sequence of the intimation contained in T.'s letter of the 26th, and they met an action at his instance for the price of the watches with a counter-claim of damage on account of the pursuer's refusal to go on with the contract. Held (1) that the pursuer's threat that he would not go on with the contract did not justify the defenders in refusing to pay for goods delivered under the contract; and (2) that their refusal was a breach of contract which excluded any claim of damages on their part against the pursuer. Thorneloe v. M'Donald & Company, p. 409. Contract-Agricultural Lease-Claim by Tenant of Farm against Mineral Tenant for Severance Damage In the lease of a farm the proprietor reserved full power to work the minerals, and to resume the land necessary for that purpose, subject to the condition that he should allow the tenant an abatement of rent in respect of any land resumed. The proprietor subsequently let the minerals under the farm to tenants to whom he assigned the rights and reservations contained in the agricultural lease, and he bound the mineral tenants to settle with the agricultural tenant for all ground taken from his farm according to the conditions of the agricultural lease. The mineral tenants having taken ground from the farm for the construction of a railway, held that the agricultural tenant had no claim against them for severance damage, in respect that the rate of compensation to be paid for land taken in connection with the mineral workings was fixed by his lease. Opinion by the Lord President that a claim of severance damage is truly a claim for part of the value of the ground taken, namely, its value as an access to the adjoining lands. Doubt expressed on this point by Lord M'Laren. Robertson v. Ross & Company, p. 853. Acquiescence. A entered into a contract with B to purchase from him all the steel he required for a work on which he was engaged. A subsequently ordered a quantity of steel rivets from C, who applied to B for rivet bars, informing him that they were to be made into rivets for A. After seeing A about the matter, B agreed to supply C with the rivet bars, and he continued to make him additional supplies until he had supplied him in all with 1200 tons. He thereafter, while continuing to fulfil C's orders, intimated to A that he reserved his claim of damages against him. In an action of damages for breach of contract by B against A, held that B had waived his rights under the contract only as regarded the 1200 tons. The Steel Company of Scotland v. Tancred, Arrol & Company, p. 873. Contract between School Board and Teacher as to Contract Trustees. Contravention. See Purgh. Contributory Negligence. See Railway. Conveyance "of Lands" without Reservation. See Property. Convicted of Aggravation not Charged. See Justiciary Cases. Corroboration of Pursuer's Evidence. See Affiliation. Counsel's Fees. See Expenses. County Franchise. See Election Law. County Hall held by Trustees. See Trust. Creditor's Petition. See Company. Crofter. See Sequestration. Crown-Title-Property-Solum of Sea LochsTrespass-Deposit of Dredgings. Held that the Crown possesses a title to the solum of sea lochs, like Loch Long, which run up into the country, entitling it, without alleging that the public rights of navigation and fishing are being in any way interfered with, to prevent any person trespassing upon such solum by depositing large quantities of solid matter thereon. Opinions expressed that the Crown's title is one of property, and not merely of trust; and opinions indicated that the right of the Crown to the solum of the ordinary sea coast below low water-mark within the three mile limit is also a right of property. The Lord Advocate v. The Clyde Trustees, p. 153. Crown not Prejudiced by Neglect of Officers. See Revenue. Culpa. See Reparation. Culpable Homicide-Child-Birth-Neglect to Call for Assistance - Indictment Relevancy. A charge was preferred against a woman, that having been delivered of a child, she did then and there compress the throat of said child, and did suffocate and kill it, or otherwise that being delivered of a child, she did refrain from calling for assistance when the time of her being delivered had arrived, in consequence whereof the said child died. Held that the alternative charge was irrelevant, but opinion that if a child dies of suffocation or other cause consequent on the mother's reckless neglect to call for assistance at the time of her delivery assistance being at hand-the mother is guilty of culpable homicide. H.M. Advocate v. Scott, p. 629. Child. Injuries causing the death of a child which has breathed and cried may constitute the crime of culpable homicide, although at the time the injuries are inflicted the child is not completely born. H.M. Advocate v. Scott, 629. Proof-Evidence in Defence-Letters of Panel-Admissibility. In