fringement of the right as to entitle the plaintiffs to the protection of the Court. Mr. Baily and Mr. E. E. Kay, for the defendants, argued that the plaintiffs had no such exclusive right as they contended for; that the right was not analogous to a common ferry right; that the 40th section of the act prescribed the only remedy which the plaintiffs were entitled to pursue in respect of any invasion of their right, and that this Court could not take upon itself to enlarge the privileges of the plaintiffs beyond the limitation contained in the act itself; whatever loss the plaintiffs were suffering by any act of the defendants was damnum absque injuria. The nature of the arguments adduced, and the points mainly insisted upon, will appear more fully from the Vice Chancellor's judgment. following authorities were cited chiefly with reference to the rights of a common ferry: The Churchman v. Tunstall, Hardres, 162. Huzzy v. Field, 2 Cr. M. & R. 432, 442; s. c. 5 Tyrw. 855; 4 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 239. Peter v. Kendall, 6 B. & C. 703; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. K.B. 283. Pym v. Curell, 6 Mee. & W. 234, 241. Viner's Abridgment, tit. 'Nuisance,' G. 4. Glen's Highway Laws, pp. 201, 202. Tripp v. Frank, 4 Term Rep. 667; s. c. 2 Anstr. 608. Anonymous, 1 Ves. sen. 476. nom. The Queen v. Matthews, 25 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 7. Mr. Glasse, in reply. KINDERSLEY, V.C., after referring to the several clauses of the Watermen's Amendment Act, upon which the right of the plaintiffs was founded, and particularly to the 40th section (as set out above), which he described as "a most extraordinary jumble of language, and very inappropriate for making known the real intention of the legislature," continued his judgment as follows: Whatever may be the true construction of this clause, the question which hinges upon it is, how far the defendants, who are not members of the Watermen's Company, nor appointed by them in any way, are infringing by their acts the provisions of this statute. At all events, the intention of this 40th section seems to have been this, that on Sundays no person not appointed by the company should carry any passenger from any of the plyingplaces appointed by the company in pursuance of the prior sections of the act, to a spot opposite to that place on the other side of the river, which will embrace two plying-places above and two plying-places below, or to any craft within that range. That, I think, is clearly the general meaning of it. Now, among the common stairs or plyingplaces which have been fixed on by the company, there is one at Greenwich called Garden Stairs, and a little to the eastward of Garden Stairs, not more than fifteen yards distant, on the same side of the river, is the public pier known as "Greenwich Pier." The defendants are owners of a ferry on the opposite side of the river, in the Isle of Dogs, called "Potter's Ferry," which is very nearly, though not quite, opposite to Garden Stairs, and, of course, nearly, though not quite so nearly, opposite to Greenwich Pier. The defendants, as owners of Potter's Ferry, have the right on all days, including, of course, Sundays, of bringing passengers from Potter's Ferry Stairs across to the southern bank; but they have no exclusive right to carry passengers from the southern shore to the northern shore of the river. In this position of affairs, the defendants have lately started a steamboat, which on Sundays brings passengers from Potter's Ferry to Greenwich Pier, and not only that, but also carries passengers back from Greenwich Pier to Potter's Ferry, that is, from the south to the north bank of the river. The plaintiffs insist that this is an infringement of their right, and that, by reason of the proximity of Greenwich Pier to Garden Stairs, and the other circumstances of the case, they are entitled to regard what the defendants are doing as being in fact a nuisance, and an injurious disturbance of a right conferred on them by the act of parliament. Now, it has been argued, on behalf of the defendants, that, irrespectively of the question, whether or not the plaintiffs have the right which they claim, still they have no right to come to this Court for relief. It is contended that they must pursue the remedy given them by the act of parliament, and that they have no other remedy; that the act does not in terms prohibit the carrying of passengers by such means as the defendants are employing, and that it only imposes a penalty of 40s. in respect of every passenger so carried, and that, therefore, there is no right to come here. Now, upon this point, I feel no doubt. Assuming the act of the defendants to be wrongful, it is, I think, quite competent for the company and their lessee to come here to quiet their right; because a bill of this kind is somewhat in the nature of a bill of peace, to obviate the necessity of taking proceedings, time after time, for the recovery of penalties upon each disturbance of the right. Then, again, another question has been raised, upon which I should feel no difficulty whatever. Assuming the right conferred by the act of parliament to stand on the same footing