reversing a judgment of Bailhache, J. (123 L. T. Rep. 650; (1920) 3 K.B., 608). The action was brought by the respondent against the appellant to recover damages for breach of covenants contained in a lease dated in 1898, of a dwelling-house and lands, and £98 2s. 6d. rent for the premises for the quarter ending the 25th March 1919. The lease contained a covenant by the lessee to keep the premises in repair, and yield them up in repair on the determination of the lease, and a covenant by the lessee to keep the premises insured against fire in the joint names of lessor and lessee, and in case of destruction or damage by fire to lay out all insurance money received in rebuilding, etc. On the 29th Jan. 1918 the Secretary for War took possession of the house and part of the land for the purpose of housing German war prisoners. On the 12th Feb. 1919 the house, while so occupied, was destroyed by fire. The lease expired by effluxion of time on the 25th March 1919. The military authority gave up possession to the respondent in June 1919. Bailhache, J. held there was no eviction by title paramount, and he gave judgment for the respondent for the quarter's rent. On the claim for damages for breach of covenants, he gave judgment for the appellant on the ground that their performance had become impossible by operation of law. The Court of Appeal (Atkin, L.J. dissenting), held that the appellant continued liable under the covenants to repair and to reinstate, and directed an inquiry as to damages. The appellant appealed. The House of Lords took time to consider their judgment. Held, that the appeal should be dismissed. Lord Buckmaster said that there were two defences, namely (1) that the lessees had been evicted by title or by authority which they could not withstand; and (2) that they were prevented by superior force from performance of the covenant to repair, and therefore ought to be excused for its breach. In his Lordship's opinion both defences failed. The lessee had not been evicted by title paramount, and he remained liable on his covenants, although deprived of the term by the exercise of legal powers. As regards the second defence, his Lordship held that a terminable occupation by military authorities during an uncertain time, for which compensation may prove to be recoverable, constituted no answer to the obligations of the repairing covenants. It was unnecessary, therefore, to express any opinion about the covenants to insure and to apply the insurance money in reinstating the premises. The other noble lords concurred in dismissing the appeal. Emergency legislation-Landlord and tenant-Possession-Trespass -Statutory tenancy-Country cottage occupied occasionallyTenancy for term certain-Premises required for whole-time servant of tenant-Damages-Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 17), ss. 5, 12, 15. Appeal by the defendant from a decision of Darling, J. The plaintiffs, two ladies with permanent residences in London, entered into an agreement with the defendant, who owned an estate in Hampshire, to take a small cottage for one year certain at £8 per annum, and at the end of that year the tenancy was extended for another year certain. The plaintiffs only occupied the cottage during holidays and at occasional week-end visits, otherwise it remained empty. At the end of the second year the defendant refused to extend the tenancy unless the rent was raised, and the plaintiffs refused to pay a higher rent, but tendered a year's rent at the original rate, which was refused. The plaintiffs having refused to obey a notice to quit, the defendant during their absence re-entered, took possession, and proposed to re-let the cottage to a lessee of the shooting rights on the estate, who required it for an under-gamekeeper in his employment. The plaintiffs then sued the defendant for damages for trespass, and claimed an injunction to restrain him from interfering with their furniture. The defendant counterclaimed for possession. Darling, J. held that the plaintiffs were statutory tenants under the Increase of Rent, &c. (Restrictions) Act 1920 and not trespassers, and that the defendant was not entitled to exercise his common law right of re-entry, and gave judgment on the claim for £60 damages for trespass. On the counter-claim he held that the defendant was entitled to an order for possession on the ground that he reasonably required the premises for a whole time servant of his shooting tenant, within sect. 5 (1) (d) of the Act. The defendant appealed from the judgment on the claim, and contended that the Act did not apply to tenancies for fixed terms expiring by effluxion of time, and that the landlord could exercise his common law right of re-entry in circumstances such that the court would make an order for possession in his favour, and further, that the damages awarded were excessive. Held, that the appeal must be dismissed as the judgment of Darling, J. was right in law, but that he was not justified, on the evidence, in awarding £60 damages, there being no circumstances of aggravation, and that they must be reduced to £10. [Cruise v. Terrell. Ct. of App.: Lord Sterndale, M.R., Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ. Feb. 15.-Counsel: J. H. Menzies; J. B. Melville. Solicitors: R. H. Behrend and Co; W. Ewart Craigen.] Landlord and tenant-Tenancy from year to year-Tenancy for year certain-Right to perpetual renewal for one year-Notice to quitAcceptance of rent after alleged expiration of tenancy Claim for declaration without consequential relief. 