explicit testimony of one of our ablest opponents, Dr Robertson of Ellon, that by the Revolution Settlement, which was guaranteed to the Church of Scotland by the Act of Security and the Treaty of Union, "the church was trusted by the State to an unlimited extent," and had "an uncontrolled judgment," in regard to the settlement of ministers, and that "she might have transgressed the regulations of the said Act [1690] without having subjected herself, in consequence, to any interference from the civil courts." How different is the condition to which she is now reduced, and how manifest is it that, in reducing her to her present degraded condition, the civil power was guilty of a violation, at once of great scriptural principles, and of the most solemn national engagements! There is some reason to believe that our civil rulers were pretty distinctly aware, that in rejecting the church's claims previous to the Disruption, and in afterwards binding her down under the Erastian domination of Lord Aberdeen's Act, they were violating the Act of Security and the Treaty of Union. In the discussion in the House of Commons in March last, which settled the fate of the Church of Scotland, there was, on the part of the opponents of Mr Fox Maule's motion, a deliberate and determined evasion of the constitutional arguments adduced on the opposite side. Mr Rutherfurd's admirable and unanswerable argument, upon the constitutional law of Scotland, was met, on the part of Sir William Follett, as the law officer of the Crown, by literally nothing else than the assertion, "that he thought it very unlikely that this should be the constitution of Scotland, or of any other civilised country." Sir William seems to have felt that he could not answer the constitutional argument in behalf of the church's claims. But Sir Robert Peel thought them inconsistent with "the principles of English jurisprudence ;" and Sir James Graham characteristically denounced them as opposed to "law, justice, equity, and common sense;" and so the matter was settled, and a deed was perpetrated which was at once a heinous sin against God, and a violation of national faith.

Sec. IV.-Doctrine and Practice of Calvinistic Churches.

We must advert briefly to the other parts of Sir William's Demonstration. After discussing the sentiments of Calvin and Beza, he proceeds to unfold the views of the other Presbyterian

and Calvinistic churches; and, First, he gives an extract from Musculus's "Common Places," describing the practice of the Bernese Church. The testimony of Musculus was adduced for the same purpose by Whitgift, and the unfairness of the use made of it was exposed by Cartwright in his first Reply.

Its unfairness and irrelevancy will be manifest from the following considerations :

1st, Sir William, after quoting Musculus's account of the ordinary practice of the church at Berne, is obliged to admit, "that in the statement of Musculus no mention is made of the right of the people to object, even for reasons assigned." The instance therefore proves too much, and of course proves nothing. It is an illustration, among many others, of the folly of drawing inferences from what is merely omitted to be stated. It illustrates, also, the important consideration, that in order to understand fully the place and influence actually enjoyed by the people, we require to know, not merely the general rules made with the concurrence of the civil power for regulating the place and province of the civil and the ecclesiastical authorities in this matter, but likewise the principles on which the ecclesiastical authorities intended to execute their functions.

2d, Musculus's statement contains nothing which either expressly asserts or necessarily implies, that ministers were to be intruded upon reclaiming congregations; and, therefore, is not relevant to the question in dispute.

3d, Musculus, in the context, has explicitly asserted that ministers should be chosen with the consent of the people, and that "thrusting a pastor upon a church which has not chosen him, agreeth to a church that is not free, but subject to bondage."

Secondly, We have next the practice of the Wetteravian churches, described in a quotation from Zepper,—not a statement of theological doctrine or ecclesiastical principle, but merely a description of practice. We have only to observe, in regard to this case, that there is nothing in the quotation which either asserts or implies that ministers are to be intruded upon reclaiming congregations, that the concurrence of the people is sought, and their consent inferred from their silence when they are silent,—but that no provision whatever is made, directly or by implication, for the case of their simply refusing their consent. And, moreover,

Zepper, in the second page after that from which Sir William's quotation is taken, makes it quite plain that he did not consider the practice which he described, as depriving the people of a share in the election, or as interfering with the principle of non-intrusion; for, in commenting upon the apostolic practice, for the purpose of showing that that of the Wetteravian churches was in substantial accordance with it, he proves that the apostles did not take the election of ministers wholly into their own hands, but assigned some real power in this matter to the people, and were careful to intrude no one upon them against their will.

Thirdly, Sir William next proceeds to the Dutch Church, and quotes some of the canons in regard to the election of ministers sanctioned by the Synod of Dort. But these canons, while they assign the initiative to the elders and deacons, contain not one syllable that has even the appearance of favouring intrusion; and, indeed, expressly require "the approbation of the members of the particular church," without any hint that approbation does not mean approbation in the common sense of the word.

