the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow limits.

Among the many cases which have been reported on this subject, one precisely in point has not, I believe, occurred; but one of the most ordinary and common instances in which the principle has been applied in practice is, that of a former master giving the character of a discharged servant; and I am not aware that it was ever deemed essential to the protection of such a communication that it should be made to some person interested in the inquiry, alone, and not in the presence of a third person. If made with honesty of purpose to a party who has any interest in the inquiry (and that has been very liberally construed, Child v. Affleck, 4 Man. & Ryl. 590; 9 B. & C. 403), the simple fact that there has been some casual by-stander cannot alter the nature of the transaction. The business of life could not be well carried on if such restraints were imposed upon this and similar communications, and if, on every occasion in which they were made, they were not protected unless strictly private. In this class of communications is, no doubt, comprehended the right of a master bona fide to charge his servants for any supposed misconduct in his service, and to give him admonition and blame; and we think that the simple circumstance of the master exercising that right in the presence of another does by no means of necessity take away from it the protection which the law would otherwise afford. Where, indeed, an opportunity is sought for making such a charge before third persons, which might have been made in private, it would afford strong evidence of a malicious intention, and thus deprive it of that immunity which the law allows to such a statement, when made with honesty of purpose; but the mere fact of a third person being present does not render the communications absolutely unauthorized, though it may be a circumstance to be left with others, including the style and character of the language used, to the consideration of the jury, who are to determine whether the defendant has acted bona fide in making the charge, or been influenced by malicious motives. In the present case the defendant stood in such a relation with respect to the plaintiff, though not strictly that of master, as to authorize him to impute blame to him, provided it was done fairly and honestly, for any supposed misconduct in the course of his employment; and we think that the fact that the

imputation was made in Taylor's presence does not, of itself, render the communication unwarranted and officious, but at most is a circumstance to be left to the consideration of the jury. We agree with the learned judge, that the statement to Taylor, in the plaintiff's absence, was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth, if it were, in point of fact, false; but, inasmuch as no damages have been separately given upon this part of the charge alone, to which the fourth count is adapted, we cannot support a general verdict, if the learned judge was wrong in his opinion as to the statement to the plaintiff in Taylor's presence; and, as we think that at all events it should have been left to the jury whether the defendant acted maliciously or not on that occasion, there must be a new trial. Rule absolute for a new trial.

SIR W. DE CRESPIGNY v. WELLESLEY.

(5 Bing. 392. Common Pleas, England, Hilary Term, 1829.)

Privilege. Repeating Libel. In an action for a libel, it is no plea that the defendant had the libellous statement from another, and, upon publication, disclosed the author's name.

To the ninth count of a declaration for libel, the defendant, after pleading the general issue, pleaded, secondly, as to the publishing, and causing and procuring to be published, the following parts of the said supposed libel of and concerning the said plaintiff, in the said ninth count of the said declaration mentioned, with the intent and meaning therein mentioned; to wit, "Mr. De Crespigny told Mr. Wellesley, he was wrong in supposing he had spoken to his father, Sir W. De Crespigny (meaning the said plaintiff); he had written a letter to him, and he had his (meaning the said plaintiff's) answer, in which he admitted the fact; and that his wife, Mrs. De Crespigny, and himself had the letter; that all the family knew of the circumstance (intimacy) that his poor brother William, who is dead, was extremely jealous of his father (meaning the said plaintiff), and had been

turned out of his house; that his mother had told him that a child had been born, and that it had been her conclusion that his brother Herbert had spoken to his father (meaning to the said plaintiff) upon the subject, who replied that he (meaning the said plaintiff) entreated that so distressing a subject might not be again mentioned to him (meaning to the said plaintiff); the Rev. Mr. De Crespigny told Mr. Wellesley he thought he was quite right not to allow his children to remain with people so infamously connected. Mr. De Crespigny informed Mr. Wellesley he had seen the Miss Longs yesterday at their house in Berkshire, and that he had directly accused Miss Emma Long with her intrigue, upon which she got so confused that she left the room in the greatest embarrassment; that he then stated to Miss Dora Long that Miss Emma Long had intrigued with his father (meaning with the said plaintiff), and that Mr. Wellesley (meaning the said defendant) intended to publish the whole story, unless they immediately gave up his children. Miss Long replied, that she had nothing to do with her sister's intrigue, and she must be responsible for her own conduct; but that no one would believe what Mr. Wellesley said. Mr. De Crespigny assured Mr. Wellesley that she never denied her sister's having committed the fault. Mr. De Crespigny told her his father had confessed it (not denied it); to which she made no reply, but put herself into a violent passion, and said she did not wish to see any of Mr. Wellesley's friends within her house; notwithstanding such declaration, she invited Mr. De Crespigny to dine with them, and to sleep at Binfield House; the above minutes were shown to Captain De Brooke, and on the part of the Rev. H. C. De Crespigny he admitted them twice to be correct, with the exception of one word, viz., that for confessed it the words not denied it ought to be substituted." The said defendant, by leave of the court here for this purpose first had and obtained, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, says, that the said plaintiff ought not to have and maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him, because he says that before the publishing of the said parts of the said supposed libel in the said ninth count of the said declaration mentioned, to wit, on the 5th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1827, at, &c., the said Rev. H. C. De Crespigny told the said defendant that he was wrong in supposing that he, the said H. C. De Cres

