Alcazar, K.C., H. Albert, 123

Bairstow, K.C., A. W., 383

Ball, W. Valentine, 138

Empire, 138

Board, W. John, 138

Boyce, Godfrey H., 138

Brain, Sydney, 61

Brooks, Arthur D., 138

Bull, Sir William, 123

Burrows, Sterndale, 181

Butcher, K.C., J. George, 123
Cameron, W. Scott, 139

Campbell, K.C., Sir J. H., 123
Cautley, H. Strother, 269
Chand, Diwan Tek, 139
Colefax, K.C., H. A., 447
Coward, K.C., J. C. Lewis, 123
Duke, Lord Justice, 40
Duke, KC., Henry E., 19
Durnford, Philip B., 138
Eady, Sir C. Swinfen, 19
Elliott, Adshead, 303
Faber, G. Denison, 138
Fanner, Henry R., 139
Farrant, H. Gatchell, 464
Field, Joseph H., 138

Forges, des, Charles L.. 139
Foster, William E., 138
Fraser, Sir Hugh, 40
Fry, Theodore W., 138
Glanville, de, Oscar, 139
Goff, Park, 123

Gorell, Capt. Lord, 139
Goulding, Sir E. Alfred, 138
Gray, J. Hunter, 303
Greenwell, Judge F. J., 138

Hayward, Edward, J., 383
Hayward, Maurice H. W., 19
Hazen, J. Douglas, 123
Hodges, H. E. Agincourt, 123
Hogg, Alan F., 19

Hume-Williams, K.C., W. E., 138
Hurst, K.C., Cecil J. B., 330
Hutton, Stamford, 139
Jackson, E. St. John, 19
Jevons, Frank B., 246
Jones, R. Guthrie, 371
Knocker, Reginald E., 139
Knox, K.C., Adrian, 123
Lawton, Frank W., 139
Leete, W. Chambers, 139
Lewis, T. Williams, 123
Lewis, Wyndham, 139
Lincoln, J. Bebrouth, 139
Ludlow, H. Sutton, 139
McCarthy, Judge, 371

Mackenzie, K.C., W. Warrender, 138
Macpherson, J. Ían, 123

Mansfield, Thomas E., 139

Milne, J. A. D., 139

Molony, K.C., T. Francis, 303

Muir, R. B. D., 123

Newnham, J. Montague, 139
Nicholson, R. Beattie, 139

Norton, K.C., R. Frederick, 138
O'Connor, K.C., James, 303

Order of the British Empire,
Honours, 138

Ormidale, Lord, 447
Parr, T. Henning, 447
Phillimore, Sir Walter G. F., 138
Pickford, Lord Justice, 447
Potter, Edmund, 138
Powell, K.C., Arthur, 410
Powell, K.C., J. Blake, 40
Preston, A. Sansome, 139
Ranger, A. W. Guest, 77
Rankin, George C., 383
Rawlinson, Leonard, 139
Richardson, Albion H. H., 138
Roden, R. Blair, 123
Rowlands, Rowland, 77
Salmond, K.C., J. W., 123
Samson, E. Marlay, 19, 138
Sanders, Edgar C., 123

Sankey, Colonel H. Stuart, 286
Schuster, Sir Claud, 123
Sewell, J. T. B., 138
Shearman, Montague, 139
Shortt, K.C., Edward, 40
Slade, George F., 139
Surridge, C. W. W., 424
Taylor, W. F. Kyffin, 138
Trickett, Wilfrid, R., 139
Turton, W. J. T., 139
Umney, Percy, 139
Wadia, Hormasji, A., 123
Waghorne, John, 139

Wells, Reginald H., 19

Whitley, Michael H., 447

Wild, K.C.. Ernest E., 123

Williams, K.C., Lieut.-Colonel, Rhys, 123

Birthday Wilson, Robert J., 139

Witt, R. Clermont, 138

The Profession and the Tribunals.

