THE GAZETTES. Professional Partnerships Bissolved. GAZETTE, OCT. 15. RUTHERFORD, HENRY TAYLOR, and READER, HAROLD CYPRIAN, solicitors, Blyth, under style of Lynn, Rutherford, and Reader. Jan. 1. Debts by H. T. Rutherford, who will continue the practice under style of Lynn and Rutherford. Bankrupts. THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 1914. RECEIVING ORDERS. GAZETTE, OCT. 11. To surrender at the High Court of Justice in Bankruptcy. BROWNE, MARIE CHANTAL, late Sloane-st, Sloane-sq, spinster. Oct. 7. WACHTER, PIETER, late Mincing-la, general produce merchant. Oct. 7. To surrender at their respective District Courts. CHILD, ARTHUR GEORGE, Terrington Saint Clements, small holder. Ct. King's Lynn. Oct. 7. COLTON, CHARLES GLANVILLE ANGUS KEMP, Stoke Holy Cross, consulting engineer. Ct. Norwich. Oct. 7. KIRBY, TIMOTHY, Penydarren, boot repairer. Ct. Merthyr Tydfil. Oct. 7. PEARCE, ARTHUR WILLIAM, late Victoria-st, motor engineer. Ct. Wandsworth. Oct. 7. BUDD, PERCY DOUGLAS (the person, or one of the persons, trading as D. Budd and Co.), Bellefield-rd, Brixton, draper. Ct. High Court. Oct. 10. CADY, WILLIAM JOHN, late Pontypridd, grocer. Ct. Swansea. Oct. 11. CHILD, ARTHUR GEORGE, Terrington Saint Clements, small holder. Ct. King's Lynn. Oct. 11. TURNER, WILLIAM HENRY, Knighton-on-Teme, commission agent. Ct. Kidderminster. Oct. 5. WACHTER, PIETER, late Mincing-la, general produce merchant. Ct. High Court. Oct. 11. WATSON, THOMAS (described in receiving order as Tom Watson), late Kenley. Ct. High Court. Oct. 11. WORRALL, ELIHU, late Bilston, insurance superintendent. Ct. Leicester. Oct. 10. Myers Silver Series ADJUDICATION ANNULLED. GAZETTE, OCT. 11. £0:0:0 PACKER, LEONARD FREDERICK, Princes Risborough, clerk in holy orders. Ct. Aylesbury. Oct. 7. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTH. WHITWORTH. On the 3rd inst., at Elleray, Windermere, to the wife of the late Major John Haworth Whitworth, D.S.O., M.C., Manchester Regiment, Barrister-at-law, of Ingersley, Bowdon-a daughter. DEATHS. GATEY. On the 27th ult., at Ambleside, Edith Marian, wife of George Gatey, Solicitor, Ambleside. GRANT.-Killed in action, on the 27th ult., Alexander Grant, Second Lieut., Grenadier Guards, son of Alexander Grant, K.C., of 11, Newsq, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. 2, aged 19 years. MACOUN.-On the 7th inst., at 28, Clifton-hill, N.W., James Ritchie Macoun, Barrister-at-law, of 4, Temple-grdns, E.C. HALLILAY'S DIGEST OF THE EXAMINATION QUESTIONS, being a Digest of the Questions asked at the Final Pass Examination of Articled Clerks on all the Subjects from the Commencement of the Examinations, with Answers; also a Time Table in an Action; and the Mode of Proceeding, and Directions to be attended to at the Examination, with the Rule of the Honours Examination. By RICHARD HALLILAY, Esq. Seventeenth Edition. 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This division has had to provide assistance in the Probate and Divorce Division and in other spheres of work, and effort is now clearly necessary to prevent the accumulation of serious arrears. "FREE FROM DU1Y." It was originally felt that settled property which had paid estate duty on the death of the deceased ought not again to pay estate duty until the death of a person competent to dispose of it; but settlement estate duty was also paid on it: (Finance Act 1894, s. 5). This was originally at the rate of 1 per cent. (sect. 17), but it was afterwards raised to 2 per cent.: (Finance (1909-10) Act 1910, s. 54). The exigencies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, in 1914 caused settlement estate duty to be abolished and imposed estate duty on the deaths of tenants for life with certain exemptions: (Finance Act 1914, s. 14). One probably unforeseen result came from this new enactment, and there has been a crop of cases on the question whether a direction in the will that a legacy is to be paid free of duty means in the case of settled legacies that the duty paid on the death of the tenant for life, as well as that payable on the death of the testator, must be paid out of residue. To hold that it does is obviously extremely inconvenient, as the residuary estate cannot be distributed until the deaths of all the persons who have limited interests in the settled legacies. There was a convenient decision by Mr. Justice Eve in Re Snape (113 L. T. Rep. 439; (1915) 2 Ch. 179) that a bequest of a sum free of all duty only referred to duties imposed at the death of the Second Sheet testator, so that, where that death happened before the Act of 1914 came into operation, the subsequent duty must be paid out of the legacy. In