Sir William ought also to have known that the Synod of Dort, in giving a sort of qualified toleration of patronage, and laying down the terms or conditions on which alone they could submit to it, the limitations within which it should be exercised, expressly provided, "ut ecclesiæ retineant jus præsentatum repudiandi, siquidem dona, aut ingenium, aut mores ejus ipsis minime placeant, ne invitis ministri obtrudantur." Will he try to pervert this provision into an accordance with his own intrusion principles? Is it possible to embody in words a more unequivocal assertion of the principle of the Veto Act? Is it not manifest, that in the judgment of the Synod of Dort, patronage could be submitted to only when checked by a veto or right of repudiation on the part of the people? And have we not, therefore, the clear testimony of this celebrated council in favour, not only of the soundness and importance of our principle of non-intrusion, but also of the duty of abandoning all connection with a system in which that principle is trampled under foot?

"In supplement and illustration of these canons," which he evidently felt afforded no real countenance to his views, he gives a quotation from Voetius, and plainly wishes to convey the impression that this quotation exhibits the whole of the power or influence

which Voetius and the Dutch Church assigned to the people. But how stands the fact? Voetius, with the Dutch Church, assigned the nomination or election to a joint meeting of the elders and deacons. He lays it down, that before proceeding to election, the office-bearers should sound the opinions and feelings of the people about the different candidates, make what he calls a præcognitio sensus et inclinationis populi, and that in the election they should give some weight to the result of this precognition, but not be absolutely determined by it. Now, it is from Voetius's illustration of this precognition previous to the election that Sir William's quotation is taken, while he conceals the fact, which, if he had really looked into Voetius, he could scarcely fail to know, that, in addition to all this, Voetius asserts that, after the formal election by the elders and deacons, "the approbation and consent of the people was required," and establishes this position by arguments which plainly show that he understood the words, in their ordinary meaning, as implying at least a veto or negative.

Lest it should be supposed that Voetius, by ascribing the formal election to the elders and deacons, intended to deny the substance of the great Protestant principle of the right of the people to choose their own office-bearers, I subjoin the following quotation from him :*" Hoc autem moneo, essentiale vocationis esse liberam electionem; accidentale vero esse modum electionis, sive per suffragia singulorum ad hoc evocatorum ; sive per scrutinium, sive per expressum aut tacitum assensum, sive per compromissum. Plessæus ait. Quanquam vero populus eligit et electum presbyterio confirmandum proponit, interdum eligit presbyterium a populo postea confirmandum; constat tamen antequam munus istud obirent, perpetuo consensum et populi et Cleri, id est, totius ecclesiæ requisitum fuisse.' Dicendum itaque jus electionis Ecclesiastica in presbyterio conservari et per illud principaliter exerceri ; non vero a populo tolli et in presbyterium transferri. Quod enim quis per alium facit, per seipsum facere putandus est. Cum enim ecclesia constet et antecessoribus, et populo (tanquam partibus integrantibus), dicimus radicaliter potestatem eligendi residere in antecessoribus; adæquate autem in tota ecclesia, quæ constat ex antecessoribus et populo. Quod si exercitii hujus potestatis principium consideremus, illud duplex est quo et quod. Principium

* Politica Ecclesiastica, Pars. iii. p. 603.

quo, est synedrium, quod nomine ecclesiæ et pro ecclesia eligit; quia ab ecclesia ad hoc constitutum est, ut colliges ex quæst. catechetica 85. et Liturgia nostra in formula confirmationis Seniorum et Diaconorum. Principium quod, est tota Ecclesia."

Fourthly, Sir William next discusses the principles of what he calls the "English Presbyterian Church,"-that is, of the English Presbyterians during the civil war and the Commonwealth. It is well known that the English Presbyterians of that period showed some symptoms of a declension from the sounder views in regard to the standing and influence of the people, which had been held by the Reformers, and were still maintained by the Church of Scotland. I had adverted to this fact, and hinted at the causes of it, in the following passage :-"It is well known, although Mr Robertson does not know it, else he would have mentioned it, that some of the English Presbyterians at this period had been led to entertain views of the rights of the Christian people in the appointment of their ministers, of a somewhat more narrow and illiberal cast than had ever been sanctioned by the Reformers, or countenanced by the Church of Scotland. Travers, the opponent of Hooker, and Cartwright, the antagonist of Whitgift, who were the two ablest and most learned men among the early English Presbyterians, and who, when persecuted in England for their Puritanism, were invited by Andrew Melville to Scotland to become professors of divinity, held the right of the people to choose their own ministers, and the necessity of at least their consent. The five distinguished divines who, in 1641, published the celebrated work usually called Smectymnuus, all of whom were members of the Westminster Assembly, had also maintained the right of the people to choose their own ministers.* And here it is interesting to notice, that those of them who took any part in the discussions in the Westminster Assembly on the point we are now considering,—namely, Marshall, Calamy, and Young,-supported the commissioners from the Church of Scotland, in maintaining that a higher place and a greater influence should be given to the people. At the same time, it is plain from Lightfoot's account of this discussion, as well as from other sources, that there were

Smectymnuus, pp. 33-35.

† Lightfoot's Journal, Works, vol. xiii. pp. 231-3.