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Justices may discharge offenders convicted under the provisions of 14 & 15 Vic. c. 92, if it be a first conviction, upon the offender making such satisfaction to the party aggrieved for damages and costs as shall be ascertained by the justices (n).

CHAPTER XII.

RETURNING INFORMATIONS, ETC.

Ir is the duty of the justices, or the petty sessions clerk, to transmit all informations, examinations, statements, and recognizances to the clerk of the crown of the county, when they relate to any matter to be tried at the assizes; or to the clerk of the peace, when the matter is to be heard at the quarter sessions (a).

When to be returned.] This must be done with all despatch, or within seven days from the holding of each petty sessions, when the party has been committed or is amenable (or at least seven days before the assizes or quarter sessions, when the party has not been committed or is not amenable), except in cases of indictable offences when the party is not amenable, and the justice of the peace deems it expedient to retain the documents. When they are kept back, the J. P. should endorse his reasons for such detention. The clerk of the petty sessions is to make an abstract of the documents, specifying the dates of them and when received by him; and if he has no other safer or more

3 Inst. 238. Every punishment for felony, after it has been endured, has the same effect respecting the civil rights of the offender as a pardon under the Great Seal, 9 Geo. IV. c. 32, 8. 3.

(n) See 14 & 15 Vic., c. 92, s. 21, In cases of wilful or malicious injuries to property, it is provided by 18 & 19 Vic. c. 126, s. 2., that in all cases where a justice shall have power to order a sum of money to be forfeited and paid to the party aggrieved,

as amends or compensation for any injury to property real or personal, the right of such person to receive the money so ordered to be paid shall not be affected by reason of such party having been examined as a witness in proof of the defence; see ante, p. 75, et seq. for competency of wit

ness.

(a) See ante p. 102, where the duty of J.P. in committing the accused for trial at the assizes or quarter sessions is considered.

convenient mode, he is to transmit them with the schedule by post, prepaid, to the clerk of the crown or peace; and he is to get a receipt from the post-master specifying the date of the posting, and the post-master is to get a like receipt from the clerk of the crown or peace; and the grand jury are to present at the assizes, to be paid to the petty sessions clerk, the amount of the postage (b).

Every justice of the peace who shall take any information out of petty sessions, is to transmit the same to the petty sessions clerk of the district to which the same shall properly belong (c).

The magistrates adjudicating under the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 126 (Larceny Act), are to transmit the conviction, or a duplicate of a certificate of dismissal, with the written charge, the depositions of the witnesses for the prosecution and for the defence, and the statement of the accused, to the next court of general or quarter sessions for the county or place, there to be kept by the proper officer among the records of the court (d).

(b) 14 & 15 Vic. cap. 93, sec. 19. (c) 21 & 22 Vic. c. 100, s. 8, cl. 3. (d) Sec. 7. See ante p. 89, for right of accused to obtain copies of depositions on which he shall have been committed or bailed. Independent of the right conferred by statute on the accused to have copies of depositions returned into court, the

judges always had power, by their general authority as a court of justice, at any time after the indictment found and the prisoner fully committed for trial, to order a copy of any depositions which have been returned into court, to be given to a prisoner. R. v. Greenacre, 8 C. & P. 32; R. v. Walford, id. 767.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION.

CHAPTER XIII.

OF PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO CONVICTION.

THE summary authority of justices out of quarter sessions, and the offences which are within their jurisdiction, are regulated in each case by the particular statute authorizing the proceeding. Their jurisdiction under their commission, their general jurisdiction and duties out of quarter sessions, its local extent, and those circumstances which deprive them of power to act, have already been the subject of distinct chapters (a). It is now proposed to review the proceedings before justices, down to judgment and conviction in summary cases.

General effect of Petty Sessions Act.] By the 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, commonly called the Petty Sessions Act, the procedure before justices relating to summary convictions and orders are simplified and rendered uniform, technical objections are defeated, and a code of duties is defined for the guidance of magistrates. General forms of procedure are given applicable to all cases, except where they do not meet the requirements of proceedings instituted under any acts relating to the revenue of excise or customs, stamps, taxes, or post-office, or relating to the preservation of game; but the act does not alter or affect the provisions contained in any act regulating the powers and duties of the justices of the peace of the police district of the Dublin metropolis; except as far as relates to the backing or execution of any warrants. The act in question is one of very great importance, as it regulates the proceedings at petty sessions, and the duties of justices of the peace out of quarter

(a) Vide chap. i., ii., iii., iv.

sessions, and its provisions are frequently incorporated, or directed to be followed in particular instances, by an express declaration in subsequent penal statutes (b).

The term "information" means the initiatory step in proceedings of a criminal nature; the term "complaint" designates the initiatory step in summary proceedings of a civil nature (c).

