Construction of convictions.] The principles adopted by the courts in construing convictions have been the subject of frequent discussions and opposite opinions, but, as Mr. Paley (x) observes, perhaps the safest rule is that laid down by Lord Ellenborough, "that the court can intend nothing in favour of convictions, and will intend nothing against them" (y). But it is to be borne in mind that jurisdiction must always appear on the face of proceedings before magistrates (2). Therefore a conviction for an offence committed on the high seas, where, primá facié, magistrates have no jurisdiction, must shew the special facts which give it (a). In a modern case it was held that the magistrates, at the first place on land to which the party was carried, had jurisdiction to try the offence, although the boat had been seized in a part of a river where other justices had jurisdiction (b). It is submitted, therefore, that where, under the provisions of the Petty Sessions Act, a portion of one county is added to the petty sessions district held in another county, any conviction for an offence committed in the first county should shew how the justices come to deal with the offence in the other. This course is advised for safety, there having been no decision of a superior court upon the point. If the conviction contains all that is necessary, it will not be invalidated by stating what is unnecessary (c). The defendant's confession does not supply any defect in the description of the

(x) Paley on Conv. 148.

(y) R. v. Hazell, 13 East, 141; see Peacock v. Bell, 10 Q. B. 411; as to construing convictions strictly, R. v. Whistler, Holt, 215; R. v. Chandler, 2 Salk. 378; R. v. Peckham, Comb. 439; Looker v. Halcomb, 4 Bing. 188; Fletcher v. Calthrop, 6 Q. B. 880, 891; R. v. Gordon. 4 Burr. 2281; R. v. Daman, 2 B. & Ald. 378; R. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 544; R. v. Little, 1 Burr. 613; R. v. Green, Cald. 391; R. v. Pain, 7 D. & R. 678; see contra, 2 T. R. 18; 1 Str. 46, 2 Ld. Raym. 1375; 2 Stra. 1240.

(z) R. v. Fuller, 2 D. & L. 98; Hollingworth v. Palmer, 4 Exch. 267; R. v. Totness, 11 Q. B. 80; R. v.

Manchester and Leeds Railway Co. 8 A. & E. 413; R. v. St. George, 24 L. J. M. C. 49.

(a) Re Peerless, 1 Q. B. 143, 154; Paley Conv. 26. Kite and Lane's Case, 1 B. & C. 101.

(b) Re Nunn, 8 B. & C. 644.

(c) R. v. Jefferies, 4 T. R. 768; see R. v. Priest, 6 id. 539; Charter v. Greame, 13 Q. B. 227; Stamp v. Sweetland, 8 Q. B. 23; Atty.-Genl. v. Le Revert, 6 M. & W. 405. Surplusage does not vitiate the rest which is sound; R. v. Hall, 1 T. R. 320; R. v. Drake, 2 Sh. 489; or an impossible date, if the conviction be complete without it, R. v. Picton, 2 East, 196. Paley on Conv. 136.

offence, for, if the facts alleged do not constitute a legal charge, his acknowledgment of those facts cannot make him subject to punishment (d).

CHAPTER XVII.

PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONVICTION.

Conviction need not be returned to Q. S.] It is no longer necessary to return to the quarter sessions copies of summary convictions made and entered at petty sessions; but if either party shall require it, a certificate (a) of any order so made (signed by the justice who shall have made the same, or by any other justice of the same petty sessions) shall be delivered to him at any time (b); and such certificate shall operate to all intents as a good form of conviction or order, as the case may be, for any purpose for which any form of conviction or order may now by law be required (c).

Certificate of dismissal.] If upon the hearing of any case of assault or battery, upon the merits, under the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 100, the justices shall deem the offence not to be proved, or shall find the assault or battery to have been justified, or so trifling as not to merit any punishment, and shall accordingly dismiss the complaint, they are authorized by the 44th sec. of that statute forthwith to make out a certificate of dismissal,

(d) See Fletcher v. Calthrop, 6 Q. B. 889; re Turner, id. 80; Tarry v. Newman, 15 M. & W. 645.

(a) For form see Sch. Ia. 14 & 15 Vic. 93; for stamp duties, see 21 & 22 Vic. c. 100, sch. C. For form of certificate in cases of disputed debts, see 22 Vic. c. 14, sch. A. Justices are bound to grant such a certificate, when it comes within the provisions of the act; and the granting of such a certificate is a ministerial and not a judicial act. Hancock v. Somes,

28, L. J. M. C. 196.

(b) See R. v. Midlam, 3 Burr. 1720.

(c) Convictions are required by the 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96 (Larceny Act), to be returned to Q. S.; see s. 112, but as the provisions of the Petty Sessions Act are incorporated into the Larceny Act, this clause need not be followed in Ireland; see note to this section to this effect by Mr. Graves, Q.C. who was entrusted with the preparation of the act.

which is made to operate as a release from all further proceedings, civil or criminal, in respect of the same offence (d).

In larceny cases.] If the proceedings should have been had under the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 126, which gives justices at petty sessions power to adjudicate in certain cases of larceny, if the charge be dismissed, a certificate of such dismissal is to be delivered to the party charged (e), and the justices are to transmit the proceedings (whether a conviction ensue or not) to the next quarter sessions, there to be kept among the records of the court; and every person who obtains a certificate of dismissal, or is convicted under the act, is released from all further or other criminal proceedings for the same cause.

