Ex. CH.] REG. v. SHEPPARD AND OTHERS. [NISI PRIUS. up the inclosed ground as a garden, and upon that alone. Then what do the defendants claim? If they claim to be entitled to compel the covenantor to keep his covenant, their rights would originate in the second section rather than in the first; but even then the covenantor could only be compelled to keep up the square as an inclosed garden, and he could perform any covenant that exists by restoring it to the position of a garden, and by means of a lock and key might exclude every one from it. The condition of the statute is that the ground to which it applies shall have been set apart for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of the square in which it is, and if that condition is complied with, and the ground has been neglected, the Board of Works may go the length of vesting it in a committee of the inhabitants to keep as a garden ground for the inhabitants for ever; or if the owners and the occupiers of the houses surrounding it do not agree to take notice of it, the Board of Works may vest it in the parish vestry to be henceforth maintained as an open street. In the present case the inclosed ground is vested in two proprietors; and it may be that they are under an obligation to keep it as an open square; but if this section applies, the board may take it entirely out of their hands, and instead of merely compelling them to keep it as a garden, may take away their exclusive property in it, and throw it open to the public, or at any rate to the inhabitants of the square, without paying them any compensation. It is only where there is a legal claim entitling the inhabitants as a matter of right that the Act applies, and there is no such right here; the utmost extent of the liability of the owners is to keep the inclosed ground as a garden, and there is no duty to throw it open to the public. The ground has never been set apart for the use or enjoyment of the inhabitants of the square, and the board cannot enforce its powers there. I think, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench should be affirmed. &c., for the care of the same, and from want of such | covenant between the owners themselves to keep care, or from any other cause, has been neglected, the Metropolitan Board of Works, where the same is in any place under their jurisdiction, except in the City of London, shall take charge of the same, putting up a notice to that effect on each garden or ornamental ground." Now, what is substantially the sole question in the case is, whether the enclosed ground in the middle of Leicester-square has been set apart otherwise than by the revocable permission of the owner thereof for the use or enjoyment of the inhabitants of Leicester-square. I am of opinion that to comply with the section some legal right to the use of the square must have been conferred upon the inhabitants thereof or upon some portion of them. Has that been done? Looking at the facts, I do not find that a legal right to use the enclosed ground is vested in any one of those inhabitants. Before the year 1791 the piece of land now called Leicester-square had become vested in undivided moieties in the devisees of two former owners, and in 1786 a bill was filed in Chancery by the owners of one moiety against the owners of the other, praying that a partition of the property might be made. Accordingly, a partition was decreed, and a commission for the purpose of carrying it out duly issued, directed to certain commissioners, who divided the square into two portions, the one comprising the houses and lands which formed the north side of the square, the other including the houses on the south, east, and west sides, and the square garden; they further appointed that the owners and proprietors of the latter portion should for ever keep the square garden in repair as a square garden, in like manner as the same then was. The partition was carried into effect in 1791, by indentures of lease and release, by virtue of which the last-mentioned portion was conveyed to J. S. Tulk, and certain persons in remainder, and the other portion to the devisees of Elizabeth Penny; the release did not contain any covenant on the part of J. S. Tulk to keep up the square garden. It is unnecessary to consider whether the decree of itself has the force of such a covenant, because, if it had not, there was no such obligation on J. S. Tulk to keep up the square garden. In the course of time the square garden passed to various people, and in 1851 became vested in fee in James Wyld, who bought it for the purpose of erecting there a building to contain amodel of the globe. Thereupon the owners of the rest of that portion of the square which had under the partition become vested in J. S. Tulk, and who were, therefore, entitled to the benefit of the covenant made by his grandson in 1808, gave notice to Wyld of their intention to prevent the building; in the end, however, they agreed to grant Wyld a licence to erect the building, and to maintain it for ten years from 1851, and that agreement was carried out. It is worthy of remark that during those ten years no remonstrance was made by any inhabitant of the square. At the expiration of the ten years, Wyld conveyed one moiety of the square garden to the plaintiff, and since then the property in it has remained vested in undivided moieties in the plaintiff and Wyld as tenants in common in fee. It may be assumed that they are under a covenant with the owners of the residue of the two original moieties, into which the square garden and the land and buildings round it were divided by the partition, to keep up the inclosed ground as a garden, but it is to be observed that no such covenant exists with the inhabitants of the houses which surround the square. It is nowhere suggested that any of the inhabitants can claim any such covenant, or that there is any contract to that effect to which they or any of them are parties. The case rests upon a CHANNELL, B., and BYLES and MONTAGUE SMITH, JJ., concurred. BRAMWELL, B.