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not here climb it again with Captain Hall; but we cannot agree with him in thinking that Mr Burford, or any one else, could paint a panorama worth looking at, by making the cone and crater the foreground, and sinking every thing within the visible horizon. We cannot imagine that any distinct view from such a point, reducing all objects, even the highest hills, to molecules, and throwing them up into the sky, and the sea where it occurs to supersede the sky, (as all views must do when taken from great elevations, could, by possibility, make an intelligible panorama or a pleasing picture. He gives us, however, the accurate height of the cone, by two measurements taken at different times, which leaves no doubt on the subject; the one by Captain Smyth of the navy, who was so long employed in surveying in the Mediterranean--the result of his measurement gives the height 10,874 feet; the other, by Sir John Herschel, from a barometrical measurement, makes it come out 10,872 feet above the level of the sea at Catania, making only a difference of 1] foot. The Catanians had been led to believe it at least 13,000 feet; and so indignant are they at any attempt to curtail its dimensions, that to dispute the accuracy of the measurement by one of their own countrymen, is considered to be not only a reflexion upon him, but also on the nation; and Captain Smyth hardly escaped their anger for venturing to diminish the height of their mountain.
Captain Hall's next mountainous expedition was up Vesuvius, which had been in a state of eruption for a fortnight before he arrived at Naples ; he was accompanied by the old guide, Salvatore, and was just in time to witness some red-hot balls falling to the ground from their highest ascent; the longest time, he says, was twelve seconds, from whence he concludes their projection from the crater must have been 2300 feet; but he observes, Sir William Hamilton considered the column of liquid lava to have shot up 10,000 feet. Unfortunately, he was too late on the spot to have his sanguine and inquisitive curiosity much gratified on this occasion ; but his prince of guides' entertained him with stories of the risks he had run, and of the accidents which had happened to persons who had accompanied him--at the same time, hot stones were whizzing about at no great distance from them. One of the guide's stories is amusing enough; and with it we shall conclude our brief notices of this amusing and instructive publication.
«« A few years ago," commenced Salvatore, just after a pretty heavy shower of stones had fallen not very far within us, that is, between the
us, “ I came up the mountain with a party of gentlemen, one of whom insisted upon going not only round the cone, as we are now doing, but actually into the crater, although I told him that such an adventure was fraught with much more danger than the thing was worth.
«« Pouh! pooh! danger ?" exclaimed this pig-headed gentleman, « what care I for danger-am I not a soldier? Why, man, I have faced the foe before now ! Lead the way, I'll follow.
6.I merely remarked,” continued Salvatore—who is himself as brave as steel-"that to face a human enemy, and to face an active volcano, were two very different things.”
•« Are you afraid to go ?" asked the gentleman. “I don't much admire it," said I ; " but as I think I know how to evade the danger when it comes-having been at the work for nearly half a century-I'll go into the crater if you are determined upon the adventure. Only, I again warn you, that there is great danger to an inexperienced stranger.”
««. Well! well I Come along," cried the impatient soldier, and away we went—the young man flourishing his stick like a sword, while I, the old man, only shrugged my shoulders.”
"si Now, sir," said I to the gentleman," the only plan by which we can hope to accomplish this expedition in safety, is to be perfectly steady, and to stand as cool and collected as if nothing were happening, should a shower' of stones come about our ears. I hope we may have none while we are in this awkward place : but should we be so unfortunate, mind, your only chance is to stand fast and look upwards. It requires good nerves-so brace them sharp up."
66 Oh! nerves ! is that all ?. You shall see!” So away we went," said Salvatore, “climbed the lip of the củp, descended the fearful abyss, and though half choked with the fumes, saw all we wished to see, and were actually on our return, when the mountain roared like thunder, the ground shook, a furious eruption took place, and myriads of stones were shot a thousand feet into the air."
Now, Signor mio," I called out, “ stand your ground, and make good use of those nerves you spoke of. Look up-be steady-and you may yet escape. << But the
facer of mortal foes quailed before those of nature; he looked up as he was bid ; but when he beheld a cataract of fire falling on his head, the courage he had boasted of on the plain forsook him on the hill, and incontinently he fled. For my part," continued the energetic old man,“ I was too much afraid to fly. I never saw such a shower of stones, and only wonder how, we were not both demolished. As it was, my companion had not run far before he was struck down by three stones, one of which broke his leg, the others stunned him, and I had enough to do to carry him on my shoulders out of the cone. Much work we had to get him to Naples, where the hotel-keepers and the Italian doctors between them had the plucking of this precious pigeon for the next six months.”
Art. III.-Manual of Political Ethics. By Francis LIEBER.
