CHAN.] BRADFORD V. BROWNJOHN. [CHAN. assumption is simply this: Take the case for years, I shall be taken to be of the value it is at the present and in that case where there is a lease for forty time. That does not alter the principle at all. It years, suppose twenty years had expired, and you only comes to this that that has happened which wish to make it still forty years, that is you are would probably happen. Both sides have agreed, about to buy a lease in reversion, and to pay for or rather it has been agreed to for them in chamit twenty years before it falls into possession. The bers, that this was an ordinary life that was taken; mode in which the lessors are in the habit of com- and therefore it is taken just as well at its value puting those interests is this: they say, "What is now, as if you were to go back and make a calcuabout the value of this lease as a lease for twentylation and computation from the time the money years in possession ?" Having ascertained that, they was paid down. say, "Inasmuch as it will not fall into possession for twenty years, you cannot pay the value down as if you were going to take possession immediately; what you must pay down is a sum of money which, invested twenty years, will exactly be the value of the lease in possession." But how simple it becomes if you have this case: that the tenant for life happened to die at the end of the original forty years, and before the new twenty years came into possession. Then you find that he had bought, entirely in the interest of those who came after him, a twenty years' lease in possession. They, finding a twenty years' lease in possession, ought to pay for it according to its value. What is that value? I have already said that the value is the sum paid down twenty years ago with compound interest upon it. Then it is said at once: It is only simple interest after the death of the tenant for life, because you have bought an estate for the trustee, and you have a right to be let into possession of it on my death, and the price is the value I paid twenty years ago, and that being the value I shall have the interest on the purchase-money for the remainder of the time." The whole thing becomes extremely simple and easy. It has arisen in this way, that originally, when there was a leasehold for lives or for years in succession which was renewed, the courts would not allow any individual having a partial interest to come in. Of course an equity immediately arose, for that you could not take as against the person who made himself trustee without paying him for it. That being the case, it is not material to know whether he paid too much or too little. You are not obliged to take the estate; but if you take it, you must simply pay for it. That is the whole proposition. Therefore the answer to the case must simply be, following Nightingale v. Lawson, that the proportion to be paid by the plaintiff for and in respect of the fines and expenses, should be ascertained by reference to the actual enjoyment by William Hollins, and to the value to be set upon the life of Francis Gale at the death of William Hollins, and having regard to the agreement to have a value set upon the life of Francis Gale at the death of William Hollins; and then compound interest should be computed at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, with annual rests, on the proportion payable by the plaintiff during the life of William Hollins, and simple interest at 4 per cent. should be computed for what shall be found due at the death of William Hollins for principal and interest as aforesaid, till payment to the defendants. Lord Justice SELWYN said :-One point which was strongly urged upon us was that the tenant for life ought at all event to have been decreed to keep down, during his life, the interest on the money borrowed for renewal, and many cases have been cited in support of this contention. Those cases consist principally of three classes; first, where a provision has been made by the testator or settlor for the expense of renewal by sale or mortgage of the estate itself, in which case the tenant for life loses the rents of the part sold in the case of a sale, and keeps down the interest in the case of a mortgage; secondly, where the same provision is made by means of the sale or mortgage of another estate, in which case the tenant for life of the estate is in a similar position, and the case of Ainslie v. Harcourt, 28 Beav. 313, affords an instance of both these classes. The third class of cases is where the expenses of renewal are directed to be paid out of the rents and profits, in which case the whole burthen is thus thrown upon the tenant for life, as in the case of Solly v. Wood, 29 Beav. 482. But where, as here, there is no provision made by the testator, but the estate is in fact reserved, it is clearly settled that the expense is to be borne by the parties interested in proportion to their enjoyment. At the time of the renewal the tenant for life in effect puchases an estate in possession, and the remainderman an estate in remainder; and if at that time they could foresee exactly the sums which certainly would have to be paid, and if it was then ascertained that, out of a sum of 2000l. required for that purpose, 1800l. was to be paid by the tenant for life, and 2007. by the remainderman, no interest would become due by or to any person. So if neither of them had the means of paying his share except by borrowing, and both had accordingly borrowed from a third person, each of them would have to pay inThen as to its being lives instead of years, terest on the sum so borrowed. But in the present Wigram, V.C., in that very case, begins his judg- case, instead of borrowing from a third person, the ment by saying that he