pany for personal injuries," the federal district court said: "The act under consideration, while it is general in its nature, applies only to railroad companies and their employees, and is not, therefore, general in its application, and does not operate uniformly on all classes of citizens. Under this statute railroad companies are prohibited from making contracts which other corporations in the state are allowed to make. The constitution of the United States prohibits any state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The bill of rights of the state of Ohio prohibits making any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The north western territorial government (1787) provides as follows: 'In the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and declared that no law ought ever to be made or have force in said territory that shall in any manner interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide without fraud, previously made.' This extract from the Ordinance of 1787 shows how jealously the right of personal liberty in the making of private contracts was regarded, and how carefully any restriction of said right was restrained. The act under consideration is certainly one which impairs the rights of a large number of the citizens of Ohio to exercise a privilege which is dear to all persons, namely, that of making contracts concerning their own labor and the fruits thereof, and, so far as it relates to such contracts already made, impairs their validity. The act seems to assume that a large class of the citizens of the state, namely, those employed by railroad corporations, are incapable of making contracts for their own labor. The Ohio statute, in denying to the employees of a railroad corporation the right to make their own contracts concerning their own labor, is depriving them of 'liberty,' and of the right to exercise the privileges of manhood, without due process of law.' Being directed solely to employees of railroads, it is class legislation of the most vicious character. Laws must be not only uniform in their application throughout the territory over which the legislative jurisdiction extends, but they must apply to all classes of citizens alike. There cannot be one law for railroad employees, another law for employees in factories, and another law for employees on a farm or the highways. Class legislation is dangerous. Statutes 1 Shaver v. Penn. Co. (1896), 71 Fed. R. 931. intended to favor one class often become oppressive, tyrannical, and proscriptive to other classes never intended to be affected thereby; so that the framers of our constitution, learning from experience, wisely provided that laws should be general in their nature and uniform throughout the state." § 666. In holding unconstitutional an act providing for the weekly payment of wages by certain corporations the supreme court of Illinois said: "There can be no liberty, protected by government, that is not regulated by such laws as will preserve the right of each citizen to pursue his own advancement and happiness in his own way, subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the same right to all others. The fundamental principle upon which liberty is based, in free and enlightened government, is equality under the law of the land. It has accordingly been everywhere held that liberty, as that term is used in the constitution, means not only freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint, but is deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free in the use of his powers and faculties, and to adopt and pursue such avocation or calling as he may choose, subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare. Property, in its broader sense, is not the physical thing which may be the subject of ownership, but is the right of dominion, possession and power of disposition which may be acquired over it; and the right of property preserved by the constitution is the right not only to possess and enjoy it, but also to acquire it in any lawful mode, or by following any lawful industrial pursuit which the citizen, in the exercise of the liberty guarantied, may choose to adopt. Labor is the primary foundation of all wealth. The property which each one has in his own labor is the common heritage, and, as incident to the right to acquire other property, the liberty to enter into contracts by which labor may be employed in such way as the laborer shall deem beneficial, and of others to employ such labor, is necessarily included in the constitutional guaranty."2 1 Braceville Coal Co. v. People (1893), 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. R. 62. 2 Citing Frorer v. People (1892), 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. R. 395; Perry v. Com. (1891), 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. R. 1126; People v. Gilson (1888), 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. R. 343; Live Stock Ass'n v. Crescent City (1883), 111 U. S. 746; Slaughter-house Cases (1872), 16 Wall. 36; Godcharles v. Wigeman (1886), 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl. R. 354; State v. Goodwill (1889), 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. § 667. Regarding the effect of attempts to restrict the right of contract it has been well said: to contract affects not only the "The restriction of the right corporation, and restricts its right to contract, but that of the employee as well." An illus E. R. 285. "The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted the community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his or their pursuit of happiness." Cooley's Const. Lim. 393. Referring to the effect of discriminating among classes of the community, the Illinois court in the same case said: "It is undoubtedly true that the people in their representative capacity may, by general law, render that unlawful, in many cases, which had hitherto been lawful. But laws depriving particular persons or classes of persons of rights enjoyed by the community at large, to be valid, must be based upon some existing distinction or reason not applicable to others not included within its provisions. Cooley, Const. Lim. 391. And it is only when such distinctions exist that differentiate, in important particulars, persons or classes of persons from the body of the people, that laws having operation only upon such particular persons or classes of persons have been held to be valid enactments. In the Millett case we held that it was not competent, under the constitution, for the legislature to single out operators of coal mines and impose restrictions, in making contracts for the employment of labor, which were not required to be borne by other employers. And in the Frorer case (1892, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. R. 395), a law singling out persons, corporations or associations engaged in mining and manufacturing, and depriv ing them of the right to contract as persons, corporations and associations engaged in other business or vocation might lawfully do, was in violation of the constitution and void. So in Ramsey v. People (1892), 142 Ill. 380, 32 N. E. R. 364, 'An act to