One of the defendant's coal barges sunk at her moor- | ings so suddenly, that she had to be cut adrift to prevent her sinking others. She was carried down stream, and injured plaintiff's barges by collision. The court below, in the absence of evidence that defendant was to blame for the sinking of his boat, rejected evidence that the place of mooring was improper, and that, in case of accident to barges moored there, barges moored where the plaintiff's barges were moored were thereby exposed to great danger: Held, that the evidence should have been admitted: (McGrew v. Stone, 53 Penn St. 436.) PUBLIC USE. The grant to the public of a right to the use of a portion of the water front of a city for a free public dock for ships is the grant of an easement. The fee of the soil and right of entry remain in the grantor subject to the easement: (San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585.) RAILROAD. Railroad companies may run steamboats between the end of their road and the proper terminus of the route, for the purpose of transporting passengers and freight, and completing the route by that means: (Wheeler v. S. F. and A. R. R. Co., 31 Cal. 46) If such companies hold themselves out as common carriers over such whole route, and usually act as such, they are bound to contract with, and convey, any one who applies, and who tenders the usual price. [AMERICAN DIGEST. Warehousemen having cotton to send by rail applied to plaintiffs in error, who ran a car on a side track to their warehouse. The cotton was loaded on the car. and the agent of the railroad company notified. It was the custom of said company, on receiving such notice, to have the bales counted, sign a bill of lading, and then to send an engine and remove the cars: before these last steps were taken the cotton was burned. It was the custom of the company, known to the shippers, to except loss by fire from their liabilities in their bills of lading: Held, that the cotton had been delivered to the railroad company, and that they could not limit their liability as common carriers, except by express coutract: (Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 354.) Hops were shipped on a railroad for a place thirty-six miles distant, where they were called for, three days later, by plafntiff, but had not arrived. Great efforts were made by him to discover them until twelve days from the shipment, when he desisted, the freight agent taking his post office address, and agreeing to give him notice when the hops arrived. They arrived six days later, but no notice was sent to the plaintiff : Held, that, under the circumstances, defendants were bound to give notice, and that the freight agent was competent to bind the company by his said promise, any rule or custom of the office to the contrary notwithstanding. But on these facts alone plaintiff could not treat the hops as lost, and recover their whole value: (Tanner v. Oil Creek R. R. Co., 53 Penn. St. 411.) The plaintiff purchased a commutation ticket from a railroad company, who gave him a receipt, on which was a note, that the ticket should be shown to conductors, &c., when required, and that no duplicate ticket would be issued. Upon the ticket it was printed, that the ticket was held subject to the regulations prescribed in the receipt: Held, the plaintiff was bound by his contract; and if, by casualty, his ticket had been lost, so that he could not produce it, the company might exact the regular fare paid by other passengers: (Ripley v. N. J. R. R. § T. Co., 30 N. J. 388.) Plaintiff below, a pedler, purchased a railroad ticket, and paid half a dollar for the extra weight of his baggage. The railroad company received no information that said baggage contained any articles not intended for personal convenience and use of plaintiff. It did, in fact. contain a number of watches and other valuable merchandise: Held, that the railroad company, having been induced by plaintiff's act to carry freight as baggage, were released from their liability as carriers, and were only bound to use reasonable care. The extra payment for extra weight did not change the principle: (C. Ch. Air Line R. R Co. v. Marcus, 38 Ill. 219. See N. 0. J. § G. N. R. R. v. Moore, 40 Miss. 39.) common In an action against a railroad company for negligently carrying defendant in error beyond the proper Station, the jury were instructed that "it is the clear duty of common carriers of passengers not only to call out the different stations at which they arrive, and for which they have passengers, but to see that the passengers, with their baggage, are put off at the place of their destination:" Held, erroneous: (Southern R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 574.) and regulations of the road: (15) A railroad company is not an insurer of passengers. Its duty is to carry them safely to a given place, to announce audibly in each car the arrival at each station, and then to