66 By agreement in writing dated the 23rd March 1917 M. let certain premises to S. for one year from the 25th March 1917 with proviso that "the tenant shall have the same right to continue on the same terms as a tenant of the demised premises for a further period of two years calculated from the 25th March 1918 but the tenant shall give two months' notice to the landlord as to whether he will continue the tenancy or not." The agreement provided that it should be binding upon the parties, their executors administrators and assigns. On the 4th Jan. 1918 S. wrote to M.: "I do not care to bind myself for a further definite period of two years, and I shall be glad to know whether you will be agreeable to my continuing for another year from the 25th March 1918 with the option to continue for a further year from the 25th March 1919 upon the same terms upon giving you notice two months before the 25th March 1919," to which M. replied, "I shall be pleased to accept your terms for one year certain from the 25th March and the option to continue upon the same terms as before." In Jan. 1919 S. wrote referring to his option to renew for one year from March 1919 and adding: "I should be disposed to exercise that option if you will now give me an option to continue after the 25th March 1920 from year to year on the same terms, provided that each year before the 25th March I give you one month's notice of my intention to continue." M. accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the notice should be two months in the event of the tenant's desiring to leave; and an agreement was drawn up by S., who was a solicitor, and signed, but was not under seal, in which it was agreed that the landlord " (M.) hereby grants the tenant (S.) "the option to continue the tenancy after the 25th March 1920 from year to year on the same terms as are contained in the above written agreement, provided that in each year before the 25th March the tenant gives one month's notice in writing of his intention to continue the tenancy, and that in the event that the tenant desires to leave the premises and put an end to the above agreement on any 25th day of March in any year he will give two months' notice of that his intention." M., who was an old lady, and was not independently advised in the matter, in 1920 sold her interest in the property to G., and on the 21st Sept. 1920 G. gave S. notice to quit on the 25th March 1921. On the 6th Jan. 1921 S. gave formal notice to continue his tenancy for a further year under the terms of the agreement. G. brought this action for a declaration that upon the true construction of the agreement S. was not entitled to a perpetual right of renewal of his tenancy, and that the tenancy was effectually determined by the notice to quit. S. counterclaimed a declaration that as tenant from year to year " he was entitled to the right of renewal during the continuance of the ground lease under which M. had held the property. After the expiration of the notice, G. accepted rent from S. Younger, L.J. (this last stated faot not having been mentioned in the Court below) sitting for Astbury, J. gave judgment for G., holding that a perpetual right of renewal was repugnant to a strict tenancy from year to year, which was the tenancy existing here, and, in the event of a lease purporting to give such a right, must be rejected. The provisions as to notice by the tenant to continue or to determine the tenancy were no indication that the landlord could not terminate it by notice in the ordinary way. S. appealed. Held, on appeal, that although a right of perpetual renewal was inconsistent with a tenancy from year to year, yet the use of the words "from year to year" in the correspondence and the agreement did not constitute such a tenancy; a continuance of the tenancy from year to year with the usual incidence of such a tenancy not being the governing part of the clause, and the words "from year to year not being used in their technical sense. Further, by accepting rent from S. after the expiration of the notice to quit G. had deprived the notice of any effect it ever could have had. As S. however, had asked for a declaration without asking for specific performance of the agreement no declaration would be made in his favour. [Gray v. Spyer. Ct. of App. : Lord Sterndale, M.R., Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ. Feb. 8, 9, and March 22.Counsel for the appellant, Hildyard, K.C., and Roope Reeve; for the respondent, Micklem, K.C. and Copping. Solicitors: Guedalla, Jacobson, and Spyer; H. J. S. Woodhouse and Co.] Nuisance-Defective wall adjoining highway-Injury to child playing in yard adjoining highway-Child not exercising right to use highway -Right of action. Appeal from a decision of Sir William Finlay, K.C., in an action tried by him as commissioner of Assize at Lancaster. The plaintiff, who was a little girl, claimed to recover damages for negligence in the following circumstances. She went to stay with her grandmother, whose husband was the licensee and tenant of an hotel, the yard of which was separated from the highway by a low wall consisting partly of vertical flagstones and being 3 ft. 6 in. in height. While the plaintiff was playing in the yard with other children she was injured by the fall of one of the flagstones upon which she had placed her hand and which was defective owing to the fact that the clamps between it and the adjoining stones had rusted away. As a result of the accident it was necessary for one of her legs to be amputated below the knee. The landlords had covenanted to keep the premises in structural repair, and this action was commenced against them for damages for negligence on the ground that the wall was out of repair. The defendant landlords contended that they were under no duty to the plaintiff and the learned Commissioner decided that, while they were not liable on the ground of negligence, they were liable on the ground that the conditions of the wall constituted a public nuisance to persons using the highway. The defendants appealed. Held, that, while it was clear that there was no contractual relation between the parties to the action and that the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of negligence, any right of action which the plaintiff would have in nuisance was that arising out of interference with her right to use the highway; that there was no evidence that she was using or going to use the highway at all, when the accident happened; that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for a nuisance of this nature when she was not actually using the highway; and that the appeal must be allowed. [Bromley v. Mercer. Ct. of App.: Lord Sterndale, M.R., and Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ. March 24.