Re Palmer (115 L. T. Rep. 57; (1916) 2 Ch. 391), however, the Court of Appeal decided that there was no such general principle which could be relied on, but that the intention of the testator must be discovered from the language of his will. The executor has therefore the difficult task of making up his mind as to whether the words are large enough to include all future duties, or whether, when the duties on the testator's death have been paid, he can distribute the residue and leave the settled legacy to bear its own future duties. The following is an attempt to draw some general principles from the cases which have been before the courts. If the direction is that all legacies should be handed over or paid free of all duties, then as soon as the executors have handed over or paid or appropriated a legacy free of all duties then charged upon or payable in respect of it their work is over, and the legacy itself must bear any future duties: (Re Palmer, sup.). Where there is a direction to pay the estate duty (in the singular) and there are indications in the provisions as to residue that the testator was clearing his estate of all liabilities once for all, future duties must be borne by the legacies: (Re Gunn, 141 L. T. Jour. 217). Where a testator gives a sum to trustees free of duty," only the duty payable on the testator's death is payable out of residue: (Re D'Oyly, 116 L. T. Rep. 442; (1917) 1 Ch. 556). On the other hand, if there is a direction that all duties payable in respect of every benefit given by the will are to be borne by residue (Re Hatch, 115 L. T. Rep. 472), or that all legacies, whether settled or otherwise, are to be paid and enjoyed free of all death duties (Re Stoddart, 115 L. T. Rep. 540; (1916) 2 Ch. 444), or that all the gifts, bequests, and legacies should be free of duty (Re Eve, 116 L. T. Rep. 682; (1917) 1 Ch. 562), or that all duties in respect of a sum given to the trustees for the benefit of A. (the tenant for life) and her issue should be paid out of residue (Re Tinkler, 115 L. T. Rep. 710; (1917) 1 Ch. 242), or that all legacies, annuities, and bequests should be free of all death duties (Re Parker, 117 L. T. Rep. 422), the duty payable on the death of a tenant for life of a settled legacy must be borne by the residue. The line of demarcation between these two classes of cases is so very thin that the rest of the will must be carefully investigated to see if there is any other indication of the testator's wishes. In Re Stoddart (sup.) Mr. Justice Sargant said: It will be sufficient for the pecuniary legatees if the words 'free of all death duties' are limited so as to mean 'free of all duties arising by virtue of the dispositions made by my will,' and I see no reason for limiting them, if I limit them at all, to any greater extent." In Re Parker (sup.) Lord Justice Bankes expressed his agreement with that statement and said that if there was any difference between the reasoning upon which Mr. Justice Neville proceeded in Re D'Oyly (sup.) and that upon which Mr. Justice Sargant proceeded in Re Stoddart, he preferred the reasoning of the latter. There is one more case to be mentioned, and that is Re Kennedy (115 L. T. Rep. 690; (1917) 1 Ch. 9), where the Court of Appeal decided that a declaration that all the legacies, annuities, and bequests should be given and paid free of all death duties had the effect of throwing on to the capital the legacy duty payable in respect of a life interest in the residue. The draftsman should make it clear whether the duties referred to are those only which will be payable on the testator's death, or include those which will be subsequently payable on the death of persons with limited interests. In most business transactions there arise questions as to the goodwill of the business, and it is of importance to have clear ideas as to the meaning, and consequently the value, of "goodwill." It is proposed in this article to set down shortly a few of the leading principles which apply to goodwill in considering its legal and commercial aspects. There is, of course, no exact legal definition of goodwill. In Trego v. Hunt (73 L. T. Rep. 814 ; (1896) A. C. 7), a case in which the meaning of the term was discussed at length, Lord Macnaghten says: "It is the whole advantage, whatever it may be, of the reputation and connection of the firm which may have been built up by years of honest work or gained by lavish expenditure of money." If it is permissible to expand the idea which seems to the writer to underlie those words, it may be said that goodwill has two aspects (1) perfected organisation of the business, and (2) expectation of future profits from