Matter of Herzikopf (D. C., Col.), 9 Am. B. R. 90, 118 Fed. 1016; In re Gasser (C. C. A., 8th Cir.), 5 Am. B. R. 32, 104 Fed. 537. "The petition in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding may be made by the attorney in fact of the petitioning creditors." Rogers v. De Sota Placer Mining Co. (C. C. A., 9th Cir.), 14 Am. B. B. 252, 136 Fed. 407. But it has been held that this power of an attorney does not extend to the creditor's choice of a trustee nor to the making of an affidavit to the schedules of a petitioning debtor. In re Blankfein (D. C., N. Y.), 3 Am. B. R. 165, 97 Fed. 191.

An attorney in fact who is not an attorney at law may not examine the bankrupt at the first meeting of creditors. Matter of Looney (D. C., Tex.), 44 Am. B. R. 542, 262 Fed. 209.

A creditor and a bankrupt may, with knowledge of the full situation, employ the same counsel. Matter of Prussian (D. C., Mich.), 43 Am. B. R. 13, 255 Fed. 857.

V. FRAME OF PETITIONS

All petitions and the schedules filed therewith shall be printed or written out plainly, without abbreviation or interlineation, except where such abbreviation and interlineation may be for the purpose of reference.

[First part of General Order XIV, 1867, without change.]

Cross-references:

To the law: As to petitions, § 18-a-c; As to schedules,

§ 7(8); As to referee's duty to examine schedules, etc., § 39-a (2); As to referee's duty to prepare schedules in certain cases, § 39-a (6).

To the General Orders: IX, XI.

To the Official Forms: Nos. 1, 2, 3, with the schedules.

To the Supplementary Forms: Nos. 117, 118.

To the Equity Rules: XX to XXV.

Use of ditto marks and abbreviations.—This order precludes the use of dots to indicate anything necessary to be stated. In re Orne, Fed. Cas. 10,582. And the use of ditto marks, in attempting to indicate a creditor's residence, is in violation of this order. Haach v. Theise, 16 Am. B. R. 699, 5 N. Y. Misc. 3, 99 N. Y. Supp. 905. The abbreviation of the residence of a creditor as "135 Bway" violates this rule. Sutherland v. Lasher, 11 Am. B. R. 780, 41 N. Y. Misc. 249, 84 N. Y. Supp. 56.

Use of printed blanks. In the eastern district of North Carolina a written or typewritten schedule will not be accepted. The printed blank containing forms prescribed by the rules of the court must be used, otherwise the schedules will be returned to the parties without action. Mahoney v. Ward (D. C., N. Car.), 3 Am. B. R. 770, 100 Fed. 278.

A mistake as to a creditor's name in the schedules will prevent the discharge of a debt. Liesum v. Kraus, 35 N. Y. Misc. 376, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1022. If a petition in involuntary bankruptcy contains the name of the judge such name must be given correctly. Anon., Fed. Cas. 459.

See, generally, Matter of Harrell (D. C., N. Car.), 34 Am. B. R. 809, 222 Fed. 160.

VI. PETITIONS IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS

In case two or more petitions shall be filed against the same individual in different districts, the first hearing shall be had in the district in which the debtor has his domicile, and the petition may be amended by inserting an allegation of an act of bankruptcy committed at an earlier date than that first alleged, if such earlier act is charged in either of the other petitions; and in case of two or more petitions against the same partnership in different courts, each having jurisdiction over the case, the petition first filed shall be first heard, and may be amended by the insertion of an allegation of an earlier act of bankruptcy than that first alleged, if such earlier act is charged in either of the other petitions; and, in either case, the proceedings upon the other petitions may be stayed until an adjudication is made upon the petition first heard; and the court which makes the first adjudication of bankruptcy shall retain jurisdiction over all proceedings therein until the same shall be closed. In case two or more petitions shall be filed in different districts by different members of the same partnership for an adjudication of the bankruptcy of said partnership, the court in which the petition is first filed, having jurisdiction, shall take and retain jurisdiction over all proceedings in such bankruptcy until the same shall be closed; and if such petitions shall be filed in the same district, action shall be first had upon the one first filed. But the court so retaining jurisdiction shall, if satisfied that it is for the greatest convenience of parties in interest that another of said courts should proceed with the cases, order them to be transferred to that court.

[General Order XVI, 1867, without change, except that the last sentence of Rule VI under consideration, is new.]

Cross-references: To the law: As to where petitions may be filed, § 1(2); As to partnership petitions, § 5; As to transfer of cases, §§ 2(19), 32; Also generally to §§ 2(19), 18.

To the General Orders: IV, VII, VIII.

