cake and died; soon after which, the servant who had made the cake ate some, and died also; it was held by Coltman, J., after consulting Parke, B., that the dying declarations of the servant were evidence against the prisoner, because the two consecutive deaths formed one transaction (o).

It has been held, that evidence of this description is only admissible where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and where the circumstances of the death are the subject of the dying declaration. Accordingly, where the defendant had been indicted by the deceased for perjury, and after conviction had shot the prosecutor, it was held that a dying declaration by the latter as to the circumstances of the perjury was inadmissible, on an application by the defendant for a new trial (p). So, where the prisoner was indicted for administering savin to a pregnant woman, but not quick with child, with a view to procure abortion, Bayley, J., rejected evidence of her dying declaration concerning the cause of her death, because the death was not the subject of the pending inquiry (4). In two old cases of perjury, evidence of a confession by a deceased accomplice was received (); but this doctrine could hardly be supported in the present day (s).

(0) R. v. Baker, 2 M. & R. 53.

(p) Per Abbott, C. J., R. v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605.

(2) R. v. Hutchinson, 2 B. & C. 608, n.; R. v. Lloyd, 4 C. & P. 233; R. v. Hind, Bell, 253.

(r) Per Lord Ellenborough, Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East, 195. (s) Doe v. Ridgway, 4 B. & Ald. 53.

The dying declarations of an accomplice are receivable (t), as well as dying declarations made in favour of the person accused (u).

(t) R. v. Tinkler, 1 East, P. C. 354.
(u) R. v. Scaife, 1 M. & R. 551.

CHAPTER XIII.

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST.

WHEN a deceased person, whose veracity in other respects is unimpeached, has, during his lifetime, made a statement concerning the matter in issue, which statement was at the time opposed to his pecuniary or proprietary interest, the legal presumption is that the statement is true, or that it contains at least some elements of credibility; for in all the exceptions to the general rule by which hearsay is excluded, it must be remembered that credibility is by no means a necessary consequence of admissibility. English law, although frequently arbitrary, and perhaps unreasonable, in its dogmatic distinctions between credibility and incredibility, refuses to reject any evidence which it considers to contain any ingredients, however minute, of presumptive truth: but, while admitting it, the judge will often intimate to a jury that they ought to give it little credit.

The rule which is now to be considered is the following:

A declaration by a deceased person who had a competent knowledge of a fact, and no interest to pervert it; which declaration was against the pecuniary

or proprietary interest of the declarant at the time when it was made, is evidence between third parties, and is evidence of everything stated in the declaration (a).

In the leading case of Higham v. Ridgway (b), to prove the time of a birth, evidence was given that the man-midwife, who attended the birth, was dead; and the books of the latter, who had kept them regularly, were offered in evidence. They contained an entry in the handwriting of the deceased of the circumstances of the birth, and the date. There was also a charge for attendance, against which the word "paid "was marked. It was held, that the entry was evidence of the time of the birth. Lord Ellenborough said:-"The entry made by the party was to his own immediate prejudice, when he had not only no interest to make it, if it was not true, but he had an interest the other way, not to discharge a claim, which it appears from other evidence that he had." Bayley, J., added :—“ All the cases agree, that a written entry by which a man discharges another of a claim which he had against him, or charges himself with a debt to another, is evidence of the fact which he so admits against himself; there being no interest of his own to advance by such entry. . . . The principle to be drawn from all the cases is, that if a person have peculiar means of knowing a fact,

(a) Middleton v. Melton, 10 B. & C. 317.

(b) 10 East, 109; cf. Gleadow v. Atkin, 1 C. & M. 410.

and make a declaration of that fact which is against his interest, it is clearly evidence after his death, if he could have been examined to it in his lifetime.” So, in a later case (c), the same learned judges received evidence of entries of charges made by a deceased attorney, who had prepared a lease, to show that the lease was executed at a time later than its apparent date. In this case the charges for preparing the lease appear to have been paid, but not upon the face of the entries. In the case of In the goods of Thomas (d), Lord Penzance admitted as evidence of the execution of a will an entry made by a deceased solicitor in his ledger admitting payment of his charges for drawing it and attending its execution.

It may, therefore, be considered as an established principle, that, although it is necessary, it is not enough, that this class of declarations should be made by one who has no interest to pervert the facts. The declaration must be against either the pecuniary or the proprietary (e) interest of the declarant. This doctrine may be considered as finally settled by the Sussex Peerage Case (f), where declarations as to the marriage of Lady Augusta Murray with the Duke of Sussex, made by the deceased clergyman who performed the ceremony, were tendered on the ground that they were declarations of a person who knew the facts, who was not interested in misrepre

(c) Doe v. Robson, 15 East, 32.

(d) 41 L. J., P. & M. 32.

(e) Per Cockburn, C. J., R. v. Birmingham, 1 B. & S. 768.
(f) 11 C. & F. 85.