thinks is settled upon the tenant for life has paid the whole, and when the authorities that there is no difference between lives remainderman comes to claim the benefit of that and years. There is simply the difficulty of arriving renewal, upon what principle can he claim to be at the value. You must assume a value for lives in a better position with respect to interest according to the tables which are always properly than if he had paid his share, that is to say, framed for this purpose, and then the principle 2001. out of his own pocket, or borrowed it from applies exactly in the same way that a value for a third person. If he accepts the estate, it is years is assigned to the lives, and you calculate clear that the 2007. was paid for his benefit at the the compound interest upon it. In this particular time it was paid, and consequently must bear intecase the parties have agreed that the surviving life | rest as against him from that time; and the autho Then in Jones v. Jones, in 5 Hare, Wigram, V.C., very carefully lays down the different cases that may happen. There may happen a case where it is declared to be a charge upon the estate, and you must take the thing exactly as you find it. But when there is no such declaration, you take from your trustee what he has bought for you, and you pay him for what he has bought and interest accordingly. Take the simple case of twenty years, and suppose a man lives nineteen years of those twenty years; every year you get the value of whatever fragment there may be of the lease in possession, and pay compound interest. Then it comes into possession. If there is only one year left he will have to pay whatever is to be appropriated for that one year. The other person having had the whole benefit of the year will only have bought a year. Then you will find what he paid down for the compound interest to arrive at that interest in possession. CHAN.] LONDON, CHATHAM, and DovER RAIL. Co. v. MAYOR, &c., oF CITY OF LONDON. rities are decisive upon the point that interest is to be calculated with annual rests upon the same principle as interest is calculated upon reversionary estates. That calculation is made up to the time when the reversion falls into possession-that is, up to the day of the death of the tenant for life, from which time the remainderman, if he accepts the estate subject to the burthen of paying his share of the expense of the renewal, becomes entitled, like an ordinary purchaser, to the rents and profits as from that day, and becomes subject to the ordinary rules as to interest on the purchase-money. This is, I apprehend, the meaning of Lord Thurlow's observations in Nightingale v. Lawson, where he says after the death of the tenant for life the demand upon the remainderman becomes a common debt. I think, therefore, that the order in this case must be in the form the Lord Justice has mentioned. Solicitor for the appellants, Charles Percival Titt. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Grane, Son, and Fesenmeyer. July 27 and 28. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) THE LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAY The Holborn Valley Improvement Act 1864, stats. 27 & [CHAN. By the Act in question (stat. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 61) sect. 2, the mayor, aldermen and commons of the City of London were authorised to make and execute a certain viaduct or raised way, new streets and improvements, namely, (1) A viaduct or raised way for the purpose of a highway, street, or road commencing on Holborn-hill at or near Ely-court, and terminating in Skinner-street, in the City of London at or near the Old Bailey. (2 and 3) Certain new streets specified in sect. 2. (4) The widening of Shoe-lane and the carrying of that lane up to and so as to form a junction with the roadway of the viaduct. (5 and 6) A widening of part of Farringdon-road and an alteration of the levels of Farringdon-street and Farringdon-road. (7) The providing of space for the erection of houses and buildings adjoining to and near the viaduct or raised way, new streets, and improvements aforesaid. (8) The stopping up and permanent appropriation of certain streets. By sect. 5, all the powers, &c., contained in The London (City) Improvement Act 1847 (stat. 10 & 11 Vict. c. 280, Local and Personal Acts) except sect. 19 thereof, and in The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, except the part of that Act with respect to the purchase and taking of lands otherwise than by agreement, and in The Lands Clauses Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1860, were extended and applied to the purposes of this Act. Sect. 15 limited the time for exercise of the company's powers of the Act, as to purchase of lands, to five years from the passing of the Act. Sect. 16 was as follows: If the viaduct or raised way and new lines of streets shall Act, then on the expiration of such period the powers given by this Act to the mayor, aldermen, and commons for con structing the same shall cease to be exercised, except as to so much thereof as may then be completed. Though the word “street” may include the houses abut-not be completed within five years from the passing of this ting or fronting upon a public thoroughfare, as well as the actual roadway or footways, yet the strict and primâ facie meaning of the word "street" is confined to the roadway and footways. Accordingly, in the construction of the Holborn Valley This was an appeal from a decision of Malins, V. C., refusing the application of the plaintiffs for an injunction to restrain the defendants from taking under their Parliamentary powers a certain piece of land, situate on the south side of Skinner-street in the City of London and belonging to the