ROLLS.] GRIFFIN V. MORGAN. [V.C. S. the tenant for life, died on the 12th Dec. 1866. He | if there had been a vesting in this person in his had seven children by his first wife, and none by lifetime and he had died without making a will. the second. Two of the children died in the That is the meaning of the word "heir." The testator's lifetime, and before the date of the codicil, consequence of which is that, I think, the next of one of them intestate and without issue, the other kin take in every case-in the case of those who leaving a son. Three of the children died in the predeceased the testator, the next of kin at his lifetime of the tenant for life, one of them intestate death, and in the case of those who survived him, and without issue, the two others leaving children. the next of kin at the period of distribution. The testator's remaining two children survived the tenant for life, one of them had since died leaving Thos. Wix Philps, one of the petitioners, his legal personal representative, and the other still survived, and was one of the petitioners. There were three classes of claimants for the fund. The first class of claimants were the petitioners, who contended that it ought to be divided between those of the testator's children who were living at the death of the tenant for life, or the representatives of such children. The second class contended that it ought to be divided between the testator's children living at his death, and their children then living. The third class comprised, in addition to those comprised in the second, the grandchild of the testator, whose parent died in the testator's lifetime. Sir R. Baggallay, Q. C. and Bristowe appeared for the petitioners. Solicitors for the petitioners, Heather, Son, and Gill. Solicitors for the respondents, Randall and Angier, for Down, Dorking. V. C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by EDWARD WINSLOW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Practice Thursday, Jan. 21. GRIFFIN V. MORGAN. Decree-Defective suit-Supplemental bill— 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52. Where a suit has become defective by an alteration in the status of the parties being unknown at the date of the decree, the defect can only be cured by a supplmental bill. This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs in Hanson, Rawlinson, and Hadley for the respondents. the above suit, seeking to revive the suit under The following cases were cited: Lachlan v. Reynolds, 9 Hare, 796; these circumstances. The bill was filed in Dec. 1866, by three infants, King v. Cleaveland, 26 Beav. 26; 4 De G. & J. by their father as their next friend, for the admi 477; Hamilton v. Mills, 29 Beav. 193. Jan. 25.-Lord ROMILLY, after stating the facts of the case, continued.-The first question is, who takes under these words, "My children then living or their heirs"? Who are the persons, the class to take. Does it include heirs of children deceased, and, if so, does it let in all? I was referred to the case of King v. Cleaveland (supra) as conclusive upon the subject, and the more I look at that case the more I think that it is conclusive, and that the word "or" is to be taken here conjunctively and not in the alternative; and that, therefore, the codicil includes the heirs of deceased children. That being so, I think it includes the heirs of all deceased children, and that it is impossible to make a distinction with reference to those who died in the lifetime of the testator. I think he intended all to take, or he would have made some distinction. One of those who died in his lifetime left a child; it is clear that he intended that child to take. If he had intended to make a distinction, he would have excluded the particular child who predeceased him and who left a child. The next question is the meaning of the word 'heirs," and it was upon this point that I was more desirous of looking into the cases, for with regard to the other point I was completely satisfied with the exact application of the case of King v. Cleaveland (supra), which was elaborately and carefully gone into in the Court of Appeal, where the view taken in the Rolls was affirmed. The question is, who takes under the word "heirs?" I don't think the case of Hamilton v. Mills (supra), governs this case. I think that was a peculiar case. There, I think, I came to the conclusionthe exact words were "right heir"-that the testator meant to make the gift to the heir-at-law as a descriptio persona. That is not so here. In this case, the testator uses the word "heir," as the word is commonly, I may say vulgarly, used in society, for the person who takes property after another person's death, that is, he meant those to take it, who would take it according to law nistration of certain property to which they had become entitled. In April 1867 one of the infants, Joyce Griffin, married a Mr. Thomas Huntley, but at the time of the marriage neither she nor her husband were aware of the proceedings in the suit, nor that she was a ward of court. On the 19th Nov. 1867 the usual administration decree was made. At the date of the decree Mrs. Huntley was the only party to the suit who knew of the marriage. She attained the age of twenty-one in Sept. 1868. Mr. Huntley made an affidavit in which, after stating his ignorance of his wife's position with respect to the suit at the time of the marriage, and apologising for having unwittingly committed a contempt of court, he offered to execute a proper settlement of his wife's share of the property under the suit and to submit to be bound by the decree and all the proceedings taken in the suit. Kekewich, in support of the motion, submitted that the plaintiffs were entitled to the usual order, under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 52, of revivor, which could be drawn up so as to cure all defects in the proceedings. In a recent and similar case, Capps v. Capps, L. Rep. 4 Ch. 1, the order now asked for had been granted. Fry appeared for the defendant. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-In the case referred to there was an actual abatement, but here the suit has become defective by a circumstance altering the status of one of the parties to the suit, being unknown at the date of the decree. This defect can only be cured by a supplemental bill. The Act of Parliament applies only to ordinary cases of abate ment and revivor, and makes no distinction between infants and adults. The motion must be refused. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Singleton and Tal tershall. Solicitors for the defendant, Thomas White and Sons. V.C. S.] RAILTON v. EASY. Re THE PERUVIAN RAILWAYS COMPANY. RAILTON v. EASY. County court--Pleading-Demurrer-Jurisdiction-In- expense, and to establish a precedent for future cases, to make the present application. terlocutory application. The County Courts Equitable Jurisdiction Act makes no provision either for demurrers or appeals from interlocutory applications. Where, therefore, pending a suit in the County Court the defendant applied to the judge of that court to dismiss the plaint for want of jurisdiction, and the judge refused to entertain the application, but sanctioned a similar application to this court: Held, that the application to this court was misconceived, but that the defendant might apply to the County Court by a statement limiting the question to one of jurisdiction, without further pleading. Every appeal from the County Courts must be accompanied by a case drawn up in accordance with the rules of the County Courts Equitable Jurisdiction Act. This was a motion in the form of an appeal from an order made in the above suit by the judge of the County Court sitting at Clerkenwell. The facts were as follows: The plaint in the suit was filed for the purpose of setting aside and cancelling two documents or assignments, whereby the plaintiff had assigned his furniture and a reversionary share of his personal estate to the defendant, on the ground that such assignments had been improperly obtained by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had commenced an action at law against him to recover 761. on account of the furniture, and that he had pleaded as a set-off a sum received by the defendant for it. The plaint prayed for a declaration that the assignments were invalid, and that they might be delivered up and cancelled; that an injunction might be granted to restrain the defendant from receiving the said share of personal estate, and from setting up the assignment of the furniture in answer to the plaintiff's plea, and for costs. Pending the suit the plaintiff had applied to the judge of the County Court for an order in the nature of an injunction for the above purposes, and at the same time the defendant had applied that the plaint might be taken off the file of the court, or otherwise dismissed with costs for want of jurisdiction. The judge, however, was of opinion that he could not entertain either of the applications, but he gave the defendant leave to apply in any way he might be advised to this court, and for that purpose he and the counsel for both parties signed the following minute: "The defendant undertaking not to apply for, or receive, the share of the personal estate, or to prosecute the action until further order, ordered that the motion for an injunction do stand over till the 26th inst., the plaintiff undertaking to accept notice of motion, to be made before Stuart, V. C., to discharge this order on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the County Court, and let the costs be reserved." The result of this was the present motion, on the part of the defendant, seeking to obtain to discharge the above order, and the dismissal of the plaint for want of jurisdiction. Cecil Russell, in support of the motion, stated that the plaint clearly showed that the question in dispute was one over which the County Court had no jurisdiction. A demurrer would have been put in, but such a course of procedure, without it was accompanied by a statement substantially denying the facts alleged in the plaint, was not allowed by the rules of the County Court. The rules, moreover, made no provision for appeals from inter Woodroffe appeared for the plaintiff. The VICE-CHANCELLOR-This motion to take a plaint off the file of the County Court is misconceived. It is substantially an appeal from the judge of the County Court; but every appeal from a County Court ought to be accompanied by a case regularly drawn up in accordance with the rules of the County Courts Act. With respect to the difficulty as to the mode of raising the question of jurisdiction in the County Court, I consider that as there has been no proper provision made for a demurrer in those courts, the judge should be informed that, in the opinion of this court, a mere statement of the fact that the defendant alleges that the court has no jurisdiction in the case ought to be admitted as sufficient, in the first instance, without any further pleading. If the judge were then to decide the question thus raised, an appeal from his decision might be brought here, in the regular course. Under the circumstances of the case I think the proper order to make will be, that the defendant be Court, limited to the question of want of jurisdicat liberty to put in a statement in the County tion; that the costs of this motion be costs in the cause, and in that case, if the plaintiff be right, he will have his costs when the case is disposed of. Solicitor for the plaintiff, E. Kimber. V.C. MALINS' COURT. Reported by G. T. EDWARDS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [ERRATUM.