allow time enough for them to get off safely. The duty of the passengers is to use reasonA quantity of coal was shipped for the port of B.,able care, and to conform to the established customs consigned to a railroad company, to be transported thence by the latter to the defendants at W. The bill of lading stated the quantity and the freight per ton. The railroad company paid the freight to the master of the vessel, and transported all the coal received to W. On being weighed there, after delivery, it was found to fall short several tons of the amount stated in the bill of haling. It was the custom of the railroad company, known to the defendants, not to weigh coal this delivered, but to depend on the bill of lading; and they had often done so for the defendants. In this case, the railroad company could have seen the deficiency, with ordinary care: Held, that the railway company was not liable for the deficiency in the coal, and could recover the full amount of the freight pail to the master of the vessel: (Naugatuck R. R. C), v. Bardsley S. Ca., 33 Conn. 218) | A crowd of drunken men rushed upon a train of cars as they stopped at a regular station, and injured defendant in error: Held, that the railroad company were not liable for the conductor's allowing improper persons and improper numbers to get upon a car when he could not prevent it; and that it was not their duty to keep a police force. But it was the duty of the conductor to put himself at the head of the brakemen and others, and try to put the rioters out. If the injury arose from the fallure of the conductor to do this, the company were labor (Pitsburg, F., W., † C. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Penn. St. 312) A party whose eattle, without fault on his part. escape from his in fosure and wander on to a railroad track, and are there killed by alleged carelessness in not slackening the speed of the locomotive, cannot recover for the loss from the railroad company: (Price v. N. J. R. R. and T. Co., 30 N. J. 229. See L., P., and B. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 38 Ill. 280.) In an action to recover for a bridge set on fire by sparks from defendants' engine, and burnt, the jury were instructed that, if the defendants used ordinary care and skill in procuring a safe spark-catcher, such as are most in use in the country, and approved by experienced railroad operators and mechanics, they would not be required to use any other or greater care in respect to the character of the spark-catcher used by them. Having exercised such care in procuring it and in using it and their engine at the time of the accident, they would not be liable: Held, correct. The care ordinarily sufficient to avoid the danger in like circumstances is required: Held, further, that evidence of the spark-catcher in ordinary use on other lines was admissible, to show what kind was ordinarily safe: (Frankfort and B. T. Co. v. Philadelphia and T. R. R. Co., 54 Penn. St. 345.) In an action against a railroad company for killing a cow, evidence was that the county board had passed an order allowing cows, &c., to run at large; and that this cow was so running, and was killed by a train on the defendants' road, at a crossing on a public highway; that it was storming at the time, making it difficult to hear or see at any considerable distance; that no whistle or bell was sounded; and that the train was running one-fourth faster than usual: Held, that the defendants were not liable. They were in the lawful use of their own property, and the order of the county board imposed no new obligation upon them: (Mich. S. and N. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Fisher, 27 Ind. 96.) SALE. Under a contract of sale, the price was paid, and the cotton put under the power of the purchaser. The contract contained these words: "Said cotton I agree to deliver at C., in good order, when required to do so; but it is understood that I am not to be held responsible for unavoidable accidents. Cotton located fifteen miles north of C." Held, the contract was executed, and the vendor liable only as a naked depositary: (McKay v. Hamblin, 40 Miss. 472.) SLANDER. The defendant, having lost goods by theft, went to the plaintiff's house with a police officer, and, in answer to questions as to the object of his visit, accused plaintiff of the theft, and stated the grounds of his belief. In an action of slander: Held, that this was a privileged communication, if made bonâ fide, unless express malice were found by the jury. Nor is the privilege defeated by the fact that the charges were made in the presence of third parties, and in an intemperate manner. The question of privilege is a question of law: (Brow v. Hathaway, 13 Allen, 239.) SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Specific performance of partnership articles will be decreed when it is necessary to invest one of the partners with the legal rights for