the course of the trial of a woman for the culpable homicide of her infant child, counsel for the panel proposed to put in evidence letters written by the panel to her mother prior to and during her pregnancy, with the object of showing that the panel having suffered from irregularity of menstruation prior to pregnancy was ignorant of the probable period of her confineHeld that the letters were inadmissible as evidence in panel's favour. H.M. Advocate v. Scott, p. 629. ment. Curator. See Parent and Child-Minor. Curator Bonis-Annuity out of Lunatic Ward's Estate Amount Fixed by Ward-Petition by Beneficiaries for Increase of Amount-Nobile Officium. Where a voluntary annuity, of an amount fixed by a lunatic before being placed under curatory, is being paid out of his estate, the Court will not authorise its increase because of the greater exigencies or altered circumstances of the beneficiary. Bowers, Petitioner, p. 812. See Diligence-Judicial Factor. Curator Bonis in Right of his Ward. See Exe cutor. Custody of Child. See Parent and Child. Damage by Fire-Title to Sue-Insurance. Held, in an action of damages on account of a fire caused by a spark from a locomotive, that the fact that the pursuers' loss was covered by insurance formed no objection to their title to use. The Port-Glasgow and Newark Sailcloth Company, Limited v. The Caledonian Railway Company, p. 577. Damages. See Superior and Vassal-ProcessContract - Reparation—Railway—Agent and Principal. Damages for Breach of Contract. See Landlord and Tenant. Dangerous Machine. See Reparation. Dangerous Part of a Road. See Reparation. Date of Valuation-Whether Interest should be Allowed on Ascertained Value. Held (1)— following Macdonald v. Macdonalds, 7 R. (H. of L.) 41-that the proper date at which to estimate the value of a substitute heir's expectancy is the date of the instrument of disentail; and (2) that the Court has no authority under the statute to allow interest on the ascertained value. Pringle v. Pringles, p. 820. De præsenti Acknowledgment. See Husband and Dean of Guild. See Burgh. Decree ad factum præstandum. See Process. Defect in Form. See Summary Prosecutions. Defender Abroad. See Process. Delay by Landlord to Charge on Decree. See Landlord and Tenant. Delegation. See Bankruptcy. Delay in Taking Delivery. See Ship. Denial of Claim on Record. See Arbitration. Deposit-Receipt Blank Indorsed by Deceased. See Donatio inter vivos. Destination different from the Terms of Statute. See Assurance. Destination in Favour of Spouses and "their Children" Exclusive of Husband's Children by Second Marriage. See Succession. Destination in Will. See Succession. Diligence Following Decree. See Reparation. Disbursement of Money in Bets. See Horseracing Discharge of Cargo into River. See Charter-Party. Discharge of Liability. See Reparation. Discharging "as Customary." See Ship. Discretion of Court. See Process--Sequestration. Discretion of Dean of Guild. See Burgh. Discretion of Sheriff. See Bankruptcy. Discretion of Trustees to Retain Capital. See Trust. Disentail. See Entail. "Dishonourable Conduct." See Reparation. Disposal of "Proceeds" of Estate. See Succession. Disposition of Lands in Security. See Election Law. Disposition of Property under Conditions. See Succession, Disputed Debt. See Company. Distinguishing Variation of Name, See TradeName. Division per Stirpes or per Capita. See Succession. Divestiture of Truster. See Trust-Disposition and Assignation. Divorce. See Husband and Wife. Domicile. See Husband and Wife. Donatio inter vivos-Deposit-Receipt Blank Indorsed by Deceased-Presumption. Evidence in support of an alleged donatio inter vivos which held insufficient to overcome the presumption against donation. Dawson V. M'Kenzie, p. 226. Donation-Donatio inter vivos. A, a tradesman, having executed a trust-deed for behoof of his creditors, B purchased his business from the trustee, and thereafter entered into an agreement with A, wherein he agreed to take him into his service in connection with the business at a weekly wage, and, without coming under any legal obligation on the subject, expressed his intention to apply one-half of the profits derived from the business, so long as A remained in his service, for the benefit of A's family. A remained in B's service for some years, and during this period B credited him annually in the books of the business with half the profits. After A's death B wrote to his children informing them of the sum standing at A's credit, and in a subsequent letter he talked of this sum as set aside for their benefit, and said that he would continue Election Law-Registration-Claim Signed by Person having no Mandate-Registration of Voters (Scotland) Act 1856 (19 and 20 Vict. c. 58), sec. 36. Held that a claim to be enrolled on the register of voters, signed on behalf of the claimant by the