county, so that the justices of the county have jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences committed thereon, whether the land be covered with water or not, at the time the offence is committed (a).

Where prisoner "found."] A person is "found" within the jurisdiction of a court of justice, within the meaning of a statute, when he is actually present there, whether he has come within such jurisdiction voluntarily, or has been brought there against his will (y).

As to offences out of his jurisdiction.] By the 10th sec. of 14 & 15 Vic. c. 93, whenever information shall be given to any J.P. that any person has committed any treason, felony, misdemeanor, or other offence, within the limits of the jurisdiction of such J.P. for which such person shall be punishable either by indictment or upon a summary conviction; or that any person has committed any such offence out of the jurisdiction of such J.P. either in Great Britain or Ireland or in the Channel Islands; and such person is within the limits of the jurisdiction of such J.P.; or that any person has committed any crime or offence whatsoever on the high seas, or in any harbour or other place in which the Admiralty have jurisdiction, or on land beyond the seas for which an indictment can be legally preferred in any place in England or Ireland, and such person is within the limits of the jurisdiction of such J.P., he may issue his warrant to arrest; and when the charge relates to any offence committed in any county in Ireland in which the J.P. shall not have jurisdiction, after he has heard the evidence in proof of the charge, he may commit him to the gaol of the county where the offence was committed, or hold the prisoner to bail in such a case where bail may be taken (z). Where the offence has occurred in the petty sessions district for which a J.P. acts, he may compel the

(x) Embleton v. Brown, 30 L. J. M. C. 1.

(y) R. v. Sattler, 1 Dear. & B.C.C. R. 525, see 18 & 19 Vic., c. 91, s. 21, which gives jurisdiction to the court to try an offender on the high seas when "found" within the jurisdiction of the court.

(2) 14 & 15 Vic., c. 93, s. 15. For the further powers conferring jurisdiction on J. P. acting in respect to warrants issued by justices out of their jurisdiction and their duties in backing them for execution, see id. ss. 27 to 31; and 11 & 12 Vic., c. 42, ss. 12, 13, 14, 15.

attendance of the person required if he resides in an adjoining county, by issuing his summons or warrant, although he be not a J.P. of the adjoining county (zz). It is not to be inferred, however, that a J.P. ought only to issue his summons against parties residing in his own petty sessions district, or that a person ought not to be summoned to appear at any petty sessions out of the district in which he resides. On the contrary, every magistrate has authority to summon to his petty sessions any person residing within his county, though such a course ought not to be adopted where it would lead to great personal inconvenience to the party, without any corresponding public advantage. The matter ought to be referred to some magistrate in the neighbourhood of the party. It is also provided by the 15th and 16th Geo. III. c. 21, s. 24, commonly called the Whiteboy Act, that, if any justice of the county where any offence is committed happens to be in another county, he, or any justice of such foreign county, may, upon proper information, issue his or their warrant to arrest any person offending against the act; and the person arrested shall be brought before such justices, who upon examination may commit, bail, or discharge him, as the case shall require.

Offences on borders of counties.] By Statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 54, s. 26, it is provided that all felonies and misdemeanors committed on the boundary or boundaries of two or more counties, or within 500 yards of any such boundary, or begun in one county and completed in another, may be dealt with in any of the said counties as if they had been actually committed therein; and by s. 27, when any felony or misdemeanor is committed on any person, or on, or in respect of, any property in or upon any coach or other carriage employed in any journey, or on board any vessel employed on any voyage on river, canal, etc. it may be dealt with, etc. in any county through any part of which such carriage or vessel passed, as if actually committed in such county, or if the side, centre, bank, or any part of such road, river, canal, or navigation, constitute the boundary of any two counties, the

(zz) 14 & 15 Vic., c. 93. s. 11.

offence may also be dealt with, etc. as if actually committed in either of such two counties.

Any two J.P.'s.] If a statute refers a matter to " any two justices," they must be justices having jurisdiction according to the rules of the common law or by statute, and such words do not enable them to act out of their jurisdiction, either in respect of its local limits or otherwise.

CHAPTER IV.

JURISDICTION, WHEN QUALIFIED.

When property, &c., is in question.] There is another rule which ousts the jurisdiction of justices in the hearing of cases, and that is, where a bona fide question of property or title is in issue, the jurisdiction of magistrates to hear and determine in a summary way is ousted, and their hands tied from interfering, though the facts be such as they have authority to take cognizance of (a). It is sufficient to stop the summary interference of a magistrate, if a colour of title appears to be in question, and that the act was done bona fide under an assertion of that supposed right, however weak the claim may appear to be (b); so, in order to oust the jurisdiction of magistrates, the defendant must shew a colourable title in himself, and also that he had acted under the impression that he had a title (c). So, where questions of this kind occur, it may be more prudent for magistrates to abstain from any other inquiry than whether the act was really done under an idea of authority entertained at the time, and not fabricated afterwards for the mere purpose of evading the penalties, and if it appears to have been done under

(a) R. v. Burnaby, 2 Ld. Raym. 900; 1 Salk. 181; R. v. Speed, 1 Ld. Raym. 583; Charter v. Greame, 13 Q. B. 216; Kinnersly v. Orpe, Dougl. 56; R. v. Cridland, 7 El. & Bl. 853; s. c. 27 L. J. M. C. 28; see Hunt v. Andrews, 3 B. & Al. 341;

Blunt v. Grimes, 4 T. R. 682.