-I only wish to make one remark, and that is, that it must not be supposed that I think it is open to the owners of this land to build upon it. Judgment affirmed. NISI PRIUS. NORTHERN CIRCUIT, LIVERPOOL. (Before KELLY, C.B. and a Common Jury.) REG. v. SHEPPARD AND OTHERS.(a) Indictment under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 10-Explosive substance in condition to explode—Whether necessary. S. and others were charged, under sect. 10 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, with feloniously throwing gunpowder against a house with intent to damage: Held, by Kelly, C.B. that in order to support an indictment under this section it is not enough to show simply that gunpowder or other explosive substance was thrown against the house; but it must also be shown that the substance was in a condition to explode at the time it was thrown, although no actual explosion should result. Indictment in first count charged the prisoners with feloniously damaging a house with gunpowder, a person being in the same. (a) Reported by J. KINGHORN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, NISI PRIUS.] THE GERMANIA. [ADM. Second count charged them with feloniously | section was that the explosive substance must be throwing gunpowder against a house with intent to in a condition to explode and cause damage at the damage. time it was thrown or placed against the building; and that, unless the fuse in this instance had a light applied to it at the time it was thrown at Johnson's house, the indictment could not be sustained, as it (the gunpowder) would not otherwise be in a condition to explode and cause damage. He was proceeding to argue that there was no evidence that the fuse had ever been lighted, when. The prisoners, Alexander Sheppard, John Jolley, and John Sheppard were charged on an indictment framed, as to the second count, under the 10th sect. of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, with having thrown a bottle containing gunpowder against a house occupied by a person named Joseph Johnson. The section in question provides that Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously place or throw in, into, upon, against, or near any building, any gunpowder or other explosive substance, with intent to destroy or damage any building, or any engine, working tools, fixtures, goods, or chattels shall, whether or not any explosion take place, and whether or not any damage be caused, be guilty of felony, &c. &c. This was a trade outrage arising out of a strike among the colliers at the Lindsay pits at Whelling near Wigan. The colliers were on strike and the prosecutor was what is called a "knobstick," he continuing to work at the collieries. It appeared that at about half-past one o'clock on the morning of the 21st March, the prosecutor heard footsteps as of some one walking about the back and front of his house. He then heard something come against the window frame and fall on the door stone, and then saw a flash of fire; it made no noise of bursting, but flared up. He then went up stairs and looked out, and he then saw a man going up the "brow" in front of his house, and two other men following. On the following morning prosecutor examined the window, and he then found that a hole had been crushed in the window frame, and a quarter of an hour after a policeman picked up the bottom of a bottle about a yard from the door. Later on the same morning prosecutor also picked up the neck of the bottle with a fuse to it; and on the morning after that he picked up about three grains of gunpowder near the same spot. It was subsequently ascertained that a short time previous to the alleged outrage Jolley and Alexander Sheppard were heard in conversation, in the course of which a father and son were mentioned, towards whom the two prisoners referred to, evidently entertained a strong enmity, and who one of them seemed to suggest should be blown up. He About the same time the three prisoners were seen together at Jolley's house, and then, according to the evidence of a witness named Winstanley, who was present in the house, Jolley got a bottle down from a shelf and put powder into it. then put a fuse in the bottle and gave it to John Sheppard, and told him to take it to "Studdy's) (meaning Joseph Johnson's), and throw it through the window. From a conversation which a witness had with the prisoner John Sheppard after the alleged outrage, it appeared that John Sheppard stated that he had been engaged with a man named Broomhead in the proceedings outside Johnson's house, and