-In the report of Re Beasney's Trusts, ante, p. 630, the petitioner's solicitor was "J. Mote," not "J. Neate," as it was inadvertently printed.] Thursday, Dec. 10. Re THE PERUVIAN RAILWAYS COMPANY; Joint-stock company-Winding-up-Contributory- C., at the request of J. P., the brother of E. P., a promoter of the P. Railways Company, and also the managing director of the L. C. Company, applied for shares in the P. Railways Company, J. P. informing him that he would be under no liability, but that he would be a trustee of the shares for the I. C. Company. Three hundred shares were allotted to C., who afterwards signed a transfer in blank. The notice of the allotment had not been sent to C., but had been handed to the secretary of the company. C. applied to have his name taken off the list of contributories in the winding-up of the P. Railways Company: Held, that his name must be retained on the list. The question in this motion, which came on upon an adjourned summons, was, whether the name of G. B. Crawley ought to be upon the list of contributories in the winding-up of this company. The facts were these: This company was established in 1845 for the purpose of obtaining concessions from the Peruvian Government, and forming railways in that country. Two engineers, named John and Edward Pickering, were active promoters of this company. Edward Pickering was managing director of another company, the International Contract Company (Limited), and both being interested in the success of the Peruvian [V.C. M. V.C. M.] Re PERUVIAN RAILWAYS COMPANY; ROBINSON'S CASE. Railways Company, were desirous that as many | be. He knew that, by applying for shares of the shares as possible should be applied for. They amount of 25, with 14. paid, as between him and entered into an arrangement with the International the company and all other persons, he would be liable Contract Company (Limited), whereby that com- to pay the 247.; but he made the application, intending pany was to take and did take shares in the Peruvian to be a trustee for the International Contract ComRailways Company. Mr. Crawley, who had been pany; is it therefore surprising that he did not give a solicitor, and had since become a contractor, was himself any further trouble? It was his intention to an acquaintance of John Pickering, and on the treat himself as a trustee for the International Con29th May 1865, John Pickering called on him and tract Company, and that the letter of allotment stated that his brother Edward was one of the com- should be sent to the owners of the shares and not mittee of the Peruvian Railways Company (Limited) to himself. But it is said that although at a subto make an allotment of shares, and was also mana- sequent period the International Contract Company ging director of the International Contract Company was ordered to be wound-up, Mr. Crawley had not (Limited), and was anxious that numerous appli- sent the letter, but only contracted as a trustee. On cations for shares should be made; and John the evidence, I think I should be bound to come to Pickering promised, on behalf of his brother, that if the conclusion that the letter of allotment should be Mr. Crawley would make the application he should sent to the party who was to have the shares. But be under no liability, but should be a trustee for it does not rest there; some day before the 12th July and on behalf of the International Contract Com- 1866, there was presented to him for signature a pany (Limited), and should be discharged by that transfer for 300 shares. (The Vice-Chancellor read company; and Crawley stated in his affidavit that, the document.) Mr. Cole says that cannot be under those circumstances, he considered the trans- read against Mr. Crawley because it is in blank; that action as a mere matter of form. Mr. Crawley it is not a legal document; that it was not used for accordingly sent an application for 400 251. shares, that, but is only of value to show that he thereby filling up the same printed form as in Wallis's treated himself as a shareholder. How can a man case, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 676. 4001. was paid be permitted to say that he did not know of the by John Pickering, and the letter of allotment allotment? If he knew of such a document as this was handed to the secretary of the company; and did not at once repudiate, he became a shareand Crawley heard nothing further after his appli- holder. Part of the judgment of the Lord Chancellor. cation for the shares until the early part of (Lord Cairns) and the authorities have settled the July 1866, when there was presented to him for law that if in Wallis's case they had given notice signature a transfer of 300 shares in this form: aliunde, or had written it, in either event that would "G. B. Crawley, solicitor, in consideration of have been proper notice brought home to him. The paid to me by whole case depended on whether the allottee this transfer in blank. received notice of allotment; and, therefore, if they had had evidence by which he was admitted to be a shareholder, they would have kept him on the list, as I did. But how can I