organising secretary of a political association who had no mandate, written or otherwise, from the claimant, was bad. Burns v. Cassells, p. 141. Registration Claim Specification of Qualification. Held that a claim which specified the qualification as "Occupier. Occupied whole of the house last year. This year joint-tenant (half and half) with J. A. L.," was good. Lindsay v. Falconer, p. 142. Registration-Claim-Statement of Qualification-Partner of Firm. Held that a claim which stated the nature of the qualification as sole partner of a certain firm in possession of certain premises was bad. Falconer v. Macleod, p. 143. Burgh Franchise-Qualification as Owner 2 and 3 Will. IV. c. 65, sec. 7. In order to support a claim for registration as owner under section 7 of 2 and 3 Will. IV. c. 65, it is necessary that the claimant shall be still proprietor of the subject at the date when the Sheriff proceeds to consider his claim. M'Kenzie v. Comrie, p. 143. Service Franchise. A butler in the employment of a firm of drapers, who by virtue of his employment occupied for his exclusive use a bedroom in the firm's premises, was entered by the assessor upon the roll. voter on the roll objected to the entry, on the ground that the butler inhabited a dwellinghouse in virtue of his employment which was A also inhabited by a person under whom he served in this employment. The premises consisted of a tenement of several flats, the ground flat being the business premises, and the upper flats devoted to sitting-rooms and bedrooms for the firm's employees. A manager or buyer and shop-walker of the firm, who had general supervision of the domestic arrangements provided for the employees, occupied rooms on the second flat, the butler's room being on an upper flat. The flats were all reached by a common stair, but had each separate doors. Except the common stair there was no communication between the flat occupied by the manager and that occupied by the butler. Held (1) that the dwellinghouse occupied by the butler was not occupied by the manager; (2) by Lord Adam and Lord Trayner-Lord Kincairney expressing no opinion--that the manager was not the person under whom the butler served; and the objection repelled. Falconer v. M'Guffie, p. 237. Election Law--County Franchise--Property Qualification Disposition of Lands in Security. Bankrupts who had entered into a composition arrangement with their creditors disponed certain lands, heritably and irredeemably, to the person who became security for payment of the composition. The disposition declared that the subjects were conveyed in security, and for payment to the disponee of moneys advanced or to be advanced in payment of the creditors, and of certain expenses in connection with the sequestration. Power of sale was conferred on the disponee, and he was taken bound to account for his intromissions, and to pay over any balance to the bankrupts. Held that the disponee was not entitled to be put on the roll as proprietor of the subjects. M'Kenzie v. Watt, p. 239. Registration-Notice of Objection-Registration of Voters (Scotland) Act 1856 (19 and 20 Vict. c. 58), secs. 4 and 9. The Registration of Voters (Scotland) Act 1856, sec. 4, as amended by the Representation of the People (Scotland) Act 1868, provides that every person objecting to any entry on the roll shall, on or before the 21st day of September, give or cause to be given to the person so objected to, or leave or cause to be left at his place of abode as described in such list, a notice;" and sec. 9-"It shall be sufficient if such notice be sent by the post, postage paid, addressed with a sufficient direction to the person to whom the same ought to be given, at his usual place of abode." A notice of objection addressed to the person objected to at his residence at S was posted at M on the evening of 21st September after the last despatch for that day from M. Held (Lord Adam diss, on the authority of M'Creath v. Smith, 1869, 8 Macph. 15) that the notice was not timeously given. Neilson v. Robertson, p. 242. Election of Magistrates. See Burgh. Election of Trustee. See Bankruptcy. Emolument. See Revenue. Employment. See Agent and Client. Employer and Workman. See Reparation. Entail-Power to Disentail Estate Entailed in Pursuance of Agreement-Entail Amendment Act 1882, sec. 13. By minute of agreement the Duke of Sutherland, heir of entail in possession of an entailed estate, and the Marquess of Stafford, the heir-apparent under the entail, and whose consent was necessary to the disentail of the estate, agreed for certain onerous causes that the estate should be disentailed, and thereafter re-entailed along with other lands which the Duke held in fee-simple. In the narrative of the agreement one of the inducing clauses was stated to be "that it is desirable for the preservation of the dignity and honour