must have been foreseen. It was said that the act of 1862 was not in esse when the contract was entered into; but there was another winding-up act then in force, and the lessor must be taken to have known that this was a chance he had to risk. Looking at the words of the act, it is impossible to estimate the value of the damage Mr. Scobell has suffered; and considering that he must have known that the company was liable to be dissolved, the application must be dismissed, with costs. Statute of Limitations-Same Hand to pay and receive-Settlement-Trust for Wife's Next-of-kin. Upon a marriage in 1818, a sum of 4001. was handed over by the wife to the husband, and the husband executed a bond for repayment with interest at the expiration of six months, if required by the trustees of the marriage settlement. The trusts of the settlement were to pay the interest to the husband for life, then to the wife for life, and then for the benefit of the children, but if no children, to transfer the trust funds to the next-of-kin of the wife. The husband died in 1853, leaving his wife his sole legatee and executrix, and the wife died in 1864. There were no children, and there had been no repayment and no demand: Held, that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run till the wife's death. Held, also, that the trustees were entitled to claim the 4001. on behalf of the wife's nextof-kin against the husband's estate. Upon the marriage of H. Mills and Lucy Loftus a settlement was executed bearing date the 29th of January, 1818. On the same day Lucy Loftus handed over to her intended husband a sum of 4007. in cash, and H. Mills thereupon entered into a bond with the trustees of the settlement the condition of which was, that he would pay to such trustees, their or either of their executors or administrators, the sum of 4007. with lawful interest on the 29th of July following, if required to do so by them or either of them. And it was de clared that the money, when paid, should be held upon the trusts of the marriage settlement for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Mills and their issue. The settlement recited that the 4007. had been given to Mr. Mills "as a marriage portion," and it recited the bond; and it was witnessed that Lucy Loftus assigned to the trustees the said sum of 4007. when paid, and also two reversionary sums of 2001. and 3007., to be held upon trust to pay the dividends to the intended husband for life, and after his death to his wife for life, and after the decease of both husband and wife upon trust for the children of the marriage in manner therein directed, and in case there should be no such children, then to pay, transfer and assign, or otherwise dispose of the several trust funds and the dividends, interest and proceeds thereof, to such person or persons as should be the next-of-kin to the said Lucy Loftus, and would have been entitled to the same as her representative or representatives in case she had died unmarried. The settlement also contained a covenant on the part of the intended husband to settle any future-acquired property of the wife on the trusts declared with reference to the beforementioned three sums of money. The settlement further contained provisions as to freehold estate which were not now in dispute. H. Mills died in 1853, and there were no children of the marriage. By his will, he made his wife the sole residuary legatee, and appointed her his executrix. Mrs. Mills died in 1864, having made her will, by which she bequeathed all her property to the plaintiff, and appointed the defendant her executor. Up to the time of the death of Mrs. Mills there had been no payment of the 4007., and there was no evidence of its having been demanded. Both trustees of the settlement were dead, and the plaintiff, who was also the administrator of the last surviving trustee, instituted this suit for the administration of the estates of the husband and wife, and claimed the sum of 400l. due upon the bond as a debt on the estate of H. Mills. The defendant, as executor of Mrs. Mills, admitted assets of H. Mills. The chief clerk allowed the claim, with interest, from the death of Mrs. Mills; and the question now came on upon an adjourned summons. Mr. Baily, for the next-of-kin of the wife, contended that the Statute of Limitations did not run during the husband's life, since he was the person both to pay interest under the bond and receive interest under the settlement. This was decided in Burrell v. the Earl of Egremont, 7 Beav. 205; s. c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 309. And in Burrowes v. Gore, 6 H.L. Cas. 907, it was held, that the statute never runs where the same hand is to pay and to receive. In this case it was evidently not intended that the money upon the bond should be repaid at the end of six months; but it was to remain in the hands of the husband for an unlimited time, until circumstances might render it necessary for the trustees to call for the repay ment. Mr. Bagshawe appeared for the wife's residuary legatee. Mr. F. Kelly, for the defendant, the executor of the wife, contended that the claim of the trustees was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The cases cited related to charges upon land where the tenant for life was in receipt