past connection and reputation. As to (1), the value of a “going concern as compared with its "break up" value is largely a question of work and money which has been expended in converting the latter into the former. The lifeless concern has to be organised into a living concern; the suitability of premises has to be ascertained; convenient methods discovered; communications opened up; the right man found for the right job, and so forth. As to (2), this is a matter of notoriety and satisfaction to past customers. In any particular business the value of its goodwill may be composed of either or both of items (1) and (2). The value of a commercial business might well be composed of both items almost equally, while the value, e.g., of a daily newspaper might consist almost entirely of the second item. It is thus obvious that goodwill is in many cases a genuinely very valuable asset-it may be the sap and life of a business— and may represent an asset of real capital value which has been acquired by laying out very large sums in experiments in organisation or acquiring publicity. It is quite proper, therefore, for a company to regard losses made during the first few years of its existence, while it is building up a business, as being capital expenditure made in the acquirement of goodwill. In this connection it is interesting to note that the rule of law that, ' although dividends must not be paid out of capital, a loss shown in past years on revenue account need not be made good before profits earned in any subsequent year are distributed as dividend: (see Ammonia Soda Company v. Chamberlain (118 L. T. Rep. 48; (1918) 1 Ch. 266). As regards the value of goodwill, generally speaking, there is not much more to be said. Goodwill varies with the nature and circumstances of the particular business. The cautious business man will be careful not to value goodwill too high, and past expenditure and the expectation of future profits are the guides thereto. In dealing with the value of goodwill of a partnership rather different considerations apply, and there are rules in connection with the matter which it is well to note as they may be of value to arbitrators and others who have to assess the value of goodwill on the dissolution of a partnership by death or otherwise Where the partnership is dissolved by the death of one partner, or by the expiration of the agreed time, or otherwise, the rule of law is that the partnership assets and effects, including the goodwill, must be sold and the proceeds divided according to the share of each partner therein. The general rule is, of course, often varied by special agreement in the partnership articles, which provide some special method of winding-up the partnership. In the absence of special stipulation, however, even if one partner buys the share of his deceased or former partner, the measure of the value which he ought to pay is what the deceased or former partner's share would fetch if the whole business were sold to a stranger. This will materially affect the value of goodwill, because on any sale to a stranger the goodwill would be depreciated in value owing to the fact that the former partners could (apart from special stipulation) set up immediately in competition with the purchasing stranger. Mr. Justice Romer said in Re David and Mathews' Arbitration (80 L. T. Rep. 75; (1899) 1 Ch., at p. 382): “I think that the goodwill ought to be valued on the footing of the consideration of what its value would have been to the partnership if there had been no contract between the partners that the surviving partner should purchase the share of the deceased partner in the partnership effects and securities, and, therefore, on the footing that, if it were sold, the surviving partner would be at liberty to carry on a rival business, but also, I think, on the footing that he could not use the firm name of the partnership firm, and would not have the right to solicit the old customers of the firm." The prohibition against soliciting old customers does not, of course, extend to the right to deal with them, nor does the prohibition against using the firm name extend It may be well to remind practitioners that the Timber Control Order 1918, dated the 16th July 1918, made by the Board of Trade under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, may render necessary the insertion of special provisions in the conditions of sale of land with timber thereon. As is well known, that order places restriction upon the sale of timber, either alone, or with the land on which it is growing. With regard to the latter, it provides that where an estate, or land, with the timber growing