-Counsel: GreavesLord, K.C. and Lustgarten; Wingate-Saul, K.C. and C. L. S. Holt. Solicitors: W. C. Greenop and Co.; Smith and Fazackerley, Preston.] CHANCERY DIVISION Emergency legislation-Winding-up of English business of foreign company-Enemy taint-Non-fulfilment of agreement with manager of English branch —Claim for remuneration or damages—Liability of Controller-Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act 1916 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 105), s. 1 (1). By an agreement made on the 28th March 1913, A. was engaged as manager of the Newcastle branch office of a company formed under Dutch law, with its head office at Rotterdam, and with branch offices in other countries. He was engaged at a remuneration of £1000 per annum, which was to last until the 30th June 1918. The fulfilment of the obligations of the company under this agreement was guaranteed by another foreign concern. On the 14th Aug. 1916 an order of the Board of Trade was made under sect. 1 (1) of the Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act 1916, that the business carried on in England by the company (which was not free from " enemy taint ") should be wound up. The services of A. were retained by the Controller until the 31st Aug. 1916, up to which date he was paid at the rate of £1000 per annum. A. claimed to retain as against the Controller £1612 78. belonging to the company, on deposit at a bank in his name, alleging that he was entitled to retain it as against his claim against the company for damages for breach of the agreement of the 28th March 1913. This sum was by agreement invested in 1917 in War Stock. The Controller issued this summons for the determination of the question whether the executors of A. (who died in 1920) were entitled to have transferred to them the funds above referred to. Held, that the debt was a debt of the Vulcaan Company and not of the British business of the company; that, while it was not proposed to decide the question whether the order of the 14th Aug. 1916 operated to determine the agreement of the 28th March 1913, the case would be dealt with on the footing that the order did operate so as to determine that agreement; that to admit A.'s claim would be to allow him to set off against this asset of the business or against the Controller a claim which he could not assert against the business or the assets of the business, and that he could only assert it against the company which for this purpose was a third party; that it was still open for A.'s executors to take such steps as they might be advised in establishing their claim against the company in Holland or its guarantors; and that the Controller must reject the claim for damages and the claim for transfer to the executors of the fund in question. [Re Vulcaan Coal Company. Ch. Div.: Russell, J. Feb. 10, 17; March 9.-Counsel: Clauson, K.C. and H. A. Rose (Farwell with him); Gavin T. Simonds. Solicitors: Field, Roscoe, and Co.; Doyle, Devonshire, and Co., for Walter Molineux, Newcastle-onTyne; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.] Will-Settled legacies and shares of residue-Forfeiture clauseDivisibility-Repetition of word "shall " before "become bankrupt -Ejusdem generis Assignment-On trusts of will-Exception of interests liable to forfeiture. E. E. who died on the 13th Aug. 1896 by his will dated the 10th May 1895 bequeathed three sums of £20,000 each to be held by the plaintiff trustees upon trusts for the benefit of his three sons, one of whom was L. H. E., who died on the 15th Oct. 1914, and directed his trustees to stand possessed of the ultimate residue, after payment of funeral expenses and debts, in trust (but subject to the provisions thereinafter contained) for such of his children as being sons should attain the age of twenty-five years or being daughters should attain the age of twenty-one years or marry under that age, and if more than one in equal shares. "But I declare that if any son of mine shall, either after my death and before attaining the age of twenty-five years, or at any time during my life, assign or charge his share or expectant share in the said residuary trust moneys or any part thereof, or shall become bankrupt or do or suffer any other thing whereby the said share or expectant share if payable to him absolutely or any part thereof respectively might or would become payable or forfeited to or vested in any other person, then, and in such case, the said share or expectant share shall not be payable to him upon attaining the age of twenty-five years or at all, but the same shall forthwith fall into and form part of my residuary estate and be divided accordingly in the same manner as if such son had died in my lifetime without having been married." L. H. E., by a settlement dated the 15th Nov. 1899 on his first marriage, as he was empowered, requested the trustees to hold the £20,000, less £1000 paid to him, upon the same trusts as were declared concerning the same in the testator's will and appointed that if his wife survived him she should receive the income until her death or remarriage, and that should there be issue of the marriage one moiety of the income should be paid to her during her life. The wife of L. H. E. died in 1901, leaving issue of their marriage the last defendant, L. A. E., who attained twenty-one, pending the hearing of the summons. L. H. E. by a revocable deed poll dated the 25th June 1912 in pursuance of an agreement of the 24th June 1912 affirmed by an order of the court of the 29th July 1912, appointed, subject and without prejudice to the trusts during his life or to his power to appoint any interest in the premises to any wife surviving him during her life or any less period or to any exercise of such last mentioned power, that the investments or additions thereto representing the £20,000 legacy should be held in trust for the last defendant L. H. E. By deed dated the 14th Aug. 1912, indorsed on the settlement of 1899, between L. H. E. and the settlement trustees in pursuance of an amended agreement of the 24th July 1912 between L. A. E., and the settlement trustees for raising a sum out of the settlement funds to meet pressing liabilities of L. H. E., and for the purpose of giving effect to an order of Joyce, J., of the 24th July 1912, L. H. E. assigned to the trustees his interests in reversion, expectancy, contingency or otherwise under the testator's will or in the residuary estate of the testator "and not being an interest determinable or liable to forfeiture upon or in the event of bankruptcy, assignment or alienation