In criminal matters it is a general rule that every person must answer for his own acts, and the command of a person cannot excuse an illegal act. A servant, therefore, is not, generally speaking, excused from liability to answer criminally for any violation of the law which he may commit, on the ground that he was only acting in obedience to his master's commands (). This is so obviously the case in regard to offences which are mala in se, that no more need be said on the subject. But where the illegal act charged is merely malum prohibitum, the fact that the servant was acting in obedience to his master's commands would be strong evidence to rebut the prima facie inference of the existence of a vicious mind which generally arises from the mere doing an illegal act; and in such cases it may sometimes happen that, in this way, the commands of the master may, in effect, exempt the servant from criminal responsibility for the consequence of illegal acts done in obedience to his master's orders. Thus "if a man does, by means of an innocent agent, an act which amounts to a felony, the employer, and not the innocent agent, is the person accountable for that act" (j).

It has been held that where the servant of a gentleman set a trap to catch hares in his master's presence, and by his orders, he was held not liable, on the principle, as stated by Bayley, Justice, in ex parte Sylvester (k), that the trap being set by the master's orders, and in his presence, must have been taken to have been set by him (7).

Aiders and abettors.] Persons aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of any offence punishable on summary conviction, may be convicted either with the principal or before or after his conviction, and are liable to the same punishment. They may be proceeded against either in the place where the principal was convicted, or where the offence of aiding, &c., was

ble criminally as well as civilly for misconduct in the paper, e. g. for publishing a libel, though he has nothing to do with the publication, and it is altogether conducted by his servants; R. v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21; and see 3 Burn, 730, 731.

(2) 1 Hawk. P. C. 3; 4 Bl. Com. 28. (j) Per Erle J., R. v. Bleasdale, 2 Carr. & K. 765; See R. v. James, 8 C. & P. 131.

(k) 9 B. & C. 63.

() Walker v. Mills, 2 Bro. & Bing. 1

committed (m). But if the principal be under fourteen years of age, the accessory is not to escape with the mitigated punishment (n).

Drunkards.] It may here be stated, as laid down by Mr. Justice Blackstone, that our law looks upon drunkenness as an aggravation of an offence rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour (o); but it has been recently stated, that though drunkenness is no excuse for crime, it may be taken into account when considering the motive or intent of a person acting under its influence (p).

When to be in writing and on oath.] If the statute under which the offence is committed does not require the information to be taken in writing and on oath, then a verbal information will be sufficient without the oath of the informer. The rule of law is that, unless a statute requires it, an information need not be on oath or even in writing (q). And a magistrate may proceed without any information on oath, if he has jurisdiction over the matter, and has good reason for setting the law in motion (r).

Negativing exceptions.] It is necessary in an information to negative every exception contained in the clause creating the offence, and a defect in omitting so to do is not aided by a proviso, "that no conviction for any offence in the act shall be set aside for want of form, or through the mistake of any fact, circumstance, or other matter, provided the material facts alleged be proved" (s). When, however, the statute constitutes an act to be an offence generally, and in a subsequent clause makes a

(m) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 22. Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, s.

99.

(n) Ib. "In misdemeanors and in all crimes under the degree of felony there are no accessories either before or after the fact, but all persons concerned therein, if guilty at all, are principals," 4 Bl. Com. by Kerr, 33; see R. v. Greenwood, 2 Den. C. C. R. 453; Woodward v. Cotton, 1 Cr. M. & R. 44.

(0) 4 Bl. Com. by Kerr, 23; see R. v. Carroll, 7 C. & P. 145.

(p) R. v. Gamlen, 1 F. & F. 90.

(q) R. v. Millard, 1 D. C. C. R. 166; 6 Cox, C. C. 150; R. v. Bedingham, 5 Q. B. 653; see R. v. Rawlins, C. & P. 439; R. v. Willis, Bosc. 16; Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 649; 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 10.

(r) R. v. Millard, supra.

(8) R. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 542; R. v. Pratten, 6 T. R. 559; R. v. Marriott, 1 Str. 66; R. v. Hill, 2 Lord Ray. 1415; R. v. Earnshaw, 15 Ea. 456; R. v. Jarvis, 1 Burr. 148; see Cathcart v. Hardy, 2 M. & S. 539; Vavasour v. Ormond, 6 B. & C. 432; R. v. Clark, Cowp. 35.

proviso or exception in favour of particular cases; or, in the same clause, but not in the enacting part of it, by words of reference or otherwise, makes such proviso or exception, then the proviso is a matter of defence or excuse which need not be noticed in the information (t). It is not necessary to negative a mere construction or inferred qualification (u). If the information or complaint negatives any exception, proviso, or condition in the statute on which it is framed, it is not necessary for the complainant to prove such negative; but the defendant may prove the affirmative, if he seeks to take advantage of it (v).

The Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, gives the form of information, with all the necessary instructions for filling it up (w). It provides for the statement of the name and description of the informer or complainant, as well as that of the defendant (x). Styling a number of defendants, as "Messrs. Harrison and Company" was held bad, Lord Kenyon saying, "It is impossible that a conviction of Such-a-one and Company can be supported" (y).