thereon, is sold by private contract, the vendor must, if the contents of such timber (excluding hedge-row trees) exceed 10,000 cubic feet, before completion submit to the controller full particulars of the timber thereon at the date of the contract, together with the name and address of the purchaser, and unless a permit is thereupon granted by or on behalf of the controller, the sale, so far as relates to the timber thereon, is void (par. 10). And where an estate, of land, with the timber growing thereon, is offered for sale by auction, whether in separate lots, or as a whole, the auctioneer, or vendor, if the contents of such timber (excluding hedge-row trees) exceed 10,000 cubic feet, must, before the same is offered at auction, submit full particulars of the timber thereon to the controller, together with the valuation thereof on the basis of sched. A of the Home Grown Timber Prices Order 1918, and, unless a permit is granted either to the auctioneer or the vendor, such timber is excluded from the sale of the land. Such permit may provide that the sale shall not be completed as regards the timber until a permit has been granted to the purchaser, and the conditions of sale are to provide accordingly. The valuation of the timber in all cases is to be announced at the time of sale (par. 11). The expression timber" in pars. 10 and 11 includes all trees of pitprop size and over, other than orchard trees. And where a permit is granted for the purchase or sale of standing, or felled, timber, such permit may specify the use to which such timber may be put, or the district in which it may be used, or resold, after severance or removal, and any other conditions which the controller sees fit to impose (par. 13). Having regard to the foregoing provisions, it seems advisable to insert a condition that the property is sold subject to the provisions of any permit granted, or to be granted, under the said order, and generally to the provisions of such order, and to stipulate that, if for any reason a proper and sufficient permit shall not be obtained before completion of the purchase, the timber will be excluded from the sale, with liberty of ingress, egress, and regress for the vendor to, from, and upon the property, with workmen and others, at all reasonable times, for the purpose of viewing and cutting down the same, and with horses, carts, and otherwise to carry away the timber, doing no wilful damage to the grass or other crops of the purchaser, and paying fair compensation for all damage actually done. Timber-Larch. are APROPOS of the previous article, it may be useful shortly to refer to what is timber in the eyes of the law, and apart from the Timber Control Order. Strictly speaking, only oak, ash, and elm timber" (Co. Litt. 53a), and that only provided they are of the age of twenty years. By the custom of the country other trees are also considered to be timber, such as birch, beech, horse chestnut, and walnut trees, and even whitethorn and blackthorn: (see the judgment of Sir George Jessel in Honywood v. Honywood, 30 L. T. Rep. 671; L. Rep. 18 Eq. 309). If wood is used for the purpose of building, that goes a long way to show that it is usually regarded as timber. Larch trees are not timber, except by local custom : (see Dashwood v. Magniac, 65 L. T. Rep. 811; (1891) 3 Ch. 379). They are peculiar in their mode of cultivation and incidents generally. It is usual to plant them somewhat closely together— about 2500 to an acre. After a lapse of time, from twelve to fifteen years, the trees are thinned, but the thinnings at that time do little more than pay for the cost of thinning. Successive thinnings take place at intervals of five and ten years. When the trees are about twenty years old the thinnings are sold for prop-wood in coal mines, and, at subsequent intervals of ten years or so, they are again thinned and sold for pit-wood until they are about fifty or fifty-five years old, when they are at maturity-see Re Harrison's Trusts (52 L. T. Rep. 204; 28 Ch. Div. 222), in which it was decided that the proceeds of the sale of larch trees blown down, and felled, by reason of the gales, did not belong to the equitable tenant for life, but must be invested by the trustees. But the court, having regard to the average income which would have been derived from the plantations if no gales had occurred, fixed an annual sum to be paid to the tenant for life out of the income, and, if necessary, the capital, of the invested fund, subject to the right of the trustees to have recourse to the fund in order to replant the plantations. An interesting case as to the rights and position of a tenant for life in larch trees on a