State, and, therefore, I believe that the election which was held in that State in October for Representatives to Congress was unauthorized and illegal.

Third. It follows, in my opinion, that the election should have been held on the 5th day of November, 1878, in accordance with the act of Congress, and under the regulations prescribed by the legislature of the State of Iowa fixing the places and manner of holding elections for such Representatives.

The Eighth Congressional district is composed of thirteen counties. At the election held on the 8th day of October, 1878, 30,556 votes were cast, while at the election held on the 5th day of November, 1878, the polls were opened in only four precincts of the district, and these were confined to two of the thirteen counties composing the district, and the entire vote cast at said election was 171.

The Ninth Congressional district embraces 26 counties, and the vote cast in the district for Representative to Congress, at the election held in October, 1878, was 38,029, while at the election held in November, 1878, for the same purpose, the polls were opened in only twelve precincts of the disirict, and these were located in three of the twenty-six counties constituting the district, and the entire vote cast at said election was 357.

The elections which occurred in said districts on the 5th day of November, 1878, were held in the absence of a proclamation of the governor of Iowa directing the holding of the same, and other formalities required by the statute of that State in relation to such elections were not complied with.

While, in my judgment, the failure of the governor to issue a procla mation, and the omission of other officers to perform their duties would not alone invalidate the election, as their neglect or refusal to comply with their duties should not result in depriving the people of the right to elect their officers at the time fixed by law for that purpose, yet it is quite evident, from the very small vote cast, that the voters of the district generally abstained from voting or taking any part whatever in said election, and it is fair to assume that the cause of their failure to do so is alone attributable to the fact that they believed that the election which had been held in October for Representatives to Congress was authorized by law and legal, and that said subsequent election was unauthorized and illegal, and by reason of this belief, so created, they failed to participate in said election and thereby the will of the people was not fairly or fully expressed at the election held in November, and therefore I do not think that the claimants who base their right to the seats in dispute under and by virture of said election are entitled to the

same.

If the views above expressed are correct it follows that the seats now occupied by Messrs. Sapp and Carpenter, respectively, as Representatives in Congress from the eighth and ninth Congressional districts of the State of Iowa, should be declared vacant, and accordingly I submit for the consideration of the House of Representatives the following resolutions:

Resolved, That neither J. C. Holmes nor William F. Sapp was lawfully clected to the Forty-sixth Congress from the eighth Congressional district of Iowa, nor is either of them entitled to a seat in said Congress. Resolved, That neither John J. Wilson nor Cyrus C. Carpenter was lawfully elected to the Forty-sixth Congress from the ninth Congressional district of Iowa, nor is either of them entitled to a seat in said Congress.

WALPOLE G. COLERICK.

W. B. MERCHANT vs. JOSEPH H. ACKLEN.
ROBERT O. HERBERT vs. JOSEPH H. ACKLEN.

THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

In these cases the contestants failing to file briefs, as required by the rules of the committee, and on further notice failing to show cause why their cases should not be dismissed on account of such failure to file briefs as directed, the committee report in favor of contestee.

The House adopted the report March 1, 1881.

MARCH 1, 1881.-Mr. SPRINGER, from the Committee on Elections, submitted the following

REPORT:

The Committee on Elections, to whom were referred the contested election cases of W. B. Merchant vs. J. H. Acklen and Robert O. Herbert vs. J. H. Acklen, of the third Congressional district of the State of Louisiana, respectfully beg leave to report:

That the notices of contest and answers thereto were referred to the Committee on Elections and filed with the clerk of said committee on the 13th day of April, 1879. Evidence taken in the above cases was printed on the 15th day of January, 1880, and copies of the same were sent to the contestants, as required by the rules of the committee, by the clerk of said committee, with an official notice to prepare briefs within twenty days from the 25th day of January, 1880, to which no attention was given by said contestants.

On the 21st day of May, 1880, the clerk of the committee was directed by resolution to telegraph to Messrs. Merchant and Herbert to appear before the committee either in person or by attorney on the 29th day of May, 1880, and show cause why their cases should not be dismissed on account of the failure to file briefs as directed. No attention was given to these dispatches, and the parties neither appeared in person nor by attorneys, as notified. The said contestants were again notified by registered letters, on the 22d day of December, 1880, to appear before the Committee on Elections on the 11th day of January, 1881, and show cause why the cases should not be dismissed, and to this no reply was made.

