knowledge examination there shall in future be two examinations in general knowledge. The subjects prescribed for the first examination are (1) English composition and writing to dictation; (2) arithmetic, simple and compound, and vulgar and decimal fractions; (3) elements of Latin; (4) history of England and Scotland; (5) geography. This examination is to be taken before or within one year after the apprentice has commenced his apprenticeship. The examiners are authorised, if they think fit, to make the standard of this examination equivalent to the examination for the lower grade leaving certificates of the Scotch Education Department. The examination is, however, not to be of a higher standard than is required for the leaving certificates. Leaving certificates either of the higher or lower grade are to exempt candidates from the subjects of the first examination. A candidate who fails to pass the first examination is to be re-examined in all the subjects, and if he fails to pass within the first year of his apprenticeship he is not to be entitled to another trial except on making special application to the examiners and giving proof of diligence to their satisfaction. Candidates who have passed the present apprentices' examination are exempted from the first examination. In the second examination in general knowledge, candidates are allowed a choice of subjects. Those specified are-Mathematics, Logic, Latin, Greek, French, German, Spanish, and Italian, and the examiners, if they desire, may include any other subjects. Candidates are only to be examined in three subjects, and these they may select; but the subjects selected must include either mathematics and one language, or if mathematics is not taken, then any two of the languages. Candidates will also require to pass in bookkeeping, and they are allowed to take this subject with the examination in law. The second examination may be taken either immediately after the first examination or at any time within three years thereafter. Candidates who fail to pass the second examination on being re-examined only require to pass in those subjects in which they previously failed, or in equivalent subjects. Higher grade leaving certificates exempt candidates from examination in any subjects to which the certificates apply. Certificates of passing in the higher standard of the preliminary examination required for the M.A. degree are to exempt candidates from the first and second examinations. Candidates also who have passed the present general knowledge examination are exempted from the second examination. Two examinations are to be held in Edinburgh yearly, and examinations may also be held in Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Dundee, if not less than ten candidates present themselves. The examinations are to be conducted by the Board of Examiners and two or more professional examiners to be "chosen from a list approved by the Court on "the recommendation of the present examiners." The examiners are directed to give notice to candidates as to the books to be read or the special branches to be studied for their next examinations. No alteration has been made on the subjects of the law examination, and candidates who are graduates in law of any Scottish university are exempted from the law examination, but require to pass in Court procedure. The regulations now prescribed are to come into operation on 1st January, 1894.

THE

SCOTTISH LAW REVIEW.

VOL. IX.

MAY, 1893.

No. 101.

THE LOCAL COURTS IN SCOTLAND.

IN whose interest is reform proposed? and whose opinion is best worth having upon the scope of the proposed reform? These are questions upon which there must be agreement before much profit can be expected to result from the discussion. In dealing with this subject it should be unnecessary to say that such matters as the effect of proposed reforms upon the legal profession do not constitute an element in the problem, and need not be considered. The legal profession are the servants of the public, and if the public service is promoted the legal profession can put forward no antagonistic interest of their own; but, fortunately for the equanimity of the profession, it may safely be assumed that whatever promotes public business will in the same measure benefit them. So also of the disputes between different branches of the legal profession. These are only of interest as they conduce to the public service. The distinction between agent and advocate is not antecedently defensible. A litigant who does not conduct his own case has the best right to choose who should represent him; and, apart from history and tradition, one would expect this right to be conceded, subject to only one limitation, that the person appearing for another should be respectful in his bearing and address to the Court. Limiting the choice to one class-law agents-and then prohibiting the person chosen from appearing in Court except through the intervention of a member of another class the advocates-is an arrangement so anomalous on the face of it that it can only be defended if experience has shown it to be conducive to the public interest. The interests of the legal profession being of no moment in the discussion, neither are the interests of the judges. Where the judges are to reside, what is to be their jurisdiction, by what title they are to be known, what is to be their dignity or precedence, how their judgments are to be

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reviewed all these are questions to be determined solely by the public convenience. If present holders of office are not content under an altered régime there are plenty of men willing and able to fill their places.

But are not the present Courts satisfactory? Who says that reform is needed? Who knows what direction reform should take? The unhesitating answer must be that the gravest dissatisfaction exists; and that the grounds of dissatisfaction are the delay, the expense, and the uncertainty of litigation. Business men do not object to have their disputes adjudicated on if judgment is given quickly and on reasonable terms. But they will not go into Court as Courts are at present constituted. A litigation occupies too much time, engrosses too much attention, costs too much money in proportion to the issue at stake unless the sum involved is large, and is too uncertain in its result to warrant its being entered upon. Practising law agents are the class who know best the objections to the present system or want of system, and who know what is required to meet the wishes of business men. Advocates do not know, for they do not meet the clients, and not one tithe of the disputes which are advised upon by law agents ever reach the advocates. Judges do not know, for only a fraction of the disputes ever become subject of litigation. Litigants do not know, for their experience in one or two cases does not suffice for generalisation. But any one in chamber practice, advising mercantile clients upon the disputes and differences which occur in business, will soon get to know where the shoe pinches and what business men need. To have to tell a man who wishes a decision in a few weeks that a proposed action will occupy three or four months, if a vacation intervenes will occupy five or six months, and that the defender may, by appealing each appealable interlocutor, procure a delay of from six to twelve months at two or three stages of the case, is equivalent to telling him to go and make the best terms he can with his opponent, and take what he can get rather than go into Court; that is to say, he must submit to injustice, must forego part of his just rights, because the tribunals of the country do not furnish a tolerable remedy. In the experience of every law agent cases like these are common. If ordinary cases could be decided within six weeks the Courts of law would be kept busy and law agents would be better paid than at present though the expense of each case were only one-third of the present average. There would be no more complaints, and it would be possible for law agents to answer the questions almost always asked, but at present unanswerable, namely, when can we depend on having a decision, and what will be the probable cost if we lose?