he alleged to a certain extent that Broomhead had assisted him. Broomhead, however, in his evidence, though admitting that he was present, denied having taken any part in the affair. In the course of the case, one of the jury having examined the fuse, expressed an opinion that it had evidently never been lighted, as there were no traces of fire on it; but Pope, on behalf of the prosecution, in his summing up said he apprehended it did not at all signify whether the fuse had been lighted or not, and that it was not at all necessary that any explosion should take place, in order that this indictment should be sustained, as the offence consisted in the placing or throwing of the explosive material, although no damage whatever should result. Torr, on behalf of the prisoner Jolley, said he ld contend that the true interpretation of the Chief Baron KELLY said he might save himself all further trouble on that point, as he should tell the jury that unless the fuse in the bottle was lighted at the time the bottle was thrown against the house the offence was not made out. "But," his lordship continued, "I don't say that it is necessary that the light should pass from the fuse to the powder in the bottle and that an explosion should take place. It is enough to constitute the offence if once the light was applied to the fuse before the bottle was thrown, although it might go out before the bottle struck the house and no explosion actually resulted from it." Afterwards, in the course of his summing up to the jury, his lordship observed that the question was whether the powder, at the time it was thrown against the house, was in a condition to comply with the words of the statute. There were cases in which they could easily suppose it possible for explosive substances to cause damage without the application of a light to them and so would come within the statute. As for instance to thrust a bundle of lucifer matches against a window would complete the offence contemplated by this Act of Parliament, because the mere contact would cause them to explode. But if any body merely threw a bottle containing gunpowder that would not comply with the conditions of the statute. If the fuse was not lighted, it could not cause an explosion, and it would be merely throwing a bottle against a house. The question, therefore, came to be this: Was the fuse ever lighted? Ultimately the jury found all the prisons guilty, and they were each sentenced to three months' imprisonment. Pope and Addison appeared for the prosecution. Torr, for the prisoner Jolley. Cottingham, for the two Sheppards. Attorneys for the prosecution, Mayhew and Sons, Wigan. COURT OF ADMIRALTY. Reported by H. F. PURCELL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Wednesday, July 15. THE GERMANIA. Lights in the mizen rigging—25 § 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 29. A collision took place between a steam vessel and a barque. It appeared at the hearing that the steam vessel did not see the barque till a collision was inevitable, and that the barque had her proper lights up, affixed to the mizen rigging. The court put in force for the first time the provisions of the 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 18, by sending the Trinity masters to inspect the vessel. They reported that the lights of the Germania, placed as aforesaid, did not comply with the regulations, inasmuch as they did not show an uniform and unbroken light over an arc of the horizon of ten Held, under the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 29, that the points of the compass. Thereupon it was barque was solely to blame for the collision. This was a cause of damage, involving an important question as to the position of the lights of Sept. 5, 1863.] ADM.] [ADM. THE GERMANIA. a vessel. A collision occurred in April last, off Dungeness, between the Hamburg-American Company's steamship Germania and the Dutch barque Pauline Constance Eleonore. The barque was 80 injured by the collision that it was with great difficulty she was kept from sinking, and subsequently beached at Hythe. Her cargo was a valuable one, a great part of it was damaged, and her owners had to pay heavy salvage claims in respect of services rendered in beaching her. The suit was instituted in the sum of 25,000/ The defence was that no light was exhibited on board the barque in sufficient time to enable the Germania to avoid the collision. There being a conflict of testimony as to the accuracy of some photographs and a model of the Pauline produced by the plaintiffs, the learned judge, at the close of the evidence, called attention to the 18th section of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, and said he was ready to exercise the power conferred on him by that section of making an order for the inspection of the vessel by the Trinity Masters. On the application of the Queen's Advocate, The Court accordingly ordered an inspection of the vessel, which was then lying in Dover harbour, by the Trinity Masters, and directed that they should be accompanied by the proctors and a viewer on each side. c. 10, and request the Trinity Masters to survey lights were visible beneath the square-sails, and that the Elder Brethren would not be able to judge of this from the position in which they were when The Queen's Advocate, Dr. Spinks, Q.C., and Searle, they made their inspection. Entertaining, notfor plaintiffs (the owners of the barque). withstanding the report of the Trinity Masters, considerable doubt in my own mind whether the The Solicitor-General (Sir W. B. Brett), Dr. Deane, barque had not sufficiently complied with the regula Q. C., Butt, and Pritchard, for defendants. tions, and whether the steam vessel, if she had had a proper look out would not have been apprised of The hearing of the cause occupied three days, the approach of the barque by her lights, I put certain and the Court now gave judgment. Sir R. PHILLIMORE.