or any like event," upon the trusts of the settlement and the deed poll declared of the residue of the stocks specified in the settlement so as to form one fund with the settled trust premises except that if no issue of L. H. E. should attain a vested interest then subject and without prejudice to trusts or powers exercisable by the trustees in favour of L. H. E. " or any wife or issue in trust for L. H. E. absolutely. Held, the settled legacy and share of residue of the deceased son being divisible into sevenths in which the representatives of such son were entitled to participate, that the forfeiture clause in the testator E. E.'s will could not be split up into the earlier part referring to assignments during the testator's life and before a son attained twenty-five and the later part after the words or shall" and the interests of L. H. E., in the events and circumstances had not become liable to forfeiture, within the meaning of the testator's will and such interests passed to the trustees of the marriage settlement of 1899. [Re Escombe; Escombe v. Halliday. Ch. Div. Eve, J. March 17.-Counsel: W. P. Spens; Edward Clayton, K.C. and R. R. Formoy; Gover, K.C., and Dighton Pollock; Courthope Wilson, K.C. and Greenland. Solicitors: Charles A. Brown; Batten, Proffitt and Scott; Nisbet, Drew, and Loughborough.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION Defence of the realm-National emergency-Coal strike-Detention of ship loading coal-Admiralty orders-Claim by charterers for compensation Claim against the Crown Regulation 39BBB Defence of the Realm Regulations—Indemnity Act 1920 ( 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 48), 8. 2. In 1920, the suppliants were engaged in carrying coal from South Wales for the French railways. By a time charter-party they had hired the steamship N., the rate of hire being £279 a day. In Oct. 1920, the steamship N. was at Cardiff loading coal for Nantes. She had nearly finished loading when the coal strike broke out. The naval transport officer, acting under Admiralty instructions given by virtue of their powers under the emergency reg. 39BBB ordered the N. to go out to Barry Roads and lie there and wait for further orders. The vessel obeyed and was detained in Barry Roads for eighteen days, and was then allowed to proceed on her voyage to France. The suppliants then applied to the Shipping Controller for compensation for the detention, for bunker coal burnt while waiting for orders, extra wages and other expenses arising by reason of the detention. But the Shipping Controller replied that, as the vessel had not been actually under requisition he could not pay any compensation. The suppliants thereupon brought a petition of right claiming from the Crown damages for the detention of their vessel. They alleged that they were requested by the Admiralty to let the N. lie in Barry Roads, and that they assented and that from such request and assent, there arose an implied promise by the Admiralty to indemnify them against loss. On behalf of the Crown it was contended that there was no contract whatever between the Crown and the suppliants. Reg. 39BBB provides for the payment of compensation for a requisitioned ship, but not for a ship under orders or detained as the N. was. The suppliants were not in possession of the vessel nor had they a lien on her. They had only a contractual right to order her master to perform voyages with her for their benefit and profit. Held, (1), that there was no implied contract with regard to the payment of compensation for the loss due to the detention of the ship; (2) that the suppliants had no right of compensation under reg. 39BBB or at common law; (3) that if the suppliants were entitled to any compensation under the Indemnity Act 1920, their only tribunal was the one set up by that Act, namely, the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission. [Federated Coal and Shipping Company Limited v. The King. K. B. Div.: Bailhache, J. March 17, 24.-Counsel: R. A. Wright, K.C. and Le Quesne; Sir Ernest Pollock (A.-G.) and G. W. Ricketts. Solicitors: Botterell and Roche; Solicitor to Board of Trade.] PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION Probate Business Practice Re-sealing grants of administration by the High Court of Northern Ireland-Probate and Letters of Administration (Ireland) Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 79) s. 95-Government of Ireland Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67), ss. 38, 40, 41 (1), 61—Government of Ireland Order in Council of 21st Nov. 1921-Colonial Probates Act 1892 (55 Vict. c. 6), s. 1. This was an application by motion on behalf of the executors for the court's directions as to the proper procedure in regard to the re-sealing here of a grant of probate by the High Court of Northern Ireland in view of a refusal by the registry to re-seal the Irish grant otherwise than under the Colonial Probates Act 1892. It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the Colonial Probates Act 1892 could by the terms of sect. I thereof only apply if made applicable by an Order in Council, and that no such order had in fact been made. By virtue of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, ss. 38, 40, 41 (1), 61, the High Court of Northern Ireland has in regard to Northern Ireland taken the place of the former High Court of Justice for Ireland, and the provisions of the Probate and Letters of Administration (Ireland) Act 1857, s. 95, as to the re-sealing here of grants by the Court of Probate in Ireland should be read as now applying to grants by the High Court of Northern Ireland. Held, that this contention was correct, and that the grant should be re-sealed. Questions of security which might arise on a grant of administration would be dealt with when they arose. [In the Goods of Robert Gault. Prob. Div.: Sir Henry Duke, P. March 24.-Counsel: Sidney Isaacs (with him Richard O'Sullivan). Solicitor: Herbert Z. Deane.] Mr. Frederick Walter Atkey, solicitor, of Sackville-street, Piccadilly, left estate of the gross value of £20,038. Mr. John Henry Chalmers, of Cavendish-place, Bath, retired solicitor, left estate of the gross value of £16,703. Mr. Arthur Mackay Ellis, solicitor, of Cambridge, left estate of the gross value of £26.258. Mr. Edgar Thomas Woodhead, barrister-at-law, B.A., LL.B., of Huddersfield, left estate of the gross value of £6392. Mr. Charles Henry Harper, solicitor, of Birmingham, left estate of the gross value of £9485. LAW LIBRARY BOOKS RECEIVED International Law Association Report 1921. 