into the store of a Mr. Wentworth, who gave the plaintiff a receipt for them. The plaintiff applied to the defendant for a clearance, in order to transport the ashes to Sackett's Harbor; but the defendant refused to grant it, alleging as a reason for his refusal that though he did not suspect the plaintiff intended to send the ashes to a British port, yet he believed that the collector at Sackett's Harbor would not do his duty, and that the ashes would be sent thence to a British port. The defendant at the same time promised the plaintiff that, if he did not receive instructions to the contrary from the Secretary of the Treasury within a fortnight, he would give a clearance to the plaintiff's ashes. After the expiration of that time, the defendant still refused to grant the clearance, though he admitted that he had received no new instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, nor had he received any instructions forbidding such clearances. He assigned no other reason for his refusal than his suspicion that the collector at Sackett's Harbor would not do his duty; and persisted in refusing a clearance, though the plaintiff offered to give bonds that the ashes should be delivered at Sackett's Harbor. The plaintiff then expressed his desire to take the ashes up the river; but the defendant declared that the plaintiff should not take them from Wentworth's store, unless he gave bonds for double the value of the property, to carry the ashes to Rome, in the county of Oneida, and leave them there, while the embargo continued; that the property was under his jurisdiction and charge; that he had control over all the stores and wharves where ashes were placed, and had employed armed men; and that he had the right to prevent their removal, and would exercise it. Two armed men were stationed near Wentworth's store during two nights, and an armed sentinel was constantly on duty, night and day, at the public store of the collector, within ten rods of Wentworth's store, and in view of it, for the purpose of observing boats, and preventing the removal of the property. The defendant avowed his determination not to permit any ashes to be removed from any of the stores in Oswego. The defendant demanded the ashes in question from Wentworth, who refused to deliver them; but, in order to prevent the defendant from proceeding to extremities, and to satisfy him, Wentworth entered into an agreement with the defendant not to deliver any property from his store without the permission of the defendant.

In the autumn of 1808 the defendant gave a general permission to remove any ashes from Oswego up the river, and thirteen barrels of the potash of the plaintiff were delivered by Wentworth to his order.

On the 13th February, 1809, the defendant gave a written permit to carry the remaining eighty-two barrels of potashes from Oswego to Rome, in the county of Oneida, requiring of the person to whom they were delivered by order of the plaintiff a written report of the ashes, and an oath that the statement was true, and that he did not intend to violate the law.

It was proved that, when the plaintiff applied to the defendant for a clearance to Sackett's Harbor, potashes were worth at that place $180 per ton, and that the expense of transportation was $ per ton. That the price of potashes on the 21st July, 1808, in the city of New York, was $173 per ton, but would not sell at Salina, in the county of Onondaga, for more than $150. That when the plaintiff received the ashes, the price of them, in the city of Albany, was $173.50, and the expense of transportation from $25 to $30 per ton.

The Chief Justice charged the jury that, in his opinion, there was sufficient evidence of a conversion by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the difference in the value of the ashes at the time when he demanded a clearance and at the time he received them. And the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, for $1,472.20.

A case was made for the opinion of the court, which it was agreed might be turned into a special verdict.

Gold, for the plaintiff. Cady, contra.

PER CURIAM. The only point made in this case is, whether there was sufficient evidence of a conversion to justify the verdict.

There were declarations and acts of the defendant united to form a control over the plaintiff's property. The very denial of goods to him that has a right to demand them, says Lord Holt, in Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod. 212, is a conversion; for what is a conversion but an assuming upon one's self the property and right of disposing of another's goods? And he that takes upon himself to detain another man's goods from him without a cause, takes upon himself the right of disposing of them. The bare denial to deliver is not always a conversion, as in Thimblethorpe's Case (cited in

Bulst. 310, 314), where a piece of timber was left upon the land of the defendant by the lessee at the expiration of his term, and he was requested to deliver it and refused, but suffered the timber to lie without intermeddling with it. The reason why this was held not to be a conversion was, that there was no act done or dominion exercised; but in the present case there were the highest and most unequivocal acts of dominion and control over the property; not only by claiming jurisdiction over it, but in placing armed men near it to prevent its removal. This fact is of itself a conversion. It is intermeddling with the property in the most decisive manner, and detaining it for months in the storehouse. It was, therefore, bringing a charge upon the plaintiff; and this, says Mr. Justice Buller, in Syeds v. Hay, 4 Term Rep. 260, amounts to a conversion. Neither the case of M'Combie v. Davies, 6 East, 538, nor the anonymous case in 12 Mod. 344, were so strong as this, and yet the conversion was maintained. It was assuming the dominion of the property which was made by Lord Ellenborough the test of the conversion, though the property in that case lay not in the defendant's, but in the king's warehouse. The definition of a conversion in trover, as given by Mr. Gwillim, the editor of Bacon, and now a judge in India, applies precisely to this case. 6 Bac. Abr. 677. "The action being founded upon a conjunct right of property and possession, any act of the defendant," says he, " which negatives, or is inconsistent with such right, amounts in law to a conversion. It is not necessary to a conversion that there should be a manual taking of the thing in question by the defendant; it is not necessary that it should be shown that he has applied it to his own use. Does he exercise a dominion over it in exclusion or in defiance of the plaintiff's right? If he does, that is, in law, a conversion, be it for his own or another person's use."