which he contracted, although the duration of the partnership is indefinite, and the defendant can dissolve the relation immediately: (Whitworth v. Harris, 40 Miss. 483.) An executory contract for the transfer of stock as collateral security for a debt, when the debtor has died insolvent, will not be enforced by a court of equity to the injury of other creditors: (City Fire Ins. Co. v. Olmsted, 33 Conn. 476.) A party, having news of Lee's surrender, sent an agent into the country to purchase cotton with Confederate money before the news arrived. The purchase was made, and the price paid in said currency, which was then nearly or quite worthless. A decree for specific performance against the vendor was refused: (Daniel v. Frazer, 40 Miss. 507.) SUNDAY. An injunction was sought against horse cars running on Sunday, in violation of a law forbidding the carrying on of any worldly employment on that day, works of necessity and charity only excepted." The only special damage shown by the plaintiff was a disturbance of his Sunday quiet and devotions. The bill was dismissed (Strong and Agnew, JJ., dissenting). It seems that the law was broken, but that the damage [AMERICAN Digest. shown was merely that suffered by the public in consequence of the breach, and that the only redress was to enforce the statutory penalty, or for the commonwealth to proceed against the corporation for misuse or abuse of their charter (by Woodward, C. J., and Thompson, J.) The running of horse cars is a work of necessity (by Read, J.): (Sparhawk v. Union Passenger R. Co., 54 Penn. St. 401.)` TELEGRAPH. A telegraphic message was erroneously transmitted to the plaintiff by the defendant company. The blank on which the original message was written contained, among other stipulations, one to the effect that the company would not be liable for an error in transmission, unless the message was repeated back from the station to which it was sent, as it might be for half the cost of first sending. The message received by the plaintiff was written on a similar blank, but was not repeated back as aforesaid. The plaintiff brought an action of tort: Held, that said stipulation was reasonable, and that, unless the said error would not have been prevented by the repetition of the message, the plaintiff could not recover: (Ellis v. American Telegraphic Co., 13 Allen, 226.) Appellants in New York agreed to deal with respondents in New Orleans in the purchase and sale of dollars, and that all communications between them, in reference to such transactions, should be by telegraph. On Jan. 30, 1860, appellants inquired price of 100,000 dols. of respondents by telegraph. Jan. 31, respondents answered in the same way, naming terms for 50,000 dols., which were accepted the same day by the appellants, also by telegraph. Each party, at the time of sending the last-named messages, sent a letter reciting his telegram of same date. Feb. 1, appellants telegraphed again. The lines were down, and neither of the appellants' messages of acceptance were received till Feb. 4. On Feb. 3, respondents telegraphed, "No answer to our despatch: dollars are sold." Respondents' letter, stating the telegram had been sent, was read in evidence: Held, that there was an acceptance, and the contract was complete, and that the case was not within the Statute of Frauds: (Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307.) VENDOR'S LIEN. The complainant had agreed to convey land, but had not passed the title, and had taken collateral security for the purchase money. He averred in his bill that he had never intended to waive his lien, as vendor, on the land: Held, on demurrer, that taking distinct security was only primâ facie evidence of waiver of the lien, and might be controlled by proof: (Fogg v. Rogers, 2 Coldwell, 290.) The vendor of a leasehold estate in lands has an equitable lien on the estate in the hands of the purchaser for the unpaid purchase-money: (Richardson v. Bowman, 40 Miss. 782.) The lien of a vendor of land, who has not parted with the legal title, passes to the assignee of notes given for the purchase-money, and cannot be defeated by the vendor after the indorsement: (Dishmore v. Jones, 1 Coldwell, 554.) A deed expressly reserved to the vendor a lien on the granted premises. The vendor assigned the purchaser's notes for the purchase money, with the lien: Held, that the assignee could enforce the lien against the purchaser by a bill in equity: (Stratton v. Gold, 40 Miss. 778.) VERDICT. In an action on the case against a railroad company for injuries to the plaintiff while crossing defendants' road, the jury found a special verdict, that defendants' engine was running at a proper rate of speed, that said engine had not a sufficient head-light, that a suitable engine bell was ringing, that defendants had no flagman at the crossing at the time, and that it was their duty to have one there then. That plaintiff knew of the