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presumption has been adopted by the legislature in the case of excise (y) and custom-house officers (). The rule does not apply to private appointments, such as tithe-collectors, or a town-clerk (a), for in these cases the appointments must be proved. A private document, such as a deed, bill of exchange, or promissory note, is presumed to have been written at the time when it bears date (b), and this extends even to letters (c). Where indentures of a pauper's apprenticeship would have been invalid, if not executed in conformity with the rules of the Poor Law Commissioners, and there was no evidence to show that their regulations had been observed, it was held, that, in the absence of contradictory evidence, it must be presumed that the regulations had been observed (d). So, generally, the orders of justices will be presumed to have been made according to all statutory formalities (e). Thus, when to prove a parish apprenticeship secondary evidence of a lost indenture was admitted, it was presumed that the indenture had been executed according to all the requisites of 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, because there was evidence that an arrangement for the apprenticeship had been made before magistrates, and that an apprentice

(y) 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 17.

(z) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, s. 307.

(a) R. v. Mayor of Stamford, 6 Q. B. 433.

(b) Malpas v. Clements, 19 L. J., Q. B. 435.

(e) Goodtitle v. Milburn, 2 M. & W. 853; Hunt v. Massey, 5 B. & Ad. 992.

(d) R. v. St. Mary Magdalen, 2 E. & B. 809.

(e) Williams v. Eyton, 4 H. & N. 357.

ship had subsequently existed (f); but it seems that it would be otherwise where there is no such evidence (g). The rule in similar cases has been extended to the principle that that may be presumed which accounts reasonably for an existing state of things; and therefore the fact that a person served an apprenticeship raises a presumption that he was duly bound an apprentice, so as, the indenture having been sought for in vain, to create a settlement by apprenticeship (h).

The fact of a marriage having taken place before a registrar in a chapel raises the presumption that the chapel was properly registered and the marriage legal (¿); and, in support of a plea of coverture, a certificate of the defendant's marriage in a Roman Catholic Chapel according to the rites of that Church, with evidence of subsequent cohabitation, was held to be prima facie proof of a valid marriage under 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, the same presumption arising as in the previous case (k). In short, wherever a marriage has been solemnized, the law strongly presumes that all legal requisites have been complied with (7); and the fact of the ceremony of marriage having been performed by a clergyman in a place where Divine Service has been performed raises the presumption that the

(f) R. v. Broadhempston, 1 E. & B. 104.
(g) R. v. Stonehouse, 10 Q. B. 234.
(h) R. v. Fordingbridge, E. B. & E. 678.
(i) R. v. Manwaring, 1 D. & B. 139.

(k) Sichel v. Lambert, 15 C. B., N. S. 781. Cf. De Thoren v. Attorney-General, L. R., 1 App. Cas. 686.

(1) Smith v. Huson, 1 Phill. 294.

place was duly licensed for marriages (m). A foreign marriage is presumed to have been celebrated with the due solemnities required by the law of the place where celebrated (n). A memorandum written on the face of a composition deed, according to sect. 196 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, was held primâ facie evidence that an affidavit was delivered to the chief registrar in compliance with sect. 192, together with the deed (0); but the production of a bill of sale with a memorandum, certifying that a copy had been filed, was held insufficient evidence of the requirements of the Bills of Sale Act, 1854, having been complied with (p); and the production of a certificate under the seal of the Queen's Bench Division that an affidavit and copy bill of sale were filed was held not to obviate the necessity of producing the copy so filed (2).

It will be seen from these cases that the rule has been extended from the acts of public servants to the purport of public and even some private instruments. Thus public records are evidence of their own authenticity, and may now generally be proved by exemplifications or examined copies (r). It would also appear

(m) R. v. Cresswell, L. R., 1 Q. B. D. 446; 45 L. J., M. C. 77; 24 W. R. 281.

(n) R. v. Brampton, 10 East, 202.

(0) Warrington v. Roberts, L. R., 3 Q. B. 579; 37 L. J., Q. B. 253; 16 W. R. 1039.

(p) Mason v. Wood, 21 W. R. 41; L. R., 1 C. P. D. 63; 45 L. J., C. P. 76.

(q) Emmett v. Marchant, L. R., 3 Q. B. 555; but see now sect. 16 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878.

(r) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 14.

that it is from a restricted application of the same rule that deeds and wills are presumed to have been duly executed where thirty years have elapsed from the time of their execution (s). The Statutes of Limitation, according to which simple contract debts cannot be recovered after six years; specialty debts after twenty years; and land after an undisturbed possession of twelve years (t); are all founded on the same legal presumption, that an omission to prosecute a legal claim for a certain number of years, amounts to an admission that no adverse claim exists, and must be treated as such by the community. It is, therefore, presumed, under such circumstances, that the debts have been paid and the land duly conveyed: and no evidence of a different state of facts will be received. On this principle, where there is evidence of a long exclusive enjoyment of property, and of an exercise of a distinct right referable to a legal origin, the court will presume such an origin, and also (in the absence of proof to the contrary), that it commenced before legal memory (u). The maxim, Omnia præsumuntur ritè esse acta is applied by the courts to the execution both of deeds and of wills. Where all the witnesses are dead, and the handwriting of one of them is proved, the statement in the attestation clause will be presumed to be correct (x). A Court of Probate goes further than this, and presumes that all

(8) Doe v. Walley, 8 B. & C. 22.

(t) Nepean v. Doe, 2 Sm. L. C. 396, notes.

(u) Johnson v. Barnes, L. R., 8 C. P. 527; 42 L. J., C. P. 259. (1) Adam v. Kerr, 1 B. & P. 360; Andrews v. Mottley, 12 C. B., N. S. 526.

formalities have been complied with in respect of a will when the attestation clause is in the usual form (y). When there is no attestation clause, or when it is not in the usual form, Courts of Law will, it seems, presume compliance with all formalities in respect of a will (z), and the tendency of a Court of Probate will be to give effect to the testator's intentions (a). Of course the evidence of attesting witnesses may rebut the presumption of due execution (b); but when a will appears on the face of it to have been duly attested, and surrounding circumstances imply that this was so, the contrary evidence of one attesting witness will not rebut the presumption of due execution (c). Where the recollection of the attesting witnesses is imperfect, but the undisputed facts, the probabilities of the case, and the evidentia rei, are in favour of due execution, such execution will be presumed (d). It may here be remarked that when a will is traced to the custody of the testator and is not forthcoming, then, in the absence of other evidence, it will be presumed that the testator destroyed it animo revocandi (e); but this presumption may be rebutted by the facts, and "will be more or less strong according to the character of the custody which the testator had over

(y) Vinnicombe v. Butler, 3 S. & T. 580. (z) Spilsbury v. Burdett, 10 C. & F. 840.

(a) In the goods of Rees, 34 L. J., P. M. & A. 56.

(b) Croft v. Croft, 34 L. J., P. M. & A. 44; 13 W. R. 526.

(c) Wrightv. Rogers, 17 W. R. 833.

(d) Wright v. Sanderson, L. R., 9 P. D. 149; 53 L. J., P. D. & A. 1; 32 W. R. 560.

(e) Welch v. Phillips, 1 Moore, P. C. 199.

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