See INDUSTRIAL COURT.
BARRISTER-Solicitor-Solicitor having five
years' actual practice-Application for admission
as barrister without being struck off the roll of
solicitors The Supreme Court Act of 1867 (31
Vic., No. 23), s. 40-The Supreme Court Act of
1921 (12 Geo. V., No. 15), s. 10.

By s. 40 of the Act of 1867 it is provided:
An attorney, solicitor or proctor of good
repute in his profession having been three years
in actual practice in Great Britain or the Colony
(ie., State of Queensland) who shall pass the
examination in classics or mathematics pre-
scribed for persons seeking admission to the bar
or who shall have a certificate of honour or other
academical distinction in classics, mathematics
or law from any university or college within the
British Dominions may, upon motion in open
Court, be called and admitted a barrister-at-law:
Provided that when so called and admitted he
shall cease to practice as an attorney, solicitor
or proctor, and shall be struck off the roll of the
Supreme Court, but nothing herein contained
shall extend to relieve persons so called and
admitted from any action suit penalty or liability
for misconduct neglect or other matter in the
practice of his profession of an attorney solicitor
or proctor nor to disable him from recovering
the costs and charges due to him when so called
and admitted or from asserting his right of lien
or from being again admitted to practice as an
attorney solicitor or proctor if disbarred by
motion in open Court at his own request without
having been guilty of misconduct in the exercise
of his profession of a barrister-at-law."

fession having been five years in actual practice
in Queensland shall upon motion in open Court
at his own request be called and admitted as a
barrister-at-law without being required to pass
any examination."

A solicitor of the Supreme Court of Queensland
of good repute and having been over five years
in actual practice in Queensland, applied to be
admitted as a barrister-at-law without having
his name struck off the roll of solicitors.

Held, that the proviso to s. 40 of the earlier
Act was not impliedly repealed by s. 10 of the
later Act; that the only alteration of the earlier
section which was made by the later section was
an elimination of the necessity for an examina-
tion in the case of a solicitor of the Supreme
Court of Queensland who had been in actual
practice for five years or more; and that the
application for admission as a barrister-at-law
must be refused unless the applicant was willing
to have his name struck off the roll of solicitors.
Ex parte ATTнOW..

BILL OF EXCHANGE-

See MAGISTRATES COURT. 3.

F.C. 95

BILL OF SALE-Assurance of chattels Alleged
sale and receipt of purchase money-Possession—
The Bills of Sale Act, 1891 to 1896, s. 4—Magis-
trates Court-Finding No express finding-
Finding of fact by implication from other findings.

on

The respondent company obtained a judg
ment against M. and seized a motor car under a
warrant of execution. The appellant,
interpleader summons, claimed the car, and
gave evidence that on 12th October, 1922, at
Cunnamulla, he agreed to buy the car from M.
for £95; and that he paid the money and re-
ceived a document, signed by M. and witnessed,
stating: "This is to certify that I have this day
sold to N. one Ford motor car, including one
Rushmore generator, one set of special Fox
spanners, etc., for full value received." Two
days after the sale the appellant left Cunnamulla
in the car with M., and arrived at Charleville on
17th. Appellant could not drive a car.
day the car was seized at the hotel where M. was
staying-appellant was staying at another hotel.
Before it was seized, M. asked the bailiff for per-
mission to remove from the car his private
property.

Next

BILL OF SALE-Continued.

found that the document was

an assurance

44. The company may from time to time by
ordinary resolution increase the capital by the

Acts, 1891-1896.

outside the document.

NELLIGAN v. WARREGO SHEEP SHEARING
COMPANY LIMITED

And See MORTGAGE.

And See SALE OF GOODS. 1.

BRISBANE TRAMWAYS ACTS-
See TRAMWAYS.

CARRYING ON BUSINESS—

See MAGISTRATES COURT. 2.

CHILDREN—

See WILL. 2.

F.C. 33

such amount and shall be issued on such terms
and conditions as the company in general meet-
ing may direct, or in default of any such direc-
tion, on such terms and conditions as the
directors may think expedient.

45. The company in general meeting may
before the issue of any new shares determine
that the same or any of them shall be offered in
the first instance to the members in proportion
to the existing shares held by them, or make any
other arrangement as to the issue and allotment
of new shares.

46. All new shares shall be offered sold or
otherwise disposed of at par or at a premium in
such quantities and on such terms and conditions
as the general meeting authorising their issue
may direct, or in default of any such direction on
such terms and conditions as the directors may
deem expedient.

47. Any capital raised by the creation of new
shares shall be considered as part of the original
capital, and shall be subject to the same pro-
visions of calls and forfeiture of shares on non-
payment of calls or otherwise as if it had been
part of the original capital.

