from petty vanity. He was not only one of the greatest, but one of the most unpretending of men. His carelessness of his literary reputation attests this. Such a man was not likely to read for the mere purpose of display. He had perhaps read the books named by Mr. Chalmers, but if so, he had read them in the course of professional study. Mr. Chalmers did not come to the controversy free from prejudice—he was one of the luckless individuals who were deceived by the Ireland forgeries. Malone, either from better judgment, or better fortune, stood aloof; and, when the imposture was exposed, enjoyed his triumph somewhat beyond the bounds of moderation. Mr. Chalmers could not bear this, and published an octavo volume, to show, that although the Ireland papers were now proved to be forgeries, he, and his brethren in misfortune, had been quite right in believing them to be genuine. It was in this volume that he sought to account for Shakspeare's legal knowledge in opposition to the opinion of Malone. Anger may sometimes make a man eloquent, but it seldom makes him impartial, and Mr. Chalmers was too much irritated to discuss the matter fairly: not to mention that his belief in the authenticity of the Ireland manuscripts is not peculiarly favorable to his character for critical discrimination. It is remarkable, too, that although Malone had published his opinion as early as 1790, Mr. Chalmers did not think of disputing it, until he found it necessary to apologise for his credulity seven or eight years afterwards. But dismissing the personal quarrels of Mr. Malone and Mr. Chalmers, it will be useful to advert to two other writers who have maintained the claims of Shakspeare to a legal education.

The Rev. Walter Whiter published, in 1794, "A Specimen of a Commentary upon Shakspeare," in which he proposed to illustrate the works of the poet by a reference to the doctrine of the association of ideas. His general principle will be found in the following quotation.

"I define therefore the power of this association over the genius of the poet, to consist in supplying him with words, and with ideas, which have been suggested to the mind by a principle of union unperceived by himself, and independent of the subject to which they are applied."

Malone conjectured that Shakspeare had passed a part of his early life in the office of the seneschal of some manor court. Some of this critic's conjectures were extravagant enough, but this was certainly a most happy one, and is sustained by the evidence of a great number of passages. The words "suit and service" are continually combined in the language of the feudal law, and those two words seem to have been associated by some recondite principle in the mind of Shakspeare. They do not always occur in immediate succession, but the former word seems almost constantly to suggest the latter, which follows it within a line or two.

"How in his suit he scorn'd you; but your loves Thinking upon his services" (Coriolanus.) "I know thee well, thou hast obtain'd thy suit, Shylock, thy master, spoke with me this day, And hath preferr'd thee, if it be preferment, To leave a rich Jew's service, to become The follower of so poor a gentleman." (Mer. of Venice.) "Princess. Biron did swear himself out of all suit.

Maria. Dumain was at my service, and his sword." (Love's Labour Lost) "What humble suit attends thy answer there; Impose some service on me for thy love." (Love's Labour Lost.) Mr. Whiter's criticisms may be thought somewhat

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refined, but they emanate from an acute and cultivated mind, and open a new vein of inquiry which deserves to be followed up. Mr. Whiter adopts generally the opinion of Malone, and expresses surprise that he had not adduced a greater number of passages in proof of it. The opinion had also the support of Ritson and Stevens.

Dr. Drake follows on the same side; and, without discussing the question, gives the following passages in addition to those furnished by his predecessors: "Immediately provided in that case.' (Midsummer Night's Dream.) "Royally attornied." (Winter's Tale.) "That doth utter all men's ware-a." (Ibid.) "Thy title is affeered."

(Macbeth.)

"Keep leets and law days, and in sessions sit."

(Othello.)

"Why should calamity be full of words,
Windy attornies to their client woes."
(K. Richard III.)
"But when the heart's attorney once is mute,
The client breaks, as desperate in his suit."
(Venus and Adonis.).

"So now I have confest that he is thine; And I, myself, am mortgaged to thy will." (Sonnett cxxxvi.) "He learn'd but surety-like to write for me Under that bond, that him as fast doth bind The statute of thy beauty." (Sonnett cxxxiv.) The two following are pointed out by Stevens: "As it [the hailstone] determines, so

Dissolves my life." (Anthony and Cleopatra.) "Our high plac'd Macbeth

Shall live the lease of nature." (Macbeth.) the list: These, which follow, may properly be added to "I am still

Attornied at your service." (Meas. for Meas.) "Shall I be charg'd no farther than this present? Must all determine here." (Coriolanus.)

"An I were so apt to quarrel as thou art, any and a quarter." man should buy the fee-simple of my life for an hour (Romeo and Juliet.)

"By the next new moon
The sealing day betwixt my love and me
For everlasting bond of fellowship."

(Midsummer Night's Dream.) "And seal the title with a lovely kiss."

(Taming the Shrew.) "Now must your conscience my acquittance seal." (Hamlet.)