plaintiffs, until it should have been determined by an arbitrator, in accordance with the provisions of sect. 36 of The Holborn Valley Improvement Act 1864, (Stat. 37 & 28 Vict. c. 61, Local and Personal Acts) whether the said piece of land should be taken by the defendants or not. Sect. 17 gave power to the mayor, aldermen, and commons to purchase by agreement, but not by compulsion, additional lands in the vicinity of the viaduct and new streets for the purpose of erecting improved dwellings for the working classes. Sect. 19 gave power to the mayor, aldermen, and commons to make, under the intended viaduct, raised way, and new streets, or any of them respectively, an arched passage or covered way called a sub-way. Sect 33 (so far as material) was as follows: When the viaduct or raised way and new streets aforesaid are completed, all the ground laid open into the viaduct or raised way and new streets respectively, shall be deemed to form part thereof respectively, and may be used by the public accordingly; and thenceforth the viaduct or raised way and new streets and the sewers beneath the came respectively, shall be under the care management, control, and jurisdiction of, and shall be maintained, repaired, cleansed, lighted, watched, paved, metalled, macadamised, and otherwise kept in proper order and condition by, the same commissioners, boards, vestries, district boards, or persons respectively as the other streets, in the respective wards, parishes, districts, or places in which the viaduct or raised way and new streets respectively will be situate. Sect. 34 provided for the protection of the works of the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, at the points where the viaduct or raised way and one of the new streets authorised by the Act crossed the lines of railway of that company. Sect. 35 was as follows: In every case in which the mayor, aldermen, and commons, and the railway company, have concurrent powers for the purchase of land, those powers shall not be exercised by either party until after seven days' notice in writing of the intention to exercise such powers has been given to the other party, and if within those seven days the party to whom notice is given shall object to the exercise of such powers by the other; then as to the lands referred to in thepurchase until an arbitrator, to be appointed by the Board notice, neither of those parties shall exercise any powers of of Trade, on the application of both or either of the parties, shall have decided whether any, and, if any, what portion of such lands shall be purchased by each or either of them; and it shall be the duty of the arbitrator to decide all such CHAN.] LONDON, CHATHAM, and DoveR RAIL. Co. v. Mayor, &c., of CITY OF LONDON. questions in such manner as he may deem best for enabling both parties to execute their respective undertakings as authorised: Sect. 36 was as follows: In any case in which the mayor, aldermen, and commons require to purchase or take any lands which have been already purchased or contracted to be purchased by the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, and that company are unwilling to dispose of the same, or require the same for the purposes of their own undertaking, then it shall be referred to arbitration in manner hereinbefore provided with respect to the exercise of concurrent powers of purchase provided always that this provision shall not be construed to prevent the mayor, aldermen, and commons purchasing and taking all such lands of the Dover Company which may be required for the construction of the viaduct or raised way, and the line of the new streets by this Act authorised. The piece of land in question was not required by the defendants for the construction of the actual viaduct or raised way, but for the providing of space for the erection of houses abutting upon the line of the viaduct. The defendants, however, gave notice to the plaintiffs of their intention to take the piece of land. The plaintiffs, who had previcusly acquired the piece of land under their parliamentary powers, refused to dispose of it to the defendants, and insisted that they were entitled to have the question of its purchase referred to arbitration, and that the proviso at the end of sect. 36 did not apply to the case. The question in dispute, therefore, turned mainly upon whether the words at the end of sect. 36, "the construction of the viaduct or raised way, and the line of the new streets," were to be restricted to the actual roadway and footways of the viaduct and new streets authorised to be constructed, or whether those words comprised also the line of houses abutting upon the viaduct and new streets. The Vice-Chancellor adopted the latter construction, and the plaintiffs appealed. Before the opening of the appeal it was agreed that the motion for an injunction should be turned into a motion for decree, so that the only question in the suit might be finally disposed of. Cotton, Q. C., and Kekewich for the plaintiffs. Sir R. Palmer, Q. C., and A. E. Miller, for the defendants. The above quoted sections of the Act, as well as others not so material, were referred to, as also the London (City) Improvement Act 1847, ss. 46 and 47; and Galloway v. The Mayor and Commonalty of London, L. Rep. 1 E. & I. App. 34; 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 865, was cited. Lord Justice PAGE WOOD said. — I do not think we need trouble you to reply Mr. Cotton. The case now before us is extremely different from Galloway's -case in every material respect. Galloway's case was determined upon quite a different point to the one which arises here. The Act of Parliament relating to this case states that the corporation of London in carrying out these great improvements by making new