On a motion under s. 34 of The Companies Act
of 1863 for rectification of the share register of
the company by directing the registration of
certain transfers of shares taken in the name of
the applicant and her nominees, as purchasers,
and tendered by her for registration and refused
by the directors:

Held, that the directors had not exercised their

See STAMP DUTY.

CLOSED-

See LIQUOR LAW.

COMMISSION-

See MAGISTRATES COURT. 4, 5.
See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

COMPANY - Shares - Purchase of Shares
Transfer to nominees-Refusal to register transfers
-Rectification of share register-Powers of
Directors-Articles of Association-The Com-
panies Act of 1863 (27 Vic., No. 3), s. 34.

The Articles of Association of a company
provided :-
:-

5. The company is entitled to treat the
registered holder of any shares as the absolute
owner thereof, and accordingly shall not be
bound to recognise any equitable or other claim
to or interest in any such shares.

7. No person shall exercise any rights or
privileges of a member until his name shall have
been registered in the register of members.

21. The directors may refuse to register any
transfer whatever of any shares without assign-
ing any reason therefor.

faith or in the interests of the company, or with
due regard to the right of a shareholder to
transfer his shares, or to the rights of the
transferee; but that it had been exercised for
the collateral purpose of unfairly keeping their
section of members in a majority and advancing
their interests to the prejudice of the other
shareholders, and that rectification of the
register, as asked, should be ordered.
METROPOLITAN

In

re

AUSTRALIAN
ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

COMPULSORY ACQUISITION-
See TRAMWAYS.

CONTRACT-

LIFE

Lukin J. 120

See BILL OF SALE.
See SALE OF Goods.
See SUGAR. 2.

1, 2.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—
See MAGISTRATES COURT. 6.

CONVEYANCE ON SALE—
See STAMP DUTY.

1.

-Breaking and entering a dwelling-house
with intent to commit a crime --Sentence of six
years' imprisonment with hard labour Appeal
against sentence-Additional evidence before Court
of Criminal Appeal of war service and other
useful work done by prisoner Sentence reduced
to two years with hard labour.

The prisoner was convicted of charges of
breaking and entering a dwelling-house with
intent to steal, of stealing in a dwelling-house,
and of stealing in another dwelling-house, and
was sentenced to six years' hard labour, three
years' hard labour, and three years' hard labour
in respect of the three offences respectively,
the sentences to be concurrent. On appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeal, additional
evidence was given proving good war service,
and the useful work which had been done by
the prisoner, and the sentences were reduced to
two years with hard labour in each case, the
sentences to be concurrent.
R. v. LEWIS

2.

C.C.A. 93

-Appeal against sentence-Stealing in a
dwelling-Conviction-Sentence of five years' hard
labour-Prisoner's age wrongfully stated at trial-
Sentence reduced-The Criminal Code, ss. 398,

668D.

Two prisoners having pleaded guilty of steal-
ing in a dwelling were sentenced-one to five
ysars' imprisonment, the other to two years'
imprisonment. The Judge who imposed the
sentence stated that he was influenced in im-
posing the lighter sentence by the fact that this
prisoner was only seventeen and a-half years of
age, while the other was older. On appeal by
the first prisoner to the Court of Criminal Appeal,
it was established to the satisfaction of the Court
that the two prisoners were of the same age, and
the Court reduced the sentence of five years'
imprisonment to one of three years.
R. v. O'ROURKE.
3. Appeals against sentences House
breaking-Habitual criminal.

C.C.A. 273

On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, a
sentence of three years, and a sentence of two
years, with a declaration that the prisoner was
an habitual criminal, for house-breaking in loth
cases, were confirmed.

R. v. MURPHY; R. v. JACKSON .. C.C.A. 276

4.

-Appeals against sentences-Standard-
ization of sentences.

Although the Court of Criminal Appeal aims
at the standardization of sentences, it must be
recognised that while it is possible for the Court
to express its opinion that a particular sentence
is a suitable sentence to be passed on an offender,
the Court cannot say that a sentence a little
longer would be excessive or that a sentence a
little shorter would be inadequate; the Court
therefore does not interfere with the decision of
the Judge who presided at the trial, unless the
sentence he has passed is one which the Court
considers substantially excessive or substanti-
to punishment should be fully placed before the
ally inadequate. The circumstances relevant
trial Judge by counsel for the Crown and for the
accused; the fullest details should be made
available, particularly in cases of first offenders.
Therefore, in certain cases, although the sen-
Criminal Appeal did not interfere; but in other
tences were apparently severe, the Court of
cases, where that Court had a greater oppor-
tunity of investigating the circumstances of the
prisoners, reductions of sentences were made.
R. v. WALLACE; R. v. JOHNSTONE, ROBERTS,
R. v. MCINTOSH; R. 2. KING; R. v. STUART ;
AND RUSSELL; R. v. WRIGHT

And See HABEAS CORPUS.