as the right of an owner to an ancient ferry, I think the proximity of Greenwich Pier to Garden Stairs is such that what the defendants are doing would be a disturbance of the plaintiffs' right sufficient to constitute a nuisance, and entitle the plaintiff's to the protection of this Court. Several of the cases which have been cited are quite conclusive on this subject; for instance, in the case of the ferry over the Humber (Tripp v. Frank) it was decided that a distance of two miles, and in the case of Matthews v. Peache, with reference to this very same Potter's Ferry, it was held that a distance of 1,280 yards was sufficiently near to constitute a nuisance, and was such a disturbance of the right as this Court would interfere to prevent. I should have no doubt, therefore, on that point. The remaining questions (and upon them the case mainly depends) are these: Whether the right conferred on the plaintiffs by the act does stand on the same footing as a right of ancient ferry-for if it does, then the plaintiffs are entitled to relief; but if it does not, then whether the act of the defendants in carrying passengers on Sunday from Greenwich Pier to Potter's Ferry is an infringement of the right which has been conferred on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs insist that their right, if it is not strictly and precisely a right of ferry, is tantamount to a right of ferry, and stands on the same footing, at least quoad the questions raised in this suit. Now, what is a ferry? Having recourse to the old law and to the principles laid down upon this point, we find that a ferry is spoken of as being "a continuation of the highway across a river or other water." It is, in fact, for the purposes of public traffic, a junction between the terminus of the highway on one side of a river and the recommencement of the same highway upon the other side; and it is obviously for the benefit of the public that there should be this continuance of the highway, because in using the highway those who have occasion to cross the river would, if there were no means of crossing, be stopped, unless by some accident there happened to be a boat or other craft about to pass over. The advantage is so great that the Crown has from time to time granted rights of ferry to individuals or to corporations, as the case may be; and most, if not all, ferries have their origin in a royal grant, or exist by prescription, which presumes a royal grant. Of course, an act of parliament may confer a right of ferry, as it may do anything else; but, ordinarily speaking, they all arise by a grant from the Crown or by prescription. The right to carry passengers thus becomes an exclusive right as against the rest of the world; and being in derogation of common right, of course it is per se and simpliciter an evil. But though the public suffer the evil of being debarred from having another passage across the river at or near the ferry, they have a compensation in the circumstance that there is, by means of this ferry, a constant means available to them at all times of travelling on the Queen's highway; so that, as a compensation to the public, and as a set-off to the profits which the owner of a ferry derives from the public traffic, he is put under certain special obligations; he is bound to provide proper boats or vessels or craft to cross the river, and skilled or competent boatmen to navigate them; and he is also bound to keep up the ferry with all the necessaries for conveyance and ferrying, and he must continue to do this on pain of being liable to indictment and fine. As the old reports express it, he will be "grievously amerced" if he does not do it. That is the compensation which the public derives from the disadvantage of the monopoly; and by these means the public at all times can travel over the highway, of which the ferry is, in fact, a continuation. Such being the characteristics of a ferry, let us see how far the rights conferred by this act on the plaintiffs stand on the same footing. It seems to me that the right conferred on the plaintiffs is a simple derogation of the common right; it is a simple monopoly, and there is not that compensation to the public, which there is in the case of a ferry. In the first place, the authority given to the plaintiffs only relates to Sundays-one single day in the week-although, of course, I can conceive of such a thing as a Sunday ferry; and, I dare say, many such exist in localities where they are necessary for the public convenience. But apart from this, it appears to me, according to the terms of the act, that the company are not under any obligation to provide any boat or boatmen, or any means of transport across the river. Certainly there is not the smallest allusion to any such obligation in the act, nor does it appear to me that that would be implied. It has been suggested that, as a matter of course, if this is a ferry, the grantee of the ferry is by implication bound to keep it up; but this can only be maintained on the assumption that this is the grant of a ferry. Then again, as the defendants very justly argue, there is nothing in this act which would prevent the plaintiffs from abandoning at any moment whenever