permit a man who takes upon himself to sign a document transferring shares, to say that he never was a shareholder? I am sorry that Mr. Crawley has brought upon himself this liability. Whatever he is now, he was a solicitor, and it was his duty to consider before he signed the letter of allotment whether persons should give their names for a purpose, whereby an appearance was given of shares having been taken when it was not so. This was calculated to mislead the public, and I cannot show any favour to a man who has put himself in this position. He was told that he was a trustee; he knew he was a holder of the shares, and never made an attempt to repudiate. As between himself and the company, by the allotment and the document which he signed, he became a shareholder' If I regard him as a trustee for the company, all that was ever required to be done was done by making the allotment and forwarding it to the company; and if he must be treated as an individual, there is the transfer. Therefore, whether as a trustee or individually, I must hold that he is a contributory, and must be upon the list. motion must be refused with costs. &c." Mr. Crawley signed Cole, Q. C. and E. Hanson for Mr. Crawley. Glasse, Q. C. and Kekewich for the official liqui dator. The VICE-CHANCELLOR (after stating the facts). -The Messrs. Pickering, for obvious reasons, were very anxious that as many shares as possible in the Peruvian Railways Company should be applied for; and Mr. Crawley, being at the time a solicitor of some standing-although his name does not now appear in the Law List-but now being a contractor, surely (whether he is the one or the other) was bound to know that it was no light thing to commit his credit in this way; but he signed the application for the shares, accompanied by the payment of 4007., and Mr. Cole admitted that John Pickering, on whose application he did this, was his agent to apply and make the payment, and having made the allotment for 400 shares, although 300 only were allotted, a new letter of allotment was issued; but in this, as in Wailis's case, unfortunately it happened that instead of issuing it in the usual course of sending a letter of allotment to the address of the applicant, it was handed to the secretary of Mr. Edward Pickering on behalf of the company. Now, in Wallis's case I thought (it being the same sort of tranaction as here) that Wallis was not the nominee of the company, and that there was evidence to show, and particularly the contents of the letter, that although there was an irregularity in sending the letter of allotment, that Wallis was aware of it, and I kept his name upon the list. Upon going to the Lords Justices they did not differ with me in principle, but thought there was a want of evidence to prove that he knew that the letter of allotment was sent to and adopted by Edward Pickering. The difference between this case and Wallis's is, that he was applying for himself; but Mr. Crawley says that he was a mere trustee for the company, and gave the use of his name, and it was for them to consider what the consequences might Re PERUVIAN RAILWAYS COMPANY. ROBINSON'S CASE. The R. applied for 1000 shares in the P. R. Company, and at the same time paid a cheque for the amount of deposit which he had received from his partner in exchange for one which had been given him by the I. C. Company. R afterwards received a memorandum from the promoter of the 1. C. Company to the effect that the shares applied for by him in the P. R. Compara were on account of the I. C. company, and that they agreed to accept a transfer, and to hold him free from V.C. M] Re PERUVIAN RAILWAYS COMPANY; ROBINSON S CASE. loss on them. R. received no further notice of allot- | ment until he was informed that he was on the list of contributories: Held, that he was a trustee for the I. C. Company, and that his name must remain on the list. Robinson's case, in the same matter, was taken next to Crawley's case. It was sought to place the name of Mr., Joseph Robinson on the list of contributories of this company in respect of 800 shares. On the 15th June 1865, Mr. Robinson had signed and delivered an application for 1000 shares in the above company, and at the same time paid the 10007. deposit; he now stated that such application was made by him at the request of the International Contract Company, conveyed to him through E. Pickering, their managing director, who asked him to apply for these shares on behalf, and as nominee of, or trustee for, the International Contract Company, who furnished him with 1000l. for the purpose of paying the deposits. Mr. Robinson did not communicate to the Peruvian Railways Company the fact that he made this application as such trustee. Mr. Robinson had never authorised any one to accept or receive notice on his behalf of any allotment of shares that might be made to him in respect of such application. No letter or notice of allotment of these shares was ever sent to Mr. Robinson by the Peruvian Railways Company; and, until a few days before he was served with the notice of settling the list of contributories, he had never received any notice, and was, as he alleged, entirely ignorant of the fact that any shares in the Peruvian Railways Company had been allotted to him in consequence of his application. Mr. Robinson had taken no part in the affairs of the company. Mr. Robinson had received and paid the 10007. in the following manner. He received a cheque for that amount from the International Contract Company, which he paid to his partner, Mr. Carter, and received a cheque in exchange from Mr. Carter, which he sent by his own clerk to the bankers of the Peruvian Railways Company. Mr. Robinson afterwards received the following document, signed by Edward Pickering: "The shares applied for by you are on our account, and we agree to accept a transfer, and hold you free from loss on the said shares." Ince, for Mr. Robinson, contended that he was a trustee for the International Contract Company, and could not be made liable as a contributory. He had given no authority to accept an allotment for him. Glasse, Q.C. and Kekewich for the official liquidator. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I can entertain no doubt on this case, whatever doubt may be entertained by others. This gentleman's own statement is, that not desiring to have a particle of interest in this Peruvian Railways Company, but being, I suppose, like the gentleman whose case I last disposed of, on intimate terms or on some terms of knowledge with Mr. Edward Pickering, he says: "In reference to the contention of the official liquidator of the abovenamed company, whereby it is now sought to place me on the list of contributories of the above-named company in respect of 600 shares, I say as follows: On the 15th June 1865 I signed an application for 1000 shares in the above-named company." Then he verifies a copy of the letter of application, and then he says: After I had signed the said application I sent in the same to the Peruvian Railways Company by causing it to be delivered at the National Bank by one of my own clerks or servants, and at the same time the deposit of 1000l. mentioned in the 66 [V.C. M. said letter of application was paid by me by means of a cheque for 1000l. payable to my order, and drawn by William Carter on his bankers, and handed with the said application to the officers of the National Bank. Save as aforesaid I never directly or indirectly, or through any person or persons whomsoever, signed or sent in any application or made any application for any shares whatever in the Railways Company. Such application as hereinbefore referred to was made by me at the request of the International Contract Company (hereinafter referred to as the Contract Company), which was conveyed to me through Edward Pickering, their managing director, who asked me to apply for the said shares on behalf and as nominee of, or trustee for, the Contract Company. The Contract Company furnished me with 1000l. for the purpose of paying the said deposit, but the same was paid in manner aforesaid by the said cheque payable to me, and drawn by the said William Carter, who paid into his said bankers the sum of 1000l., so furnished to me by the said Contract Company as aforesaid. I made such application as aforesaid solely and entirely on behalf of, and as trustee for, the Contract Company, and as between myself and the Contract Company I have not, and never had, any beneficial interest whatever in the said application. I did not communicate or authorise any person to communicate to the Railways Company the fact that I made such application as aforesaid as such trustee as aforesaid. I never authorised any person or persons whomsoever to accept or receive notice on my behalf of any allotment of shares which might be made upon such application as aforesaid. In reference to such application I received from the Contract Company a note signed by the said Edward Pickering as the managing director, that is in these terms: "Messrs. Carter and Robinson. Gentlemen, -The 2000 shares applied for by you this day in the Peruvian Railways Company (Limited) are on our account-that is, the company's '-and we agree to accept a transfer of them at any time you may require us, and to hold you free from all loss on the said shares,-Yours faithfully, E. PICKERING, managing director." Now, this gentleman describes himself as a merchant of the city of London. What does he do? He commits his name to the application for 1000 shares. He does it under the indemnity signed by Edward Pickering, the managing director of this company. It was for him to decide at the time, as I said in the last case, whether, in committing himself to the payment of no less than 25,000l., he had an indemnity which he could rely upon if it became necessary. But this merchant of the city of London makes this application on the 15th June 1865. He pays 1000l., which, as between himself and the Peruvian Government, appears to have been his own money, although it was derived from the International Contract Company. He never makes an inquiry whether there has been an allotment of shares or not; and now that his name is sought to be put on the list, he turns round upon what I must characterise as a miserable subterfuge, and says that the letter of allotment was never forwarded to him. What was his intention when he made the application? To make himself the mere tool of this International Contract Company? He applied for the shares for them; and he intended that all communications relating to the shares should be made to them. I am as satisfied as I am of my own existence that he never contemplated anything else, although he did happen to put his correct address to the letter, and, as I said in the other case-not in the one that has been on to-day, but on the preceding occasion-it would have been better if this company had sent the letter of allotment to the BRADFORD ELECTION PETITION.