settled estate arose in the recent case of Re Terry: Terry v. Terry (ante, p. 148; on appeal, p. 233). There the larch trees, which were between thirty and thirty-five years old, were sold to the Controller of Timber Supplies for an exceptional price. In 1890 an order of the court had been made authorising the trustees to cut and sell timber, wood, and underwood, in a due and proper course, and directing that the net proceeds of all sale of wood, other than timber not cut for thinning, should be applicable as income. In the ordinary way these trees would have been left, with judicious thinning, for another twenty-five or thirty years, but, owing to the exceptional demand at the present time for pit-wood, it was more advantageous to cut them now than to wait till they grew to maturity. Under the circumstances Mr. Justice Astbury ordered that the agent's commission, and the cost of replanting, should be paid out of the proceeds of sale, and the balance divided into equal moieties, capitalising one and paying the others to the tenants for life. On appeal that order was confirmed. The Court of Appeal thought that the learned judge in the court below had given to the tenants for life quite as much as they could possibly be entitled to. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED. BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS. COURT OF APPEAL. Master and Servant-In the Course of Servant's Employment— Instruction of Master-Servant shooting Rubbish on Plaintiff's Land-Application for Injunction against Master. An action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant to restrain the defendant, his servants, and agents from trespassing upon the land of the plaintiffs and from depositing rubbish thereon. The plaintiffs were the owners in fee simple of a piece of land. It was vacant land awaiting development, and was unfenced and separated from the highway on one side merely by a pavement and kerb. The defendant was a contractor, and part of his work was the removal of rubbish for other persons. The rubbish was removed in carts and sometimes shot on dumps upon which the defendant had acquired a right to shoot rubbish, or sometimes disposed of to customers. For the purpose of his business the defendant employed a number of carters, who were paid daily wages. The job was settled for the carters each morning, and they were engaged to take certain loads of rubbish to some particular destination, and it was for this that the carters were paid, and if they were able to put in an extra job they got extra payment. Occasionally a carter, against the express authority of the defendant. had shot his cartload of rubbish upon the plaintiff's land in order to get rid of his load and save himself trouble. It was in respect of this that the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendant. The defendant.stated that he had made inquiries from all the cartera in his employment with reference to the plaintiffs' complaint, and they all denied trespassing or shooting rubbish upon the plaintiffs' land. It was decided by Neville, J. (an'e, p. 276) that the act done by the defendant's servants was not done by them in the course of their employ. ment; that the act was done by them entirely for their own benefit and without regard to and without the intention of carrying out the work for which they had been employed; and that therefore the defendant was not liable. His Lordship relied upon Limpus v. London General Omnibus Company (1 H. & C. 526). The plaintiffs appealed. Held, that the decision of Neville, J. was right and his order could not be disturbed, it not having been established that the defendant had authorised the acts which his servants had committed, but, on the contrary, the same were done to further their own purposes, so that there was no actionable wrong for which he was liable. [Joseph Rank Limited v. Craig. Ct. of App.: Swinfen Eady, M.R., Duke, L.J., and Eve, J. Oct. 16.-Counsel: Jenkins, K.C. and J. W. Manning; Ward Coldridge, K.C. and Timins. Solicitors: Oldham, Cornwall, and Wood Roberts; Herbert A. Phillips.