We are, therefore, of opinion that the motion to set aside the verdict must be denied. Motion denied.

LOESCHMAN v. MACHIN.

(2 Stark. 311. King's Bench, Nisi Prius, Hilary Term, 1822.)

The hirer of a piano, who sends it to an auctioneer to be sold, is guilty of a conversion; and so is the auctioneer who refuses, unless the expense incurred be first paid, to deliver it up.

THIS was an action of trover, brought to recover the value of two piano-fortes.

The plaintiff was a maker of piano-fortes, and the defendant was an auctioneer. The plaintiff had lent one of the pianos, the larger, to a person of the name of Brown, whose wife was a musical teacher, on hire, for which Brown was to pay at the rate of 188. per month, if he kept it for the whole year; and if for a less period, he was to pay a guinea per month. With respect to the other piano, it did not appear very clearly on what terms it had been delivered by the plaintiff to Brown, whether upon hire, or that he might dispose of it for the plaintiff. Brown had sent both these pianos to the defendant, to be sold by auction, and he, upon the plaintiff's application to deliver the pianos to him, refused to deliver them unless the plaintiff would pay the amount of certain expenses which had been incurred.

ABBOTT, J., in summing up to the jury, said, I wish you to find whether the smaller piano was let on hire, or sent to be sold by Brown, if an opportunity offered; this is a question of fact for your consideration; and although I am of opinion that it will make no difference as to the verdict, it will give the party an opportunity of making the distinction. The general rule is, that if a man buy goods, or take them on pledge, and they turn out to be the property of another, the owner has a right to take them out of the hands of the purchaser; except, indeed, in the case of a sale in market overt. With that exception, it is incumbent on the purchaser to see that the vendee has a good title. And I am of opinion that if goods be let on hire, although the person who hires them has the possession of them, for the special purpose for which they are lent; yet, if he send them to an auctioneer to be sold, he is guilty of a conversion of the goods; and that if the auctioneer afterwards refuse to deliver them to the owner, unless

he will pay a sum of money which he claims, he is also guilty of a conversion.

The jury found that the smaller piano had been sent to Brown for the purpose of sale, and the plaintiff had a verdict for the value of both the pianos.

Leave was given to Marryatt, for the defendant, to move the point.

Scarlett and Campbell, for the plaintiff. Marryatt and Chitty, for the defendant.

DONALD v. SUCKLING.

(Law R. 1 Q. B. 585. Queen's Bench, England, July, 1866.)

Detinue. Repledge of pledge. A. deposited debentures with B. as a security for the payment, at maturity, of a bill indorsed by A. and discounted by B., on the agreement that B. should have power to sell or otherwise dispose of the debentures if the bill should not be paid when due; before the maturity of the bill, B. deposited the debentures with C., to be kept by him as security until the repayment of a loan from C. to B. larger than the amount of the bill. The bill was dishonored; and while it still remained unpaid, A. brought detinue against C. for the debentures. Held (by Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn and Mellor, JJ., Shee, J., dissenting), that the repledge by B. to C. did not put an end to the contract of pledge between A. and B., and B.'s interest and right of detainer under it; and that A., therefore, could not maintain detinue without having paid or tendered the amount of the bill.

DECLARATION. That the defendant detained from the plaintiff his securities for money, that is to say, four debentures of the British Slate Company, Limited, for 2001. each, and the plaintiff claimed a return of the securities, or their value, and 1,000l. for their detention.

Plea. That before the alleged detention the plaintiff deposited the debentures with one J. A. Simpson, as security for the due payment at maturity of a bill of exchange, dated 25th August, 1864, payable six months after date, and drawn by the plaintiff, and accepted by T. Sanders, and indorsed by the plaintiff to and discounted by Simpson, and upon the agreement then come to between the plaintiff and Simpson, that Simpson should have full power to sell or otherwise dispose of the debentures if the bill was not paid when it became due. That the bill had not been