crossing, stopped, looked out for an approaching train, and passed on to the track, using due care. Damages were assessed: Held, that as the verdict did not find that the plaintiff was travelling along a public street, in pursuit of his lawful business, and was compelled to cross the railroad to reach his point of destination, plaintiff could not recover: (Pittsburg F., W., and C. R. R. Co. v. Evans, 53 Penn. St. 250.) To an indictment which contained two counts AMERICAN DIGEST.] VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-WITNESS. JONES v. BADLEY. charging a felony-horse stealing—and a third charging a misdemeanor-receiving a colt, knowing it to be stolen-a general verdict of guilty was returned. The two offences differred, not in degree, but in kind, and were inconsistent with one another. The punishments also, were different. A new trial was granted, as the court could not know of which offence the defendants were guilty, or what sentence to pass: (State v. Major, 14 Rich. S. C. 76.) But when the indictment charged the same transaction in one count as a felony, and in another as a misdemeanor of such a nature that the latter might be included in the former, held, that a general verdict of guilty found the higher offence. A new trial was granted, however, as the jury did not appear to have been instructed as to the effect of their finding, and because the judge did not, in his discretion, require the prosecuting officer to elect one of two counts charging distinct felonies, and confine himself to it: (State v. Nelson, 14 Rich. S. C. 169.) VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. A voluntary conveyance is fraudulent in law and void as against existing creditors. The qualification of the rule where the debts are slight, as for current expenses, or inconsiderable in comparison to the donor's estate, is restricted in its application to where the laches of the creditor have permitted the reserved property to be wasted, and made a resort to the property conveyed necessary: (Richardson v. Rhodus, 14 Rich. S. C. 95.) WAREHOUSEMAN. Warehousemen, on receiving grain for storage, gave a grain receipt, and stored said grain, together with that of other parties and with their own, in a common mass. This was according to custom, and was not objected to by the owners. Said warehousemen assigned the corn in their warehouse, and certain contracts for the purchase of other corn. The corn in the warehouse was insufficient to satisfy all the grain receipts: Held, that the common mass of corn was to be distributed in the proportion in which the holders of receipts and the warehousemen had contributed to the same. The corn to be received under the contracts went to the assignee: (Dole v. Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150.) WARRANTY. Trustees advertised for sale that valuable cotton factory known as the Phoenix Factory, with 187 acres of land, more or less, attached thereto."-"The machinery is in good running order, and now in use." It was also stated that "persons desiring to examine the premises can leave Baltimore in the morning cars, and return the same day." The land was sold at public sale, and the purchasers filed a petition that deductions might be made from the purchase-money for a deficiency of fifty-three acres of land, and the bad condition of the machinery. No fraud was alleged against the trustee, and there was none. The petition was dismissed. In the absence of bad faith, the words "more or less" qualify the representation of quantity so as to throw the risk of a deficiency on the purchaser. As to the quality of the machinery, the public were invited to examine the same before buying; and the defects, though not known to the vendor, could have been seen at once by any practical man: (Slothower v. Gordon, 23 Md. 1.) WAY. [CHAN. A testator devised to his wife "all my property, real, personal, and mixed, during her natural life," and, at her death, "all the property hereby devised or bequeathed to her, as aforesaid, or so much thereof as may then remain unexpended," to his daughter and son: Held, the wife took only a life estate in the realty: (Cowles v. Concles, 53 Penn. St. 175.) The body of a will coutained both coutingent and vested legacies. There was also a residuary bequest, "to be shared by the same persons to whom I have given specified legacies in stock, and in precisely the same rateable proportions: Held, that the interest of the contingent legatees in the residue was vested: (Coll v. Hubbard, 33 Conn. 281.) A will contained the following clause: "I give to my three daughters, M., S., and J., and the children of my son S., my homestead, to them and their assigns for ever, share and share alike:" Held, that children of the son S. took per stirpes, and not per capita (M'Curdy, J. dissenting): (Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 223.) A testator directed his farm to be sold, and the proceeds