to represent 100,000 working men opposed to contracting out being prohibited. Mr. Chamberlain is strongly opposed to prohibition, for reasons stated with his usual clearness and force; and Lord Salisbury made it distinct that he sympathised with and generally endorsed the views of the deputation referred to. I have therefore little doubt that the House of Lords will not pass the measure without some provision being made, in certain cases at all events, as to an exception to such prohibition. I am aware that I have not dealt with every point in the new Bill, but I have, I hope, given a pretty fair view of the proposed alterations on the existing law. WALTER C. SPENS. PROFESSIONAL RECOLLECTIONS. 9.-"Not Guilty." EVERY lawyer who has had even a moderate amount of litigious business must have won cases which he expected to lose and lost cases which he expected to win. And if this holds good of cases decided by judges, it is still more applicable to cases tried by jury. The experience and observation of the present writer have led him to think that, if he had to stand his trial on a criminal charge, he would prefer to be tried by a judge if he were innocent, and by a jury if he were guilty. By this it is not meant to be conveyed as the writer's opinion that judges never misjudge and that juries never give good verdicts. Still, if training is needful for the judge, it is curious that juries can be expected to do without it. The weighing of evidence is often the most difficult and delicate part of the judge's function, and remains to the end of his career the duty which puts his judicial qualities to the severest strain. In earlier times, and under very different governmental conditions, there may have been— nay, there were reasons for brushing aside the judges of the Crown from answering the inquiry whether an accused was innocent or guilty. But in these days, when judges are under no temptation to be servile, (for, though appointed by the Crown, they are nominated by Ministers who possess the confidence of the Parliamentary representatives of the people, and they hold office for life), it is surely a mistake to throw away their skill and prefer the untaught and unlearned occupants of the jury-box for a task which always tries and often transcends the oldest judges. Trial by jury is too important a subject to be dealt with in a passing note like this, and is entitled to the fuller consideration of a separate paper; so, to our "recollection" which suggested these observations. Many years ago a client of mine in a good social position was accused of stabbing a woman. My first interview with him on the subject occurred in prison, but threw no light on the main question guilty or not guilty. As even those who are guilty usually assert their innocence, the fact that this accused omitted the usual formula left on my mind the impression that he But he perhaps had his own reasons for saying nothing. wanted very much-more than usual-to be got off. He got off. The accusation was that, in the bedroom occupied by him in a hotel where he was staying for a night, he had stabbed a woman of the town in the face with a knife. She stated that in passing the hotel door she was accosted by the accused and invited to spend the night with him, and that he directed her to his room; that she made her way to it and he followed her; that an altercation arose about money, and that he got angry and stabbed her in the face with his pocket knife. The story of the accused was that he was smoking at the hotel door before turning in for the night when the woman was passing and importuned him ; that he told her to go off, but she would not, and that to get quit of her he went in and walked straight to his room; that, as he was closing the door, he felt it pressed open and the woman pushed in and shut the door; that she then demanded money either to go or stay, and that he ordered her out, and when she would not go he took her by the shoulders to put her out, and as she resisted and struggled he used some force, and she fell on her face on the fender and caused the injury which she ascribed to his knife. Both stories contained improbabilities, and it was not easy to believe either. The woman's story suggested an inadequate motive for so serious an attack as she alleged, and the circumstances were likely to make the man abstain from violence that would lead to noise and disclosure. The man's story was incredible, for, in the circumstances alleged by him, most other men would have rung for the waiter to eject the intruder. The appearance of the wound did not, in the opinion of the medical witnesses for the Crown, confirm the fender theory, and there was no medical witness called for the defence. At the trial a waiter in the hotel swore that he had caught a glimpse of the woman going up the stair as he was carrying refreshments to another visitor two or three minutes before the scream came from the bedroom. He was quite positive about the time that elapsed. The woman had sworn that she had been ten to fifteen minutes in the bedroom before she was stabbed. In the address to the jury on behalf of the accused this discrepancy was pointed out and made the ground of an attack on the woman's credibility, and the jury disbelieved her and found the accused not guilty." It was suggested that the waiter had been paid for winking at the irregularity of taking a woman into the hotel, and dare not admit that he had allowed ten to fifteen minutes to elapse without informing his master that she was upstairs, or taking steps to have her turned out. That was the turning point of the case, and it will never be known whether the waiter told the truth, or lied to save his situation. Moreover, was the woman's whole story false, even if her estimate of the time spent in the room was wrong? These questions would have bothered the judge, but fortunately for the accused they were questions for the jury. The man who wants to know the value of jury verdicts would need to sit on a few juries and observe for himself the measure of capacity for judging shown by the discussions in the retiring room. Out of the fifteen who heard a case he might discover that only one or two had noticed the importance of the point on which the verdict was ultimately given unanimously. A clear and strong-headed foreman may do more to guide the other fourteen than the judge's charge had done, but a strong and wrong-headed juryman may do more harm than the rest are able to withstand in the form of a verdict. Reader, in token of my respect for you and this bulwark of our liberties, God forbid you should ever be tried on a criminal charge before a jury! Literature. A HANDBOOK OF HUSBAND AND WIFE ACCORDING TO THE LAW 1893. In the early part of the present year there was published a little volume, "Marriages, Regular and Irregular, by an Advocate." In its preface the author stated that it was not intended for the practitioner, but for laymen and persons about to marry-a large and