provide for the weighing in gross of coal hoisted from mines,' approved June 10, 1891, was held unconstitutional and void for the same reason. The act under consideration applies not to all corporations existing within the state, or to all that have been or may be organized for pecuniary profit under the general incorporation laws of the state. There is no attempt to make a distinction between corporations and individuals who may employ labor. The slightest consideration of the act will demonstrate that many corporations that may be and are organized and doing business under the laws are not included within the designated corporations. No reason can be found that would require weekly payments to the employees of an electric railway that would not require like payment by an electric light or gas company; to a corporation engaged in quarrying or lumbering that would not be equally applicable to a corporation engaged in erecting, repairing or removing buildings or other structtures; to mining that would not exist in respect of corporations engaged in making excavations and embankments for roads, canals, or other public or private improvement of like character; that will apply to a street or elevated railway that will not make it equally important in other 1 By the supreme court of Illinois in Braceville Coal Co. v. People (1893), 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. R. 62. tration of the manner in which it affects the employee, out of many that might be given, may be found in the conditions. arising from the late unsettled financial affairs of the country. It is a matter of common knowledge that large numbers of manufactories were shut down because of the stringency in the money market. Employers of labor were unable to continue production, for the reason that no sale could be found for the product. It was suggested, in the interest of employees and employers as well as in the public interest, that employees consent to accept only so much of their wages as was actually necessary to their sustenance, reserving payment of the balance until business should revive, and thus enable the factories and workshops to be open and operated with less present expenditure of money. Public economists and leaders in the interests of labor suggested and advised this course. In this state and under this law no such contract could be made. The employee who sought to work for one of the corporations enumerated in the act would find himself incapable of contracting as all other laborers in the state might do. The corporations would be prohibited from entering into such a contract, and if they did so the contract would be voidable at the will of the employee, and the employer subject to a penalty for making it. The employee would, therefore, be restricted from making such a contract as would insure to him support during the unsettled condition of affairs, and the residue of his wages when the product of his labor could be sold. The employees would, by the act, be practically under guardianship; their contracts voidable, as if they were minors; their right to freely contract for and to receive the benefit of their labor, as others might do, denied them." § 668. An act making it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in mining or manufacturing to establish a truck store or any shop for the purpose of furnishing supplies of groceries to employees has been held unconstitutional as amounting to a prohibition of the employees from contracting with modes of transportation of freight and passengers. The public records of the state will show, and it is a matter of common knowledge, that very many corporations have been organized and are doing business in the state, which necessarily employ large numbers of men, that are not included within the act under consideration." their employer for the purchase of supplies and property which they want and which he may happen to have, and in so far as the law was confined specifically to parties engaged in mining or manufacturing it was held unconstitutional as class legislation.1 1 Frorer et al. v. People (1892), 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. R. 395. The court said: "We must take judicial notice that employees in mines and manufactories include but a part of those who are employed by others and who depend upon their daily labor for subsistence, for we know, from daily observation, that many thousands are employed in making excavations and embankments for roads, buildings and other improvements, erecting and repairing buildings and various other structures, in the business of transportation, in that of the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, in that of quarrying stone, in that of agriculture, and in that of domestic service, and in all of these branches of industry employers and employees are unaffected by this statute, and such employers may therefore, after as before its taking effect, engage or be interested in truck stores or shops or schemes for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions and groceries to their employees. And this leads to the inquiry whether the keeping of a truck store, or controlling of a store, shop or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions or groceries to his employees by the person carrying on the business of making excavations and embankments for roads and other improve ments, erecting and repairing buildings and other structures, the business of transportation, that of the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, or that of agriculture, is, in substance and in principle, a different thing from that of the keeping of a truck store, or the controlling of a store, shop or scheme for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions or groceries to his employees by the person carrying on the business of mining or manufacturing. The purpose is, manifestly, the same in each case, namely, the sale by the employer to the employee of the articles designated; and it requires precisely the same elements to constitute a contract, including mental capacity in the parties contracting, and freedom from fraud and overreaching, in one case as it does in the others. "The operator of a mine and the manufacturer have no other control over the employee than that which may result from employing him or continuing him in employment, or refusing to do so, and every other employer of labor has precisely the same control over those who obtain, or wish to obtain, employment from him. There can be no reason why the miner or the operative in the manufactory will be more or differently influenced by his hopes and fears in these respects than will laborers in other industries. Mining and manufacturing are indispensable branches of industry, and as honorable as any others. There is nothing in operating mines or manufactories to render the individuals employed therein less capable to contract, or to give the employer greater wisdom and adroitness therein, than if they were engaged in operating and controlling, respectively, some other branch of industry. "It may be conceded that there is more of dependence of the employee upon the employer in case of |