Information or complaint when necessary.] The first step in every case, except where the magistrate is empowered to convict on view (d), is that there be a complaint by summons or information, which is the basis of all the subsequent proceedings, and without which the justice is not authorized in intermeddling (e). But if a party appear in court in answer to a complaint, although there is no information or summons out against him, he is liable to the jurisdiction of the court (f); but it would appear that there should be a complaint to give the justice jurisdiction (g). In the case of R. v. Justices of Queen's County (h) it appeared that J. L. had been summoned to attend the petty sessions at A. as a witness, and that the magistrates, conceiving him to be

(b) For example, 20 & 21 Vic. c. 40 (Illicit Distillation); 19 & 20 Vic. c. 65 (Cottier Tenant); 18 & 19 Vic. c. 126 (Larceny Act).

(c) In re Dillon, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 232, per Hayes, J.

(d) As to conviction on view, see Jones v. Owen, 2 D. & R. 600 ; R. v. Jones, 12 A. & E. 684; Nixon v. Nanney, 1 Q. B. 747. It should appear unequivocally, and not only by probable argument, that the justice acted on his own view, and derived his conviction from that. "Statutes which provide an instant and summary remedy for offences dangerous to the public are highly beneficial, but they are extremely liable to abuse, and we must take care that in enforcing them parties adhere to the strict letter of the law." Jones v. Owen, sup.

(e) 1 Smith's Leading cases, 387 bn; 1 Wm. Saund. 262 n. (1) R. v. J. of Buckinghamshire, 3 Q. B. 800, 807; R. v. Bolton, 1 id. 66; R. v. Fuller, 1 Ld. Raym. 509; R. v. Mil

lard, 17 Jur. 400; 22 L. J. (N. S.) M. C. 108, S. C., 1 D. C. C. R. 166; 6 Cox, C. C. 150; Brookshaw v. Hopkins, Lofft, 240; R. v. Hareby, Andr. 361; R. v. Birnie, 1 Moo. & R. 160, 5 C. & P. 206; Stevens v. Clark, 1 Car. & M. 509. The same principle applies to other limited jurisdictions created by statute; Wingate v. Wait, 6 M. W. 745; see also Doe v. the Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, id. 320; R. v. Croke, Cowp. 26; Christie v. Unwin, 11 A. & E. 373; R. v. Hartley, Wintley Union, 1 Q. B. 677.

(f) R. v. J. P. of Queen's County, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 438.; R. v. Beresford, Lev. Js. Manual, 200, 2nd ed.; R. v. Millard, 6 Cox, 150; in re Perham, 5 Jur. N. S. 1221, Ex.; R. v. Stone, 1 East, 639; R. v. Jennings, 2 D. & L. 741; 1 New Sess. Ca. 488; R. v. Barrett, 1 Salk. 383; R. v. Aiken, 3 Burr. 1786.

(g) R. v. Js. of Queen's County, sup. (h) Ib. S. C. 3 Ir. J. N. S. 249.

implicated as a culprit in the case on which he was summoned to give evidence, without any other summons or complaint changed his name from the witness column to the defendants' column in the petty sessions' book, and then sentenced him to imprisonment; and it was held (i), on cause being shewn that the certiorari should not go, that the magistrates appeared to have acted without jurisdiction, there having been no complaint made against J. L. However, it is better and more conducive to the proper administration of justice, that magistrates should not make a short cut towards the attainment of justice, for such proceedings generally render abortive their object. Magistrates should follow the course pointed out by statute or common law, and not deviate from that unless in a serious case of emergency. Pigot, C. B., is reported to have said, in giving judgment in Lawrence v. Hill (j), "I wish to lend no sanction to the opinion that if, on inquiry on oath before magistrates, upon the appearance and in the presence of a party charged with a specified offence [for instance, an assault], it appears in evidence that the party accused is guilty of another and distinct offence [for instance, rape, robbery, or murder] of which there was no previous formal charge, the magistrates would not have full jurisdiction, on one information properly framed, and embodying that evidence, to commit the party for trial for the offence imputed in the new accusation. To hold that they would not have such authority would be, in some instances, to paralyse the administration of justice. Upon such new accusation, indeed, thus suddenly brought against him, great care ought to be taken to allow the accused ample time and opportunity for showing that he ought not to be put on his trial at all on such a charge, or that, if it be a charge of felony, he ought to be admitted to bail."

(i) Per Crampton and Perrin, J.J. Upon this subject there would appear to be some doubt, for on the return to the certiorari the case was again argued before the full court, and no rule was made; coram C. J. Lefroy, J.J.'s Crampton, Perrin, and O'Brien. See re Thompson, 36 L. T. 412 per Bramwell, B. He says,

"The magistrates may say, 'the offence is not proved; we dismiss it: and such another charge is preferred, and we convict on that.' That is possible; but in point of form, they ought to dismiss any charge brought before them, if not well-founded, and separately entertain another."

(j) 10 Ir. C. L. R. 193.

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