deserving class, as he naively put it. Written in a simple yet forcible style, the hearty welcome given to it on this as well as on the other side of the Border testified to the interesting and instructive nature of its contents. It is satisfactory that the author has disclosed himself, and given to the profession the volume now before us, which we have had great pleasure in perusing. By common consent the law of Husband and Wife is properly regarded as the happy hunting ground of that eminent jurist, the late Lord Fraser. From the first publication of his "Personal and Domestic Relations," nearly half-a-century ago, till the last edition in 1876 of his standard treatise on Husband and Wife, he was the authority on the subject, and will remain so. The very comprehensiveness of this learned work, however, not to speak of the statutory changes on the law, and the great number of cases which have been decided since it appeared, leave ample room for a "Hand"book of the law." To supply this want has been Mr. Walton's object, and he has admirably succeeded in doing so. We cannot speak too highly of either the clearness and conciseness with which he states the law, or the careful arrangement of his book, and the labour bestowed on its preparation. A glance at the table of contents and list of cases cited should satisfy anyone on the latter head, and we are confident that an examination of the text will leave no room for impugning its accuracy. We highly approve of the method adopted of stating a case, as an illustration, by using the rubric, which readily conveys to the professional mind the point in question. Altogether. we are satisfied that Mr. Walton's Handbook will be looked upon by the profession as a valuable contribution on a branch of the law which, in its far-reaching effects, is the basis of all social life, and we predict for it a wide circulation. The publisher's department leaves nothing to be desired. THE LAW OF SCOTLAND IN RELATION TO THE PRESUMPTION OF LIFE As stated in the preface of this little volume, the law of the presumption of life of absent persons has of late years increased both in importance and complexity. Within little more than the last decade two Acts of Parliament-the one repealing and supplanting the other-have been passed, the provisions of which materially supplement, if they do not to a great extent abrogate, the common law of the country. After being ten years in existence, the Act of 1881, which was the first of these measures, was found in practice to be less comprehensive in its provisions than its framers probably meant it to be. Among other blemishes it may be mentioned that it did not apply to persons who had never been in Scotland; that it was of no use in the case of a fiar desirous of freeing his estate of the burden of a liferent; and that no succession which opened to an absent person after the date on which by the Act he was held to have died was affected by its provisions. These and other defects led to its total repeal by the Presumption of Life (Scotland) Act, 1891, which de novo enacted modifications on the common law, and at the same time remedied the flaws to which we have alluded. A careful digest of a branch of the law which presents so many points of interest and importance cannot therefore fail to be of use to the profession. Such a work, we are pleased to say, is the one which we are now noticing. It contains not only a careful analysis of the Act of 1891, but a terse summary of the common law, with chapters on the evidence admissible to overcome the presumption of life, on cases in which the presumption of life was and was not elided, and on common law and statute law procedure. There are besides appendices of useful forms of petitions under the Act of 1891, and clear statements of foreign laws of the presumption of life. The object which the author had in view has been successfully accomplished, and we commend the book, with every confidence, both as regards its accuracy and usefulness. Obituary. At Johnstone, on 16th November, Mr. John Holmes, of the firm of Messrs. Holmes, Mactavish, & Fullerton, writers, Johnstone and Glasgow. Although Mr. Holmes had attained the ripe age of eighty-eight years, his death was not expected so suddenly, as he had been in his usual, although somewhat infirm, health. Mr. Holmes had a wide connection, and had business relations with most of the leading families of Renfrewshire. His agency for the Union Bank of Scotland extended back to the year 1839, and at his death he was understood to have been the oldest official connected with the bank. At Largs, on 18th November, Mr. James Patrick, of the firm of Patrick & Wood, from the effects of a gun accident the previous afternoon. Mr. Patrick was a native of Dalry. He was admitted as a procurator in 1865, in which year he went to Largs, being appointed procurator-fiscal of the Justice of Peace Court for the Largs district of Ayrshire in succession to Mr. Mercer. In 1882 Mr. Patrick opened a branch in Glasgow, and in 1885 he assumed Mr. Wood as partner. Mr. Patrick was some years over fifty, and leaves a widow, but no family. At Kirn, on 21st November, Mr. Thomas Anderson, writer, senior partner of the firm of M'Grigor, Donald, & Co., writers, Glasgow. Mr. Anderson had been in failing health for the past three years, and resided for the most part at the coast, only coming up to town on rare occasions. Latterly he had an attack of congestion of the lungs, which terminated fatally. Mr. Anderson, who was in his sixty-sixth year, was a native of Irvine. He came to Glasgow while still in his teens, and entered the office of Messrs. M'Grigor, Stevenson, and Fleming as an apprentice, so that he had been connected with the firm for nearly half a century. He was cashier for a good many years, and was assumed a partner in 1861. The deceased gentleman never took any share in the practice of the Courts, but had charge of the financial department of the firm. A member of the United Presbyterian Church, Mr. Anderson was for many years treasurer of Renfield Street church. He also interested himself in a number of public movements, and was for a long time one of the directors of the Royal Lunatic Asylum. He became the principal of M'Grigor, Donald, & Co.'s firm on the death of Dr. A. B. M'Grigor, three years ago. He leaves a widow and family of two sons and two daughters. At Edinburgh, on 24th November, Mr. David Johnston MacBrair, S.S.C., at the age of eighty-seven years. Mr. MacBrair, who had long retired from the practice of his profession, was the oldest Solicitor to the Supreme Courts in Scotland, having been admitted in 1833. He was chief clerk in Chancery up to the time of his death. He is survived by an only son. Notes from Edinburgh. PARLIAMENT HOUSE, 30th November, 1893. DURING the month the chief interest of Faculty men has centred in the election of a successor to Professor Goudy. Mr. Goudy, it seems, hesitated to place his resignation in the hands of the |