ONLY the same type of official mind that put forward the suggestion that, while the National Service representative should have unrestricted right of appeal, that right should be totally denied the applicant-a proposal that was promptly withdrawn when the new Military Service Act was before Parliament-could have framed the regulations restricting the present rights of appeal and denying applicants professional assistance before the tribunals. The extraordinary naïve explanation by Mr. HAYES FISHER that he could not admit that the new regulations "deprive an applicant of the full right of appeal from the decision of a local tribunal," and that the right of professional assistance had been taken away "with the object of expediting proceedings before the tribunals," only goes to show the total lack of acquaintance with these matters that exists in some official circles. We can state without fear of contradiction that professional assistance for applicants has considerably facilitated and expedited the work of the tribunals, the members of which have had all the necessary facts placed before them clearly and concisely by both barristers and solicitors. Everyone, we suppose, save the head of an important Government department is aware of the difficulties encountered by any tribunal or committee-judicial or otherwise-in eliciting the whole of the facts to ensure adequate justice when the parties appear in person. That the tribunals under the Military Service Acts have had this experience is clear from the resolutions passed by the whole body of the London appeal tribunals. Having regard to the extension of the age limit, it is imperatively necessary that a strenuous and impartial comb out of the younger men who have crept into Government offices and "protected" jobs should take place. Further, that the same full rights of appeal that have hitherto obtained should be continued and professional assistance allowed before all tribunals. If this is done, the older men will undertake cheerfully all necessary burdens that must be placed upon them for the welfare of their country.

PRACTICE UNDER THE COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) ACTS.

WHEN the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 78) was first passed, the criticisms of its drafting were generally hostile. There were obvious blemishes on its face, and it bore the appearance of work done in a hurry-as did most of the work done by the Legislature in those days of sudden emergency. Nevertheless, in practice this enactment has given singularly little difficulty. Considering the fact that it affected the vast majority of all lawsuits, uncontentious as well as contentious, and many other every-day proceedings which were not lawsuits at all, such as the levying of distress, the machinery has worked with wonderful smoothness. The judges have not been called upon for a large number of interpretations of the wording of the statute, and the appeals to the Court of Appeal have been very few indeed.

The intention of the Act was fairly obvious. Doubtless, according to a strict interpretation of the words under the accepted canons of construction, it could be plausibly argued that the Act affected nothing at all but certain policies of insurance. Or, again, "inability to pay" might have been so literally explained that, whenever there was anything to execute upon, the court could not stay execution, whereas obviously whenever there was not it did not matter what the court did one way or the other. But the spirit of the present times is not patient of such arguments, and the practice has speedily fallen into line with the obvious intention.

This intention was not to protect debtors, but to uphold public credit. The moratorium was a temporary measure which it was undesirable to continue longer than was necessary, but if all pre-war

debts were pressed to the extreme limits of execution, the number of ruined homes and businesses would have been enormous, and each ruin would have been the cause of other ruins in its turn. This is what the enactment under consideration set out to remedy. Practically, therefore, it came to this: If the debtor was under inability to pay without thereby bringing about the ruin of his home or business, and if that inability was owing to the circumstances pointed to by the Act, the emergency relief ought to be given.

At first sight it was somewhat surprising to observe that the initiative in the matter of this emergency relief was cast upon the creditor and not upon the debtor. The object being to determine whether or no the debtor was unable to pay owing to circumstances of a particular kind- -as to which the onus obviously lay upon the debtor-the logical thing would surely, one would think, have been that the debtor should begin. But we are in all things a people more practical than logical. It was doubtless felt that, in view of the maxim Ignoratio legis reminem excusat, it was desirable to prevent execution or kindred relief being given until the debtor had been informed of his rights. Therefore the so-called summons for leave to proceed" came into being.

This very precaution, however, in some cases did harm to ignorant debtors. Orders for "leave to proceed" were given in the terms of the summons, and the creditors were able to show these orders as if they had determined every possible question in their favour— as if "leave to proceed" meant that bills of sale were valid and mortgaged premises might be sold forthwith whatever the circumstances might be.

To meet these difficulties, in some cases two alterations in procedure were devised. First, the plaintiff in an action might serve a notice together with a form of counter-notice-challenging the defendant to raise his claim for relief under the Act now or never. This mitigated the grievance of the plaintiff in many actions. Where there is judgment for default of appearance and no counternotice filed, the master ex parte marks the judgment "No stay" as of course, and there is an end of the matter.