If there should be any mistake or error in the certificate, the Court of Queen's Bench will not allow the defendant to avail himself of the variance as any ground of objection, because these errors may and ought to be corrected in the convictions formally returned (f); but the corrected statement must be conformable to the facts as they really took place (g).

It is to be observed that an order of justices cannot, like a conviction, be returned to sessions in an amended form (h).

It should be remarked that the Irish statutes have conferred no power to amend an order or judgment on the court of quarter sessions. Upon appeal, the court may confirm, vary, or reverse the judgment, but cannot amend it (i).

(d) The word forthwith in this section means upon the application of the party entitled to the conviction; Costar v. Hetherington, 5 Jur. N. S. 985.

Therefore when a J. P. on the 17th of February dismissed a case for assault, on the ground that the case was not proved, and application for a certificate was made on the 22nd, but on account of the absence of the magistrate was not obtained until the 24th, held, that the certificate was a good defence to an action for the assault.

(e) Sec. 1.

(f) See R. v. Allen, 15 East, 333; 12 East, 67; R. v. Barker, 1 East, 186; Lindsay v. Leigh, 11 Q. B. 455; Gray v. Cookson, 18 East, 13; Sel

wood v. Mount, 9 C. & P. 75; Basten v. Carew, 5 D. & R. 558; 3 B. & C. 649; R. v. Justices of Huntingdon, 5 D. & R. 588.

(g) 15 East, 346; R. v. Simpson, 10 Mod. 382. See further on this subject, Chaney v. Payne, 1 Q. B. 712; R. v. Chaney, 6 Dowl. 281; Charter v. Greame, 13 Q. B. 216; Paley on Conv. 249.

(h) Paley Conv. 250; R. v. Justices of Cheshire, 5 B. & Ad. 439; Wilkins v. Wright, 2 C. & Mee. 191; R. v. Js. of Radnorshire, 9 Dowl. 90.

(i) See 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 39, where it is stated that no objection is to be allowed, on appeal, for any alleged defect in substance or in form to any conviction or order.

If the magistrate, after receiving due notice of appeal, neglects or refuses to grant a certificate of the conviction, whereby the party is prevented from prosecuting his appeal, he would be liable in an action for the special damage (j).

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF DISTRESS.

Ir is now proposed to consider how a conviction is to be enforced by a distress, the power and duties of magistrates to commit having been discussed in a previous chapter (a).

The power given by statute.] The power to enforce a conviction by distress of the offender's goods is a compulsory power derived from statute, and is not any necessary consequence of a conviction (6). It is provided by the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 (c), that in every case where the justices shall award any penal or other sum to be paid, they may order that, in default of the said sum being paid at the time and in the manner directed by their order, the goods of the person against whom the order shall be made shall be distrained for such sum, or for so much of such sum as shall remain unpaid at the time fixed, and also for the costs of such distress. This provision, however, does not apply to any proceedings under the revenue of excise or custom acts, or under the game laws (d).

When warrant to be issued in offence cases.] The justices, in all cases of summary jurisdiction, when they shall make an order on the conviction of any person for an offence, shall issue the proper warrant for its execution forthwith, upon the nonpayment of any penal sum, or the non-performance of any condition, at the time and in the manner fixed by the order for that purpose; or, at furthest, upon the next court day after the

(j) See Proser v. Hyde, 1 T. R,

414.

(a) Ante, p. 103, et seq.

(b) Paley Conv. 254; 4th ed.
(c) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 22.
(d) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 42.

expiration of the time so fixed for the payment or performance of the condition, as the case may be, unless the penal sum shall have been remitted by the crown or other competent authority in the interval (e). It is also provided that where, in offence cases, the order shall have only directed imprisonment, and it shall be found impossible to execute a warrant of committal, it shall be lawful for the magistrates at petty sessions to order a warrant to issue, to levy by distress of the goods of such person, such penal sum as might have been awarded by the original order (f); but no time is fixed by the statute or by any authority, within which the justices may issue a distress warrant on a conviction, where it has been found impossible to execute the warrant of committal; therefore, no positive directions on this subject can be safely given until the matter has received a judicial decision or a legislative declaration.

In civil cases.] Whenever an order shall be made in any case of a civil nature, and the same shall not be obeyed, the justice shall issue the proper warrant for its execution at any time after the time fixed for compliance with its directions, where required so to do, by the person in whose favour such order shall have ben made, or by some person on his behalf (g).

No distress on appeal.] However, it is provided by the Petty Sessions Act (h), that in every case where the party being entitled to appeal against any such order shall have duly given notice of appeal (i), and entered into a proper recognizance to prosecute the appeal, it shall not be lawful for any justice to issue any warrant to execute the said order until such appeal shall have been decided, or until the appellant shall have failed to perform the condition of such recognizance, as the case may be; unless where any act shall expressly authorize or direct the levy of any sum to be made, notwithstanding the appeal.

After appeal.] After the appeal has been decided (), if the original order has been confirmed, the justice who made the original order, or any J. P. of the same petty sessions, shall issue

(e) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 23.

(f) Id. s. 22. cl. 4; in such case they are to make a note of the proceeding in the order-book.

(g) Id.

(h) 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, s. 23.
(i) See id. 8, 24.

(j) See id, s. 24, cl. 7.