We therefore respectfully recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

Resolved, That Joseph H. Acklen was duly elected and is entitled to a seat in this House as a Representative in the Forty-sixth Congress from the third Congressional district of the State of Louisiana.

Resolved, That Robert O. Herbert and W. B. Merchant have leave to withdraw their papers of contest in this case.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

E. MOODY BOYNTON vs. GEORGE B. LORING.

SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Contestant charges that illegal votes were cast for contestee, and that a number of ballots failed to designate the office for which the candidate was designed. Contestee objected to the specifications of the grounds of contest because of their insufficiency.

Held: That had the objections been pressed and relied upon they would have been sustained, as a glance at the nature of contest discloses its utter insufficiency. All persons who could not read and write, as required by the Constitution of Massachusetts, were not legal voters.

The presumption that sworn officers of the law have done their duty must obtain until the contrary clearly appears.

The public law of Massachusetts created the sixth Congressional district; and it appearing that there was no other "sixth district" in which any of the voters of Groveland, lived except the "sixth Congressional district," nor was there a Representative office to be filled in any sixth district in which the town of Groveland was situated except the sixth Congressional district, ballots cast there reading "For Representative, sixth district, George B. Loring, of Salem," clearly indicate in writing the office for which the person voted for is designed.

The House adopted the majority report January 21, 1881.

DECEMBER 20, 1880.-Mr. CALKINS, from the Committee on Elections, submitted the following

REPORT:

The notice of contest in this case is as follows:

NOTICE OF CONTEST.

NEWBURYPORT, December 2, 1878. DEAR SIR: You are hereby notified of my intention to contest your election to the Forty-sixth Congress from the sixth Massachusetts Congressional district, for the following reasons, viz: To obtain a recount of votes cast for the candidates for said office, as errors are believed to exist in the returns as made. It is known that ten legal votes cast in the town of Danvers were rejected in the count on pretense of having been challenged, but they should be counted. It is believed many votes in other places were excluded for the same reason. Names of persons were added to check-lists and their votes cast and counted in the precinct of which they were not residents. Others were excluded and not permitted to vote in the precinct of which they were residents and legal voters. Discrepancies are said to exist in the returns made by the returning officers of the representative district. It is reported on good authority that one man in the town of Amesbury voted twice, and both votes have been counted. A large number of votes were cast in several towns which failed to designate the office for which the candidate was designed. It is also reported that bribery and illegal interference were practiced. In some cities the returning officers did not register the voters in accordance with law, and it is probable many were registered who should not have been. The selectmen of Bradford, it is said, were illegally chosen, and were therefore unauthorized by law to issue a warrant for an election. In the town of Marblehead there were three ascertained fraudulent votes, and it is reported there were others, which nevertheless have been included in the returns from that town. In the town of Essex there is said to be an error in the count, and in various towns there seem to be discrepancies; and as the law does not provide for a recount in towns, it is neces

sary to contest your election in order to obtain a recount. Frands of various kinds are reported to have been practiced in the last election, but the candidates are believed to be innocent of them. To prevent the recurrence of these evils, and to ascertain who is legally elected to the office of Representative to Congress from the sixth Massachusetts district, I shall claim the election to that office, and hereby notify you to that effect.

Respectfully,

EBEN MOODY BOYNTON.

The contestee, in his answer, objects and excepts to the specifications of the ground of contest because they are insufficient in law, and he especially reserves all right of exceptions for insufficiency. The answer closes with a general traverse of any and all facts set forth in the notice of contest. (See Record, pp. 1 and 2, for the notice of contest and the answer.)

Had the exceptions alleged against the notice of contest for insufficiency been pressed before the committee, the exceptions would no doubt have been sustained.

Section 105, Revised Statutes of the United States, is as follows:

SEC. 105. Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any member of the House of Representatives of the United States, he shall, within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been determined by the officer or board of convassers authorized by law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the member whose seat he designs to contest of his intention to contest the same, and in such notice shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (Revised Statntes of the United States, p. 18.)

This section of the statute provides for the procedure in contests of this nature.

