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process—I am only repeating the open accusations made in the press of China---and got him to sign a memorandum, the so-called secret 1918 agreement, which is further confirmatory of Japan's position in Shantung, and which amounted to the fact that they would have certain additional railway concessions there over and above what Germany had had, and that, providing the peace conference would give Japan Germany's position in Shantung, China would consent. That thing was signed at Tokio by the Chinese minister, and if that holds China, that is all there is. It was never confirmed by the Chinese parliament; it was never confirmed by a meeting of the Chinese cabinet or anything. Now, that is what that so-called 1918 agreement rests upon.
Senator POMERENE. Will it interrupt you to ask you just this question, to clear that up: Does the Chinese law require ratification by the Chinese Parliament?
Mr. MILLARD. Yes; the only constitution that is in existence.
Mr. MILLARD. You see, China has been in a more or less turbulent state ever since the revolution. They have a so-called constitution and under their forms it would have required at least ratification by the cabinet and also ratification by the Parliament. It was never ratified. In fact, the text of it was never even disclosed to anybody until the Paris peace conference.
That brings us along up to, say, the armistice. I was in Peking at the time, and China made preparations
Senator HiTCHCOCK. Before you leave that, will you please make it clear whether there was any disagreement between the Ishii note in Japanese and the American note in English ?
Mr. MILLARD. As I say, it was a question of translation. Of course, we can all read the American note in English, but we can not read it in Japanese or Chinese. Now, the Japanese Government, of course, immediately telegraphed this out to Tokio and then telegraphed it over to Pekin, and they had translations made. They had a translation made into Chinese and another translation made into Japanese, those, of course, being the languages of the two Governments.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is there any question whether the Japanese note is correctly translated into Chinese?
Mr. MILLARD. That, of course, as I say, led to a dispute, because our sinologues say that our translation is the better translation.
Senator HITCHCOCK. Is the translation of the Japanese note into Chinese?
Mr. MILLARD. Our translation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement into Chinese is accepted by everybody except Japan. She made her own translation.
Senator BORAH. As I understand, in translating it into Chinese and Japanese they used a certain word-
Mr. MILLARD. They used a certain character.
Mr. MILLARD. They used a different character than we used in our translation
Senator BORAH. Which indicated “special interest" or "paramount,” according to which character was used.
Mr. MILLARD. Something which they translate paramount. Senator BORAH. Ours indicates nothing but “special interest."
Mr. MILLARD. Ours indicates the interpretation which Mr. Lansing gave you gentlemen the other day. There is just that difference, but as you say, it is a very important difference.
Senator POMERENE. In view of these questions may I ask this further question: Are you able to state whether the word which was used by the Japanese was correctly translated into our word "paramountcy?"
Mr. MILLARD. There would be no way of making an exact translation, but the sense of it would be that according to the sinologues. Our legation has Chinese experts, as every legation has, and these sinologues got together and translated this thing, and the general unanimity of opinion outside of the Japanese legation is that our translation is correct and theirs is a translation fixed up to suit what they want to put in there.
Senator POMERENE. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Millard. Mr. MILLARD. Now the next step would come after the armistice, when China began to make her preparations. The Japanese had been making a fight up there for some time by which they were attempting to secure representation in China. They even produced at Peking—they never had the nerve to produce it at Paris-an agreement which this same Chinese minister, Mr. Lou, had signed, whereby Japan was to represent China at the peace conference.