of the Earldom of Sutherland that the said estates should be secured by fetters of entail, so far as legally may be done, from being alienated from the Earldom of Sutherland, or wasted or charged with debt except as after mentioned." In pursuance of the agreement the estate was disentailed, and afterw4rds re-entailed along with the feesimple lands. The Entail Act of 1882, sec. 13, gave power to the heir of entail in possession to have the consent of the apparent heir dispensed with in an application to disentail. In 1891 the Duke of Sutherland presented a petition to disentail a portion of the estate entailed in pursuance of the agreement of 1878. The application was opposed by the Marquess of Stafford. Held that the application was not barred by the agreement of 1878. Duke of Sutherland v. Marquess of Stafford, P. 422. Petition to Disentail a Portion of an Entailed Estate Power of Court to Dispense with Consents of Next Heirs-Entail Amendment Acts 1848, sec. 3; 1875, sec. 5; and 1882, secs. 3 and 13. Held that the power of the Court to dispense with consents of next heirs is not confined to the case of an application to disentail the whole of an entailed estate, but applies to the case of an application to disentail a part of such estate. Duke of Sutherland v. Marquess of Stafford, p. 422. Disentail Valuation of Expectancies— Entail Amendment Act 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 61), sec. 5-Valuation of Estate-Deduction of Burden---Bond of Annual Rent-Entail Act 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 53), sec. 6, sub-sec. (4). By section 6, sub-section (4), of the Entail Act 1882 an heir of entail in possession is empowered, where one-fourth of a capital sum of improvement expenditure borrowed upon the security of a terminable rent-charge is defrayed, to substitute for the bond of annual rent a bond and disposition in security for the remaining three-fourths of such capital sum. In a petition for disentail-held that in estimating the value of the next heirs' expectancies, the whole of a capital sum of improvement expenditure, charged upon the estate by bond of annual rent, fell to be deducted from the valuation of the estate in so far as not repaid at the date of valuation. Pringle v. Pringles, p. 820. Disentail-Valuation of Expectancies— Entail Amendment Act 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 61), sec. 5—Whether Succession Duty should be Deducted. The amount of succession duty which a substitute heir of entail would have to pay on coming into the estate is not a proper deduction from the value of his expectancy. Pringle v. Pringles, p. 820. Entail-Whether Exceptional Health to be Taken into Account. Opinions by the Lord President and Lord Adam that in estimating the value of a substitute heir's expectancy, circumstances tending to show that his chance of life is above the average, form a proper subject of inquiry. Opinion by Lord M'Laren reserved. Aver ments by a substitute heir of entail of circumstances tending to show that his chance of life was above the average, which were held too indefinite to be made the subject of inquiry. Pringle v. Pringles, p. 820. See Revenue-Appeal to House of Lords. Entry. See Superior and Vassal. Equitable Construction. See Contract. Estate of Inheritance in Possession in the Real Evidence. See Poor-Reference to Oath. Excepted Causes. See Ship. Exceptional Health, whether to be Taken into Exclusion of Action. See Arbitration. tion. Executor Competing Claims for the OfficeNomination of Survivor to be Sole Executor by Mutual Settlement by Husband and WifeSubsequent Nomination of Trustees by One of Parties alone-Curator Bonis in Right of his Ward-A.S., 1730. By a mutual deed of settlement executed by a husband and wife, the survivor was nominated sole executor to the predeceaser. By subsequent deed the husband, without the wife's consent, named certain persons to act as trustees along with his wife in case of his predecease. He was survived by his wife, who was shortly thereafter placed under curatory. Competing petitions for the office of executor were presented by the wife's curator bonis as in her place, and by the trustees. Held (1) that whether the provisions in the subsequent deed by the husband innovated unwarrantably in other respects upon the prior mutual settlement or not-which it was premature to consider-it was competent for him to nominate trustees to act along with his wife; (2) that their nomination as trustees implied in the circumstances that they were also to be executors; and (3) that they fell to be decerned executorsnominate to the exclusion of the wife's curator bonis. Ferguson's Trustees v. Martin, p. 401. See Reparation. Executor-Dative-Competing Claims - Right of Surviving Husband. Held (following the case of Stewart v. Kerr, decided by the Second Division, March 