they please these Garden Stairs or any other common stairs or plying-place which they may have selected. They might use it for a week, or a month, or a year, and the next week, or month, or year they might abandon it and then resume it again at any future time. An obvious consequence of this will be that, assuming the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction which they ask for, they might, the very week or day after the injunction had been granted, abandon not only the Garden Stairs but Billingsgate Dock Stairs, or any other of the plying-places mentioned in the bill. It is impossible, I think, to maintain. that the right conferred on the company by this act of parliament stands in any respect on the same footing or carries with it the same right to protection as that which pertains to the owner of a ferry. But it has been pointed out that one of the sections in the act, the 33rd, does mention "ferry" with respect to this particular right. The marginal note to that section is this: "Sunday ferries not to be appointed within 200 yards of Vauxhall Bridge." And the section itself runs thus: "Nothing herein contained shall empower the said Court of Watermen to appoint any Sunday ferries or grant any licence to any ferryman or others to ply on the river Thames on Sundays from or at the stairs on either side of the bridge at Vauxhall, or any stairs or other place within 200 yards of the said bridge, so as to interfere with, or prejudice, or affect the tolls authorized to be taken for crossing the same." It has been contended (and certainly the language of this clause justified the contention) that the mention there made of a Sunday ferry, must mean the appointment of watermen to ply from the different stairs on Sundays. It appears to me that it is only one of those instances, so numerous in this act, of extreme looseness and carelessness of language. In popular parlance, you may speak of it as a ferry, but it is to be observed that the term "ferry" is used in that one section only; and it appears to me impossible to contend that the effect of the single clause, taken in connexion with the other provisions of the act, is to constitute a ferry in the proper sense of the term, with its consequential privileges and obligations. This, then, being, as I conceive it is, a derogation of the public right, without that compensation to the public which exists in the case of the grant of a ferry, it must of necessity be construed strictly. The Court is not in any way to enlarge or give a wider extent to the privileges conferred than the language of the act fairly and reasonably implies. Well, now let us see what is the principle on which the Courts will interfere to protect the owner of a ferry, properly so called, from being disturbed in his right, by persons plying for passengers in the immediate neighbourhood of his ferry. It seems to me to rest simply on this ground, that, inasmuch as a ferry (notwithstanding the disadvantage of its being a monopoly) is on the whole a benefit to the public, so it is for the public interest that the rights of a ferryman and his enjoyment of his right should be properly secured and continued to him. But this is not at all the case here; the public have really no interest in the profits arising from this Sunday plying. It is true that the surplus receipts are by the act dedicated to a charity, but the object of the charity is that the company may have the means of providing for their aged and decayed and infirm members. The public do not derive any benefit from it in the sense in which we are now speaking of the interests of the public. There is a passage in Blackstone which seems to me to enunciate the principle so plainly that I will refer to it it occurs in the chapter in which he deals with nuisances. Speaking of nuisances which may exist to the detriment of an existing right, a market or ferry or whatever it may be, he comes to the case of a ferry, and says (1), "If a ferry is erected on a river so near another ancient ferry as to draw away its custom, it is a nuisance to the owner of the old one; for where there is a ferry by prescription the owner is bound to keep it always in repair and readiness for the ease of all the king's subjects; otherwise he may be grievously amerced. It would be therefore extremely hard if a new ferry were suffered to share his profits, which does not also share his burthen." Then he adds this: "but where the reason ceases the law also ceases with it." The principle upon which he says that protection is afforded to the owner of a ferry is, that nobody ought to interfere with his profits who does not also share his burthen, in other words, who is not under an obligation to keep up (1) 3 Stephen's Commentaries, 493, 4th edit. the ferry and provide proper ferry-boats, and men to work them, and so forth. This same principle is referred to in several of the cases that have been cited, and is, in fact, the foundation of all the decisions on this subject. I come, therefore to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have no right to seek this injunction unless by fraud or undue means the defendants are drawing away passengers from the stairs or plyingplaces appointed