(b) Kinnersley v. Orpe, Dougl. 56; Blunt v. Grimes, 4 T. R. 682; Hawkins v. Bailey, id. 681.

(c) R. v. Donegal Js. 5 Ir. J. N. S.

185.

such real impression, to dismiss the case without investigating the legal grounds of the claim. But it is the duty of the magistrate to judge from all the circumstances whether the party did so act (d). It has been laid down in the recent case of R. v. Cridland (e), that the justices should try whether the defendant entertained an honest belief that he had a title, and when the party disputing has given reasonable grounds in a reasonable manner, the justices have no right to say, for some reason or other, "We will go on and make the order" (f). Again, upon the hearing of a summons against the defendant for nonpayment of a church-rate, he gave notice to the justices that he disputed the validity of the rate, and his liability to pay it, and stated his reasons for doing so. The justices were of opinion, though without any evidence to justify that opinion, that the allegations and notices of the defendant were not made and given in good faith, but were put forward as a pretext for avoiding payment of the rate, and therefore they made an order for payment; and it was held that they were wrong, as by the course adopted by the defendant they were deprived of all jurisdiction to make the order (g). But a mere assertion of a general right, without shewing any such claim of right as would be a defence to an action of trespass, will not oust the jurisdiction of magistrates to convict (h).

Reasonable belief.] It will be found that by the 24 & 25 Vic. c 97, s. 52, persons are not to be punished for offences against the provisions there mentioned, when the party acted under a fair and reasonable supposition that he had the right to do the

(d) R. v. Dodson, 9 A. & E. 704. (e) 7 El. & Bl. 853. This was a case on the hearing of an information for trespassing in search of game, and the defendant claimed a right to enter upon the land under an authority from a party who was alleged to be the owner of the land, and asked for an adjournment, as he was not then prepared with evidence, which was refused; and the court held that this was such a bona fide claim of right as put an end to the jurisdiction of the justices.

(f) See R. v. Nunnely, 27 L. J. M. C. 260.

(g) Id. 4 Jur. N. S. 1146, 27 L. J. M. C. 260 Q. B.

(h) See Leat v. Vine, 30 L. J. M. C. 207. The court in this case took a different view of the duties of magistrates in ordinary cases and those under the Malicious Injuries Act, and held that mere belief would not protect parties as it might under that statute. See also Morden v. Porter, 7 Com. B. N. S. 641.

act complained of, nor to any trespass, not being wilful and malicious, committed in hunting, fishing, or in the pursuit of game. When, therefore, an assault is proved before the magistrate to have arisen out of the assertion of a title to lands, or any interest therein, their jurisdiction is taken away (¿). But where there is evidence before them on which they can decide a complaint of assault, without deciding a question of interest in land set up by the defendant, they have jurisdiction so to decide, and it is for them to determine whether the title or interest in land comesin question; and when they act bonâ fide in determining that it is not material for them to decide such question of title, the court will not interfere (). When the magistrate has heard and determined that the case is within his jurisdiction, the court will review his decision upon that point only, and if of opinion that he has wrongly decided, a prohibition will be granted (k). But it is said that if the parties dismiss a summons on the ground that in their judgment the question of title was raised bonâ fide, although the facts tending to raise the title are extremely scanty, still it is a matter which the justices have to determine, and the court will not say that they were wrong (1). It is said (m) that upon a suggestion of title the court of Q. B. at any time while the conviction remains below, and has not been removed by certiorari, will grant a prohibition after conviction, to stay the magistrate from proceeding upon it (n). The jurisdiction of justices is also limited by circumstances independent of the ambit of his local jurisdiction.

Disqualified by interest.] No magistrate is authorized to act judicially in a case where he is himself a party interested (o). A court, of which interested persons form a part, is not properly constituted, no matter what may be the number of interested

(i) R. v. O'Brien, 5 I. J. 132; Lloyd v. Jones, 1 County C. C. 111; Lilley v. Harvey, and Owen v. Pierce, ib. 115.

() R. v. Edwards, 26 L. T. 257. (k) Lilley v. Hervey, and Owen v. Pierce, 1 County C. C. 115; see Thompson v. Ingham, ib. 348; Latham v. Spedding, ib. 498.

(Legge v. Pardoe, 7 Eng. J. N. S. 499.

(m) Per Holt, C. J., 2 Ld. Raym.

901.

(n) Paley on Conv. 122.

(9) Co. Litt. 141 a; 8 Co. 118; Dalt. c. 173; Bonham's case, Hob. 87; 12 Mod. 687.