The true meaning of this general order is that where petitions are filed in different districts, the court whose ground of jurisdiction is that the bankrupt's domicile has been in that district during the greater portion of the six months next preceding the filing of the petitions is the court in which the first hearing should be had. In re Isaacson (D. C., N. Y.), 20 Am. B. R. 437, 161 Fed. 777. This rule contemplates a case in which each court has jurisdiction of the cause, and that question, when raised, must be first determined. In re Waxelbaum (D. C., N. Y.), 3 Am. B. R. 392, 395, 98 Fed. 589. The letter as well as the spirit of this general order confers exclusive jurisdiction upon that court in which the petition is first filed, subject to the provision for the transfer of cases from one to another district court where

the convenience of parties in interest demands it. As between two district courts of United States,. it is the duty of the other court to yield jurisdiction and the control and direction of the entire proceeding to the one whose jurisdiction was first invoked. In re Sterne & Levi (D. C., Tex.), 26 Am. B. R. 259. It may be assumed that General Order No. 6 is subject to the provisions of section 32 of the bankruptcy law, and that the case may be transferred and consolidated for the convenience of the parties, if brought within the provisions of section 32, in spite of the direction in the general order that the court first adjudicating shall retain jurisdiction until the proceedings are closed. In re Isaacson (D. C., N. Y.), 20 Am. B. R. 430, 161 Fed. 779. This order leaves no room for doubt, but that the court taking and retaining jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the question of a transfer under section 32, for it expressly provides that the court so retaining jurisdiction (because the petition was first filed therein) shall, if satisfied that it is for greatest convenience of parties in interest, that another of said courts shall proceed with the case, order them transferred to that court." In re Sterne & Levi (D. C., Tex.), 26 Am. B. R. 259, 262.

Under this general order, in the case of petitions against an individual, the first hearing shall be in the district of the domicile, while in the case of petitions filed against a partnership that first filed shall have priority of hearing, and the court acquiring the whole jurisdiction shall determine whether the greater convenience of parties requires that one of the other courts should proceed with the cases. Matter of United Button Co. (D. C., N. Y.), 12 Am. B. R. 761, 132 Fed. 378; Matter of New Era Novelty Co. (D. C., N. J.), 39 Am. B. R. 80, 241 Fed. 298.

General Orders VI and VII are designed to relate simply to the consideration of proceedings. In re Strait (Ref., N. Y.), 2 Am. B. R. 308.

Time for motion to transfer case. As this order is subordinate to the statute, and was not designed to effect any change in the Bankruptcy Act, it can have no bearing upon the question as to whether a motion to transfer a case from one district to another is premature. Matter of Okmulgee Producing & Refining Co. (D. C., Del.), 45 Am. B. R. 631, 265 Fed. 736.

"Greatest convenience" of "parties in interest" meaning of terms.- Neither the act nor the general order attempts to define the terms "greatest convenience" of "parties in interest." The interpretation placed upon them by the court in the Matter of United Button Co., 13 Am. B. R. 454, 132 Fed. 378that the term "parties in interest," covers every party having any interest in or connection with the case, including priority, secured and unsecured creditors, as well as the bankrupts themselves, and that the term "greatest convenience," depends upon all the circumstances — proximity of a majority of creditors and the place of business of the bankrupts to the court, proximity of witnesses whose attendance is desired in any hearing, and perhaps numerous other factors would seem to be the correct view. In re Sterne & Levi (D. C., Tex), 26 Am. B. R. 259, 263. See also Matter of Devonian Spring Co. (D. C., Ohio), 47 Am. B. R. 82, 272 Fed. 527.

Corporations are within the provisions of this order. In re Elmira Steel Co. (D. C., N. Y.), 5 Am. B. R. 484, 109 Fed. 456. The word "individual," as used in the clause providing that “in case two or more petitions shall be filed against the same individual in different districts, the first hearing shall be had in the district in which the debtor has his domicile," is equivalent to person," and

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as such includes a corporation. Matter of United Button Co. (D. C., Del.), 13 Am. B. R. 454, 132 Fed. 378.

District of bankrupt's domicile definition. The district in which an alleged bankrupt has resided during the greater portion of the six months next preceding the filing of a petition against him is the "district of his domicile " within the meaning of this general order, and the first hearing should be had therein unless, under the provisions of section 32 of the bankruptcy law, the proceeding is transferred and consolidated with a proceeding instituted in a district to which the alleged bankrupt had recently removed and established a residence. In re Isaacson (D. C., N. Y.), 20 Am. B. R. 430, 161 Fed. 779.

An application for the transfer of a case under this order may be denied in the discretion of the court. In re Sears (D. C., N. Y.), 7 Am. B. R. 279, 112 Fed. 58. Thus, where a petition has been filed against a corporation in the district of its domicile, and thereafter a petition is filed against it in a district in another State, the court in which the first petition is filed, unless satisfied that it is for the greatest convenience of all parties in interest that the case should be transferred, is required, under the provisions of this order, to retain jurisdiction until the proceedings are closed. In re Tybo Mining & Reduction Co. (D. C., Me.), 13 Am. B. R. 68, 72, 132 Fed. 697.