Nature of offence.] The nature and substance of the offence is likewise to be stated with certainty and precision, in order that it may appear that the magistrate proceeded upon a legal charge, and that the defendant may know what charge he is to answer (2). A defendant may be proceeded against in the same information for several offences against the same statute (a); but they must be distinctly charged (b). And if the defendant has been guilty of several distinct offences against the same statute, there is no objection to charging him with all of them in the same information (c). A direct and positive charge must be stated against the defendant; a mere statement of facts amount

(t) See R. v. Ford, 1 Str. 555; R. v. Layton, 2 Salk, 352.

(u) R. v. Pickles, cited in 1 Burr.

150.

(2) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 20; see further as to negativing exemptions, Chapter on Convictions, post.

(w) For forms in game cases, see App. tit. "Game."

(r) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 38; see

R. v. Stone, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545.

(y) R. v. Harrison, 8 T. R. 508. As to what will be a sufficient averment of residence when necessary, see R. v. Toke, 3 N. & P. 323. (z) Bosc. 25.

(a) R. v. Swallow, 8 T. R. 284. (b) Newman v. Bendysh, 10 A. & E. 11.

(c) R. v. Swallow, 8 T. R. 286.

ing to a presumption of guilt is not sufficient (d). And all the facts should be expressly alleged, and not left to be gathered by inference or intendment (e). The offence must not be stated by way of recital, nor in the alternative or disjunctive, nor in an argumentative way (ƒ).

Description of property.] In any information or complaint it is sufficient to describe the property belonging to, or in the possession of partners, joint tenants, parceners, or tenants in common, as the property of any one of such persons who shall be named, and of another or others, without naming them (g).

Time and place.] Both the time and place where the offence was committed should be accurately stated, in order to shew that the proceedings are taken within the time prescribed by the statute (h); and that the offence should appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the magistrate (i). The form given by the act also provides that the information is to be signed by the justice taking it.

One justice may receive it.] The Petty Sessions Act, 1851 (j), authorizes any justice to receive an information for any offence over which he has jurisdiction (k).

Variance between information and evidence.] In cases of summary proceedings, no variance between the information or

(d) R. v. Bradley, 10 Mod. 155. It is better to make the charge in the information in the precise words of the act, R. v. Seward, 1 A. & E. 706.

(e) R. v. Fuller, 1 Ld. Raym. 509. (f) R. v. Catherall, 2 Stra. 900; R. v. Crowhurst, 2 Ld. Raym, 1363; R. v. Middlehurst, 1 Burr. 299; R. v. North, 6 D. & R. 143; 3 D. & R. M. C. 38; R. v. Pain, 7 D. & R. 678; R. v. Sadler, 2 Chit. Rep. 519, 1 Salk. 373.

(g) See 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 38, which also provides for the description of the property of counties, of. goods provided for the poor, of property in materials for turnpike roads, and for the property of commissioners, trustees, directors, &c.

(h) R. v. Pullen, 1 Salk. 369; R. v. Catherall, 2 Str. 900; 14 Ea. 272; R. v. Chandler, 1 Salk. 378; R. v.

Simpson, 10 Mod. 248.

(i) R. v. Austin, 8 Mod. 309; Kite & Lane's case, 1 B. & C. 101; R. v. Hazell, 13 East, 139; R. v. Fletcher, 13 L. J. 16 M. C.; Deybell's case, 4 B. & Ald. 243.

(j) See s. 10.

(k) But where a statute expressly requires more than one justice to receive an information, it would appear that it should be laid before two; see R. v. Griffin, 9 Q. B. N. S. 155; unless the repealing words at the end of s. 43 of the above statute would be held to support the general words of the 10th section; nothing, how ever, in the 14th & 15th Vic. c. 93, relates to proceedings under the Revenue, Excise, Customs, Stamps, Taxes, Post-office, or Game Laws. See as to justices declining jurisdiction, ante, chap. II. p. 11, et seq.

complaint, and the evidence adduced in support of it, as to the time or place at which the offence or cause of complaint is alleged to have been committed or to have arisen, shall be deemed material, if it be proved that the information or complaint was in fact laid or made within the time limited by law, or to have been committed, or have arisen within the jurisdiction of the justice or justices by whom the information or complaint shall be heard and determined (). It is likewise provided that no objection shall be allowed in any proceedings to any information or complaint for any alleged defect in substance or form, or for any variance between any information or complaint, and the evidence adduced on the part of the complainant at the hearing; but if such variance or defect at the hearing appears to the justice to be calculated to deceive or mislead the defendant, he may adjourn the case to some future day (m).

Defendant entitled to copy of information or complaint.] In all summary proceedings, any person against whom any information or complaint has been made in writing is, upon being amenable or appearing in person or by counsel or attorney, entitled to receive from the clerk of petty sessions a stamped copy of such information or complaint, on payment of the usual fee, but the clerk must not in any case allow the original to be taken out of his possession (n).

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE SUMMONS.

Ir is provided by the Petty Sessions Act, that in all cases of summary jurisdiction the justice shall issue his summons (a), directed to the defendant, requiring him to appear and answer the complaint. This positive enactment is founded upon a rule

(7) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 39. (m) Ib.

(n) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 10; 21 & 22 Vic. c. 100. See post, note to 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 10.

(a) For form, see sch. 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93. Where a particular form of notice is prescribed by statute, it must be strictly pursued, R. v. Croke, Cowp. 30; see remarks on this case,