dehors of the charge which is entered as liquidated (x). The character of the party making the entry or declaration must be established before the entry is read, unless it be made by a person in a public character, in which case due appointment will be presumed (y). Thus agency must be proved, where the declaration was by an agent; and accounts of rents signed by a person styling himself clerk to a steward, but not proved aliunde to have been so employed, although they were found among family muniments, were rejected, because there was no other evidence given to show that the accounts affected the declarant in a pecuniary character (~). Proof of handwriting, and other extrinsic evidence of authenticity, will be unnecessary when entries have been made thirty years previously, and are produced from proper custody (a). It has been said that in the case of an entry against interest "proof of the handwriting of the party and his death is enough to authorize its reception; at whatever time it was made, it is admissible" (b). The first part of this dictum applies of course only to entries made within thirty years prior to the time when they are tendered. As miscellaneous instances of cases, in which declarations against interest have been admitted as (x) Taylor v. Witham, L. R., 3 Ch. D. 605; 45 L. J., Ch. 798; 24 W. R. 877; R. v. Heyford, 2 Sm. L. C. 300. (y) Davies v. Morgan, 1 C. & J. 587. (z) De Rutzen v. Farr, 4 A. & E. 53. (a) Wynne v. Tyrwhitt, 4 B. & Ald. 376. (b) Per Parke, B., Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 898. evidence, the following may be mentioned. Where a deceased tenant, by a written instrument, acknowledged L. as his landlord, this was held to be evidence of L.'s title as against subsequent tenants who did not claim through the declarant (c). In ejectment by A., the declaration by deed of a deceased receiver of rents and profits, that he held under A.'s ancestor, is evidence against third parties of A.'s title (d). A declaration by a deceased occupant, that he managed an estate for a claimant, is evidence for the latter (e). In an action for specific performance of an agreement to take a lease, an entry of a deceased landlord in his own handwriting in his rent-book of a promise to grant a lease to a tenant, was held admissible in evidence against the tenant as being against the landlord's proprietary interest (ƒ). In an action by the corporation of Exeter for port duties, documents more than thirty years old, which purported to be the receipt of such duties by ancient receivers, but which were unsigned and in the third person, were admitted (g). So, the receipts of an ancient receiver of rents, brought from the muniment chest of the family, are unobjectionable evidence (h). Wherever there is privity of interest between the declarant and a party to the proceedings, the declara (e) Doe v. Edwards, 5 A. & E. 95. tion will be received; and it will be admissible, even though the declarant is alive (i); but neither the acts nor the declarations of deceased tenants, although against their interest, are any evidence against the reversioner; for a tenant cannot derogate from the title of his landlord; and therefore, in a disputed right of common, the plaintiff was not allowed to give evidence of declarations made concerning it by a deceased former tenant of the farm, in respect of which the plaintiff claimed the right (k). The declarations of a person in possession of property are admissible, after his decease, to cut down his title, not only as against those claiming under him, but also against strangers (1); but declarations of what he heard other persons say are not admissible (m). The same document may be proof of possession, and also admissible as a declaration against interest (n). The acceptance of an allotment under an award made by commission under an Enclosure Act by a person against his interest is evidence that the land allotted was waste of the manor (o). It will be observed that, in all the preceding cases where entries have been tendered, great stress has (i) Woolway v. Rowe, 1 A. & E. 114. (k) Papendick v. Bridgwater, 5 E. & B. 166. (1) Sly v. Dredge, L. R., 2 P. D. 91; 46 L. J., P. D. & A. 63; 25 W. R. 463. (m) Lord Trimleston v. Kemmis, 9 C. & F. 780. (n) La Touche v. Hutton, Ir. R., 9 Eq. 171. (0) Gery v. Redman, L. R., 1 Q. B. D. 161; 45 L. J., Q. B. 267; 24 W. R. 270.. been laid on the circumstances of the custody from which they are produced. The declarations under consideration, are also subject to the remarks which have been made on the declarations discussed in the two preceding chapters, as to the necessity that they must be made ante litem motam. CHAPTER XIV. EVIDENCE OF DECLARATIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY. Ir was stated in the last chapter, that declarations are not admissible merely because the deceased witness had no apparent interest to misrepresent the truth. There is, however, a class of cases, which are now to be considered, in which this condition, coupled with proof that the deceased made the declaration in the course of his trade or professional duty, is held to be a sufficient reason for admitting the statement in evidence. The foundation of this rule will not, perhaps, sustain a close analysis; but, as in declarations against interest, it is presumed that no man will wilfully or fraudulently state falsely what is injurious to his pecuniary advantage, so in the present case it is presumed that the deliberate statement by a man of anything which he has done strictly in the course of his daily duty is primâ facie deserving of credibility. It has, therefore, long been a settled principle that Declarations made by a person, strictly in the course of his trade or professional duty, and without any apparent interest |