of the rents; but here the husband could not be said to have paid himself interest. Moreover, it was not the case of a man having to pay exactly what he was entitled to receive, for he was bound to pay 5l. per cent. interest; and if this sum had been repaid and invested he would only have been entitled to receive the interest payable on government stock. The settlement was so badly drawn that it was almost impossible to ascertain the meaning of the parties; but it never could have been intended that the wife should have only a life interest in her own fund, in case of there being no children of the marriage. The usual form would have been to give the property in the events which had happened to such persons as would be the wife's representatives in case she had died intestate and unmarried; but here the word intestate was omitted, and it would be more consistent with the intention of the parties that the money should go to the persons designated by her will. They cited In re Crawford's Trusts, 2 Drew. 230; KINDERSLEY, V.C.-It appears to me, that the next-of-kin of the wife are the parties entitled. This settlement seems to be drawn in a very unusual form; but we must take it as it stands. I am satisfied, with respect to the Statute of Limitations, that it is not a bar in this case. The sum of 400l. was intended to be lent to the husband; but it is called a marriage portion, a very inappropriate term if he was to repay it in six months. Then he gave a bond, the condition of which is, not that the husband shall pay the sum on that day six months, but that he shall pay it if required; and it appears to me, on the face of the bond, taken in conjunction with the recitals in the settlement and other circumstances, the intention was, not that the husband should be under the actual liability to repay it on a given day, but that it was to remain in his hands, and the trustees were under no obligation to call upon him to pay on a given day. There was no trust of this sort, nor any direction as to investment of the money, which seems to me to lead to the conclusion that it was intended to remain in the hands of the husband, who was to repay it at some future time, so that the trustees might have called it in if the husband had been in pecuniary difficulty. Putting aside the question of a trust, there are many strong arguments why the Statute of Limitations should not be held to operate. Under the bond, the husband was bound to pay 57. per cent. to the trustees, and under the settlement the trustees were bound to repay that same sum to the same person, the husband. It would be a payment by him to the trustees, although there would be a repayment by the trustees to him; and where that is the case, the statute does not apply. In the case of Spickernell v. Hotham, before Vice Chancellor Wood, the intention was, that the stock covenanted to be transferred to the trustees should be transferred immediately after the marriage, and in default of that being done, the covenantor would not be liable to pay interest equivalent to the dividends he was entitled to receive, but a sum in the nature of damages for the detention. Here it was intended that the bond should remain unsatisfied, and the same interest which the husband was bound to pay he would be entitled under the settlement to receive. My opinion is, that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run during the lifetime of Mr. Mills, who died within twenty years from the time of the claim being made; and as Mrs. Mills was his executrix, and also tenant for life under the settlement, the same argument applies to her, and the statute did not begin to run till her death in 1864. I think, therefore, that the claimant is entitled to sustain the demand, notwithstanding the time that has elapsed since the date of the bond. Bill of Exchange-Notice of Dishonour --Indorsement "In need"-Agent-Time for giving Notice. A bill of exchange was indorsed by bankers at Leeds, "In need, at S, P. & S," S, P. & S. being London bankers. The bill was dishonoured by the acceptor, and on the following day was presented by the agent in London of the holder, who lived at Liverpool, to S, P. & S. and returned dishonoured. On the next day the agent wrote to the holder informing him that the bill had been dishonoured, and on the following day the holder sent notice of dishonour to the indorsers:-Held, first, that the presentment of the bill to S, P. & S. was not notice to them of dishonour by the acceptor; secondly, that notice of dishonour to S, P. & S. would not have been notice to the indorsers, inasmuch as the terms of the indorsement did not make S, P. & S. agents of the indorsers for the purpose of receiving such notice; thirdly, that a day could not be allowed for communication between the agent and the holder, and that consequently the notice to the indorsers was a day too late. This was an application, by summons, adjourned from chambers, by Messrs. Prange & Co., merchants at Liverpool, to be admitted as creditors of the Leeds Banking NEW SERIES, 35.