distributed in a certain way. He appointed executors, who sold said farm. The sale was impeached, on the ground that the executors were not made donces of a power of sale: Held, that equity of money to be distributed by the executors, and that would consider the provision in the will as a bequest they were therefore the proper persons to sell: (Rankin v. Rankin, 36 Ill. 293.) Parts of a will and first codicil were obliterated, to make them consistent with a second codicil. The second codicil was void for want of two attesting witnesses: Held, that the will and first codicil were to be read as before the obliterations: (Storer v. Kendall, 1 Coldwell, 557.) WITNESS. A husband cannot, in a collateral proceeding, be a witness directly to charge his wife with a crime which is of the grade of indictable offences, even though the wife has been previously acquitted of the offence so charged, and therefore cannot be indicted: (State v. Wilson, 30 N. J. 77 ) When three are jointly indicted for a capital offence, but one of them is not on trial, not having been arrested, the wife of the one not on trial is a competent witness for the State: (State v. Drawdy, 14 Rich. S. C. 87.) After his deposition was taken, contrary declarations were elicited from the witness in conversation: Held, evidence of such declarations was inadmissible from the party calling the witness. It seems (by the court) that evidence of statements of a witness, conflicting with his statements under oath, is never admissible from the party calling him. It seems (by Thompsou and Agnew, JJ.), that a party may contradict his own witness in this way, when he is deceived as to what the testimony of said witness will be: (Stearns v. Merchants' Bank, 53 Penu. St. 490.) Equity Courts. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. March 4 and 5, and April 15. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Cairns.) JONES v. BADLEY. An object in a highway with which a traveller did not come in contact or collision, and which is not shown to have been an actual incumbrance or obstruction in the way of travel-e. g., a pile of gravel fifteen inches high and five feet or six feet across-is not to be deemed a defect for the sole reason that it was of a nature to cause a horse to take fright, in consequence of which be Charitable devise and bequest of real and personal estate escaped from the control of his driver, and caused damage to person and property: (Kingsbury v. The Inhabitants of Dedham, 13 Allen, 186.) WILL. A clause in a will was to the effect that testator gave and bequeathed to his daughter-followed by a blank. There appeared on the face of the will an intent to dispose of all the testator's property. Half of his real estate was left undisposed of: Held, that the daughter took the undivided moiety: (Eatherly v. Eatherly, 1 Coldwell, 461.) -Secret trust-Assent. A testatrix devised and bequeathed all her real estate, and all such moneys as might be secured to her upon mortgage of real estates, and all her property not applicable under her will for the purposes of mortmain, to the defendants J. B. and J. P. B., their heirs, ex cutors, administrators, and assigns, as joint tenants. The testatrix had considerable real estate and large personal property mixed and unmixed. It was alleged that the testatrix thought she had given the above pro CHAN.] JONES v. BADLEY. [CHAN. perty to J. B. and J. P. B. for charitable purposes, and on a secret trust which she also thought that they, or one of them, at all events, had promised to perform. The defendants, J. B. and J. P. B., claimed the property absolutely. carry Where a person, knowing that a testator in making a disposition in his favour, intends it to be applied for purposes other than for his own benefit, either expressly promises, or by silence implies, that he will the testator's intention into effect, and the property is left to him upon the faith of that promise or undertaking, it is in effect a case of trust. Held (reversing the decision of the M. R.), that whatever charitable desire or object might have existed in the mind of the testatrix when she made the devise of her residue, the plaintiffs had entirely failed to show that any secret trust for charity was communicated to, much less accepted or acquiesced in, by the defendants or either of them. Bill dismissed. This was an appeal by the defendants from the decree of the Master of the Rolls. The proceedings in the court below are reported 15 L. T. Rep. N. S. 497. The arguments and all material facts are so fully stated by the Lord Chancellor, that it is unnecessary here to repeat them. trust on the devise by admitting evidence which the statute would in terms exclude, in order to prevent a party from applying property to a purpose foreign to that for which he undertook to hold it." Another test founded on the same principles, which has sometimes been applied, is to consider the case as unthen to inquire