19, 1890, 17 R. 707) that a husband is not entitled to be decerned executor-dative to his deceased wife in competi tion with her next-of-kin. Campbell v. Falconer, p. 445. Executor Making Agreement Adverse to Interest of Executry Estate. See Intestate Moveable Succession. Exemption. See Revenue. Agent - Disburser. Where in an action of damages for breach of promise raised in a Sheriff Court two appeals were taken to the Court of Session, one upon the merits of the cause, and another at a later stage against the competency of a decree for expenses pronounced in the Sheriff Court, the Court refused to pronounce decree in name of the agent-disburser for expenses to which the pursuer had been found entitled in the second appeal, a larger sum of expenses for which the defender had obtained decree in the first appeal being still unpaid. Macgillivray v. Mackintosh, p. 103. Expense of having Auditor's Report Approved. A defender obtained decree for expenses, and at a later stage of the same case the pursuer was found entitled to expenses. After the pursuer's account was taxed by the Auditor the defender offered to credit him with the amount of his account under deduction of the expenses of approval and decree, and only to claim payment of a balance due to her. This offer was refused by the suer, who enrolled the case and moved for decree in name of the agent-disburser. The Court, holding that the defender was entitled to have the one account set off against the other, refused to allow the pursuer the expenses of approval and decree. Macgillivray v. Mackintosh, p. 103. pur A shareholder of the company was allowed at the first hearing of the petition to lodge answers. They contributed nothing material to the arguments for or against the petition. Held that he was not entitled to expenses. Cowan and Others, Petitioners, p. 375. Expenses of Process-Tender-Reasonable Conduct of Defender. A firm of electric contractors raised an action against a person whose house they had lighted with electricity, for £169, Os. 7d., the balance of their account. After the summons had been signeted, but before it was called, the defender offered the pursuers £155 in full of their claims. This offer was refused. In the defences to the action the defender tendered the pursuers £50 "in full of their claims in this action." The Court in decerning against the defender for payment to the pursuers of £44, 13s. 1d., held that the defender was entitled to expenses of process. Mavor & Coulson v. Grierson, p. 766. Taxation-Counsel's Fees-Hearing Continued over More than One Day. For an Inner House debate, which lasted half-an-hour one afternoon and about an hour the following day, the fees sent to senior counsel were five guineas for the first day and four guineas for the second day, and to junior counsel four guineas and three guineas. The Auditor taxed off one guinea from each of the first day's fees and disallowed the second day's fees altogether. Held that as the debate had been continued into a second day, the two guineas taxed off the first day's fees fell to be restored. Baird & Stevenson v. Malloch, p. 883. Expenses. See Process-Company-Parent and Child. Expense of having Auditor's Report Approved. Expenses of Opposition. See Judicial Factor. Expenses, Printing. See Valuation Roll, Extrajudicial Admission. See Arbitration. Extinction of Servitudes Affecting Land Acquired. Failing to Remove Nets, &c. See Justiciary Cases. Failure to Deliver Copies to Opposite Agents. See Process. Failure to Dispose of Fee. See Succession. Family Tradition. See Poor. Fee and Liferent. See Succession-Minor. Feu-Contract. See Superior and Vassal—Burgh. Foreign-Reparation-Wrong Done in England - Right of Action-Seduction-Aliment. A married woman, with concurrence of her husband, brought an action against a man resident in Scotland, in which she averred that before her marriage, and while a servant in a house in London rented by the defender, she had been seduced by him, and had, as the result thereof, borne a child after her marriage. She claimed damages for the seduction, aliment for the child, and inlying expenses. The defender, while denying the truth of the pursuer's averments, stated that by the law of England the pursuer's claims were excluded, and pleaded that the questions between the parties fell to be determined by that law. The defender was allowed a proof of that statement, at which two English barristers were examined for him, and no evidence was led for the pursuer. Thereafter it was held that as by the law of England a woman had no right of action for damages on the ground of seduction, and only a limited statutory claim for aliment and inlying expenses conditional upon her being a single woman, the action fell to be dismissed. Ross v. Sinhjee, p. 63. See Assignation. Foreigner. See Arrestment jurisdictionis fun- |