However, when they tried to put that over, China absolutely resisted that, and of course the British, American, and all other legations said, “Do not recognize anything like that. You send your own delegation.” They did that. · They nominated their representatives. They sent their minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang. Then the Chinese delegates had been working with various experts on the subject of their case, how they would present it at the peace conference, and the matters they would want to bring up at the peace conference. I understand you have summoned Mr. Ferguson to appear. He was among the foreign advisers they had employed. When I was in Peking, last October, I went up there, and I had two interviews with the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, merely in my capacity as a journalist, in which we discussed these various matters, and what China ought to do, and what China purposed to bring up, and things like that. Just about that time the Chinese foreign office went up to our legation and said, “Now, we have followed along with you people. We came into the war under your wing, and we are going to continue in that way. We are going to Paris in that way. We are not going there under the wing of Japan, like she is trying to fix it up, and here is what we propose to ask. What do you think about it?” And they laid down a list of the matters which China wanted to bring up at the peace conference. I will say that I have this information in a way so that I do not doubt its substantial accuracy, and I presume that that list perhaps was cabled by Dr. Rice, the American minister, to the State Department, and eventually the Chinese were advised by our Government that it would be better if they would not raise certain questions.
I might mention what those questions are. One of them was the question of extraterritoriality in China. Another was the question
of future financial cooperation in China, and these various concessions and one thing and another. China wanted to obtain from the Powers over there a general declaration written somehow into the treaty, which would form the groundwork for a real reconstructive policy in China, which would rid her of the burden of all these secret and published regional understandings, and all these various concessions interfering with Chinese territorial integrity and economy, which in one way and another have been forced on her by that method.
As I understand it our Government advised China somewhat to this effect, that it would tend to befog the issue. Our Government, I understand, was in perfect sympathy with what China wanted to do by these things, but she said, “Now, the Paris conference will be concerned with the making of peace with Germany, and perhaps it will be advisable if China will not raise any questions at Paris except those which are directly concerned with her relations with Germany." Of course the Shantung question was directly concerned, and a few matters associated with the Shantung question, but our Government said, “Do not raise all these other questions, because they will open up the whole subject so that perhaps it will impair your chances of getting the Shantung question raised in the right way." And I will say that, in my opinion, that advice was exactly sound, and that if my advice had been asked at that moment I would have advised China in the same way. In fact I did so at Paris.
I do not think it is fortunate the way the thing turned out, but I mean looking at it from the way the situation appeared then, I would have given the same advice that our Government is presumed to have given on that occasion. China took with her to Paris her chief British adviser, Dr. George E. Morrison, for twenty-odd years the famous foreign correspondent of the London Times, and for the last seven years employed as foreign adviser on foreign affairs to the Chinese Government. They took Dr. Leconte, a Frenchman, who for a long time has been employed over there as counsel. The Japanese tried to force them to take Dr. Riga, the Japanese legal adviser, whom in one way and another they had forced upon the Chinese Government, but they would not take him, because they knew that if Dr. Riga had gone along the Chinese delegation would have been privy to everything the Chinese delegation did. They refused to take Dr. Riga, but they took Dr. Morrison and Dr. Leconte, and they desired to take one or two Americans, but I have explained about that.
That brings us on to Paris. China went over there and confined the presentation of her case to the Shantung issue, which, of course, was entirely a question with Germany, complicated by Japan's interposition. At a plenary session-I was under the impression that it was early in February, but I see Mr. Lansing the other day fixed it, i believe, at ianuary 29, which probably is the correct date-at a plenary session of the council of ten in Paris, before it narrowed down to a council of four--my knowledge of this, as you gentlemen 'inderstand, is second hand. I was not present.
The account which I am going to give now was, however, given to me circumstantially by two plenipotentiaries who sat at the table, and their accounts substantially coincided. They did not differ in any material degree in their recollection of what transpired. The matter under discussion at the moment was the disposition of the German colonies. As you may recall, at that time they had advanced the theory that the German colonies were to be detached from Germany, but that their disposition would be turned over to a league of nations if such a thing was organized, to be disposed of by them, and they brought forward this idea of mandatories. They were discussing the disposition of the German colonies, and President Wilson, as I understand it, proposed that they could just brush this question of the German colonies off to one side by agreeing at that session that they should be detached from Germany. and their disposition invested in the league of nations or some other international trusteeship, to be parceled out afterwards under the mandatory theory in some form, and by that method they would simply get that question disposed of and out of the way, and they could go on to other business. There was a general agreement and it looked like it would be passed unanimously, but the Japanese plenipotentiary, Baron Makino, who was sitting in the council, interposed an objection. They asked him what was the objection. He said Japan could not consent to that. When asked for his reasons, he said that Japan could not consent because she already had private engagements with her allies regarding the Shantung question.