-It is admitted as a matter of law that if the barque carried proper lights, properly fixed, it was the duty of the steam vessel to get out of her way, and as a matter of fact that the steamvessel did not see the barque until the collision was inevitable. According to the preliminary acts and the evidence, the vessels were meeting each other, and there are therefore two principal questions for the court to decide. Did the barque carry proper lights? And were they so placed as to comply with the regulations in this respect? His Lordship then went through the evidence with regard to the lights being exhibited on board the barque, and continued-It is clear that the proper lamps were on board, and that their framework was fitted to the mizen rigging. It is agreed that the night was dark, and the presumption would certainly be in favour of the lamps being lighted. This presumption 18 strengthened by the evidence of those on board the barque, and the court has come to the conclusion that the proper lights were burning at the time of the collision. I have how to consider the second question, as to which, indeed, the chief controversy in this case has been raised-viz., were the lights so placed as to comply with the regulations? They were placed in the mizen rigging 6in. clear above the iron rail, which is 4ft. above the poop, and between 8ft. and 9ft. above the main deck. A model was put in evidence for showing the position of the lamps, the lower sails, the relative breadths of the vessel, and the height of the lamps from the poop, though not their exact projection from the rigging, and it will presently be seen that in fact the lights did not project beyond the extreme breadth of the ship, she being at that point 26ft. 3in., and at the broadest part 31ft. lin. wide. As the visibility of the lights depended in a great measure upon the accuracy of the measurements and upon the exact position of the lamps, I thought it expedient to put in force for the first time the provisions of sect. 18 of 24 Vict, questions to the Trinity Masters, and in reply they Decree accordingly. COURT OF PROBATE. Reported by G. CALLAGHAN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. June 16 and July 7. - น. Administration Nullity of marriage after death of wife-Impotence-Costs. Impotency does not render a marriage "void," but only may [PROB. such as a prior existing marriage, insanity, illegality under the Royal Marriage Act, and, since Lord Lyndhurst's Act, consanguinity or affinity. All these matters when they arise incidentally in the temporal courts have in modern times been there dealt with for the purposes of the suit in which they may have arisen. In older times all questions of marriage were relegated to the ecclesiastical authorities. Upon the old plea of ne unques accoupé in the action for dower the validity of the controverted marriage used always to be determinable by the bishop's certificate. The gradual declension of spiritual authority in matters temporal intrinsic validity of a marriage, if arising collaterhas brought it about that all questions as to the ally in a suit instituted for other objects, are determined in any of the temporal courts in which they suit for the purpose of obtaining a definitive decree, chance to arise; though at the same time a declaring a marriage void, which should be universally binding, and which should ascertain and determine the status of the parties once for all, has from all time up to the present been maintainable in the ecclesiastical courts or Divorce Court alone. How, then, it may be asked, does it happen that the particular ground of nullity which is raised incidentally in this suit, has not followed the fate of all other grounds of nullity, and become cognisable in the temporal courts? The answer is, that impotence does not render a marriage "void," but only "voidable." And this brings me to the second objection, viz., that this matter can only be discussed and adjudicated in the lifetime of both parties. The distinction between "void" and "voidable" is not a mere refinement, but expresses a real difference in substance. This real distinction is well known and perfectly recognised at common law with regard to many contracts, in respect of which it is held that the injured party may treat the contract as void or not at his option. This is notably the case in some instances of fraud, and it is this option to hold to the contract or cancel it which is the distinguishing feature of a contract "voidable as compared with a contract intrinsically "void." Questions of this kind arise most comSearle, for the plaintiff, submitted that the mar-monly where the rights of third parties