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Defence of the Realm-Summary Offence-Plea of guilty-Right of Appeal-Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 58), s. 37 (1)—Defence of the Realm Regulations, reg. 58. An information was preferred by the appellant against the respondent under the Defence of the Realm Regulations for a breach of the Pigs (Maximum Prices) Order 1917. At the hearing the respondent was present, and his solicitor stated that he pleaded not guilty. At the end of the case for the prosecution the respondent's solicitor submitted that there was no case for him to answer, but the justices overruled the objection and decided to fine the respondent. The respondent's solicitor thereupon withdrew his plea, and the respondent gave evidence in mitigation. The justices then fined him 10s. The respondent appealed to quarter sessions, which held that the respondent had a right of appeal under reg. 58 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, and allowed the appeal. By reg. 58: " Any person aggrieved by a conviction of a court of summary jurisdiction under these regulations may appeal in England to a court of quarter sessions. By sect. 37 (1) of the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914: "Any person aggrieved by any conviction of a court of summary jurisdiction in respect of any offence, who did not plead guilty or admit the truth of the information, may appeal from the conviction in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to a court of quarter sessions." Held, that reg. 58 was not affected by the above section, and that, if a person was aggrieved by any part of the conviction, i.e., either the decision as to his guilt or the sentence, he was a person aggrieved and had a right of appeal under reg 58 even if he had pleaded guilty, and therefore the decision of quarter sessions must be affirmed. [Harris v Cooke. K. B. Div.: Darling, Avory, and Salter, JJ. Oct. 18.-Counsel: Sir Archibald Bodkin and Richard Watson; Travers Humphreys. Solicitors: E. P. Lckfold; Seaton Tay'or and Co. for J. R. Cooke, Wakefield.] Gaming-Place used for Betting-Social Club-Betting between Members of Club-Members of the Club Bookmakers-Room set apart for Purposes of Betting-Evidence-Betting Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), ss. 1, 3. The respondent R. was the lessee of certain premises used as a social club, and he was also the secretary and manager of the club. The club in question had a membership of about 200, and in the basement of the club there was a room which contained a billiard table, a number of small tables, chairs and settees, two telephones, and a tape machine. Another respondent, C., who had been a member of the club for many years, attended to the tape machine and called out the racing news, such as the names of starters and winners, the odds, &c. The other respondents were described as turf commission agents. The whole of the respondents were members of the club, and it was found as a fact by the learned magistrate before whom the proceedings hereinafter mentioned were taken that the club was a bonâ fide club. On certain days in July 1918 police officers visited the club and found a large nomber of persons present in the basement room. The whole of the respondents -nine in number-were present on each occasion. No games of billiards were being played on any occasion, and nothing was being done in the room but what had reference to betting. Several documents relating to betting were found in the possession of the respondents. Summonses were taken out by an inspector of the metropolitan police against the respon dents charging them with offences against sects. 1 and 3 of the Betting Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119), for opening, keeping, and using rooms for the purposes of betting. The learned magistrate who heard the summonses was of opinion that the Act did not apply to the case of members of a club who were betting in a room of a club, and that the members of a club could not be held to be "persons resorting to the premises so as to make them liable under the statute. He was further of opinion that it was quite immaterial that some of the members of the club who were upon the premises and in the basement on the occasion of the visit of the police were bookmakers. He therefore dismissed the summonses. Upon an appeal from the finding of the learned magistrate by way of case stated, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that where there was a place in a club set apart for the purpose of betting it was immaterial whether the club was or was not a bonâ fide one, and whether the persons resorting thereto were or were not members thereof. Chance betting between members of a club did not constitute an offence against the statute, but where betting was carried on systematically as a part of the business of the club the offence was complete, and the learned magistrate should have convicted the respondents. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the learned magistrate was justified in the circum same. stances in drawing the inference that betting was not a part of the business of the club, but was merely an incident of the The case was covered by the decision in Downes v. Johnson (72 L. T. Rep. 728; (1895) 2 Q. B. 203). Held, that the decision of the learned magistrate was wrong, Case remitted to the magistrate. [Jackson v. Roth and others. K. B. Div.: Darling, Avory, and Salter, JJ. Oct. 22.