8vo. London, 1839. THOUGH, assuredly, it cannot be said that there is any want of
political discussion among us, we think it must be admitted that but few considerable or very successful attempts have been made to treat politics scientifically. Particular questions of civil policy and government are often discussed in an enlarged and comprehensive spirit; and extensive generalizations of political truth are undoubtedly to be found in the writings of some of our eminent statesmen and jurists; but comparatively little has been done to fix the general principles on which all questions of government and political right must be determined, or to trace particular truths, by a systematic deduction, from such principles. In most of the political controversies, indeed, that occur amongst us, we are much more prone to seek a support for our peculiar views in historical precedents and constitutional maxims, than in abstract truths. Nor is the reason of this difficult to be assigned. In political disputes, the most philosophical argument is not always the most effective. In this country, in particular, to show that a certain privilege is the birthright of all Englishmen, will generally have much more effect than to show that it is the birthright of all men. No proof that a certain institution ought to exist, will recommend it so strongly to many persons as the proof that, at some assigned period, it did exist ; nor will any degree of intuitive or demonstrative evidence lend such weight to a political principle, as showing it to be contained in Magna Charta or the Bill of Rights' would do. That every man's house is his castle'—that every man has a right to be tried by his peers '—are propositions which no Englishman would fail to rank as elementary truths-as amongst the purest abstractions to which political philosophy could conduct us. Nor is it desirable that this reverence for constitutional maxims should, by any direct means, be diminished. But the respect felt for mere antiquity, custom, and prescription, must, whether it be desirable or not, be expected gradually to abate. The progress of intellectual cultivation and activity, is towards general truths; and, considering the extensive and powerful influence which political opinions must exercise on the happiness of mankind, too much care cannot be employed in establishing and disseminating sound generalizations. We are, therefore, well disposed to notice any work of which this is the design, even although, as in the present case, we may take considerable exceptions to the mode of prosecuting it.
When we observed that politics, as a science, had not been very extensively cultivated among us, we did not overlook the works of Bentham. These works, however, (independently of their relating more properly to jurisprudence than to politics,) hardly form an exception to our observation, in the extent in which it was meant to be offered. Though the writings of Bentham will undoubtedly operate strongly on public opinion, they are not calculated to do so directly, but only through the medium of a particular and limited class of readers. Besides that, the views of Bentham are founded upon a peculiar ethical theory, the soundness of which is by no means beyond the reach of exception, the dry and technical character of his style must always prove repulsive to the generality of readers.
If the work of Paley is assuredly free from one of the defects that are to be found in the writings of Bentham, it is not altogether exempt from the prejudice arising from the other consideration al. luded to_namely, the peculiar ethical opinions of the author. We say prejudice, because, even granting the erroneousness of some of Paley's ethical views, both theoretical and practical, we are not aware that these at all affect his expositions of political science. Indeed, the great excellence of this part of his work has been admitted by some of the most decided opponents of his ethical doctrines. Still, we believe, the prejudice alluded to exists to a certain extent. The political part of Paley's work, too, is, in reference to the importance of the subject, of very circumscribed extent, and many political subjects of weight and interest are necessarily but slightly, if at all, touched upon. Nor had Paley, at the time he wrote, enjoyed the advantage of the momentous lessons in politics which are to be drawn from the American and French revolutions, and the consequences to which they severally gave birth. This consideration alone makes it unnecessary, in our judgment, to refer here to the works of older writers.
The work before us involves no peculiar moral theory, and is composed in a popular and easy style, and diversified with numerous historical illustrations. It is entitled a Manual;' but when we consider that the part already published (composing an octavo of above four hundred pages) contains but what is more strictly introductory matter, we must say that, if the temple is to bear any proportion to the portico-if the Hercules is to be estimated ex pede-the title has been somewhat whimsically chosen. The author, a German by birth, is at present a professor in an American university, and the present publication is a reprint from the American edition. With reference to what has been just said as to its being uncompleted, it is proper to give the following annunciation : The present volume forms, as may be
conjectured from the title, a separate whole of itself, and has, for • that reason, been called part first, and not volume first.'
That which has most struck us, on a general survey of the work-exhibiting, as it does, some sound and judicious views—is the grievous want of compactness, selection, and logical order. Whatever sort or degree of satisfaction may be found in the perusal of it, it is certainly not that satisfaction which arises from the mode of evolving truth, as distinct from the truth itself ---the satisfaction produced by gradual progress and development,—by the perception of connexion and dependence of parts. Not but that there is an affectation of method-an affectation, bowever, which serves only to make the want of the reality more apparent, and more obnoxious to censure.
The specific object of the work is indicated in the following passage:- Wherever the application of a principle or rule is required, whenever an abstract principle passes over into practical life, conscientious action is required, or it will fail to attain its object. No prescription or form of words, no law or institu• tion, can serve as a substitute for this essential element of • human action. It is therefore necessary to ascertain by what moral principles we ought to be guided in certain specific poli
tical cases, and what it is that experience points out as the • wisest course for a conscientious citizen, under the law and in • relations established by the two former sciences. And this • branch in particular I call political ethics.'
• The two former sciences' here alluded to, are, natural law,' and politics proper.'. The object of the former, (as we are told,) is to show the rights which man has, according to his inherent, ' inalienable, ethical nature.' Thence we are led to the object of politics proper.'
Natural law having ascertained and established that which is right from the nature of man, it is the subject of another science to ascertain the best means of securing it, both according to the result and conclusion of experience, and the demands of existing * circumstances. I would call this branch politics proper.'
The science of political ethics thus arises out of politics proper, and that again out of the science of natural law. But it being, as we have seen, the object of natural law to show the rights which man possesses according to his ethical nature, or, (as it is stated a little after,) ' the rights of man derived from his nature, both * physical and moral, the author has thought it necessary to explain at some length wherein the ethical or moral nature of man consists; and the process by which his rights are shown to be derived from this nature. In fact, the work sets out from