-No. 1. address at the foot after the name of the applicant, yet it is a mere question, as Mr. Ince says, of law-how the judge would direct the jury. In this court I am obliged to sit here and discharge the functions of a jury. The way the judge would direct the jury would be this: "The question, gentlemen, is for you whether Mr. Robinson, in making this application, intended to constitute Mr. Edward Pickering, or this company represented by Mr. E. Pickering, his agents, not only to make the application for the shares, but to accept the shares if they should be allotted." Now, exercising the functions of a jury, I unhesitatingly come to the conclusion (and, whatever any other judge may think, my impression on this is very strong) that he intended to make him self the mere tool of the International Contract Company. I characterise it as an improper proceeding on his part for him to make himself the tool of this company, to apply for shares that he never intended to hold, solely to give a fictitious appearance of value to the shares of the company, and to make it appear that a greater number of shares had been applied for than ever had been applied for; and although, as a matter of form, he sent the application through his own bankers, so that it might appear as if he, a merchant, had paid the deposit with his own money, yet I am perfectly satisfied that when he sent it he never had any other intention than this, that all communications relating to the shares were to be made to the party on whose behalf he states he acted as trustee or nominee merely. Therefore it is not open to him to say that there was not a proper application. I cannot for a moment give sanction to the principle that a mer cantile man is to make an application of this kind, allow it to remain dormant for, I think, two years and a half, and then turn round and by such an argument as this say that he did not know the allotment had been made. He knew perfectly well that the shares in this company had been allotted, and if he entertained any doubt whatever whether the allotment had been made, it was his duty to go and make inquiry at the offices of the company. I deprecate this mode of conducting business, which is a part of the system which has disgraced this country for the last few years, by which mercantile men enter into transactions of this kind. Mr. Robinson deliberately gave the use of his name, and, as far as I am concerned, he must bear the consequences. His name must remain upon the list. Glasse.-Your Honour will give us the costs? The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-Yes; you must have the costs. Solicitors: Freshfields; Clark, Woodcock, and Ryland; Ashurst, Morris, and Co.; Randall and Angier. There were a large number of Irish voters in the borough, and several paid Irish canvassers were employed to canvass these voters on behalf of the respondent : Held, that this was evidence from which the inference must necessarily be drawn that the canvassing was a cloak to bribery, and that bribery did actually take place: Held, further, that the payment of canvassers to infin ence a class of persons to refrain from voting is illegal, as contravening the provisions of sect. 2 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102. Treating took place in a certain part of the borough, and the committee-rooms of the respondent were open to voters who might go and take reasonable refreshments there at his expense: Held, that this was not evidence to justify a certificate to the Speaker that corrupt practices had extensively prevailed. The Corrupt Practices Act must in every case receive its true legal construction, and cannot be affected as to its operation by local custom, or the peculiar circumstances of localities. This was a petition against the return of Mr. Ripley, the sitting member, and alleged bribery, treating, and undue influence. Giffard, Q. C., Metcalfe, and Mellor conducted the case for the petitioners; and Overend, Q. C., Price, Q. C., and Littler appeared for the respondent. The particular points supported by the evidence, and upon which the decision is founded, had reference to the influence exercised over Irish voters, extensive treating, colourable employment of voters, and general lavish expenditure. Taking the evidence referred to in the judgment, Terry, an attorney, who had been retained by the respondent's legal agent, said: I kept no accounts until after the election, when I began to make payment. I am not aware that I paid any money until after the election. I asked the gentlemen who st tended the different committees to attend and see the parties who applied for payment. I did not devise any means of checking the accounts while they were running. That was left to the different committees. I believe Mr. Kitcheman sent several notes stating that persons were to be paid. It was in the form "Please pay so-and-so so much." [Shown note]. I believe that to be Mr. Kitche man's handwriting. I believe I paid all moneys that you find in the list. I had a clerk who sat with a voting list before him, and everybody was asked particularly if they were voters. There were public-house bills sent in, but these I sent Mr. Little, with the exception of one for two small casks of beer that the clerks had on the day of election. The payments I made were for canvassing, messengers, clerks, &c. The canvassers were paid 6s. a day. Some of them were only paid 5s. I don't know what the arrange ments were, or when made. I did not employ a single canvasser myself. I believe most of them had been enployed before the 5th Nov., and they were generally employed by the gentlemen who attended at the various committee-rooms. Canvass books were made out before I was engaged. I had them put into a different form, and from time to time took reports of what was doing. |