them and a third party. Such evidence is said to be res inter alios acta, and will be rejected as irrelevant to the issue, unless, indeed, it is part of the res gestæ, and so tends to throw any light upon the question at issue (e). The fact that A. contracted, or dealt in a particular manner with B., is no evidence that he meant to contract, or deal in the same manner with C. Thus in an action for goods sold and delivered, in which the defence is that the plaintiff sold them to the defendant on certain terms, the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff has sold the same quality of goods to other persons on the same terms, for the fact that a man has once or more acted in a particular way does not make it probable that he so acted on a given occasion; and the admission of such evidence would be fraught with the greatest inconvenience (f). Where, indeed, the question is one of guilty knowledge or intent, as in cases of uttering forged documents or base coin, such evidence is admissible as tending to establish a necessary ingredient of the crime. Where in an action for work done to some houses the defendant denied that he was personally interested in the property, the plaintiff was allowed to call other persons as witnesses who had done work or supplied materials on the personal order of the defendant (g). In an action by a brewer against a publican, where (e) Milne v. Leisler, 7 H. & N. 786. (f) Hollingham v. Head, 4 C. B., N. S. 388; cf. Howard v. Sheward, L. R., 2 C. P. 148; 36 L. J., C. P. 42; 15 W. R. 45. (9) Woodward v. Buchanan, L. R., 5 Q. B. 285; 39 L. J., Q. B. 71. P. M M the issue was as to the quality of beer supplied by the former to the latter, Lord Ellenborough refused to let the plaintiff call witnesses to show that he supplied them, at the time in question, with good beer. His lordship said:-"This is res inter alios acta. We cannot here inquire into the quality of different beer furnished to different persons. The plaintiff might deal well with one, and not with the others" (h). Hence, where the issue was whether the plaintiff, a tradesman, had given credit to A.'s father, evidence that other tradesmen had given credit to the father was rejected (i). So, evidence of the treatment of scholars at one school is no evidence of the quality of their treatment at another school (j); and where the action was for withdrawing scholars without a quarter's notice, according to a prospectus of terms, which the defendant was proved to have received, it was held that a witness might state that she had never received any prospectus while her children had been at the school, because this evidence bore on the usual course of the plaintiff's dealing, but that she could not prove that she had taken her children away without notice, and without being called on to pay a quarter's salary; apparently because this might have been merely a matter of peculiar arrangement (k). So, the terms on which one tenant holds are no evidence of the (h) Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391. terms on which another tenant holds under the same landlord (); and an award in favour of a party to a former action is not evidence for a party to a subsequent action, claiming by paramount title, as against a party claiming through the person against whom the award was made (m); and in an action to recover money paid to a third party, the receipt given by the latter to the plaintiff is not per se evidence against the defendant (n). Again, on the trial of an indictment for carrying on a noxious trade, a previous summary conviction for a similar offence is inadmissible (o). Where, however, the extraneous transaction contains the principle of a reasonable and credible inference as to the motive or conduct of the party, the judge, in his discretion, will admit evidence of it. Thus, where a letter from the defendant, in answer to a letter written on the plaintiff's behalf, was proved to have been seen by the plaintiff, it was admitted in evidence against the latter (p). So, in false imprisonment on a charge of felony, where the defence is a bona fide belief that the defendant had committed felony, the defendant may show that he had previously done acts which go to establish the presumption of bona fides (2). In an action against (1) Carter v. Pryke, Peake, 95. (m) Lady Wenman v. Mackenzie, 5 E. & B. 447. (n) Carmarthen and Cardigan Rail. Co. v. Manchester and Milford Rail. Co., L. R., 8 C. P. 685; 42 L. J., C. P. 262. (0) R. v. Fairrie, 8 E. & B. 486. (p) Carne v. Steer, 5 H. & N. 628. (q) Thomas v. Russell, 9 Ex. 764. a company to recover a sum of money obtained by them from the plaintiff through a fraud of the defendant's agent, committed with their knowledge and for their benefit, evidence of similar frauds committed on persons other than the plaintiff, by the same agent, in the same manner, with the knowledge and for the benefit of the defendant, is admissible on behalf of the plaintiff (r). So, on a charge of uttering counterfeit coin, a guilty knowledge may be proved by evidence either of a previous or subsequent uttering of another description of counterfeit coin (s); and on an indictment for knowingly and unlawfully having possession of coining instruments, proof is admissible that the prisoner had previously uttered counterfeit coin (t); and the strictness of the rule is similarly relaxed in cases of false pretence, where the prisoner's guilty knowledge or intent is in question (u); and even on a charge of murder, evidence that the prisoner committed other murders has been admitted (v). The customs of one manor are not evidence of the customs of another manor (x), unless a connection between them is first established, as by showing that they belong to the same lord, that the same descrip (r) Blake v. Albion Life Assurance Society, L. R., 4 C. P. D. 94; 48 L. J., C. P. 369; 27 W. R. 321. (s) R. v. Foster, 1 Dears. 456. (t) R. v. Weeks, L. & C. 18. (u) R. v. Francis, L. R., 2 C. C. R. 128; 43 L. J., M. C. 97; 22 W. R. 663. (v) R. v. Geering, 20 L. J., M. C. 215. (x) Marquis of Anglesea v. Lord Hatherton, 10 M. & W. 233. tion of tenants has existed in each, and that their leases have been granted in the same terms. In such a case, the usage which has prevailed in one part, and which is therefore evidence to explain the meaning of a grant there, is evidence to explain a grant expressed in similar terms as to any other part of the district (y); but the unity or original identity of the manors must be clearly shown, and the mere fact of their being in the same leet, or parish, is not sufficient (). A custom of trade may be proved by showing what is the custom of the same trade in a different place. Thus, evidence of the custom of fisheries off Newfoundland, is evidence of the custom of similar fisheries off the coast of Labrador (a): and evidence of an usage in the colonial market, under which a broker contracting on behalf of an undisclosed principal is personally liable unless he discloses such principal within three days from the date of the contract, has been admitted as relevant, to show a similar custom in the fruit trade (b). So, parish books were held to be evidence against a member of the vestry of the practice of the parish, although they related to proceedings of the vestry before he became a member (c). When the issue involves a question of manorial (y) Per Bayley, J., Rowe v. Brenton, 8 B. & C. 764. (2) Per Lord Abinger, 10 M. & W. 236. (a) Noble v. Kennaway, 2 Doug. 510. (b) Fleet v. Murton, L. R., 7 Q. B. 126; 41 L. J., Q. B. 49; 20 W. R. 97. (e) Cooper v. Ward, 6 C. B., N. S. 50. |