In determining on what basis any system of judicature ought to be established, the following propositions may be assumed (1) Courts of law exist for the benefit of the community. Those who benefit by them are not the litigants merely. Any one may any day become a litigant, and the mere existence of efficient Courts of law often renders litigation unnecessary. (2) Litigation should be encouraged. This does not mean that litigation is good in itself, but merely that whoever has a claim which is disputed, or a right which is denied, should be encouraged to bring it before the recognised tribunals, whose procedure should be such as to render them more popular and more worthy of confidence than private arbitration. (3) Courts of law should be accessible in every sense of the word. The final end of all civil government is to see that justice is done. This involves providing a remedy for every legal wrong, and making that remedy easy of access. Courts of law should be within reach of every person, that is to say, as regards situation they should be locally convenient, as regards procedure they should dispose of causes with reasonable speed, and as regards costs they should be cheap. (4) The decisions of Courts of law should be authoritative. Not that every decision in every case should be quoted or quotable as law, but care should be taken that the decisions pronounced be in conformity with law, and that in doubtful cases the law can be definitely ascertained and enunciated. Unless this is done there will be no confidence in embarking on litigation, and uncertainty and confusion will prevail in the practice and administration of the law.

It may be convenient in considering how the present system can be brought into harmony with the ideal to deal with the matter under two branches, namely, Courts and procedure.

Courts should be locally convenient. Justice should be brought within reach of every man instead of requiring him to go afield in search of it. This is necessary in the interest of litigants, and still more in the interest of witnesses, who should be put to as little loss and inconvenience as possible when called on to give evidence. The arrangement of Sheriff or County Courts meets this requirement to a partial extent but not altogether, because many causes must be tried in Edinburgh. These local Courts should have jurisdiction in all causes. It is conceded that local tribunals are necessary for small causes, but why subject litigants and witnesses in causes of larger amount to loss, trouble, and expense which smaller litigants are spared? Provided care be taken to appoint competent judges, and to correct errors by appeal, there is no reason except tradition for limiting the

jurisdiction of the local Courts. The parties litigants are the best judges of where to litigate. If the pursuer sues in the local Courts he thereby makes his choice of a tribunal with which presumably he is satisfied. If the defender is dissatisfied, he has the remedy in his own hands, and can transfer the cause to the Supreme Court for trial there (Willing v. Heys, 15 Nov. 1892, 20 R. 34, per M'Laren). Special provision may be made for special cases, e.g., consistorial causes might be intimated to the procurator-fiscal in the public interest; but subject to these provisions the parties themselves may safely be left to select their own tribunal. The important thing is that parties should not be prevented resorting to a Court which is convenient, and in which they have confidence, merely because of the nature or amount of the issue at stake. To draw an arbitrary line above or below which jurisdiction is withheld is an antiquated and vexatious arrangement. To some extent the principle contended for is already conceded by allowing parties in certain cases and within limits to prorogate the jurisdiction of a Court, and in England, notwithstanding the pecuniary limit to the jurisdiction of the County Court judges, the parties may by consent bring an action of any amount in the County Court. Of course it would still be open to anyone to initiate litigation in the Court of Session, and that Court would necessarily continue to have privative jurisdiction in a number of causes, such as actions against defenders resident in different counties, actions relating to lands in more than one county, actions against foreigners, &c.

As regards appeal, the Inner House of the Court of Session should, as at present, be the common Court of Appeal, whether from Lords Ordinary or Sheriffs, and the stages at which appeal is competent should be the same in both. This of course involves the abolition of the appeal from one local judge to another. It also involves the considerable modifications in procedure mentioned below. It is not proposed that there should be any change in the constitution or jurisdiction of the Court of Session, but if the Second Division of the Court were locally situated in Glasgow, and the judges of that Division resident there, such an arrangement would greatly facilitate business. The headquarters of the Court would still be in Edinburgh, and the records of Court would be kept there. The jurisdiction of each Division and of the Lords Ordinary would, as at present, extend all over Scotland, and there would be the same power of distributing business and transferring causes as at present. The only change would be in the place of meeting, and that is a change not of law or constitution, but merely of practice and convenience. The will of every summons still bears the words, " or where they