Ogg et al. v. Tate. that the hypothetical case put corresponded very well with the real case. The question was not irrelevant. Besides, it is difficult to see how the court could then determine whether the question was relevant or otherwise to the case yet to be shown by the evidence. On the trial of the cause, the deposition was the first evidence offered, and the defendant objected to the sixth question and answer, "because the same was argumentative, leading and irrelevant," but the objection was overruled. The question was not, in our opinion, open to either of the grounds of objection thus stated. The question was long, and it is useless to take up space by setting it out. This disposes of the fourth and fifth reasons for a new trial. The question put to the witnesses Wesner, Adams and Hines, as stated in the sixth reason for a new trial, was clearly relevant. The word "inadmissibility," as used in that cause for a new trial, points out no ground of objection. There is no error in the record. The judgment below is affirmed, with costs. MECHANIC'S LIEN.-Pleading.—The sale and delivery of materials to be used in the erection of a building and their use for such purpose could not authorize the seller to acquire a mechanic's lien on such building and the land whereon it was erected, for the unpaid price of such materials, where it did not appear that the person to whom the materials were furnished was other than a mere stranger, acting without the knowledge or consent of the owner of the land. From the Hancock Circuit Court. H. J. Dunbar, for appellants. M. Marsh, R. A. Black and B. F. Davis, for appellee. 52 159 137 689. Ogg et al. v. Tate. PETTIT, J.-This suit was brought by Warren Tate, the appellee, against the appellants, John R. Reeves, Adams L. Ogg and Letta Longnaker. The following is the substance of the complaint: The plaintiff sold and delivered to Reeves, at his special instance and request, a quantity of lumber described, and said materials furnished to Reeves were of the value of two hundred and three dollars, for which Reeves agreed to pay the plaintiff at thirty days. And plaintiff says that said materials were so furnished in the month of September, 1871, and were furnished by the plaintiff for building a dwelling-house then being erected in Hancock county, Ind., then and now owned by Ogg and Longnaker. Said building was being erected on certain lands described, and said house is situated on said premises, and said materials were used therein. Prayer for judgment, and that it be a lien on the land of Ogg and Longnaker, and that it may be sold to pay the lien. An account against Reeves for the amount of the lumber and a notice of a mechanic's lien are filed with the complaint. Reeves paid no attention to the case, and no judgment was rendered against him; but after issue joined as to the other defendants, there was a verdict, judgment and decree fixing a lien on their lands for one hundred and sixty-five dollars and costs, ordering sale, etc. The sufficiency of the complaint, as to Ogg and Longnaker, is properly before us. We hold that it was not sufficient, for the reasons that it does not show or charge that Reeves was the agent, builder or architect of Ogg and Longnaker, or that they had contracted for the erection of the building or had any knowledge that materials were being furnished for building a house on their land, or that such a building was needed or would be useful on the land, or that they or either of them were residents of the county or State. We hold that a mere stranger cannot purchase materials for the erection of a house on the lands of another, without his knowledge or consent, and thereby create a mechanic's lien Blakely v. The State. on such real estate. We need not notice other objections taken to the complaint. The judgment is reversed, at the costs of the appellee, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint. BLAKELY V. THE STATE. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.-Motion for a new trial, "because of errors of the court in admitting evidence at the trial which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial." Held, that the cause assigned was too indefinite. SUPREME COURT.-Evidence.-The Supreme Court will not reverse a judg ment upon the weight of oral evidence. From the Marion Criminal Circuit Court. W. P. Adkinson and J. M. Johnston, for appellant. C. A. Buskirk, Attorney General, J. M. Cropsey, Prosecuting Attorney, and R. D. Doyle, for the State. BUSKIRK, J.-The appellant was convicted of grand larThe errors assigned are: ceny. 1. That the court erred in overruling the motion to quash the indictment. 2. That the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. The objection taken to the indictment is, that the property alleged to have been stolen is not properly described. The objection is untenable. The description is full and sufficient in all respects. The motion was properly overruled. Under the second assignment of error, it is claimed that the court erred in the admission of evidence. The motion for the new trial is not specific enough to present such ques tion. The fourth reason for a new trial is as follows: VOL. LII.-11 Blakely v. The State. "Because of errors of the court in admitting evidence at the trial which prevented the defendant from having a fair trial." What evidence was improperly admitted? Was it documentary or parol? If documentary, how is it to be identified? If parol, what was the name of the witness who gave it? or what was the substance of it? It has been too repeatedly decided that such a reason for a new trial is too uncertain and indefinite to present any question, to justify a citation of adjudged cases. It is next claimed that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence. The fact of a larceny is clearly proved. As to who committed it, there is no direct and positive evidence. It was fully shown that the appellant was in possession of the stolen property within two or three days after the larceny, and that he sold it. These facts are not denied, but are fully admitted. The defence relied upon was, that defendant came honestly into possession of the property. The defendant, when offering the property for sale, said that he had been employed by a man by the name of Hall to sell the property; and when his story was called in question, he went to the door and called in a man who answered to the name of Hall, and who claimed to be the owner of the property. The defendant testified that he was employed by Hall to sell the property, and that for his services he was to have all over one dollar and fifty cents that he realized; that he had known Hall in Chicago; that he met him on the streets of Indianapolis; that afterward he came to his house and informed him that he had some jugs of liquor and silver spoons which he wanted him to sell for him, as he was not much acquainted. They met that night. The property was found in an alley, back of a saloon. The property was shown to be worth ten or twelve dollars. It was sold for three dollars and five cents. After the sale, the defendant went to the depot with Hall, who left on a train leaving at 1 o'clock A. M. Hall was not produced as a witness, nor was any attempt made to show how he came into possession of the stolen property. The Logansport, Crawfordsville and Southwestern R. W. Co. v. Buchanan. The question submitted to the jury was, whether the defendant had honestly and truthfully accounted for how he came into possession of the stolen property. The jury, evidently, did not believe his story; for if they had, they would have acquitted him. The whole question turned upon the weight to be given to the evidence of the defendant. The jury were far more competent to determine that question than we are. We cannot reverse the judgment upon the evidence in the record. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. 52 163 55 58 THE LOGANSPORT, CRAWFORDSVILLE AND SOUTHWEST- RAILROAD.-Appropriation of Land.—Evidence.— In a proceeding to con- From the Montgomery Circuit Court. R. B. F. Pierce, for appellant. J. Buchanan, M. B. Williams and C. D. Whitehead, for appellee. DOWNEY, J.-This was a proceeding under section 15 of the railroad law, 1 G. & H. 509, by the appellant against the appellee, to condemn and appropriate certain lands of the appellee for the way of said company. An instrument of appropriation was deposited with the clerk of the circuit court, and appraisers were appointed, who returned their 170 170 |