have become riage was voidable, not void, and cited Elliott v. involved. Now, it is obvious enough that this Gurr, 2 Phil. 16, in which it was held that a void-matter of impotence is one which ought to be raised able marriage could not be rendered void after the death of either of the parties. The plaintiff claimed administration as the lawful husband of the intestate. The defendants, who were the next of kin of the intestate, opposed the grant, and filed an act on petition, alleging the fact of a marriage between the intestate and the plaintiff on the 8th June 1854; that such ceremony of marriage was and is null and void in law, for that the plaintiff did not, and was unable, by reason of the incurable frigidity or malformation of his parts of generation, to consummate the said pretended marriage during the lifetime of the intestate; that there was not at the date of the said pretended marriage, nor during the lifetime of the intestate, any hindrance on her part to the consummation of the said pretended marriage; and that the intestate died, on or about the 26th Feb. 1868, leaving her surviving the defendants, her mother, sister, and brother. The plaintiff, in his answer, pleaded that the marriage between him and the intestate was, and is not, null and void in law by reason of the allegations set forth in the act on petition. The case was argued before Sir J. P. Wilde, on Tuesday, June 16. T. Jones, Q. C. (with him Dr. Swabey), contended that the marriage was void, the condition of the contract having failed through the impotency of the plaintiff, and referred to Swinton's Justiciary Reports, 437; only by the party who suffers an injury from it, and who elects to make it a ground for asking that the contract of marriage should be cancelled. For although it has been said that the procreation of children is one main object of marriage, yet it cannot be doubted that marriages between persons so advanced in years as effectually and certainly to defeat Fraser on the Law of Personal and Domestic Rela- that object are perfectly legal and binding. The tions, 51, 52; Browning v. Reane, 2 Phil. 69'; Pride v. The Earl of Bath and Montague, Ib. 120; Cur, adv. vult. July 6.-Sir J. P. WILDE.-The defendants, who are the next of kin of the deceased, have filed an act on petition claiming the administration to her estate, on the ground that although she died married to the plaintiff for fourteen years, yet that the marriage was in truth void on account of the plaintiff's impotence. These pleadings disclose a great novelty -an attempt to question a marriage as void on the ground of impotency, after the death of one of the parties; and that, too, as a collateral matter arising in the Probate Court. I will deal with this last difficulty first. It may be safely asserted that the question of impotency as a ground of nullity has never yet been raised in the temporal courts of this country. The various restrictions on marriage, truth is, consensus non concubitus facit matrimonium. In the case of all incapacities to marriage in which society has an interest and which rest on grounds of public policy, it would be wrong and illogical that validity or invalidity should rest upon the option of the parties. And in all such cases, as I have already shown, the marriage is absolutely "void," and not "voidable" only. But impotency has always hitherto been considered in the Ecclesiastical Courts (and since their abolition in the Divorce and Matrimonial Court) as a matter of personal complaint only. I do not find the principle of the Court's interference to cancel such a marriage anywhere distinctly set forth. Its original exercise was, it is likely enough, mixed up with the interests of those who asserted it. But I conceive that it has a sound basis of justice in the consideration that the party complaining was (though perhaps unintentionally) deceived in the contract, and ought not to be bound by it. But, whatever the ground, it has been and is always dealt with as a matter of personal complaint and BANK.] Ex parte STEVENSON, re PURSER-Re A Deed of COMPOSITION. grievance; and that it has been so dealt with is apparent from the fact that the courts have been in the habit of requiring many conditions to be fulfilled before they would grant relief, all of which are inconsistent with the notion that the marriage is absolutely void. Thus the party complaining must be sincere in the ground upon which he is asking relief; there must be no unreasonable delay, and the defect must be incurable. I will only stop to point out that a contrary system would give rise to some almost intolerable results. The question whether two persons are married or not may arise on a great | variety of occasions and be raised by third persons, as creditors or otherwise. Now if the parties themselves, in a case of impotency, are content with it, consortium vitæ, and prefer to maintain the bond of matrimony intact, would it not be almost intolerable that a third person should have the right to insist upon an inquiry into the nature of their cohabitation and the revelation of their physical defects. With these observations, I will quit the subject. It has been endeavoured in the above remarks to vindicate the propriety of confining the question of impotence as a ground for nullity of marriage