pigny, had spoken to his father, Sir W. De Crespigny; he had written a letter to him, and that he had his (meaning the said plaintiff's) answer, in which he (meaning the said plaintiff) admitted the fact; and that his (the said H. C. De Crespigny's) wife and himself had the letter; that all the family knew of the intimacy; that his poor brother William, who was dead, was extremely jealous of his father (meaning the said plaintiff), and had been turned out of his house; that his brother Herbert had spoken to his father (meaning the said plaintiff) upon the subject, who had replied that he (meaning the said plaintiff) entreated that so distressing a subject might not be again mentioned to him (meaning to the said plaintiff); and the said H. C. De Crespigny then and there further told the said defendant he thought he was quite right not to allow his children to remain with people so infamously connected. And the said H. C. De Crespigny afterwards, and before publishing the said libel in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., further told the said defendant that he had seen the Misses Long yesterday at their house in Berkshire, and that he, the said H. C. De Crespigny, had directly accused Miss Emma Long with her intrigue, upon which she got so confused that she left the room in the greatest embarrassment; that he then stated to Miss Dora Long that Miss Emma Long had intrigued with his father (meaning the said plaintiff), and that Mr. Wellesley (meaning the said defendant) intended to publish the whole story unless they immediately gave up his children. That Miss Long replied, she had nothing to do with her sister's intrigue, and that she must be responsible for her own conduct, but that no one would believe what Mr. Wellesley said; and the said H. C. De Crespigny assured the said defendant that she never denied her sister's having committed the fault. Mr. De. Crespigny told her his father had not denied it; to which she made no reply, and said she did not wish to see any of Mr. Wellesley's friends within her house; notwithstanding such declaration she invited Mr. De Crespigny to dine with them, and to sleep at Binfield House. And the said defendant further said, that before the publishing the said parts of the said supposed libel in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., certain minutes and statements in writing were made as and for correct minutes and statements of the said communica

tions and representations so made by the said H. C. De Crespigny as aforesaid, and the same were then and there revised and corrected by the said H. C. De Crespigny; and when so revised and corrected contained, and still do contain, the words and matter following, with the interlineations and alterations as follows. (Here followed a statement of the minutes as revised and corrected by the Rev. H. C. De Crespigny. The expression not denied, was substituted for confessed; and the statement, that his mother told him a child had been born, was erased; in other respects the minutes corresponded with the foregoing statements.)

And the said defendant further said, that afterwards, and before the publishing of the said parts of the said supposed libel, in the said ninth count mentioned, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., the said H. C. De Crespigny caused the said minutes and statements, so revised and corrected by him as aforesaid, and containing the words and matter last aforesaid, to be delivered to him, the said defendant, as and for a true and correct statement of the conversation he, the said H. C. De Crespigny, had had with the said defendant as aforesaid; and the said minutes were theretofore, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., shown to the said Captain De Brooke, in the presence of the said Colonel Freemantle, Mr. Saville Lumley, M.P., and Colonel Paterson. And the said defendant further said, that, at the time of the publishing the said parts of the said supposed libel in the said ninth count, and in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, as therein mentioned, he, the said defendant, also published that the same had been so published to him by the said H. C. De Crespigny, therein mentioned as aforesaid; wherefore he, the said defendant, at the said several times, when, &c., in the said ninth count mentioned, did publish of and concerning the said plaintiff the said several parts of the said supposed libel in that count mentioned, as he lawfully might for the cause aforesaid, and this he is ready to verify, &c.

To this plea there was a demurrer; many causes of demurrer were specified and argued; but as the decision turned altogether on the general question, it is unnecessary to state the other points.

Wilde, Serjt., in support of the demurrer. Spankie, Serjt.,

contra.

BEST, C. J. Great industry has been bestowed upon this case