Under the 6th rule objection may be taken to answer an interrogatory on the ground that it is scandalous. Scandal consists in the allegation of anything which it is unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear, or is contrary to good manners, or which charges some person with a crime not necessary to be shown in the action. Any unnecessary allegation bearing cruelly on the moral character of an individual is scandalous; but nothing that is material is scandalous, and therefore the language of the record is often, although literally scandalous, not legally so (s). The sole test is "whether the matter alleged to be scandalous has a tendency, or, in other words, would be admissible in evidence, to show the truth of any allegation in the bill that is material with reference to the relief that is prayed" (t).

Another ground for objecting to answer an interrogatory is that the subject of inquiry is not sufficiently material at that stage of the action. Thus, in an action for an infringement of a patent, where the defendant denied the infringement, he was held not bound to answer any interrogatory inquiring after matters irrelevant to that question (u); but where the plaintiff filed a bill to establish that a business carried on by three of the defendants in partnership belonged to the estate of her late husband, and the interrogatories required these defen

(s) Fisher v. Owen, L. R., 8 Ch. D. 645; 47 L. J., Ch. 681; 26 W. R. 581.

(t) Per Lord Selborne, Christie v. Christic, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 503; 52 L. J., Ch. 544.

(u) Delarue v. Dickenson, 3 K. & J. 388.

P.

R R

dants to set forth whether they, or any of them, had drawn out of the business any money for their or his own account in respect of capital advanced, profits or otherwise, and to set forth the particulars of the moneys so drawn out, and the third defendant declined to answer this interrogatory, submitting that the plaintiff was not entitled to this discovery till she had established her right to a decree, the Court of Appeal in Chancery held, affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls, that the interrogatory must be answered (v). An executor must, if required, set out his accounts in his answer (r), and a mortgagee in possession admitting himself to be redeemable has been held unable to decline answering interrogatories as to the state and particulars of the account which it is one of the objects of the suit to take (y). In the same case, the Court of Appeal in Chancery laid down that the true rule was, that in an ordinary suit for accounts, a defendant submitting to answer (even when he altogether denies the plaintiff's title), must answer fully, not only as to other matters, but also as to consequential matters of account; but (the judgment proceeded) "the court may be trusted to exercise a proper control over any attempt on the plaintiff's part to press for any such minuteness of discovery as would be either vexatious or unreasonable, as,

(v) Saull v. Browne, L. R., 9 Ch. 364; 43 L. J., Ch. 568; 22 W. R. 427.

(x) Thompson v. Dunn, 18 W. R. 854; Alison v. Alison, 50 L. J., Ch. 574; 29 W. R. 732.

(y) Elmer v. Creasey, L. R., 9 Ch. 69; 43 L. J., Ch. 166; 22 W. R. 141.

indeed, it can do in every case in which it is satisfied that any kind of discovery is required vexatiously or oppressively." The same court, in a subsequent case (), on the ground that it was vexatious or unreasonable, within the meaning of the above quoted words, refused, where the plaintiff had filed a bill, founded on the alleged agency of the defendant, which was the question in the suit, to compel the defendant to answer interrogatories as to what appeared to be his private transactions, saying that "It would be monstrous that a man, by merely alleging that he had a share in a concern, which allegation was denied and had not been established, and whilst it was doubtful whether it would be established, could get the accounts of the defendant's private business and of his dealings with other people."

With regard to the 7th rule, when leave has been obtained to deliver interrogatories, the whole set would not be set aside except, perhaps, on the ground of prolixity. When leave has not been obtained, they can be set aside on that ground if leave is necessary, and when leave is unnecessary they will be set aside as a whole if unnecessary or vexatious, but with leave to deliver reasonable and proper ones in proper cases (a).

(=) Great Western Colliery Co. v. Tucker, L. R., 9 Ch. 376; 43 L. J., Ch. 518.

(a) See Cawley v. Burton, 32 W. R. 33.

CHAPTER IX.

STAMPS.

In this chapter only the leading principles of the Stamp Acts will be stated, so far as they affect the admissibility in evidence of written documents.

The general rule is, that no instrument executed in any part of the United Kingdom, or relating, wheresoever executed, to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in any part of the United Kingdom, shall, except in criminal proceedings, be pleaded or given in evidence, or admitted to be good, useful, or available in law or equity, unless it is duly stamped in accordance with the law in force at the time when it was first executed.

The 15th section of the Stamp Act, 1870 (a), provides that "except where express provision to the contrary is made by this or any other act," any unstamped or insufficiently-stamped instrument may be stamped after execution on payment of the unpaid duty, and a penalty of 107., and, in certain cases, of interest on the duty. The 16th section of the same act provides as follows:

"(1.) Upon the production of an instrument chargeable with any duty as evidence in any court

(a) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 97.

of civil judicature in any part of the United Kingdom, the officer whose duty it is to read the instrument shall call the attention of the judge to any omission or insufficiency of the stamp thereon, and if the instrument is one which may legally be stamped after the execution thereof, it may, on payment to the officer of the amount of the unpaid duty, and the penalty payable by law on stamping the same as aforesaid, and of a further sum of one pound, be received in evidence, saving all just exceptions on other grounds.

(2.) The officer receiving the said duty and penalty shall give a receipt for the same, and make an entry in a book kept for that purpose of the payment and of the amount thereof, and shall communicate to the commissioners the name or title of the cause or proceeding in which, and of the party from whom, he received the said duty and penalty, and the date and description of the instrument, and shall pay over to the Receiver-General of Inland Revenue, or to such other person as the commissioners may appoint, the money received by him for the said duty and penalty.

"(3.) Upon production to the commissioners of any instrument in respect of which any duty or penalty has been paid as aforesaid, together with the receipt of the said officer, the payment of such duty and penalty shall be denoted on such instrument accordingly."

The 17th section provides that, "Save and except as aforesaid, no instrument executed in any part of the United Kingdom, or relating, wheresoever