streets, have authority to take all the lands which are specified in the Act, and they have authority not only to make the streets, that is the line of roadway described in the preamble, but to take what may be necessary to enable them to accomplish the making of those streets in pursuance of the powers conferred upon them by the Legislature, and, if not laid out in making the streets, the lands may be otherwise laid out and let at a ground-rent, and the ground-rents may be sold. The Legislature has given conflicting powers to two public bodies for public purposes. It has given one set of powers to the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company, and it has given another set of powers to the corporation of London, by which either of those two bodies may purchase such lands [CHAN. as they want for their respective undertakings, both of them undertakings of an important character. The 36th section of the Act meets a case in which neither party has exercised its powers. One party may give a notice to take the land one day, and the next day or the next hour the occupier or owner of the property may be served with notice from the other party, and if both parties want the lands, in such a case as that, where no notice has been given up to that time, the matter is at once to go to an arbitrator, and each party is to give seven days' notice in writing of the intention to exercise their powers. If an objection is raised it is to go to the arbitrator, and he is to decide what portion of the land shall be taken by either party. We start therefore with this, that the arbitrator is assumed to be a person taking upon himself the responsibility of deciding that point, he being appointed by the Board of Trade. He is to decide fairly on behalf of the public which party ought to be authorised to take the whole or any part of the land in dispute, under the 35th section. Then comes a more difficult question, under the 36th section of the Act, as to what is to be done when the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway have the land. They must be assumed primâ facie to have taken it for the purposes of their Act, and the Legislature has to deal with a case where for a public purpose the company have made themselves owners of the land. A public body authorised to do certain works for the public benefit will have a certain degree of limit put upon its powers. It is not to be expected that one body is to yield to the other without the question in dispute being taken into consideration that is to be referred to arbitration; and the reference is to be had in any case where the company are unwilling to dispose of the land or require the same for the purpose of their own undertaking." The wording is somewhat peculiar. Mr. Miller called our attention to the fact that they must not simply say we are unwilling, though we do not want it in the least, to dispose of it, but there must be some reason for their saying they are unwilling. It is put in the alternative of their requiring it for their undertaking, when they say they are unwilling. It is not left to the court to say whether they are justified in saying they are unwilling, but it is for the arbitrator to settle the whole matter, and he acquires his jurisdiction when they say they are unwilling, unless the corporation are exempted by the proviso. The arbitrator must be supposed to act fairly between the contending parties, and they are entitled to send it to the arbitrator unless the proviso saves the corporation from the necessity of submitting to the delay and inconvenience of so doing. [His Lordship read the proviso at the end of sect. 36 and proceeded.] The question then arises whether in the construction of the viaduct or raised way is included land which may be required by the corporation for the purpose of being laid out as building land as to which they acquire the advantage of selling the ground-rents, or whether it is confined to the construction of the roadway itself, including the footway and everything necessary to make a public way, and also whether it applies to the houses. As regards any primâ facie intention which might be supposed to militate against that construction, I am not much impressed with what has been said as to the improbability of Parliament sanctioning any such limitation as is contended for by the plaintiffs in this case. I think it is not at all an unreasonable view to take that Parliament may have meant this: that whereas we have given to you, the corporation of the City of London, power to make, for the convenience of people frequenting this metropolis, more convenient thoroughfares, we will secure to the public that advantage; and if the corporation of CHAN.] [CHAN. LONDON, CHATHAM, and DovER RAIL. Co. v. MAYOR, &C., OF CITY OF LONDON. London want the thoroughfares, we have authorised that it means the plans and sections for the new the improvements; and if they want any land which streets included any part of the houses. Then the the London, Chatham, and Dover Company have, preamble goes on "showing the proposed situation, the London, Chatham, and Dover Company shall lines, and levels thereof." There the word "lines not stop the thoroughfare. They shall not have the does occur, and it is not unimportant to observe chance of leaving it to an arbitrator, for the Act of that, for it is evidently used as having reference to Parliament in substance says, we, the Legislature, the direction which the new streets were to take, have thought it of importance that the public "and the lands intended to be, or which may be should have this thoroughfare, and they shall have taken for the purposes of this Act." Then in the it, and no arbitrator shall be allowed to interfere in second section, which is divided into