to a suit brought by one of the parties to the marriage and in the matrimonial court. Whether I am justified or not in these views this much is clear, that the practice of the courts, both temporal and spiritual, from all time has been inconsistent with the attempt now made, and that it is not supported by a single authority. The Court, therefore, pronounces the contention of the defendant to have wholly failed. It overrules the act on petition and grants administration to the plaintiff, with costs. (Before Mr. Commissioner WINSLOW.) Ex parte STEVENSON, re PURSer. Disputed adjudication-Infancy-Trading. Under the B. A. 1861, an infant can be adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition. On the 13th June 1868, Purser, a trader, being under twenty-one years of age, filed his petition in the Court of Bankruptcy under which he was adjudicated a bankrupt. Stevenson, a creditor, after proper notice, disputed the adjudication. Reed for Stevenson.-It has been invariably held by the courts that an infant cannot be made a bankrupt. Jennings, of Uxbridge, solicitor for the bankrupt, contra. After having taken time to consider, Mr. Commissioner WINSLOW said: In deciding whether an infant can, since the Act of 1861, petition for adjudication against himself, or can be made a bankrupt, it is necessary to consider how the law stood before the present Act. The general rule was that an infant could not trade, and therefore he could not be made a bankrupt as a trader: (Ex parte Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 493; O'Brien v. Currie, 3 Car. & P. 283; Thornton v. Illingworth, 2 B. & C. 824; Chapple v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252; Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42; 5 L. T. Rep. 223; Belton v. Hodges, 2 M. & S. 496; 9 Bing. 265.) But, though that was well settled law, yet, as a fact, infants did trade, and were [BANK. occasionally made bankrupts. When this occurred the adjudication might be annulled, but this has been refused if the application was not made in proper time (Ex parte Thorold, 3 M. D. & D. 385; Ex parte Veysey, 3 Ibid. 420; Ex parte West, 1 Bank. & Insolr. Rep. 58; 21 L. T. Rep. 277); or if the conduct of the infant disentitles him to it; as, for example, if he had professed himself to be and had traded as an adult: (Ex parte Moule, 14 Ves. 602; Ex parte Watson, 16 Ves. 265; Ex parte Bates, 2 M. D. & D. 337.) In a case in which the bankrupt brought an action against the assignees to try the validity of a commission issued against him while an infant, Tindal, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, held that without applying to the Lord Chancellor for a supersedeas the commission might be, under the circumstances, held invalid by a court of law, and the court was of opinion that the commission in that case was altogether invalid: (Belton v. Hodge, Bing. 365.) This case was, however, determined upon the express ground that an infant could not be a trader, and a trading was absolutely necessary to a bankruptcy. The only relief which a person not a trader could obtain from debts he had not the means of paying, and from imprisonment, before 1861, was by the different Acts for the relief of insolvent debtors; but an infant could not obtain the benefit of the Insolvent Act with respect to prisoners, because the provisions of the Act required the petitioner to execute a warrant of attorney to authorise the entering up of a judgment against him, and au infant could not give such a warrant of attorney. The question does not appear to have been decided whether an infant could obtain the benefit of what have been called the "Protection Acts." All these questions have been decided, not upon any general principle, but upon the special matters in each Act which applied to the case of infants, and which the Act of 1861 appears to have swept away. The law of bankruptcy is now applicable to all persons, whether traders or not, and there is no warrant of attorney required. There appears now nothing to prevent an infant from availing himself of the law of bankruptcy if he considers such a course for his advantage. The words of the 86th section are sufficiently general: "Any debtor may petition for adjudication against himself." I think the application must be refused. I have been referred to the case of Ex parte Smedley, 10 L. T. Rep. 432, in which the judge of the County Court at Liverpool delivered a well-considered judgment on the same, in which I quite concur. Application refused. Friday, July 31. (Before Mr. Acting Commissioner HAZLITT.) Re A DEED OF COMPOSITION. Assenting creditor-Costs-Witness. An assenting creditor, summoned to be examined as to the validity of a deed of composition, is entitled to costs as an ordinary witness. A. executed a deed of composition for the benefit of his creditors under the B. A. 1861, sect. 192. Mrs. B., one of his largest creditors, duly assented to and executed the deed. A dissenting creditor obtained an order for a private meeting, and a summons against Mrs. B. under sect. 197, in order that she might be examined as to her dealings with A. Mrs. B. attended the summons, but refused to be sworn until her expenses were paid. Doria for Mrs. B.-The deed having been duly registered must be taken as valid, and the accounts |