-CHANC. Company, now being wound up under the Companies Act, 1862, for the amount of two bills of exchange indorsed by the Leeds Banking Company, of which Prange & Co. were the holders. The first bill was a three months bill for 5647., dated the 4th of August, 1864, drawn by Watts & Co. upon Early & Smith, and accepted by Early & Smith, payable at the London and County Bank. It had been indorsed by several persons, and among others by the Leeds Banking Company, their indorsement being in these terms" In need, at Messrs. Smith, Payne & Smith." The bill fell due on the 7th of November, including the three days of grace, and was on that day presented by the agents of Prange & Co. at the London and County Bank, and was dishonoured by them; it was then presented at Messrs. Smith, Payne & Smith's, and was dishonoured by them, the order to wind up the Leeds Banking Company having been made on the 13th of October. It was admitted that actual notice of dishonour of this bill was not given in due time to the official liquidator of the Leeds Banking Company. The second bill was a three months bill for 500l., dated the 10th of August, 1864, drawn and accepted by the same persons as the first bill, and indorsed in the same terms by the Leeds Banking Company. It fell due on Saturday, the 12th of November, and was presented by the agents of Prange & Co. on that day at the London and County Bank. On Monday the 14th it was returned dishonoured by them, and was presented at Smith, Payne & Smith's, and returned dishonoured by them; on the 15th the agents sent the bill to Prange & Co. at Liverpool; and on the 16th Prange & Co. sent it, noted as dishonoured, to the official liquidator of the Leeds Banking Company, who received it on the 17th. The claim in each case was resisted by the official liquidator, on the ground that there had been no sufficient notice of dishonour. Mr. Druce, for Prange & Co.--The presentment of the bills at Smith, Payne & Smith's implied that they had been dishonoured by the acceptors, and was sufficient notice to Smith, Payne & Smith of that fact; and it was not necessary to give any further notice to the Leeds Banking F Company, they having by the terms of their indorsement made presentment at Smith, Payne & Smith's equivalent to presentment to themselves; just as it is unnecessary to give notice to the acceptor of the dishonour of a bill by the bankers named by him in his acceptance Pearce v. Pemberthy, 3 Campb. 261. In the case of the second bill actual notice was given in due time to the official liquidator. A day is allowed for each step in giving notice of dishonour as between the different parties to a bill, and upon the same principle a day must be allowed for communication between a holder, who does not live at the place where the bill is payable, and the agent employed by him to present the bill. Mr. Glasse and Mr. Cotton, for the official liquidator.-Notice of dishonour must be an actual notification, and the mere fact of presentment is not notice; but even if it were notice to Smith, Payne & Smith, there is no authority for the proposition that presentment to the bankers indicated "in need," by the indorser, is, for the purpose of notice, equivalent to presentment to the indorser. The holders were not bound to present the bill to the bankers so indicated. Leonard v. Wilson, 4 Tyr. 415. They also referred to Byles on Bills, 8th edit. 243. 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 58. KINDERSLEY, V.C. (Nov. 14), after stating the facts, said -The first point for consideration is, whether, as is contended on the part of the claimants, it was unnecessary, under the circumstances, that there should be any notice of dishonour, or whether what took place in fact was a sufficient substitute for and operated as a notice of dishonour. I will deal with the first bill only, because the other will share the same fate upon this general question. The notice which is relied upon, so far as there was notice, is this. The bill was presented at the banking-house of Smith, Payne & Smith, the bankers who were indicated by the terms of the indorsement; and it was contended that such presentment was, in fact, a notification to Messrs. Smith, Payne & Smith, and, therefore, to the Leeds Banking Company, who had pointed out Messrs. Smith, Payne & Smith as the banking house at which the payment was to be made, that there had been a dishonour by the acceptor. There was no other notice in the case of the first bill. If that was not a notice of dishonour there was no sufficient notice of dishonour. Now, it is contended, that, although there is no authority directly bearing upon this point, there is an analogy between the case of this indorsement and the case of an indorsement by an acceptor pointing out a banking-house at which the payment will be made. If an acceptor accepts a bill payable at a banking-house, or at any other place, and if upon the bill falling due the holder presents it at that place, if it is not then paid, it is not necessary for him to give notice to the acceptor himself that the bankers whom he has indicated have not paid the bill. That has been decided. Then, it is said, there is an analogy between that case and the present; that, inasmuch as here the indorser has indicated a bankinghouse at which the payment would be made, in case of need at least, whatever that may mean, and inasmuch as there has been a dishonour by those bankers, that is, the bankers declined to pay it, it is not necessary to give any notice to the indorser. Now, it