C.C.A 278

Application for grazing
Attorney - The

CROWN LANDS
homestead-Applicant- Agent
Land Acts 1910-1920, ss. 66, 68.

The Lands Act, 1910-1920, provide, by s. 66:
Any person desiring to select land shall himself,
or by his agent appointed in writing under his
hand, lodge an application
; and
by s. 68: Every applicant for a selection shall
himself, or by his agent appointed in writing
under his hand, appear at the Commissioner's
Court when his application is dealt with by the
Commissioner. If an applicant fails so
appear his application shall be refused.

By a power of attorney, A. appointed B. as his
attorney to lodge an application signed by A.
for a selection, and to appear for A. and on his
behalf at a Land Commissioner's Court, and
generally to act in respect of the application as
A. could do if personally present; and the power
of attorney provided that in the event of B.
being unable to act as therein indicated, B. should
be empowered to appoint a substitute to act in
his stead.
B. was unable to go to Cloncurry.
On the power of attorney he wrote: "I hereby
appoint (blank) to act in my stead," and signed
his name. B. forwarded the application and
power of attorney to his agent in Cloncurry, by
whom, with the authority of B., the name of P.
was inserted in the blank space, and the applica-
tion and power of attorney was then lodged.
P. appeared at the Commissioner's Court at
Cloncurry, claiming to act as agent for A.

CROWN LANDS—Continued.

Held, that the appointment of P. did not
satisfy the requirements of The Land Acts, and
that as A. had failed to appear at the Com-
missioner's Court in the manner prescribed by
the statute, his application was rightly refused.
Re BECKETT'S APPLICATION
F.C. 27

And See MAGISTRATES COURT. 5.

DAMAGES

See MAGISTRATES COURT. 6.

DESERTED WIVES AND CHILDREN-

1. -Order for Maintenance-Order varying
order for maintenance-Appeal—“ Person against
whom order has been made "-Jurisdiction on
Appeal-Supreme Court-Rehearing-Recogniz
ance not a condition precedent to appeal-The
Deserted Wives and Children Act Amendment Act
of 1840 (4 Vic., No. 5, 88. 2, 10-The Deserted
Wires and Children Act Amendment Act of
of 1858 (22 Vic., No. 6), s. 12-The Justices Act
of 1886 (50 Vic., No. 14), ss. 4, 237, 243-The
District Courts Act, 1891 (55 Vic., No. 33), s. 159
(repealed) The Supreme Court Act of 1921 (12
Geo. V., No. 15), s. 3.

In proceedings in a Court of Petty Sessions,
under s. 2 of The Deserted Wives and Children
Act of 1840, a husband was ordered to pay
maintenance for his wife. About a year later
the husband applied under s. 12 of The Deserted
Wives and Children Act Amendment Act of 1858
for a variance of that order on the ground, inter
alia, that his wife had committed adultery.
After hearing the evidence, which was chiefly
that of a private detective and his subordinates,
a Police Magistrate directed that the order for
payment of maintenance he "varied in whole
to terminate as from 13th July, 1922," the date
of the alleged commission of adultery. From
that order the wife appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Held, that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.

Held, that an order made under s. 12 of The
Deserted Wives and Children Act Amendment Act
of 1858 is an order within the meaning of s. 237
of The Justices Act of 1886, and that therefore
the appellant was a person against whom an
order was made, and had a right to appeal under
ss. 237 and 243 of The Justices Act of 1886 to a
District Court, and since the abolition of District
Courts by The Supreme Court Act of 1921, had a
right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Held, on the facts, that the evidence before
the Police Magistrate did not support a finding
of misconduct by the wife, or establish any right
to the relief claimed by the husband, and that
the husband's application for a variance of the
order for payment of maintenance for his wife
must be dismissed.

The recognizance which an appellant may
enter into under s. 239 of The Justices Act of

1886 is a condition precedent to a stay of pro-
ceedings under the order appealed from, but is
not a condition precedent to the hearing of the
appeal.
WHITE v. WHITE
Shand J 1

2. Appeal Court of Petty Sessions-
Supreme Court-The Deserted Wives and Children
Act of 1840 (4 Vic., No. 5), s. 10-The Justices
Act of 1886 (50 Vic., No. 17), ss. 4, 237, 242—
The Judicature Act (40 Vic., No. 6), s. 10-The
Supreme Court Act of 1921 (12 Geo. V., No. 15),

s. 3.