whether a trust has been imposed affected by the Statute of Mortmain or Wills, and by the testatrix, and accepted by the devisee in such a way as that a court of equity would enforce it as binding on the conscience of the devisee. The law applicable to the case being therefore free from doubt, we have to examine the facts for the purpose of ascertaining the answer to two questions: first, did the testatrix, so far as her own mind and intention were concerned, devise her residue to the Messrs. Badley, in order that they might take, not beneficially, but as trustees for the accomplishment of some charitable purpose; and secondly, if the first question is answered in the affirmative, was her mind and intention in this respect made known before her death to the Messrs. Badley, or either of either of them, expressly or tacitly, on this footing. them, and was the devise accepted by them or As to both of these questions the onus of establishing the affirmative must be upon the plaintiffs. In endeavouring to ascertain what was the mind and intention of the testatrix herself in making this Sir R. Palmer, Q. C. and Sargant, for the bequest, it is necessary to look a little more closely plaintiffs. into her history and character. The testatrix appears to have been possessed of considerable pro Baggallay, Q. C., Jessel, Q. C., and Jasper Peck, for perty, amounting, it is said, at the time of her the several defendants. The LORD CHANCELLOR (Cairns).-In this case a bill was filed by the plaintiffs, claiming as heiresses at law and next of kin of Miss Caroline Elizabeth Pargeter, of Foxcote, near Dudley, who died on the 26th April 1864, at the age of sixty-five. Miss Pargeter by her will, dated the 8th Aug. 1862, after several specific devises and pecuniary bequests, gave all the residue of her real property, and of her property savouring_of realty, to the defendants, John Badley and James Peyton Badley, as joint tenants. The plaintiffs insist that this residue was given on a secret trust, for charity, and by this bill prayed that the defendants, the Badleys, might be declared to be trustees of it for the plaintiffs. The Master of the Rolls, by his decree dated the 14th Jan. 1867 has made a declaration to this effect, and directed accounts and inquiries upon that footing, and from that decree this appeal is brought. Upon the law applicable to such a case there is no controversy. Both appellants and respondents were content to take it, as the Master of the Rolls took it, from the clear and felicitous exposition of it by Wood, L. J., when ViceChancellor, in the case of Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 K. & J. 313, where "a person knowing that a testator, in making a disposition in his favour, intends it to be applied for purposes other than for his own benefit, either expressly promises, or by silence implies, that he will carry the testator's intention into effect, and the property is left to him upon the faith of that promise or undertaking, it is in effect a case of trust; and in such case the court will not allow the devisee to set up the Statute of Frauds, or rather the Statute of Wills, by which the Statute of Frauds is now, in this respect, superseded; and for this reason--the devisee by his conduct has induced the testator to leave him the property; and as Turner, L. J. says in Russell v. Jackson, no one can doubt that if the devisee had stated that he would not carry into effect the intentions of the testator, the depositions in his favour would not have been found in the will. But in this the court does not violate the spirit of the statutes, but for the same end, namely, prevention of fraud, it engrafts the death, to 200,000l. and upwards in value. This property, or the greater part of it, she had inherited from her father in 1849. She was of a reserved and retiring disposition, living in a manner by no means indicating the possession of so much wealth; and it would seem that the amount and particulars of her property were in her lifetime known to few persons, if, indeed, any one person was acquainted with the whole particulars. With the plaintiffs, who were her nearest relations, she kept up some intercourse. The extent and cordiality of this intercourse is a matter in controversy upon the evidence, a controversy which appears to me to be irrelevant, inasmuch as some specific provision is by the will made for her relations, and, as regards the residue, the case of the plaintiffs supposes no more desire on the part of the testatrix to benefit her relations than does the case of the defendants. The testatrix had a female friend, a Miss Mary Purton, to whom she was much attached, and who lived with her up to Dec. 1856, when Miss Purton died. The elder Mr. Badley, who is between eighty and ninety years of age, had been long an intimate friend of the testatrix and her family, and was also her medical adviser. Her solicitor up to 1860 was Mr. William