Secondly, the misleading words" leave to proceed"-though still appearing in the summons-were no longer used in the order. The order is now for no stay under this particular Act, and means merely that the creditor has cleared this one particular fence on his way to execution. If there are any other fences, they remajn exactly as they were before.

In order to obtain relief under the Act of 1914, the respondent must prove (1) inability to pay; (2) that such inability is owing to circumstances attributable to the war. Prima facie if the debt was left unpaid for a considerable time before the war, it does not look as if the war caused the trouble. But this consideration is not infallible. My tailor may have been willing to give me huge credit before the war, and my then means may have made him quite safe; the war may have altered all this. Each case will depend upon its own circumstances, and a long cross-examination of the debtor is often necessary for the elucidation of the truth. The result is in the discretion of the court. The respondent must not forget that the onus is on him, and he ought to bring all books and other documents necessary to support his case.

A company under the Companies Acts was in a somewhat unfortunate position in respect to this matter of emergency relief, for it has been held that the Act of 1914 does not give the court any power to give relief upon a winding-up petition: (Re Globe Trust, 113 L. T. Rep. 80; cf. 112 L. T. Rep. 1100).

With the bankruptcy of an individual it is otherwise, and the Bankruptcy Court has full discretion. If there are many debts it seems, therefore, to be the fairest and most convenient course to leave the relief to be given or refused in the Bankruptcy Court. The order in such case must be an unconditional no stay" in order to give the Bankruptcy Court its jurisdiction, but the applicant is often asked to promise not to proceed otherwise than in bankruptcy with the express purpose of leaving open the question of emergency relief.

A somewhat hard case may arise on garnishee proceedings. Although the object of the Act is to prevent the ruin of the debtot for the sake of public credit, an order nisi may be made agains his banking account so that he cannot draw a penny till the summons is heard. An order absolute cannot, it is true, be made until the

Act of 1914 has been considered, but even then the position of the debtor and his claim to any relief seem to be doubtful. See Keats v. Conolly (138 L. T. Jour. 563; (1915) W. N. 174), where the obiter dicta of the different members of the Court of Appeal showed an important measure of dissent.

Similarly an injunction may be given on leave to issue a summons for equitable execution, but the order on the summons cannot be made until the Act has been complied with.

It has been decided in Ireland that a writ of ejectment may be issued without any application under the Act (National Bank Limited v. Claffey, 1917, I. R. K. B. 281), and practice in Judges' Chambers here is in accordance with this decision.

An important recent decision was that of Dobb v. H. Dobb Limited (118 L. T. Rep. 244), in which it was decided by the Court of Appeal that the provision of sect. 1 (1) of the Act of 1914, that without the leave of the court no person can proceed to the execution or enforcement of any judgment or order of any court for the payment or recovery of “ a sum of money to which this sub-section applies," extends to any judgment or order for the payment of any sum of money whatever, unless it is excluded by the Act itself or some subsequent Act or Order in Council, and that the provision thus extends to an order for the payment of the costs of an appeal in an action for an alleged breach of a pre-war contract.

The application of the Act to actions of tort was made the subject of some discussion, but the accepted view was that it did not apply to such actions: (Midland Furnishing Company Limited v. Allan Tracey and Co., cited Annual Practice 1918, p. 1325). This controversy is removed by a statutory enactment to be presently noticed.

Of course every debtor who would not have been a payer in any event came along under this enactment and swore that he had been " affected by the war," but experience has shown those folk that something much more than that is required to satisfy the court that a proper case has arisen for relief.

In practice, however, a reasonable compromise upon the lines of payment by instalments or an arrangement for adequate security is very often brought about on the hearing of the summons, even when the Act does not strictly apply at all, so that many debtors who do not fall within its provisions have nevertheless cause to be grateful for the opportunity for consideration which the practice affords.

The Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5., c. 18) is directed to the especial protection of sailors and soldiers and to the prevention of a downfall of public credit as the result of the dislocation which must be caused by so many men who owed all the ordinary liabilities of life suddenly leaving their ordinary occupations and joining the colours.