-Counsel: Sir A. Botkin and Roome: Zeffertt. Solicitors: Wontner and Sons; De Frece and Co.] Intoxicating Liquor-Drunkenness-Resident on licensed Fremises Found drunk on the Premises"-Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 12 The respondent, who was the wife of the occupier of fullylicensed premises and lived on the premises with her husband, was found drunk on the premises at 10 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. on a weekday, the premises being open at the time. The premises were situate in the district of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) for the Welsh area. By an order of the board the sale and supply of intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises on weekdays had been restricted to the hours between twelve noon and 2.30 p.m. and between 6 pm. and 9 p.m., but the premises were allowed to be open for the sale of nonintoxicants until 11 p.m. An information against the respondent under sect. 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 for being found drunk on licensed premises was dismissed by the justices on the ground that it was not an offence for a resident on licensed premises to be found drunk on the premises at a time when they were not open to the public for the purpose of the licence. Held, that, as the premises remained licensed premise, being used as a public-house for certain purposes though not for the sale of intoxicants, the justices ought to have convicted the respondent. [Lewis v. Dodd. K. B. Div.: Darling, Avory, and Salter, JJ. Oct. 17-Counsel: St. John G Micklethwait; R. O. B. Lane. Solicitors: Taylor, Rowley and Lewis, for F. Lyndon Cooper, Newport, Mon.; Kinch and Richardson, for D. Edward Jones, Abertillery.] Res judicata-Damage to Electric Light Apparatus-Award by Justices-" By Way of Satisfaction"-Action for Balance of Damage. Defendants' appeal from a judgment of the Birmingham County Court. The Gasworks Clauses Act 1847 (10 Vict c. 15), s. 20, provides that: "Every person who shall carelessly or accidentally break, throw down, or damage any pipe, pillar, or lamp belonging to the undertakers, or under their control, shall pay such sum of money by way of satisfaction to the undertakers for the damage done, not exceeding £5, as any two justices or the sheriff shall think reasonable." In March 1917 a section box of a lighting standard of the corporation of B. was injured by being struck by a motor lorry of the defendants, the damage done being estimated at £29 11s. In Sept. 1917 the plaintiffs summoned the defendants under the above section, and justices awarded that the defendants pay the plaintiffs £5. The plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendants in the County Court and recovered judgment for £24 11s., the balance. The defendants appealed, contending that the matter was res judicata, and the County Court judge had no jurisdiction to make the order against them. Wright v. London General Omnibus Company (36 L. T. Rep. 590; 2 Q. B. Div. 271) and Crystal Palace v. Idris Table Water Company (82 L T. Rep. 200) were cited. Held, that, although the common law remedy by action was not ousted by the section, yet the award of £5 by the justices was 'by way of satisfaction" under the section, and that the defendants, having been ordered by the justices to pay that sum, could not be sued for the balance of the damage. Appeal allowed. [Birmingham Corporation v. Samuel Allsopp and Sons Limited. K. B. Div.: Rowlatt and McCardie, JJ. Oct. 18.— Counsel for the corporation, J. F. Eales; for the defendants, N. Birkett. Solicitors Sharpe, Pritchard, and Co., for F. C. Minshull, Birmingham; Barlow, Barlow, and Lyde, for James Ore, Birmingham.] : Revenue-Income Tax-Statement of Profits-Proper Deductions -Annuities not charged on particular Fund-PaymentWhether out of t›xed Dividends-Pension ranted to ex Employee -Income Tax Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict c. 35), s. 52—Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 8), s. 24 (3). A company carried on the business of purchasing reversions and life interests, making loans upon them and granting annuities. Its revenue was derived from reversions which had fallen in or been redeemed, from repayments of loans, and from other sources, including a considerable income from dividends taxed at the source. Before paying annuities the company deducted income tax from them, and, in making up its state |