An order was made by a Police Magistrate
under The Deserted Wives and Children Acts of
1840, and The Deserted Wives and Children Act
Amendment Act of 1858, setting aside an earlier
order whereby a husband was ordered to pay
maintenance to his wife. By s. 10 of the former
statute a right of appeal to the Court of Quarter
Sessions is given to every person feeling
aggrieved by an order made under those Acts.
By s. 237 of The Justices Act of 1886, every
person against whom an order is made by Justices
is entitled to appeal to a District Court or a
Court of Quarter Sessions, and by s. 242 the
Judge of the District Court shall hear and
determine the subject matter of the appeal. . .
and such decision shall be final. District Courts
were abolished by The Supreme Court Act of
1921, and by s. 3, subsec. 4, of that Act it was
provided that where provision is made for an
appeal to a District Court, the appeal shall lie
to the Supreme Court or a Judge thereof.

The wife appealed from the order of the Police
Magistrate to a Judge of the Supreme Court,
who allowed the appeal. From that decision
the husband appealed to the Full Court.

Held, that the decision of the Judge of the
Supreme Court was final, and that the appeal
was not competent.

Held, that the order made by the Police
Magistrate setting aside the order for payment
of maintenance, was an order from which an
appeal would lie under s. 237 of The Justices Act
of 1886, and s. 3 of The Supreme Court Act of

1921.

DESERTED WIVES AND CHILDREN-Contd.
a place situated about 65 miles from Brisbane,
on the afternoon of November 6th, calling upon
the defendant to appear at the Court in Brisbane
on November 8th, at 10 a.m. The defendant
did not appear, and the Magistrate, after proof
of service on the defendant by affidavit in Form
6 of the Third Schedule to The Justices Act of
1886, heard the evidence for the complainant,
and made an order against the defendant.
Held, that in view of the circumstances of the
case there was no denial of justice.

The sufficiency or otherwise of the time to be
allowed between the date of service of a summons
on a complaint, and the date of hearing of the
complaint, is a question for determination by

the Court which hears the complaint.

An affidavit of service in Form 6 of the Third
Schedule of The Justices Act of 1886 is sufficient
proof of due service for the purposes of s. 2 of
The Deserted Wives and Children Act of 1858.
PORTER V. INGOLD, Ex parte INGOLD

F.C. 42

The Friendly Societies Act of 1913 provides
(s. 20): The provisions set forth in the Second
Schedule to this Act governing the business
proceedings and property of societies shall be
observed. The Second Schedule, clause 40 (1)
states: "Every dispute between a member or
person claiming through a member or under the
rules and the Society or branch or an officer
thereof, or Letween any registered branch or an
officer thereof and the registered Society or
branch of which the other party to the dispute
is a registered branch or an officer thereof, and
or between any two or more registered branches
or an officer thercof, or between any two or more
registered branches of any registered Society or
be decided in manner directed by the rules.
branch or any officers thereof respectively shall
(2) The decision so made shall be binding and
conclusive on all parties without appeel, and
shall not be removable into any Court of law or
restrainable by injunction. Rule 63 of the
Society's rules provides: Should any dispute
arise between the Board of Directors and any
lodge or officers, the party aggrieved by the
action of the Board may appeal to the Grand
Lodge against such action.

Prior to the meeting of the United Ancient
Order of Druids (Grand Lodge of Queensland),
a society registered under The Friendly Societies
Act of 1913, held in April, 1922, the Board of
Directors of the Society gave notice of a propoced
amendment of the Society's laws or rules by the
addit'on of a new rule providing for a levy of
threepence per quarter payable by all members
on account of a monthly paper which was being
publihed by the Society. The proposed new
rule was adopted by the Society at its April
meeting, but was never approved by the
certifying barrister. Section 2 of the Friendly
Societies Act provides that an amendment of the
rules includes a new rule, and s. 13 provides that
no amendment of a rule shall be valid until it
has been approved by the certifying barrister
and registered under the Act. Rule 47 of the
Society's rules provides, inter alia, that: “Each
lodge shall contribute to the management fund
ninepence per quarter for each member good on
the books, or such other amount as may be fixed
by the Grand Lodge in session." In July, 1922,
the Board of Directors passed a resolution that
the payments from the various branches to the
management fund of the Grand Lodge be nine-
pence and threepence per quarter as from the first
day of July, 1922. the latter payment being, as
the branch lodges were advised, on account of
the monthly paper. Certain lodges refused to
collect or forward the levy of threepence to the
Board of Directors, who thereupon suspended
those lodges.

Clause 37 (2) of Schedule II. of the Act pro-
vides that no society shall suspend any branch
from benefit except for default in payment of a
penalty imposed on the branch or of any con-