66

The Act was to have effect in favour of officers and men of His Majesty's forces." The "Derby recruit " having attested was posted to Army Reserve B. So that he was entitled thenceforward to take advantage of the Act-subject, of course, to the discretion of the court to find that his case came de facto within the mischief which it was the purpose of the Act to remedy. But with the compelled man it was otherwise. Men who hold a certificate of exemption under the Military Service Act 1916 (5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104) for the time being in force (other than a certificate of exemption from combatant service only), or who have offered themselves for enlistment and been rejected since the 14th Aug. 1915," are among those who are not "deemed to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's regular forces for general service with the colours or in the reserve for the period of the war and to have been forthwith transferred to the reserve": (see sect. 1 and sched. 1 of that Act).

The plaintiff in an action was faced with a new set of difficulties owing to this Act. For in this case inability to pay owing to circumstances directly or indirectly attributable to the war is no longer a condition of relief. So if the defendant be a male and unless he be known not to be of military age, the plaintiff cannot pursue him to execution without inviting an application under this enactment. The “notice and counter-notice” procedure have to be extended so as to cover both Acts of Parliament.

Nor is it at all clear on what principle relief is to be granted. The case of the impossibility of carrying out a pre-war contract after the falling of the bolt from the blue (though to the weatherThird Sheet

wise in the study of the face of Europe there was surely more bolt than blue) was easy to understand. But the sailor or soldier who made his contract with his eyes open while war was already raging may nevertheless be protected by this Act. Yet it may

be remarked that, though his eyes were opened widely enough to the horrors, financial and otherwise, of war, they may perhaps not have been open to the likelihood of his taking himself an actual combatant part in it, and in any case the country must take a lenient view even of the delinquencies of one who has put it out of his power for the best of all reasons to rehabilitate his finances, and this must count for something even where the chance of such rehabilitation must in any case have been of the slenderest. Lastly, we must consider the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1917 (7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 25). There are certain powers given to the court to suspend or annul certain contracts-the intention being to see that no injustice is done to individuals by the various emergency restrictions or commandeering powers, &c., which Government exercises in these unusual times. An Englishman's house being no longer quite the castle that it was, his liabilities in respect of it must naturally be somewhat modified besides his rights. The courts may therefore give relief from liabilities. All the provisions of the Act are based upon a similar principle, and, in comparison with the earlier statutes, it would seem to be an easy statute to bring into practice. By sect. 6 of this Act judgments in actions of tort are excluded from the operation of the Act of 1914.

Such are the three Courts (Emergency Powers) Acts and such the general emergency practice, but it must be remembered that all the powers given by these Acts are temporary only.

BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS.

FROM the point of view of international law, as well as from other points of view, the present war is the most remarkable that has ever taken place. In the first place, in no previous war were so many violations of law deliberately committed; and, secondly, in no other war did the more law-abiding belligerents find it necessary to make so many modifications and new departures. Again, in no other war did so many States and such enormous combatant forces take part; and never before did so many States, not parties to the original difference that caused the war, find themselves obliged to join in the general conflict. Thus we now witness the extraordinary spectacle of countries in South America, thousands of miles from the various scenes of hostilities, entering the war. This is not through an overpowering impulse of an infectious war fever. It is rather a striking sign of the times—a sign that henceforth neutrality, as contemplated and governed by the international law as it existed before the war, will be rendered impossible, at all events in a war between the Great Powers and their allies. Various encroachments have quite recently been made on neutrality; of one kind, we have the German threats to Holland in order to secure traffic facilities; of another kind, we have our own Orders in Council, confirmed by our Prize Court (in The Leonora), which affect neutral commerce. It would seem as though many of the rights of neutrals must fall to the ground in view of the exigencies of a general war carried on in presentday conditions. On the other hand, the maintenance of strict neutrality is becoming more and more difficult; and it is not unlikely that the ancient practice, which did not recognise neutrality, will eventually be reintroduced, but with a new significance of a far-reaching kind.

The conception of neutrality was not foreign to classical antiquity, though its meaning and application had little in common with the modern legal view. The Hellenic States recognised certain rights and duties of non-belligerent peoples; but in the case of Rome her unswerving policy of expansion, of imperial development, of incorporation of other communities, was of necessity antagonistic to the recognition of neutrality." Her rule was that those who were not her allies were her enemies, no intermediate position being admitted: "Media . . . nulla via est Romanos aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet" : (Livy, xxxii. 21). When a State was not forced to become an active ally or an enemy, it was none the less expected to render aid, by permitting