Power of amendment; limitation of. The provisions of this order by implication limit the power of amendment to the single case in which an earlier act of bankruptcy has been sought to be incorporated into the petition. In re Sears (C. C. A., 2d Cir.), 8 Am. B. R. 713, 117 Fed. 294; Wilder v. Watts (D. C., S. C.), 15 Am. B. R. 57, 68, 138 Fed. 426; Gleason v. Smith, Perkins & Co. (C. C. A., 3d Cir.), 16 Am. B. R. 602, 145 Fed. 895; Matter of Riggs Restaurant Co. (C. C. A., 2d Cir.), 11 Am. B. R. 508, 130 Fed. 691. A bankruptcy petition may be amended so as to allege grounds of bankruptcy subsequently occurring notwithstanding the provisions of this order. In re Hamrick (D. C., Ga.) 23 Am. B. R. 721, 175 Fed. 279.

Other cases citing this order.- Bradley Timber Co. v. White (C. C. A., 5th Cir.), 10 Am. B. R. 329, 332, 121 Fed. 779, affg. 9 Am. B. R. 441; Matter of R. H. Pennington & Co. (D. C., Ky.), 35 Am. B. R. 832, 228 Fed. 388; Matter of Vanascope Co. (C. C. A., 2d Cir.), 36 Am. B. R. 778, 233 Fed. 53.

VII. PRIORITY OF PETITIONS

Whenever two or more petitions shall be filed by creditors against a common debtor, alleging separate acts of bankruptcy committed by said debtor on different days within four months prior to the filing of said petitions, and the debtor shall appear and show cause against an adjudication of bankruptcy against him on the petitions, that petition shall be first heard and tried which alleges the commission of the earliest act of bankruptcy; and in case the several acts of bankruptcy are alleged in the different petitions to have been committed on the same day, the court before which the same are pending may order them to be consolidated, and proceed to a hearing as upon one petition; and if an adjudication of bankruptcy be made upon either petition, or for the commission of a single act of bankruptcy,

it shall not be necessary to proceed to a hearing upon the remaining petitions, unless proceedings be taken by the debtor for the purpose of causing such adjudication to be annulled or vacated.

[General Order XV, 1867, without change other than that "four months" appears in the new rule in place of "six months."]

Cross-reference: See those to General Order VI, immediately ante.

Meaning and construction of order. This order contemplates independent proceedings and provides for their disposition. Matter of Haff (C. C. A., 2d Cir.), 13 Am. B. R. 362, 135 Fed. 742. It must be strictly construed, and can be put in motion only by acts of the creditors and debtors combined. The mere filing of two or more petitions, one of which avers a prior act of bankruptcy, cannot put in action the enforcement of this rule. There are two things absolutely necessary.

First. Two or more petitions must be filed by creditors against a common debtor alleging several acts of bankruptcy committed by said debtor; and Second. The debtor shall appear and show cause against an adjudication in bankruptcy against him on the petitions.

Thus, where two petitions are filed, each alleging different acts of bankruptcy, and the debtor answers only the one which alleges the earlier act of bankruptcy, this rule has no application. Had there been three petitions, it would have been equally necessary for the debtor to have answered all three. In re G. W. Harris (D. C., Ala.), 19 Am. B. R. 204, 155 Fed. 216.

Other cases citing this order.- In re Strait (Ref., N. Y.), 2 Am. B. R. 308; In re Elmira Steel Co. (D. C., N. Y.), 5 Am. B. R. 484, 109 Fed. 456; Bradley Timber Co. v. White (C. C. A., 5th Cir.), 10 Am. B. R. 329, 333, 121 Fed. 779, affg. 9 Am. B. R. 441.

VIII. PROCEEDINGS IN PARTNERSHIP CASES

Any member of a partnership, who refuses to join in a petition to have the partnership declared bankrupt, shall be entitled to resist the prayer of the petition in the same manner as if the petition had been filed by a creditor of the partnership, and notice of the filing of the petition shall be given to him in the same manner as provided by law and by these rules in the case of a debtor petitioned against ; and he shall have the right to appear at the time fixed by the court for the hearing of the petition, and to make proof, if he can, that the partnership is not insolvent or has not committed an act of bankruptcy, and to make all defenses which any debtor proceeded against is entitled to take by the provisions of the act; and in case an adjudication of bankruptcy is made upon the petition, such partner shall be required to file a schedule of his debts and an inventory of his property in the same manner as is required by the act in cases of debtors against whom adjudication of bankruptcy shall be made. [General Order XVIII, 1867, with no substantial change.]