sub-sections, the matter. As regards the people who would live we find in the first sub-division one improvement there, and as regards the streets which are to be made was this. "A viaduct or raised way to be made, there it may be reasonable enough for the purpose of a high-level street or road, comthat the arbitrator shall say whether the whole mencing on Holborn-hill." The word "road" is of the thoroughfare is to be lined with hand- there used as synonymous with "street." Although some houses, or houses of a proper character, I quite agree with what Lord Chelmsford said in along its course, or whether the exigencies of the Galloway's case, viz., that the word "street" may other public works for the railway may not re- include, according to the particular subject-matter, quire that there shall be a gap (it might not be a houses also, but primâ facie, I think the more accularge gap, but a small one) required for some pur-rate and correct meaning of the word is the poses of the railway. It is not for us to enter into that. The arbitrator might say, "You shall sell all that piece of land coloured red, except so much, to the city of London; we think you want this piece, and to the extent of that there may be a gap." It might well be, as I suggested to Sir R. Palmer, that handsome stations at certain places might be erected to fill up the gap, so as to form part of the continuous line of the streets in the sense used by Sir R. Palmer in his argument, with houses facing the street. There is no à priori consideration which can induce one to say that the land shall be taken | without arbitration, or, if there be an à priori consideration, it is more favourable to the railway company than it is to the corporation of the City of London, because it is reasonable that the public should have the benefit of the streets. They may not be much interested in having a particular class of houses, but they may be interested very largely in having proper accommodation for the railway and its works. The case, therefore, reduces itself to a case unfettered, I think, by any absurdity arising from such a construction. A reductio ad absurdum is what has been attempted. As to that portion of the argument, we must take the words as we find them in the Act of Parliament. Looking back to the former Act of 1847, we find what the City of London were to do; they were to make lines of streets, but they were not to make the houses facing the streets. I do not say that they were prohibited from making the houses, and it is not necessary to express such an opinion for the decision of the case. At all events, they were not compelled to do it, and there was another mode provided of their making use of the land. They could let the land at the side of the street to other people, who might build upon it, and it was a very valuable power to them to be able to sell the ground-rents. The preamble of the Act of 1864 says: "Whereas it is expedient that the mayor, aldermen, and commons, be empowered to form a viaduct or raised way over Holborn-valley, and to make new streets and other improvements in connection therewith, and for the purpose to raise money on the credit of the duty of 4d., by the recited Act continued and appropriated as aforesaid, and whereas the objects aforesaid cannot be effected without the authority of Parliament, and whereas plans and sections of the intended viaduct or raised way, new streets, improvements, and works connected therewith." Stopping there for a moment I do not apprehend that the plans and sections as to the manner in which the land was to be laid out, show the houses. I do not know how that was de facto, but the sections probably will show the railway, and will also show where the land rose and where it fell. I do not apprehend one which was given by Lord Cranworth in CHAN.] LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAIL. Co. v. MAYOR, &C., OF CITY OF LONDON. the preamble as "lines." In the 16th section the lines of streets are to be completed, and that work the corporation themselves are to do. That is the operation they have to take in hand; the rest is to be done by other persons to whom they sell the property. The 33rd section is very strong upon the meaning of the word "streets." That word in that section must mean the roadway, the pavement, and the fencing, or whatever may be necessary for the street; that is the thing which the public use, and not the houses in which private individuals live. Then the section says: "All the ground laid open into the viaduct or raised way and new streets respectively, shall be deemed to form part thereof respectively, and may be used by the public accordingly." That distinguishes between the ground which is to be built upon, and the ground which is to be laid open into the new roadway or street which may be used by the public. Accordingly the public may use no part of the road for the purpose of building the houses. The corporation only have under their care the roadway and the streets; they do not enter the private houses. Certainly they have to get the rates from the private houses for certain purposes, and they have also to watch the streets for the benefit of the inhabitants living there, nevertheless it is a street that they are actually to watch. The argument as to the subway seems to me to carry the case no further. I never recollect seeing a subway or sewer running under houses, but the pipes generally run down the middle of the street. Now, that being so, it seems to us that there is no prima facie absurdity in coming to the conclusion that we have come to as to what the clauses in the Act of Parliament provide. It goes to an arbitrator, and the arbitrator, we must assume, will do his duty, and we cannot prevent it going to the arbitrator