President Wilson then asked, or someone asked, what was the nature of those private agreements. Baron Makino said they were confidential, and he did not feel at liberty to communicate them without conferring with the other Allied governments and with his own government. President Wilson then asked that it be made the sense of the council that the Japanese Government be requested to produce the text of those agreements and to lay them upon the table for the information of the council. That action was taken as the sense of the conucil, and the result was that at the next meeting the text of those agreements was produced. They are known as the Shantung secret agreements, and were produced confidentially. I can say from my own knowledge, coming direct from the Chinese delegation at Paris, that that was the first knowledge which the Chinese Government had of their existence, although myself and many of us had suspected the possible existence of those agreements, from various circumstantial indications, for at least a couple of years. In fact I had for some time felt morally certain of them. You could not explain in any other way certain things that had happened. Therefore those agreements revealed that at different dates, from I believe the 16th of February on to the 7th of March and on certain intervening dates, Japan had obtained
Senator HITCHCOCK. In what year?
Mr. MILLARD. In 1917—that Japan had obtained from the British, the French, the Russian, and the Italian Governments written engagements—in the case of the British, French, and Russian Govemments, and oral statements from the Italian Government-by which those nations assented and would support Japan at the Peace Conference in having yielded to her Germany's rights and leaseholds in Shantung Province.
There was one other interesting thing brought out in the French note replying to the Japanese note on that question. France made certain conditions, one of which was that Japan would withdraw her
objections to China entering that war on the allied side. You will find that in the text of the French note, thereby getting it down in black and white, what everybody had known for various reasons to be the fact, that Japan had been keeping China out of the allied group ever since the war started. If you will note the dates of the signing of those agreements you will see that they coincide with our severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and with the efforts which I have just narrated by which we were inducing China to come into the war, which was in February and March, 1917. I guess it was early in March. China, I think, actually took that step on the 9th of March, 1917. However, as we all had been morally certain, but as Mr. Lansing disclosed positively the other day, our Government did not know of the existence of those agreements until we learned of it at Paris, in the manner which I have described, at the same time that China did.
China was urging them to give her assurances in the same way she was urging us to give assurances, but the British, Russian, and French Governments would not give any assurances that the territorial rights of China would be protected, because they had already signed them away to Japan, or were on the verge of doing so; but if China had known it at that time and we had known it at that time, it was reasonable to assume it would have had some influence upon the action of China and upon the action of the United States. If we had been appraised of it at that time we would have said to the nations flatly, "You musy agree to this." We were in a position at that moment to have demanded any conditions from any of those governments, anything in reason that we had said we wanted, and we could have protected China positively by saying, “Here, these things must be unwritten, these things must be wiped out. It will be understood that we will all be there to act on a footing of justice to China when the time comes."
Mr. Lansing also disclosed the other day that at the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement we also were not informed of it, and after we had declared war on Germany and were in the war, and Mr. Balfour and M. Viviani came over here, they did not tell us, but we were allowed to go ahead and get China into the war under those circumstances, without that information.
After that disclosure at Paris—the date of which Mr. Lansing fixes at January 29-I thought it was early in February—then it was evident in respect to China's case at the peace conference that she had to submit her case to a court of five, because Japan was added to the council of four on the Far Eastern question, and that of those five, four members of the court had signed a secret agreement in advance to decide against her. Under those circumstances it became a question as to whether or not our Government would or could exert its influence upon the British, French, Japanese, and Italian Governments. Russia was also a signatory to one of those secret Shantung agreements, but she was not represented in the conference. The revolution had eliminated Russia. Under those circumstances, as I say, it became a question as to whether or not our Government could prevail upon them to scrap those secret Shantung agreements and to make what we considered to be a proper solution of the Shantung matter, in justice to ourselves and to