2 vols. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane, W.C. 2. Price £2 10s. net. Butterworth's Twentieth Century Statutes 1921. Vol. 17. Butterworth and Co. Bell-yard, Temple Bar, W.C. Price 28s. 6d, Wright's Office of Magistrate. Fifth Edition. Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar, W.C. Price 6s. net. Dicey and Keith on the Conflict of Laws. Third Edition. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane, W.C. 2; Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane, W.C. 2. Price £2 5s. Spencer on Law and Business. Vol. I. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. Clunet's Le survol et l'atterrissage en territoire étranger dans l'état actuel du droit aérien positif. Libraire de la Cour de Cassation, 27, Place Dauphin, Paris. Clunet's Des Mariages Devant les Consuls Etrangers dans les rapports de la France avec l'Angleterre et divers pays étrangers. Libraire de la Cour de Cassation, 27, Place Dauphin, Paris. Evans and Jones on the Law and Practice as to Fidelity Guarantees. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited, Parker-street, Kingsway, W.C. 2. Price 6s. net. 10.30 a.m. April 3, at Burnley, Monday, April 10 Derby, Thursday, April 6 Grantham, Monday, April 10, 12 noon. Grimsby, Tuesday, April 11 Guildford, Saturday, April 8 Hastings, Friday, April 7 Huddersfield, Tuesday, April 11, at 10.30 Ipswich, Thursday, April 6, at 10.30 a.m. King's Lynn, Thursday, April 13 Leeds, Wednesday, April 12 Leicester, Monday, April 3 Lincoln, Saturday, April 8, at 10 a.m. Liverpool, Thursday, April 20 Maidstone, Saturday, April 8 Margate, Monday, April 24 Middlesbrough, Friday, April 7 April 7 Tyne, Friday, Northampton, Tuesday, April 11 Salisbury, Monday, April 3, at 2 Wolverhampton, Friday, April 7. DISPOSAL OF DEAD BODIES TO PREVENT INQUESTS AT the last Staffordshire Assizes, Mr. Justice Avory had before him a case in which James Osbourne (30), carter, and Ethel Osbourne (29), his wife, were indicted for disposing of the dead body of a female child by putting it in the canal at Perry Barr between the 17th Nov. and the 14th Dec. last with intent to prevent the holding of a coroner's inquest upon the body. Both prisoners pleaded not guilty. Mr. J. Wylie prosecuted; Mr. A. W. Cockburn appeared for the male prisoner, and Mr. T. P. Haslam for the female prisoner. At the close of the case for the prosecution Mr. Cockburn submitted that there was no evidence to support the charge of disposing with intent to avoid an inquest. There were only two cases he could find upon the subject, both a few years before the Coroners Act 1887. He thought it was clear from them, as well as from the statement in Archbold, that the real offence was the disposing of the body when and after the coroner had come to hear of the circumstances and had made up his mind to hold an inquest, and the accused knew that. Both the reported cases were cases of that kind where the coroner had notified the prisoners that he was going to hold the inquest, and they then made away with the body so that the jury could not view it. Mr. Cockburn cited the case of Reg. v. Stephenson (52 L. T. Rep. 267; 13 Q. B. Div. 331), in which it was held to be a common law misdemeanour "to burn or otherwise dispose of a dead body with intent thereby to prevent the holding upon such body of an intended coroner's inquest, and so to obstruct the coroner in the execution of his duty in a case where the coroner had jurisdiction to hold and was justified in holding an inquest, if he honestly believed the information given him to be true." The case referred to was one in which defendants were charged with having burned the dead body of a child with intent to prevent the holding of an inquest, and the police had communicated to the coroner the fact of the death of the child and he had come to the conclusion that it was his duty to hold an inquest. The coroner accordingly appointed the afternoon of the following day for the holding of such inquest, and of this the defendants had knowledge on the Monday evening. His Lordship: And the judgment proceeds on that ground. Mr. Cockburn: The judgment proceeds upon that ground. Mr. Justice Stephen said that the offence was committed if a person destroys a dead body or removes it to prevent an inquest being held if the inquest intended to be held was one that might legally be held. The other case proceeded on similar lines. The learned counsel also cited the case of Reg. v. Price (15 Cox C.C. 389; 12 Q. B. p. 247), and said he desired to make the further point that it was an essential ingredient of the offence that the circumstances should be such that an inquest ought to be held, and that ingredient ought to be stated in the indictment. Here it was not. His Lordship asked if it was not clear that it was the duty of a coroner to hold an inquest in a case where death had either been caused by violence or where the cause of death was unknown. His Lordship asked if it was not those two grounds upon which a coroner was called upon to hold an inquest. Mr. Cockburn submitted that there was no evidence here that the death of the child was violent or unnatural; in fact, it was agreed that it was a natural death. He referred to sect. 3 of the Coroners Act 1887. His Lordship: Was not this a case where the death was unknown? Can there be any doubt that this body, when recovered from the canal, in the ordinary course would have been taken to the mortuary and there would have been a coroner's inquest upon it? Mr. Cockburn said he did not think he could contest that, but it did not touch his point that the offence did not arise until the coroner had made up his mind to hold an inquest. His Lordship: You say it is an ingredient of the offence that the coroner must have already determined to hold an inquest, but is it not sufficient if the case is one in which the coroner would in the ordinary course hold an inquest? How can a coroner make up his mind to hold an inquest in a case where a person has disposed of the body to avoid an