A glance at the notice of contest discloses its utter insufficiency and non-compliance with the section of the statute above set out. In the recent case of Duffy against Mason, decided by this House, the view we have taken is so clearly and ably set forth that we adopt the following provisions of that report as eutirely applicable to the case at bar. The report is as follows:

McCrary, in his Law of Elections, section 343, referring to this statute, says: "A good deal of discussion has arisen as to what is to be understood by the words specify particularly the grounds on which he relies.' It is evident, however, that these words are not easily defined by any others. They are as plain and clear as any terus which we might employ to explain them. Cases have arisen and will again arise, giving rise to controversy as to whether a given allegation comes up to the requirement of this statute, and it must be for the House in each case to decide upon the case before it. It may be observed, however, that this statute should receive a reasonable construction, one that will carry out and not defeat its spirit and purpose. And perhaps the rule of construction which will prove safest as a guide in each case is this: A notice which is sufficiently specific to put the sitting member upon a proper defense and prevent any surprise being practiced upon him is good, but one which fails to do this is bad. (Wright rs. Fuller, 1 Bartlett, 152.)

"The Houses of Congress, when exercising their authority and jurisdiction to decide upon 'the election returns and qualifications' of members, are not bound by the technical rules which govern proceedings in courts of justice. Indeed, the statutes to he found among the acts of Congress regulating the mode of conducting an election contest in the House of Representatives are directory only, and are not and cannot be made mandatory under the Constitution. In practice these statutory regulations are often varied and sometimes wholly departed from. They are convenient as rules of practice and of course will be adhered to, unless the House in its discretion shall in a given case determine that the ends of justice require a different course of action. They constitute wholesome rules not to be departed from without cause." (Ibid., section 349.)

While it is true that this statute should receive a liberal construction, yet it will not do to permit parties to disregard its provisions. The House, in sanctioning its violation in cases heretofore determined, has created precedents that are now frequently and pertinently cited to justify similar infractions. This practice, if tolerated, will finally result in the virtual abrogation of the statute. The only safe course to pursue is to require at least a substantial compliance with its provisions.

We think that the notice of contest in this case is clearly insufficient. It is too indefinite and uncertain in its allegations. As was said in the case of Bromberg vs. Haralson (Smith's Digest of Election Cases, page 355)—

"It is too vague and uncertain to be good. The statute requires that the contestant in his notice shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in his contest.' It is impossible to conceive of a specification of the grounds of contest broader or more general in its terms. It fixes no place where any act complained of occurred. It embraces the whole district in o e sweeping charge. This specification embraces three general grounds of complaint, not one of which possesses that particularity essential to good pleading."

The points decided in the Duffy and Mason case exactly cover the case in hand, and it is unnecessary to examine any of the other points raised in the case. Fearing, however, that, unless the merits of the case are taken up and examined, injustice may be done, the committee have, at the expense of much inconvenience and loss of time, examined the questions raised, and present their views specifically on each point.

CITY OF GLOUCESTER.

It is claimed that the registration law of Massachusetts requires the registration of voters to cease at twelve o'clock midnight of the seventh day next preceding the day of any election. (See chapter 235, section 2, Massachusetts laws of 1877; see also section 10, chapter 376, acts of 1874; also chapter 251, laws of 1878, and chapter 233, laws of 1878.)

We are inclined to take the view, in construing these statutes, that the registration of voters does not, as claimed by the contestee, "cease at twelve o'clock midnight of the day next preceding the day of election," but that chapter 251 of the laws of 1878 extends the right of regis tration under the conditions therein named up to the opening of the polls. But it is not necessary for us to decide this question, and we do not, much preferring that the courts of Massachusetts shall first construe their own statutes, and when they have undergone judicial construction we would follow the decisions of the courts of that State. We retain the vote of the city of Gloucester as returned.

MARBLEHEAD.

It is claimed that William H. C. Coates, jr., voted twice, and that he voted for the contestee, and that one of the ballots was counted. If the contention of the contestant is correct, one vote must be deducted from the contestee, as it is shown that when the selectmen, in counting the votes, found the two ballots together, one of them was torn up and the other counted.

The vote of L. R. Woodfin is next attacked, on the ground of resi dence. It is claimed that he was not a resident of Marblehead. It seems to be conceded by contestee that Woodfin's vote ought not to be counted.

The three Hathaways, father and two sons, who voted at Marblehead, are attacked on the ground that they actually lived in Salem and kept up a nominal residence in Marblehead. As to Benjamin G. Hathaway, sr., if it be conceded that he voted at Marblehead, it is not shown for whom he voted. As to George G. Hathaway and Benjamin G. Hathaway, jr., it is conceded they voted at Marblehead, and voted for the contestee. Residence or domicile is to a great extent a question of intention, and a liberal construction of the statutes of Massachusetts on that subject, we think, will not justify us in finding the two latter-named persons to be illegal voters.