by the company. Nothing of that kind, however, appears before me here. True it is the places are very near each other. True it is that the public will go to the one or the other according as they find the accommodation the best for their purposes. It is true, no doubt, that the means of transport offered by the defendants may and probably will interfere with the amount of traffic which accrues to the plaintiffs at Garden Stairs. But there is nothing fraudulent in what the defendants are doing. There is a regular place of embarkation and debarkation used by a multitude of boats and craft, and it appears to me that the defendants are in nowise precluded by the terms of this act of parliament from carrying passengers from the pier at Greenwich to Potter's Ferry. I must, therefore, dismiss the bill, with costs. in June, 1849, by the plaintiff, for certain improvements in machinery for grinding corn. In the ordinary process of grinding corn the mill-stones often get clammed up from the heat produced in grinding, espe cially if the corn is not very dry, whereby the flour or meal is much injured in quality, the quantity is diminished, and greater power is required to drive the stones. great deal of dust or "stive" is also in general produced in mills, which seriously affects the health of the persons employed. Various measures had at different times been taken for ventilating mill-stones and keeping down the temperature of the mill-stones and the grain, and various patents had been taken out with that view, but no one before the plaintiff had, as the bill alleged, succeeded in effecting these objects. Millstones are ordinarily placed one above the other, the lower one or bed-stone being fixed, and the upper one rotating; the surfaces of the stones are cut like files, and deep grooves or furrows are also cut in their faces to produce a blast or current of air between the grinding surfaces, which facilitates the grinding. The upper stone has always had an eye, or hollow centre, into which the grain is poured, and through which a current of air is drawn down by the centrifugal action, and is thence expelled outwards along the grooves in the faces of the stones by the same action, carrying out with it the stive into the mill. At an early period cases were introduced for inclosing the mill-stones, through the bottom of which the flour passed out by a pipe termed the meal-spout; but even with these cases much stive passed out down the meal-spout. The most important part of the plaintiff's invention consisted in attaching to the mill-stone case a pipe communicating with a fan or other exhausting machine, by means of which the hot dusty air in the case was sucked out, in such a manner as to cause a gentle current of air to flow up into the case from the meal spout below. By this process the falling meal was dried and cooled, the stones were ventilated, and the stive, instead of falling down the spout and into the mill, was drawn upwards and carried off to a chamber where it was deposited and utilized. The plaintiff, in his specification, as amended, described his patent, which had three branches, as follows: "I declare my invention to consist of the following particulars: First, in an arrangement for ventilating the grinding surfaces of the mill-stones, and the introduction of air through the top stone (when fixed), either by blowing or exhaustion; secondly, in exhausting the air from the cases of the mill-stones, combined with the application of a blast to the grinding surfaces; thirdly, in separating the stive, or dust of flour, from the air when exhaustion or blast is employed to facilitate grinding, and preventing the dust and waste in the mill. "The first part of my invention consists in introducing air-pipes into the top millstone, so as to more freely ventilate the grinding surfaces when currents of air are forced or exhausted through them. Air has also been exhausted down through the eye of the top stone when running, and between the grinding surfaces. I do not therefore claim the principle except when worked in combination with a fixed upper stone. "In carrying out the second part of my invention, when working mill-stones with a blast of air, I introduce a pipe to the millstone case from a fan or other exhausting machine, so as to carry off all the warm dusty air blown through between the stones to a chamber, as hereinafter described, by which the dust in the mill is avoided and grinding improved. And this part of my invention relates only to sucking away the plenum of dusty air forced through the stones, and not to employing a sufficient exhausting power to induce a current of air between the mill-stones without a blast, this having before been practised, as above mentioned. "The third part of my invention consists in straining the stive, or air which is surcharged with fine flour, through suitable porous fabrics, which retain the flour, and allow the air to pass through, and this I accomplish by exhausting the air from the mill-stone case, or other closed chamber receiving the meal from the stones, by means of a fan or other exhausting machinery, and blow the stive so exhausted into a chamber, having its sides and top formed of one or |