inquest? Mr. Cockburn: I don't think he can, but it is a question whether it is an offence in law. Counsel proceeded to quote Mr. Justice Stephen's judgment, and said: "It seems a very much wider proposition to say that poor and ignorant people are to be taken to know exactly when an inquest is properly to be held and to know all about inquests. If they have been told that an inquest is going to be held and then make away with the body, it is a different thing." The Judge: Those cases do not appear to me to decide that it must be proved that the accused has had notice that an inquest is going to be held. That is your proposition, I understand? Mr. Cockburn: The whole basis of the offence is rather shadowy. It is supposed to be a common law offence, but there does not seem any authority, nor does there seem to be any case since this one. I am told by the learned associate that this is only the second case that has been on this circuit within his long memory. Mr. P. T. Haslam (for the female prisoner) quoted from the judgment of Mr. Justice Stephen in the case of the Reg. v. Price (ubi sup.), in which his Lordship said it involved a legal question, and one of such interest that he proposed to state the law on the subject. His Lordship said he understood that point, but in that particular case there was notice to the accused that an inquest was going to be held. Mr. Haslam said that in both the cases quoted notice was given, and he could not find any case where notice was not given. His Lordship: The question is, Mr. Haslam, whether it is not time that there was one. Mr. Haslam pointed out that it was essential to the offence that the inquest proposed to be held was one that ought to be held. His Lordship: That is the difficulty you have not got over. What do you say, Mr. Wylie? Mr. Wylie said he had looked into the law, but he could find no further authorities beyond those which his two learned friends had cited. He left the matter in his Lordship's hands in this way-if he thought that this particular count ought not to be gone on with, then he raised no objection. His Lordship: It would be useless to raise any objection. Mr. Cockburn said that in the Reg. v. Stephenson (ubi sup.) Mr. Justice Grove said that the case referred to was absolutely in point, but there were many cases which showed that interference with statutory duties and preventing their performance was a misdemeanour in common law. A coroner who intends, on a reasonable ground, to hold an inquest should not be prevented from doing so. His Lordship: This is merely an illustration of the well-known principle that judgments must be read according to the subject matter of the cases to which they belong, and in those cases it is obvious that the learned judges gave judgment only on the facts of those cases. It is plain-in effect they said it was plain-that in a case where a coroner gives notice of his intention to hold an inquest it is obviously a common law misdemeanour for anybody to dispose of the body so as to prevent it, but that does not include the whole question as to whether it may be an offence for a person to dispose of a body with intent to avoid an inquest which will probably be held if they do not dispose of that body. That is the difficulty. But I happen to remember that when the Indictment Act was framed, and the rules under it, a form was given for this very offence as an example of common law misdemeanour, and as I am partly responsible for these forms which were then settled, I will call attention to them, and the actual words of them. It is Form 31: "A. B. on the day of intending to prevent the coroner of from holding an inquest in the execution of his duty upon view of the dead body of who died a violent or unnatural death or a sudden death of which the cause was unknown, did bury the said body in a certain place." There you see the form required that there should be a statement that the child or the body which has been disposed of was the body of the person who died a violent or unnatural death of which the cause was unknown. In my opinion that is an essential statement for the purpose of this offence. I am not prepared to hold that those two cases which have been cited embrace the whole law on the subject. I am certainly not prepared to hold that it is necessary to prove in such a case that the coroner has given notice of his intention to hold an inquest, and when the proper opportunity arises I should be prepared to express my opinion upon a case like the present, where in the ordinary course the inquest will be held and the body is disposed of so as to prevent the holding of an inquest. But on looking at the indictment in this case I am satisfied that this count does not sufficiently state the offence, but merely alleges that these persons did dispose of the dead body of the said child with intent to obstruct a coroner's inquest. There is no statement that the child had died an unnatural death, or a violent death, or a death the cause of which was unknown. There is nothing, therefore, to show that it was a case in which a coroner's inquest would in the ordinary course be holden. On that ground I must hold that the count does not sufficiently disclose a common law offence, reserving my judgment on the other points if and whenever they arise. His Lordship added that he quashed the count. On a charge of neglecting an elder chila the jury returned verdict of guilty against both prisoners, who were each sentenced to two months imprisonmnt with hard labour. LEGISLATION Sedition and Blasphemy Two somewhat remarkable little Bills are due for early consideration in the House of Commons. They are presented by persons standing for widely variant schools of thought. The first of these makes it a special offence to teach children under sixteen, by means of spoken words uttered with a seditious intent, or to read to them or distribute to them any written or printed document, or to print publish, sell, distribute or possess for these purposes documents advocating or inciting to the commission of seditious offences. The maximum penalty on summary conviction is imprisonment up to three months and a fine of £50. It is rather noticeable that the framers of these sub-sections do not attempt to deal with sedition by way of pictures, still or otherwise. The definition of “seditious intent" is intended to collate into a brief shape the common law and judicial decisions now on the books. It will apply to those who bring into contempt or hatred or who sow dissatisfaction against the Crown and Constitution or the administration of justice, or who incite the attempt by unlawful means to alter the form of government legally established, or who seek to foster ill will and hostility between class and class. If one compares this classification with that to be found in the books it will be seen that unlawful efforts to alter matters in the Established Church are not included with those relating to the established government. Nor is there any unambiguous and direct reference to incitement to disturb the peace (Cf. Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law). It has been held by various decisions that there is no seditious intent where efforts are made to show that the Government is in error and that defects should be remedied, or to kindle a response to a demand for reforms, pointing out for these purposes that feelings of dissatisfaction are being provoked by reason of these defects. Persons who try and steer too close to the wind in these matters should remember that the courts will interpret a man's intentions by the consequences which must naturally result from his words and acts under their particular circumstances. Again, in these complicated days when public duties call, at times, for some plain speaking, it may be usefully noted that the publication of documents in this country to disturb some foreign government does not constitute a seditious libel: (R. v. Antonelli, 70 J. P. 4). On the other hand, since matters are so complex it would be well to consider that matters unobjectionable in normal times may well have sinister effects to-day and be judged with a jealous eye. This particular Bill aims at a well-known modern development of extreme teaching provided for a very impressionable and inexperienced class of mind, but it is not certain whether these disabilities cease to exist precisely at the age of sixteen. Legislation on this subject is not a novelty. There was some passed in the reign of George III., and in 1817, and, in the case of Ireland, during some of the Roman Catholic disturbances there were measures against sedition until 1848. The Blasphemy Bill is of a very different character. It proposes that no criminal proceedings be instituted against any person for schism, heresy, blasphemy, blasphemous libel or atheism, and its effect would be to repeal legislation dating back from the time of Edward I. down to 1888. No one in these days would seek to impair the very necessary freedom for fair argument, especially in matters religious, but a community needs protection from indecent reviling. A calm, dispassionate argument against Christianity would in these days scarcely admit of a prosecution. It might indeed prove a great tonic. It is, however, otherwise with contumacious reproach, profane scoffing or the exposure of what to many minds is a sacred thing to ridicule, contempt and derision: vide per Mr. Justice North in R. v. Foote (Central Criminal Court, Prosecution against the Freethinker, the 5th March 1883); see also R. v. Ramsay and Foote (48 L. T. Rep. 733), where Lord Coleridge held that the mere denial of Christian truth was not blasphemous, but the wilful intention to insult others by means of abuse levelled at sacred objects, or by wilful misrepresentations was blasphemous. This view has been questioned by certain judges, but it was approved by Mr. Justice Phillimore (as he then was) in R. v. Boulter (72 J. P. 188) decided in 1908. This decision controverts the more drastic view set out in the 5th edit. of Stephen's Criminal Law, where it is suggested that any denial of truth in Christianity in general, or of the existence of a God, however decently expressed, would be blasphemy at the common law. The old statute, 9 Will. 3, c. 35 (1698), went a long way in that direction, but it is said that there was never a prosecution under it, and its provisions are partly repealed already. Its further repeal is naturally sought in the new Bill. Blasphemy is one of the earliest crimes, for it was punished by death in Levitical times (Lev. 24) some 3400 years ago, and Justinian's Code took the same view in A.D. 529. Unemployment Insurance THE Continuance of the grave conditions of unemployment, which are by no means without their effect on the problems discussed in the above paragraph, has moved the Minister of Labour to further emergency legislation up to a period ending with June 1923. The scheme assumes that up to June 1922 there will be on the average unemployment not in excess of 1,900,000, and that during the twelve months following the average number of insured persons unemployed will not be more than 1,500,000. In both cases the number on short time is counted at half their full number. The question becomes urgent, for after the 5th April many persons begin to exhaust their benefit. The existing law makes a new period of benefit begin in July, but the emergency provision of last year comes to an end. The Insurance Act 1921 provided for a reversion to the ordinary rates under which benefit is payable. The expected improvement in trade has not materialised and the position is made the more stringent by reason that the Unemployed Workers' Dependants Act 1921 comes to an end in May. The present Bill introduced by Dr. Macnamara continues the benefit of these Acts at the present rates and a new combined benefit will begin for persons who have exhausted their previous benefit in mid-April. Between April and October fifteen weeks' benefit is given, distributable at intervals during the period, and from Nov. next to June 1923 it is proposed to give twelve weeks, with a discretionary power to add two further extensions of five weeks each. This will mean a State subsidy of nearly fifteen millions, or nearly six millions more than now allowed. The benefit given on the figures computed by the Ministry of Labour will amount to sixty millions, to which the employers give more than three-eights, the employees rather less than that fraction, and the State adds about one quarter. This is a larger proportion than that shouldered by the State in the Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 where it provided one-fifth of the whole. Betting. Coercion, and Married Women THERE have recently been presented to Parliament two private Bills framed for the purpose of amending the law in two several matters: (1) Lord Buckmaster's Bill dealing with the subject matter of the decision in Sutters v. Briggs (125 L. T. Rep. 737; (1922) 1 A. C. 1), in which it was held that a loser might recover money paid by cheque in respect of betting transactions, although losses paid in cash in the same circumstances were irrecoverable; and (2) Lord Ullswater's Bill, inspired by the decision in the Peel case and purporting to abolish the legal presumption that a wife in the commission of certain crimes in the presence of the husband acts under his coercion. In each case the Bill is designed to reform the law where it has been found to be in flagrant conflict with modern ideas of justice, and was introduced partly as a result of the criticisms and comments of the court, and partly as the result of the pressure of public opinion. Such reforms, which wait for a public demonstration of their necessity, are in their nature inadequate, piecemeal, and unscientific, and it may well be asked why the occasion should not be used for a general amendment or abolition of laws which are equally objectionable and offensive to modern ideas. The enfranchisement of women, for example, has rendered imperative now, or in the near future, a revision of the law relating to married women, which contains many curious distinctions and anomalies depending on their peculiar legal status. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the law which makes a husband liable for his wife's torts. That liability depends on a decision of the Divisional Court in 1886 in the case of Seroka v. Kaltenberg (54 L. T. Rep. 649; 17 Q. B. Div. 177), followed by the Court of Appeal in Earle v. Kingscote (83 L. T. Rep. 377; (1900) 2 Ch. 585). Despite a long series of authoritative and adverse criticisms, those decisions are still binding, and have never been reviewed by the House of Lords. To quote Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton in Cuenod v. Leslie (100 L. T. Rep. 675; (1909) 1 K. B., at p. 889): "This decision is, of course, binding on us, but in my opinion it is most desirable that the matter should be reviewed by the final Court of Appeal, because the present state of things is highly anomalous. I cannot believe that the Married Women's Property Act 1882, which drew such a clear line of separation between the husband's and the wife's property and liabilities, and arranged them in other respects so fairly on the lines of separate personal responsibility, could have intended to leave such a blot on the legislature as would follow from permitting a plaintiff to recover damages from a husband in respect of torts of the wife either before or during coverture, although he was not liable for the torts or any participation in them, and was not needed as a party to the action.' Mr. Justice Darling will to-day (Saturday) leave London for Hereford on the Oxford Circuit, and will proceed with the trial of the Armstrong case on Monday next. The April Quarter and General Sessions for cases arising on the north and south sides of the Thames, will commence on Tuesday next at the Sessions House, Newington, at 10.30. The General and Quarter Sessions Appeals will be taken on the following Friday, the 7th inst., at 10.30. The Easter Quarter Sessions for cases arising in the County of Middlesex will commence on Saturday next, the 8th inst., at the Guildhall, Westminster, at 10.30. The Recorder for London, Sir Ernest Wild, K.C., M.P., has appointed Mr. Dennis Cave to be his clerk. Sir Gordon Hewart, the newly-appointed Lord Chief Justice of England, has been raised to the peerage, and has taken the title of Baron Hewart of Bury in the County of Lancaster. At a meeting of the Union Society of London, to be held on Wednesday next, the 5th inst., in the Middle Temple Common Room at eight o'clock, the following subject will be discussed, viz. : "That in the Opinion of this House an Official Pact Between this Country and France is Undesirable." At the Palais de Justice in Brussels, on Saturday last, was inaugurated a memorial to the avocats of the Bar of Brussels who died fighting for their country in the late war. Ministers, magistrats, civil and military, and members of the Bar were present. The bâtonnier, M. Leroy, in the course of his allocution, said that 140 members of the Brussels Bar responded to the appeal of the country in 1914, and of these, twenty-three fell at the front. The annual general meeting of the London Solicitors' Golfing Society was held at the Law Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, on the 23rd ult. The chair was taken by Mr. T. C. Fenwick, in the absence of the President, the Right Hon. David Lloyd George. The following officers were elected for the current year: President, Sir Joseph Hood, Bart.; captain, Mr. H. Forbes White; hon. secretary and treasurer, Mr. B. Trayton Kenward. The retiring president (the Right Hon. David Lloyd George) was elected a vicepresident, as were also Lord Riddell, Sir Ellis Cunliffe, past-presidents of the Society, and the late hon. secretary, Mr. T. C. Fenwick. In view of the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act 1920, which allows the enforcement in England, Scotland, and Ireland of judgments obtained in any part of His Majesty's Dominions outside the United Kingdom, or in any territories under His Majesty's protection, or in respect of which a mandate is being exercised by the Government of any part of His Majesty's Dominions to which the Act extends, the Legislatures of the under-mentioned territories have made reciprocal provision for the enforcement therein of judgments obtained in the High Court in England, the Court of Session in Scotland, and the High Court in Ireland. Orders in Council have accordingly been issued extending Part II. of the Act to the following Colonies and Protectorate:-The Straits Settlements, the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, and also to the under-mentioned territory in respect of which a mandate is being exercised by His Majesty's Government :-The Tanganyika Territory. |