Robinson, of Dudley. In that year Mr. William Robinson retired from business, and was succeeded by his son, William Brook Robinson, who acted as solicitor for the testatrix until her death. The testatrix, in 1853, consulted Mr. Wm. Robinson as to making a will, and his evidence, so far as it appears to me to be material, is as follows: "Miss Pargeter called upon me and introduced herself. She was alone. She then explained to me that she had placed a sum of money in the late Mr. Eyre Lee's hands to give away in charity on her behalf in the name of a friend, 3000l. of which he had not applied. That was what she came to me about. In the first instance I saw her two or three times on that subject, and during one of those times she told me she wished to make a will. She would draw out some particulars and see me again another day. She came again a few weeks afterwards with written instructions for the will. I found from those instructions that after numerous specific devises and bequests to relations and friends, she directed the residue to be applied to charitable | [CHAN. I also wish to say that Miss Pargeter never stated to me at any time that she wished her residuary devisees to add the property to her charitable fund." Question by the plaintiff's solicitor: "Do you mean that she never told you that she wished her residuary devisees to add the residuary property to the charity for distressed gentlewomen?" Answer: "I do." Mr. Robinson subsequently wished the words "or to any other" to be added to his last answer. This will thus executed in 1854 gave considerable benefits to members of her family, and her pure personalty to a particular charity for distressed gentlewomen, and the residue was devised, as Mr. Robinson states, to Miss Purton and Mr. Badley, as joint tenants. The will of 1854 was subsequently cancelled, and another will made in 1856. Mr. Robinson's evidence as to this is as follows: "In the year 1856 Miss Pargeter directed me to make some alterations in her will in respect of some of the specific devises and bequests, some of the parties having died. The general form and scheme of this will was similar to that of the will of 1854. I do not recollect that I had any conversation with her in regard to the residuary estate left to Miss Purton and Mr. Badley. I pointed out to her that if she wished the moneys to go in charity, which were invested in those securities she had better call them in and invest them in the funds. She declined doing so. She said she should like the above-named James Peyton Badley's name inserted as a residuary devisee and legatee in addition to the names of Miss Purton and John Badley, as she thought John Badley would think it a compliment. I did not then understand how it could be a compliment. I had the impression, from the original instructions, that anything that she had not specifically devised was to go in charity; but she never afterwards expressed the slightest anxiety that the residuary real and mixed estate should go in charity. She said nothing either one way or the other after her first instructions. I think she said, when she wished to insert the name of J. P. Badley, that John Badley was getting an old man. The executors to this will were the same as to the will of 1854. I cannot say why she charged the property specifically devised in exoneration of her residuary estate. I put in the words 'joint tenants,' because I thought at that time all the residue was to go in charity. My opinion then candidly was that Miss Pargeter intended the whole of the residue to go in charity; but I have since changed my opinion on that subject, for the reasons that she would not call in the moneys secured on real estate, and next that she had the opportunity of selling some land at Cradley, which I found had not been specifically devised, at the fair market price of the day, but which she objected to sell at. She was of a nervous and sensitive disposition, and excessively fearful lest her testamentary dispositions should become known, and relied on my keeping everything secret, and she pressed me to write the drafts and fair copies of her wills myself." Finally, on the 8th Aug. 1862, the will now in question was made. Mr. Robinson's evidence as to this is as follows: "I remember being in Dudley in Aug. 1862. She had expressed a wish to see me when I went up there. I saw her at my son's office. No one was present but Miss Pargeter and myself. She gave me instructions to make some alterations in her will; they were in writing, and after she left I gave them to my son, and pointed out to him what she wanted, and he was to prepare a fresh will. The paper writing now produced marked F. contains the said instructions. These alterations were principally in the amount of charges and interest given to friends and relations. The instructions contained no reference to the residuary gifts. She expressed nowish to alter them, except to omit the name of |