made since, are sought to be recovered in this action. In the deed are the following clauses (3, 5, 6, 8) (a). [His Lordship read them.] In pursuance of these clauses a register was prepared, in which the names of shareholders were entered, the defendant's among them; but against his name in the column for the number of the shares was a blank. His shares had never been numbered.

The Court of Queen's Bench gave judgment for the defendant. The ground on which they proceeded was that this case was concluded by that of The Wolverhampton New Waterworks Company v. Hawksford (b), and they indicated very considerable doubt of the propriety of that decision. In that doubt we do not concur, as it does not seem to us that the decision was such as supposed by the Court below. What was decided there was that there was no sealed register at the time of the first calls, and that unless there was the defendant was not then a shareholder liable to calls. The remark that the defendant was not the owner of specific shares is only in furtherance and illustration of the remark that there was no scaled register. We think that case was rightly decided, but that it was no authority, as supposed, for the decision in the Court below; and some of us concur in that part of the doubt there indicated, viz., whether the want of numbering the shares in the register would of itself be a bar to this action.

But it is not necessary to decide that question, as there is another objection taken by the defendant on which we think him entitled to judgment. The decla

(a) See ante, p. 604–606.

(b) 7 C. B. N. S. 795.

ration and the replication to the third plea both assert, the former in part by implication, the latter in words, that the defendant was a shareholder at the time of the

calls, and indebted by virtue of the deed of settlement. We think he was not; the cases cited are inapplicable. There is no statute laying down an arbitrary rule to govern this case. The question is at common law, and we are of opinion he is not liable as alleged, unless he had executed the deed. There may be evidence that he agreed with the promoters to become a shareholder to execute the deed, or even that he so agreed with the plaintiffs, but that is not the case put forward in the declaration. Nor is this a mere formal objection. Had the defendant been charged on such an agreement the question would be wholly different, the defence might be different, the damage, if any, different.

We think the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

1861.

IRISH PEAT
Company

V.

PHILLIPS.

1861.

MEMORANDA.

In this Vacation,

John Baron Campbell, Lord High Chancellor, died suddenly on the morning of Sunday, the 23d June, at his residence, Stratheden House, Knightsbridge.

Sir Richard Bethell, Attorney General, was thereupon appointed Lord High Chancellor, and was created a peer by the title of Baron Westbury, of Westbury, in the county of Wilts.

Sir William Atherton, Solicitor General, succeeded to the office of Attorney General: and Roundell Palmer Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, was appointed Solicitor General. He afterwards received the honour of knighthood.

Edwin John James Esq., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, was disbarred by the benchers of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple.

END OF TRINITY VACATION.

HILL J. was absent during the whole Term, owing to

ill health.

1861.

WILLSMER against JACKLIN.

Saturday,
November 2d.

1. Under the Insolvent Debtors Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110., it is not a Insolvent condition on the non-vesting in the assignees of privileged articles of debtor. the insolvent not exceeding the value of 20%., that those articles be 1 & 2 Vict. specified by him in his schedule.

2. Quare, when the value of such articles exceeds 201.

THIS

HIS was an action for the conversion of the plaintiff's goods; to which the defendant pleaded the general issue and a traverse of the plaintiff's possession.

c. 110.

Privileged articles.

1861.

WILLSMER

V.

JACKLIN.

On the trial, before Williams J., at the Surrey Summer Assizes, 1861, it appeared that, on the 26th July, 1860, the plaintiff, according to the provisions of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110., petitioned the Court for the relief of insolvent debtors to be discharged from his liabilities. A vesting order was made accordingly, and the defendant appointed trade assignee; and on the 9th July a final order was made for the discharge of the plaintiff at the expiration of nine months from the date of the vesting order. The defendant having, as assignee, taken possession of the plaintiff's property, and sold it for the benefit of the creditors, under section 42 of the statute, the plaintiff brought the present action against him to recover the value of certain privileged articles, alleged to have been sold among the rest. In his schedule, however, the plaintiff had not specified any articles which he claimed to retain as privileged. Under these circumstances a verdict was taken for the plaintiff for 9., with leave reserved to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit.

Hawkins now moved accordingly.-There was no evidence to shew that these articles were excepted from the operation of the Insolvent Debtors Act, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. Sect. 37 of that statute enacts: "Upon the filing of such petition by such prisoner, or on the filing of such petition by such creditor or creditors as aforesaid, and the evidence in support thereof, as the case may be, it shall be lawful for the said Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, and such Court is hereby authorized and required, to order that all the real and personal estate and effects of such prisoner, both within this realm and abroad, except the wearing apparel, bedding, and other such necessaries of such person and his