will be observed that, so far as that can be said to be an analogy, it only goes to this extent: assuming that notice to the acceptor is unneccessary where the bankers indicated by him have refused payment, the only analogy would be that where the bankers indicated by the indorser have refused payment, it is not necessary to give notice to the indorser of the dishonour by those bankers. But it does not go further than that. There is no analogy upon which you could ground the conclusion that it is not necessary to give notice of the dishonour by the acceptor's bankers, or rather by the acceptor himself. It appears to me, therefore, that the analogy altogether fails. But then comes this question. The indorsement was "in need," which seems to mean "in case of need," "at Smith, Payne & Smith's." Now, I do not know whether it is necessary to discuss the question of what is meant by "in case of need." If it means anything, I should have thought it must mean this—“In case you have occasion to apply to me, the indorser, for payment, apply at Smith, Payne & Smith's." If that be the meaning of it, the words "in need" seem to me to be inoperative. If the indorser had simply indorsed it at "Smith, Payne & Smith's," omitting the words "in need," it would be the same thing; that is, "if the indorser has to pay it, I point out to you the bankers to whom you may apply for that payment." That is the effect of it, as I conceive. I am not aware, indeed, that there is any other meaning suggested for those words; but however, whatever they mean, what is the effect of that indorsement? The effect of it is, that the holder may, if he has occasion to apply to the indorser, go to the bankers thus indicated and referred to by the indorser. He may go to them; he is not obliged to do it—I think that is agreed; he may go; and if he does apply to them and they do not pay, then comes this question, assuming that those bankers are appointed even the agents for payment, which is the utmost limit you can go to (I think that, in fact, they are appointed only as a place to which, for his convenience, the holder may refer if he likes); but suppose you go to the utmost extent, and say the bankers indicated are pointed out as the agents of the indorser. Agents for what? Agents merely for the purpose of making the payment. But are they agents therefore to receive notice of dishonour? There is no authority for any such proposition; and it appears to me that it is contrary to the nature of the thing. There is no ground for saying that the indorser by saying, "in need, at Smith, Payne & Smith's means to say, not only this, "in need, you may go to Smith, Payne & Smith, and ask them to pay you," but, "I appoint Smith, Payne & Smith as persons to whom you may give notice of dishonour in case the acceptor does not pay." On that ground, therefore, it appears to me that it is impossible to hold that, merely because it was presented at Smith, Payne & Smith's, the indorsers are therefore to be supposed to have had notice impliedly that the acceptor had dishonoured the bill, because it would not have been presented to the indorsers' bankers unless it had been first dishonoured by the acceptor or the acceptor's bankers. It appears to me, supposing it was notice to Smith, Payne & Smith, that Smith, Payne & Smith were not, by the terms of the indorsement, constituted the agents of the indorsers, so as to make notice to those bankers of the dishonour by the acceptor a sufficient notice to the indorsers. - But there is another ground upon which, I think, the contention fails, which is this. The only notice to Smith, Fayne & Smith is the implied notice, or rather the implied knowledge, on their part, that there must have been a dishonour of the bill by the acceptor. But assuming that the act done gave Smith, Payne & Smith knowledge of the fact of dishonour,-assuming that the necessary inference was that there had been a dishonour by the acceptor's bankers or by the acceptor, there must be something more than mere knowledge. It has been held repeatedly that there must be notice, not only in the sense in which a Court of equity speaks of a man having notice of a thing, which means he must have knowledge of it, but there must be, in fact, an act of notification. Here there is no act of notification at all. It is merely a bill, presented at Smith, Payne & Smith's. It was not impossible (I do not mean to say it was probable) that the bill might have been presented to Smith, Payne & Smith without having been presented it to the acceptor or to the acceptor's bankers. At all events, the law is, that there must be an act of notification; it need not be in any particular form, but it must be something in the shape of notification—a communication conveying, in sufficient terms, to the party to whom notice is to be given, the fact that there has been a dishonour by the acceptor, and that the holder looks to him, the indorser, for payment. Upon these grounds it appears to me that what took place did not stand in the place of, was not a sufficient substitute for, a notice to the indorser of dishonour by the acceptor. The only remaining question is with regard to the second bill, whether the notice of dishonour actually given was in sufficient time. It is admitted on all hands, and the |