By the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876 (q), s. 2, it is for the purposes of the act provided that "In proving interference with the due flow of any stream, or in proving the pollution of any stream, evidence may be given of repeated acts which, together, causes such interference or pollution, although each act taken by itself may not be sufficient for that purpose."

In criminal cases the rule is observed with the utmost strictness, that no evidence can be admitted which does not tend directly to the proof, or disproof, of the matter in issue; and therefore, as a general rule, evidence that a prisoner has committed a similar crime before, or that he has a disposition to commit such crimes, is inadmissible (). On a charge of burglary and larceny on a particular day, evidence of a larceny in the same house on a previous day was rejected (s); and on a charge of obtaining money under false pretences, evidence that the prisoner had within a week previously obtained another sum of money under the same false pretence was rejected (t). In the last case the question seems to have been as to the prisoner's authority to obtain the money. If the question had been as to his knowledge of the falseness of the pretence, the decision would doubtless have been different; for where a man was indicted for attempting to obtain an advance from

(2) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 75.

(r) R. v. Cole, 1 Phil. Ev. 508.

(8) R. v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach, 816.
(t) R. v. Holt, Bell, 280.

a pawnbroker by falsely asserting that a certain ring contained diamonds, evidence of a similar attempt two days before was held to have been rightly admitted as proof of his knowledge that the pretence was false (u). When the animus or intent of an act has to be shown, previous and subsequent conduct will be evidence of it. Thus, the animus or intent in uttering counterfeit coin may be proved by evidence of previous utterings; and the possession alone of several pieces of counterfeit coin is evidence of guilty knowledge (x). On the same principle, a woman being upon her trial for murdering her husband by means of arsenic, and there being a question whether she had administered it intentionally, evidence was admitted of the subsequent death of two of her children, and that their bodies displayed the same appearances as that of her husband (y). Again, when several felonies are so connected as to form one transaction, evidence of all may be given in order to convict of one. Thus, where the indictment charged stealing from the prosecutor's till, and the evidence showed different takings, by which the whole deficit was caused, it was held that the fact might be shown by proof of the results of different inspections of the till (3). So, in conspiracies, since the act of one is in law the act of all, when complicity has been proved, the act of

(u) R. v. Francis, L. R., 2 C. C. R. 128; 43 L. J., M. C. 97; 22 W. R. 663; cf. R. v. Roebuck, D. & B. 24.

(x) R. v. Jarvis, Dears. 552.

(y) R. v. Geering, 20 L. J., M. C. 215.

(z) R. v. Ellis, 6 B. & C. 145.

one conspirator is evidence on an indictment against another.

The most important exceptions, however, to the last stated general rule arise under the 19th section of the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 (a), which provides, that "Where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, evidence may be given at any stage of the proceedings that there was found in the possession of such person other property stolen within the preceding period of twelve months, and such evidence may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that such person knew the property to be stolen which forms the subject of the proceedings taken against him ;" and "Where proceedings are taken against any person for having received goods knowing them to be stolen, or for having in his possession stolen property, and evidence has been given that the stolen property has been found in his possession, then if such person has within five years immediately preceding been convicted of any offence involving fraud or dishonesty, evidence of such previous conviction may be given at any stage of the proceedings, and may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proving that the accused knew the property which was proved to be in his possession to have been stolen; provided that not less than seven days' notice shall have been given to the person accused that proof is intended to be given of such previous convic

(a) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112.

tion; and it shall not be necessary for the purposes of this section to charge in the indictment the previous conviction of the party so accused." "Found," in the first part of the section, means found at the same time as the property the subject of the indictment (¿).

In larceny, to prove the identity of the prisoner, it may be shown that other goods not included in the indictment, which were stolen at the same time, were found in his possession; and on the same principle, on a trial for riot and conspiracy, resolutions passed at a meeting, prior and avowedly preliminary to that named in the indictment, were held to be relevant evidence to show the objects of the second meeting; and the general conduct of the members on their way to it, their military order and threatening language to people on the road, were held strictly relevant to show the character of the meeting. On the other hand, it was held that the defendant could not go into evidence of the conduct of the military who dispersed the meeting, because that could have no bearing upon the intention and object of the assembly, as these must have existed before the dispersion, and were in their nature perfectly distinct from the conduct of those who dispersed the assembly (c).

(b) R. v. Carter, L. R., 12 Q. B. D. 522; 53 L. J., M. C. 96; 32 W. R. 663.

(e) R. v. Hunt, 3 B. & Ald. 566.

CHAPTER VI.

DEPOSITIONS.

DEPOSITIONS are at common law secondary evidence, and inadmissible where the original witness can be produced; but they are admissible in certain cases, and subject to certain restrictions, when he cannot be produced. The principle of this exclusion in the first instance rests on the hearsay nature of such evidence, and the prejudice to the adverse party who loses the benefit of his cross-examination. They were absolutely and universally inadmissible at common law when the adverse party had no opportunity of controlling and explaining the evidence at the time of deposition, by cross-examining the deponent; but where he had such an opportunity, he was (and is, in certain instances), where public policy recommends such a course, affected by such testimony of an absent witness.

A deposition to be in any case admissible must refer to the same parties, or their privies, and there must be the same substantial issue (a). It is on this principle that the evidence of a witness in a former action may, after his death, be read in a subsequent action (b); and in criminal cases, a deposition taken

(a) Morgan v. Nicholl, L. R., 2 C. P. 117; 36 L. J., C. P. 86; 15 W. R. 110.

(b) Wright v. Tatham, 1 A. & E. 3,