church; but though this obligation brings religion and the church

within the scope of his care, it does not bring them within the sphere of his jurisdiction; or entitle him to deal with them in a manner inconsistent with, or unauthorized by, their proper nature or their prescribed constitution. The civil magistrate is also entitled to exercise a certain superintendence and control in religious and ecclesiastical matters, limited to the object of promoting the attainment, and preventing the frustration, of the great end of his office-the peace and good order of the community. But this consideration,-though authorizing him to restrain and punish whatever, under pretence of conscience or of ecclesiastical authority, interferes with the interests he is bound to guard,—does not invest him with legitimate authority in matters of religion, or the affairs of the church, or enable him to impose upon any a valid obligation to render to him obedience in these things.

Neither is there any great difficulty in settling the line of demarcation between things civil or temporal, and things ecclesiastical or spiritual. Civil or temporal things are just the persons and the property of men, and ecclesiastical or spiritual things are just the ordinary necessary business of the church-all those acts. and processes which the Church performed and conducted before her connection with the State, and which should be performed and conducted wherever a church exists, and is in the full execution of its appropriate functions. And while there is no great difficulty in settling theoretically the line of demarcation between the Church and the State, neither is there much difficulty in the practical application of sound principle in this matter. It is true that there are questions in which the civil and ecclesiastical element are combined. Nay, it is true, as has been said, that there is no act so purely ecclesiastical but that in some of its aspects and consequences it may come legitimately under the cognizance of the civil power; and no act so civil that it may not, provided it be done by a member of the church, come legitimately under the cognizance of the ecclesiastical authorities. But notwithstanding all this, there is no great difficulty in disentangling the one from the other by a fair and honest application of the principles that have been stated. In this way it is easy to show that there is no necessity for subordinating the one society to the other; while, at the same time, the process suggests considerations which contribute to establish the great general truth, which of itself would fully answer the argument, even if the practical difficulties were far greater

than they are,—namely, that the Church and the State are two distinct societies, each supreme in its own sphere, and neither dependent on the other in respect to jurisdiction or authoritative control.

The Popish argument for the superiority of ecclesiastical over the civil in point of authority, derived from the higher and more exalted character of the ends or objects of the Church than of the State, has manifestly no weight. There is, indeed, no connection. between the premises and the conclusion. This notion, however, enables them to dispense with the necessity of denying the appointment of a distinct government in the State, and allows them to concede this, affording, as it does, a pretence for alleging that the administration of this distinct government must be subordinated to the ecclesiastical authorities.

The Erastians are reduced to greater straits. Concurring with the Papists in holding that the one must be superior and the other subordinate, they have no very plausible pretence of a general kind for alleging that the superiority lies on the side of the State; and thus they have been led to adopt as the only plausible ground on which to defend the right of the civil power to exercise jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, a denial that Christ has appointed a distinct government in His church, in the hands of other parties than the civil magistrate.*

* See "Historical Theology," vol. i. p. 396, etc.; vol. ii. p. 569, etc. (Edrs.)

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION ON THE RELATION

BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

*

THE scriptural principles which regulate the relation between Church and State necessarily involve and imply these two positions: First, that the only rule or standard by which the affairs of a church of Christ ought to be regulated, is the mind and will of Christ, revealed in His word; and, secondly, that the parties in whom the right of interpreting and applying Christ's laws for the administration of the affairs of His kingdom,-for the management of the ordinary, necessary business of His house, -is vested, are ecclesiastical office-bearers, and not civil functionaries. There is nothing in the twenty-third chapter of this Confession which is inconsistent with these principles, or which sanctions the recent decisions of the civil courts in reference to the Church of Scotland.

In proceeding to prove this, I assume that the statements contained in twenty-fifth, thirtieth, and thirty-first chapters of the Confession, about the general character of the Christian church, -the sole Headship of Christ over it, and His appointment in it of a government in the hands of church officers distinct from. the civil magistrate, involve and imply the two positions already stated. I assume further, that these two positions fully vindicate the principles and proceedings of the church, in so far as concerns her refusal to obey the decisions of the civil courts; and that her principles and proceedings cannot be successfully or plausibly assailed without an explicit denial of these positions. I assume all this, because it has been repeatedly asserted and proved in the

From a pamphlet, published by Dr | marks on the Twenty-third Chapter Cunningham in May 1843, immedi- of the Confession of Faith as bearing ately before the Disruption of the on existing Controversies."—(EDRS.) Church of Scotland, entitled,

"Re

course of this controversy, and because no one of any weight or respectability has ever attempted to answer it. The twenty-third chapter can be made to serve the purpose of our opponents only by its being shown that it contains principles inconsistent with these, that is, that the Confession is inconsistent with itself. This, of course, is not to be presumed, but the reverse, and very strong evidence must be produced in order to establish it. If the twenty-third chapter is susceptible, without straining, of a meaning consistent with those principles so clearly stated in other parts of the Confession, this, according to all the rules of sound interpretation, must be received as its true, real, and intended import. It is quite unwarrantable to impute inconsistency, especially to such a document as the Confession of Faith, if by any fair interpretation the apparent inconsistency can be removed. Let us consider, then, whether we are shut up to the necessity of regarding the Confession as chargeable with inconsistency in this matter.

The passage in the twenty-third chapter which has recently been adduced, as if it at once settled the whole controversy, is the following: "The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the word and sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof he hath power to call Synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God."

Our opponents, in quoting this passage, sometimes leave out the first clause, though it plainly contains the leading proposition, which is the key to the whole sentence, and with which its other statements should, if possible, not be made to conflict. The reason of this omission is, that they are afraid of being asked what is meant by the "power of the keys," which "the civil magistrate may not assume to himself," a question which many of them are quite unable to answer.

The truth is, that this single declaration overturns the whole

* Sec. 3.