Such is the present state of the evidence on the subject, and the weight of it clearly inclines to the conclusion, which gives to the law the honour of blishment of this point might be beneficial in disso illustrious a disciple as Shakspeare. The estapelling a very foolish prejudice, that the study of the law has a tendency to narrow the mind. Did it narrow the mind of Shakspeare, who probably received a legal education? Did it narrow the mind of Bacon, who certainly did! The study of the law upon enlarged principles must tend to expand and invigorate the mind, and the contrary position is either the dictate of prejudice, or the refuge of indolence.

RECENT DECISIONS IN THE
SUPERIOR COURTS.

It appears probable, from the number of new statutes for altering the law, and regulating its administration, that we shall have frequent occasion to notice decisions, of which it must be particularly important to the general practi

30

tioner to receive early information. We have therefore made arrangements for a regular report of such new decisions as may be deemed within the general scope of the work.

We also intend to accompany these new cases, and the abridgment of others, with short occasional tracts on the general branches of law to which they relate. This plan, we conceive, will be particularly serviceable, not only to every student, but in no small degree also to the older practitioners, amidst the alterations which are constantly taking place. And such a method, we trust, will somewhat relieve this otherwise heavy, though useful, portion of our pages.

AUTHORITY OF COUNSEL AND ATTORNIES.

The court will presume that counsel have authority to enter into such agreements as they make on behalf of their clients. It is for the client to disprove the authority. And especially where the party is present in court, and assents to an arrangement by himself or his attorney, the terms will be enforced.

Disputes having arisen between a husband and wife, and an assault having been committed by the former, for which he was convicted, an agreement was made in court, and signed by counsel, for the

allowance of an annuity to the wife, and for other terms of compromise. The court then inflicted a nominal fine only. The husband afterwards refused to pay the annuity, or execute a deed to carry the

arrangement into effect.

It was proved that the defendant's solicitor at the trial stated openly in court, in the defendant's presence, in reference to the arrangement, "we agree to it." The chairman of the Quarter Sessions confirmed this evidence.

For the defendant it was proved, by one witness, that he was within hearing of what passed between the defendant, and his attorney and counsel, and that the defendant refused to allow his wife anything, but the witness could not say whether the agreement was signed with, or without the privity or consent of the defendant.

It was contended for the defendant, that a party trusts his counsel as to the particular cause in which the brief is delivered to him, but does not make him his agent for a purpose foreign to the cause.

I

The Master of the Rolls said, in the absence of evidence, a court will conclude that counsel had authority. There is evidence on both sides. think that counsel had authority which would bind his client. Though the defendant objected at first, did he not afterwards assent? The counsel swears that the arrangement was concluded, and that the attorney was present. The chairman said, "I impose a nominal fine upon you, because you have entered into the arrangement.' The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a decree with costs. Let a deed be prepared. Elworthy v. Bird, 1 Tamlyn, 38.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.

It appears that where solicitors are in partnership, the knowledge of a defect by one of them regarding the title to property, will bind the other in a subsequent purchase, in which such knowledge is essential in the way of notice or privity. This point has been decided in the following case; but it is questionable whether it can be extended beyond the precise circumstances of that case.

In 1818, two solicitors in partnership were employed for the purchaser of an estate to investigate the title. It did not appear which of them person

ally conducted the investigation. The title, how. ever, was allowed to pass, and after the death of the client, and the lapse of eight years from the former purchase, namely, in 1826, one of the solicitors contracted with the widow of the deceased for the purchase of the property, and paid part of the consi

deration money.

He afterwards objected to the title. It was a circumstance favorable to the bona fide character of the transaction, (though it might not affect its legal nature) that the solicitor had made the purchase for the Norwich Water Company, and this was publicly known at the office of the clerk of the peace, preparatory to an application to Parliament.

The defendant, in his answer, stated he did not recollect or believe that he personally examined the abstract, but that the conveyance was prepared and approved by his partner.

There was no stipulation in the agreement, that the solicitor should take the title as it stood; and it was contended on his behalf, that he was not bound to complete the purchase without a title.

The Master of the Rolls held, that a solicitor who had been employed to advise on the title should not, on purchasing the same property from his client, importance when advising his principal. Beevor v. set up an objection which he did not think of any Simpson, 1 Tamlyn, 69.

Quere, whether if it had been quite clear that the defendant was personally unacquainted with the defect, the proper remedy would not have been against the partnership, rather than the individual partner who in this latter transaction was acting for a third person?

COSTS.

Where one party insists upon that to which he is not entitled, and the other is willing to perform the agreement really entered into, the defendant is entitled to costs, although a decree for specific performance is pronounced for the plaintiff. It is a frequent practice to give costs against a plaintiff who has a decree-the real question being, by whose fault were the costs incurred. 1 Tamlyn, 83.

AD VALOREM STAMP.

Letters of administration had been taken under £20. It was doubtful whether property of a considerable amount belonged to the administrator of It was urged that the ecclesiastical court did not a bankrupt's wife, or to the bankrupt's assignees. put a stamp when the property was in litigation. But the Master of the Rolls said, "I think differently, for I must protect the revenue.' The cause stood over, with leave to correct the letters of administration. 1 Tamlyn, 144.

LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES.

The members of the profession are so frequently appointed trustees and executors in important matters, that it may be useful to notice the following case, which is a liberal construction of their responsibility.

A bill was filed to make executors liable for a sum produced by the sale of £3000 Navy 5 per cents. which had been deposited with country bankkers, who had failed.

It appeared the testator had kept large sums in the hands of the same bankers till the time of his death, and had employed one of the bankers' clerks as his confidental agent. The executors employed the same person. In the execution of their trust they contracted for the purchase of an estate, and believing it would be immediately completed, they

Formerly the number of judges in each court appears to have been uncertain. From the special commission granted by Henry III. in the fortysecond year of his reign, to the justices of the King's Bench, to hold that court at Westminster till he should otherwise determine, it would appear that the number of judges of that court was then three; namely, Roger de Thurkelby, Gilbert de Preston, and Nicholas Hundlo. Dugdale's Orig. Jurid. c. 17. The number of judges in the Common Pleas varied considerably. Previous to the reign of Edward II. the number was three. At the commencement of his reign the number was increased to six, on account of the increase of business. They sat in two separate places, but for how long this practice continued is uncertain. Three years after, 6 Edward II. there were seven; but no more than six in any subsequent year of that reign, nor until 7 Edward III.; then the number of seven was resumed. In 11 and 12 Edward III. they were increased to eight, and by 14 Edward III. Trinity term, they amounted to nine. This appears by the fines levied before them. Afterwards, during the remainder of Edward III. Richard II. Henry IV. and Henry V. there were only five. Henry VI. increased them to seven. After that, the number was reduced, and there were seldom more than five, until 27 Henry VI.; then they were increased to six, and that number remained till 29 Henry VI. In that year, and till 32, they were seven, and then eight. In 33, six; then, and until the latter end of the reign of Edward IV., seven. Then they were reduced to four; and so they remained till the end of Henry VII. It is to be observed, that some of these justices were, at the same time, chief barons of the Exchequer. Dug. Orig. Jur. c. 18.

In the Exchequer, under Henry III. three spiritual and three temporal barons sat with Ranulph de Glanville, at that time justice of England. Dug. Orig. Jur. c. 19.

The power to increase the number of judges is new, as a legislative enactment. It, however, appears to have been exerted as a matter of prerogative by James I. during the greater part of his reign, for the benefit of a casting voice, in case of a difference of opinion, and that the circuits might at all times be supplied with judges of the superior courts. (a) In subsequent reigns, upon the permanent indisposition of a judge, a fifth has been sometimes appointed. (Bl. Com. vol. 3, p. 41, note n.) Sir Thomas Raymond mentions the death of Sir Thomas Twisden, one of the justices of the King's Bench, in the first week in January, 1682, grandævus senectute. He continued judge till his death, but was dispensed with from sitting in court by reason of his age and infirmity. T. Kay. Rep. p. 475.

THE LATE LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

who was a ripe and a good scholar, was peculiarly happy in his Latin quotations, an instance of which occurred one day in the court of King's Bench. It is well known to the senior members of the profession, that Erskine was a great favorite with Lord Kenyon, who, though a rigid moralist himself, and accustomed to treat with severity the slightest deviations from rectitude in others, always looked upon

(a) The provision intended by this Act, as to the number of the puisne judges who are to sit at a time in the different courts, will have just the opposite effect to that which James I. intended, by his alterations in the number of the judges in the King's Bench and Common Pleas.

Erskine's failings (for he, too, had some of the leaven of human nature in his composition,) with great tenderness and forbearance, apologizing for in his rapid manner, "Spots in the sun! spots in the them whenever they were mentioned, by observing, sun!" But that he had not the same kindly feeling towards Law is also well known. One day Erskine and Law were warmly opposed to each other in discussing some matter before the judges of the court of King's Bench, when Lord Kenyon appearing to lean in favor of Erskine, and the puisne judges seeming disposed to side with their chief, Erskine, in anticipation of victory, became more glowing and animated than usual, which so irritated Law, who thought that the justice of the case was with him, that, at the conclusion of his speech, turning towards his opponent, he indignantly poured forth, in his deep and manly tone, the following quotation from the 12th Æneid of Virgil :

non me tua fervida terrent, Dicta, ferox, Dii me terrent et Jupiter hostis. Those who remember Erskine in his best days will feel that the epithet "fervida" was as characteristic of his glowing eloquence, as "ferox" was foreign to his kind and amiable disposition, and that whilst "Dii" was a suitable appellation of the puisne judges (who may be considered as a sort of dii minores, or terrestrial deities), "Jupiter hostis" was powerfully descriptive of the omnipotence of their chief, and of his dislike of Law; in fact, a quotation so apt in all its points (except the one alluded to) to the occasion and the persons, very rarely occurs.

THE FIRST LAW BOOK.

"Yes, sir, the

Memoirs of Charles Macklin, 1804, p. 308.

LORD MANSFIELD.