for the purposes mentioned in the Act, and I think it must be left there. It is within our jurisdiction, or within the jurisdiction of any other competent court to say whether this is a thing wanted for the streets, and in that sense we are to construe the Act of Parliament. That being once decided in the negative, then it is taken out of our hands, and it goes to the arbitrator to determine what is proper to be done. Lord Justice SELWYN said :-The question now before the court is entirely different from that which was raised in Galloway's case. In the case now before us it is admitted that the City of London are authorised to take the land in question, and the only question is whether under the 35th section an arbitrator is necessary as a preliminary or a condition precedent to their taking the land in the event that has happened of the railway company being unwilling to dispose of it. The Act of Parliament throughout makes a distinction between the viaduct or raised way, which follows the line of the old street, Holborn Hill and Skinner-street on the one hand, and the new streets contemplated by the Act on the other hand. It was admitted by Sir Roundell Palmer in his argument when he said that the proviso at the end of sect. 36 ought to be read as viaduct or raised way used for the purpose of a high level street or other streets which are authorised by the Act. As the lands in question are adjacent to the viaduct, and not to any new street, the question we have to decide is narrowed to the construction of the words in that proviso, "the viaduct or raised way," it being contended on the part of the plaintiffs that those words are confined to the viaduct and roadway, and on the other hand that they include so much land on both sides of the viaduct or roadway as would be required for the creation of houses suitable for such a street, and such improvements. I think that, although this [CHAN. question is not free from difficulty, the Act of Parliament has itself afforded us the means of arriving at a satisfactory determination. In the first place we find these words, "viaduct or raised way," very frequently referred to in the Act. We find them first of all in the preamble of the Act, where the corporation are empowered "to form a viaduct or raised way over Holborn Valley, and to make new streets and other improvements in connection therewith." And we find it again in sect. 2, "The mayor, aldermen, and commons may make and execute the following viaduct or raised way, new streets, and improvements." Without taking upon myself to express any opinion, which it is not necessary to do, as to whether under the general powers, or under the powers of any other Act, the corporation of the City of London have or have not power to build the houses in question, it is, I think, perfectly clear that, neither under this Act, nor under any of the Acts referred to, is the building of houses by them in contemplation except in the single instance of houses for mechanics. Where you find a reference to their forming a viaduct or raised way, and to their making and executing the viaduct or raised way, I think it refers to viaduct or raised way in the senso contended for by the plaintiffs, and not in the more extended sense for which Sir R. Palmer, in his argument, has contended. If we look at the first subdivision of the 2nd section upon which so much reliance was placed, I think it leads to the same conclusion, because it is “a viaduct or raised way for the purpose of a high level street or road." Sir Roundell Palmer contended that those words are to be introduced into the proviso. But introducing those words would, in fact, be altering the proviso, for those words are not to be found there, and this subdivision is one which plainly points out the distinction between viaduct or raised way on the one hand, and the purposes for which the high level street or road was to be used on the other. Sir Roundell Palmer contends that the street is something different from the viaduct or raised way. This subdivision points out the distinction between the high level street or road, and the purpose for which the viaduct or raised way was to be made. So also in the seventh subdivision of the 2nd section, "the providing of space for the erection of houses and buildings adjoining to and near the viaduct or raised way." That shows distinctly that these houses and buildings which Sir R. Palmer says are included in the viaduct or raised way, are not so included, but are treated by the Legislature as being something separate and distinct, although adjoining to or near the viaduct or raised way. Then sects. 19, 20 and 21 all, I think, point in the same direction, and the same observation would apply to those sections. In the first place, the corporation are to make under the intended viaduct or raised way the arched passage or covered way hereinafter called a subway. By the 21st section the corporation are to "construct under the intended viaduct or raised way and new streets, such sewers and drains as may be necessary in connection with the improvements by this Act authorised." I think, having regard to the fact that the Act contemplated that the land adjoining the streets should be let by the corporation, and that the houses should be built by other persons and the ground-rents sold by the corporation, the 21st section plainly points to the construction under the viaduct itself of the sewers and drains there referred to. The 33rd section also points very strongly in the same direction, but it is unnecessary for me to repeat what has been already said with respect to this section by Wood, L. J. I think the same conclusion is arrived at, if possible, even more strongly, by reference to the sections to which we were referred by |