The State v. Day. causing water to flow in said road," was not bad for its failure to allege the depth of the ditch and the height of the embankment. From the Putnam Circuit Court. C. A. Buskirk, Attorney General, R. D. Doyle and T. C. Grooms, for the State. M. A. Moore, G. Moore and D. R. Eckles, for appellee. BIDDLE, J.-The indictment in this case charges the appellee as follows: "That, at said county of Putnam, on the 7th day of May, 1875, one Vincent Day did, then and there, unlawfully obstruct a certain highway, then and there situate, running through section No. 31, town 15, range 3, and leading from the Greencastle and New Maysville road, in said county, by then and there unlawfully cutting a ditch alongside of, and making an embankment alongside of and across said highway, thereby causing the water to flow in said road; contrary," etc. On motion of appellee, the indictment was quashed. The State excepted, and appeals to this court. The appellee here moves to dismiss the cause, "because no bill of exceptions was filed in the court below, and because no order of court was made in the court below as to what part of the record in this cause should be certified into this court." We do not think a bill of exceptions was necessary in this case. The purpose of a bill of exceptions is to bring into the record something which otherwise would not properly belong to it. It is never necessary when the question arises on the face of the pleadings. Here the question is upon the sufficiency of the indictment, raised by the motion to quash. No extrinsic fact is necessary to its presentation. It is all upon the record, and the clerk has officially certified that this record is "true, full and complete." We cannot, therefore, see the force of a motion to dismiss the cause for the reason that the court below made no order as to what part of the record should be certified. Section 155 in the act regulating criminal pleading and practice (2 G. & H. 426) The State v. Day. applies only to cases where a bill of exceptions is necessary to raise the question presented, and where it is not necessary for the clerk to certify "any part of the proceedings and record, except the bill of exceptions and the judgment of acquittal." We are informed by the briefs of the counsel, that the ground upon which the court below sustained the motion to quash the indictment was the failure to allege the depth of the ditch and the height of the embankment, which, it is averred, obstructed the road. Words used in an indictment, except such as are technical, or defined by law, must be construed in their common and usual acceptation. A trace across a highway, insufficient to seriously obstruct it, could not, with propriety, be called a ditch; and to call a ridge of earth an embankment, which was so inconsiderable, when raised across a highway, as not to be a serious obstruction, would be quite frivolous. The allegations, "by then and there unlawfully erecting fences across said highway" (State v. Buxton, 31 Ind. 67), and "by then and there manufacturing a rail fence across said road, against the statute" (Jeffries v. McNamara, 49 Ind. 142), have been held good by this court, without averring the height of the fences; and we think the same is properly applicable to ditches and embankments. In our opinion, the word "ditch," in its common and usual signifition, as generally accepted, imports a trench of sufficient width and depth to obstruct a highway, in the legal sense, if cut or dug across it; and it seems very plain that the word "embankment," in its common, usual and accepted meaning, fairly imports a ridge of earth of sufficient height and base to form a serious obstruction to a highway, if raised across its passage. We are constrained to hold that the averments under consideration are sufficient, and that the court erred in quashing the indictment. The judgment is reversed, at the costs of the appellee; Allen v. The State. the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the motion to quash the indictment, and for further proceedings. THE STATE v. DAY. From the Putnam Circuit Court. C. A. Buskirk, Attorney General, R. D. Doyle and T. C. Grooms, for the State. M. A. Moore, G. Moore and D. R. Eckles, for appellee. DOWNEY, C. J.-The questions in this case are the same as those in The State v. Day, ante, p. 483, and for the reasons there stated the judgment must be reversed. The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded. 52 486 Case 2 [166 216 ALLEN v. THE STATE. LIQUOR LAW.-Sale or Gift of Intoxicating Liquor to Minor, etc.—Constitu tional Law. It is settled that the sixth section of the act of February 27th, 1873, making it "unlawful for any person, by himself or agent, to sell, barter or give intoxicating liquors to any minor, or to any person intoxicated, or to any person who is in the habit of getting intoxicated," was not unconstitutional. NAME. Descriptive Affix. — Criminal Law. The addition of "Senior" or "Junior" to the name of a person in an indictment is mere matter of description, and the affix forms no part of the name, and need not be proved where proof of the name is necessary. From the Kosciusko Circuit Court. C. Clemans, E. Haymond and L. W. Royce, for appellant. C. A. Buskirk, Attorney General, R. D. Doyie and S. W. Corand, for the State. BUSKIRK, J. Conviction under the sixth section of the Allen v. The State. act of 27th February, 1873, for giving intoxicating liquor to a minor. The court overruled a motion to quash the indictment. It is claimed, in argument, that said section is unconstitutional. It has been held to be constitutional and valid, and has been enforced in many cases. Williams v. The State, 48 Ind. 306; Hanson v. The State, 43 Ind. 550; Farrell v. The State, 45 Ind. 371; Connell v. The State, 46 Ind. 446; The State v. Young, 47 Ind. 150; Fountain v. Draper, 49 Ind. 441; Meyer v. The State, 50 Ind. 18. We regard the question as settled and put at rest. It is also claimed that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. It is urged that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, in this, that the indictment charges a gift, and the evidence shows a sale. The proof shows both a gift and a sale. The witness testified: "I bought some liquor, and he treated me to some whiskey, and I was not twenty-one yet." Upon crossexamination, he testified: "About the 22d of January, 1874; got it of Allen himself. I don't know whether I paid for it or not, and I bought it on time. I bought by the half pint and by the quart. I don't remember the exact amount of liquor I bought. I bought it in a bottle. He treated me. He did not treat me when I got it in the bottle. He called me up to the bar and treated me. It was some time within the present year, 1874. I cannot state the exact day, or time of day. He treated me two or three times. I don't remember the number of times. I don't remember how much I was to pay him at any of the times," etc. We think the evidence fully establishes a gift to a minor. There is also evidence of a sale, but this was at another time. He testified that Allen never treated him when he bought whiskey in a bottle. It is also insisted that there is a variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof. The indictment charges that the liquor was given to Robert McNeal, Davis v. The State. Jr. The proof is, that it was given to Robert McNeal. There is no evidence as to whether he was junior or senior or simply Robert McNeal. The objection is untenable. The addition of "senior" or "junior" to a name is a mere matter of description, and forms no part of the name. People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259; Commonwealth v. Perkins, 1 Pick. 388; State v. Grant, 22 Me. 171; Coit v. Starkweather, 8 Conn. 289; Commonwealth v. East Boston Ferry Co., 13 Allen, 589; Hoadgson's Case, 1 Lewin, 236; Rex v. Peace, 3 B. & Ald. 579. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. DAVIS V. THE STATE. LIQUOR LAW.-Keeping Disorderly House.-Indictment.-An indictment under section 17 of the act of March 17th, 1875 (Acts 1875, Spec. Sess., 58), for keeping in a disorderly manner a house, etc., wherein intoxicating liquors are sold, which, besides averring that the defendant had a license, does not also aver the place to which his license was applicable, and that that place was kept in a disorderly manner, is bad on motion to quash. From the Fayette Circuit Court. B. F. Claypool and W. C. Forrey, for appellant. BIDDLE, J.-Indictment for keeping a house, wherein spiritous liquors were sold, in a disorderly manner. The appellant was tried, convicted and fined, and his license. adjudged forfeited. He excepted, and appeals to this court. The charging part of the indictment is as follows: "That one George M. Davis, late of said county, on the 1st day of June, A. D. 1875, at said county and State aforesaid, and continuously up to the time of making this presentment, he being then and there licensed according to the provisions of an act of the legislature of Indiana, approved |