proprietors of lands lying within his sheriffdom in any competent action relating to the possession of these lands, or of things locally situated within them, although such proprietors reside beyond and are not served with the action within the sheriffdom. A local authority brought an action in the Sheriff Court of Fife at Dunfermline against the proprietors of certain lands in the county, to have them interdicted from drawing a supply of water for these lands from a pipe belonging to the pursuers, and situated within the county. The defenders were resident beyond, and the action was not served upon them within the sheriffdom. Held that the Sheriff had jurisdiction to deal with the action, in respect that its subject-matter was the possession of certain heritable property within his sheriffdom, and the defenders were proprietors of lands within it. Culross Special Water Supply District Committee v. Smith-Sligo's Trustees, p. 73. Sheriff Jurisdiction-Process-Union of Several Counties into One Sheriffdom. Held—following Tait v. Johnston, February 28, 1891, 18 R. 606-that in a sheriffdom in which several counties are combined, the Sheriff sitting in one county of the combined sheriffdom has jurisdiction to try an offence committed in another county of the same sheriffdom. The District Committee for Kelso District of County of Roxburgh v. Fairbairn & Ferguson, p. 284.

Sheriff Court. See Parent and Child.
Ship Charter-Party-Construction- Demurrage

-Custom of the Port. A charter-party stipulated that a vecsel should proceed to "Portugalete, or any other usual ore loading-place in the river Nervion, not above Luchana, as ordered by merchant's agents on arrival, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and there load in the customary manner from the factor of the said merchant a full and complete cargo of iron ore. . . . Steamer to be loaded at the rate of not less than 400 tons per working day as customary, after being berthed in turn, and ten days on demurrage over and above the said lay-days at 16s. 8d. per hour." The rules of the port provided that the turn for loading vessels was to be taken from an official list of arrivals. The

vessel arrived at Portugalete on 17th June, and received her official number. She was ordered by the shippers' factor to load from a particular station or deposit. On 21st June the vessel was ready to receive cargo, but as other previous arrivals had to be loaded from this particular station, she could not be berthed until June 27th, when her loading began, which was completed on the evening of the 28th June. In the meantime vessels which had arrived later were able sooner to load their cargoes from other and less crowded stations. In an action for demurrage by the shipowners, held (diss. Lord Young) that as the charter-party did not stipulate that the vessel should berth in turn at a particular place, she should have been berthed in turn

with other ships according to the order of their arrival at any berth where iron ore was loaded at Portugalete; that her time for loading in turn arrived on 21st June; and that the defenders were liable for the detention of the vessel before the loading commenced. Stephens, Mawson, & Goss v. Macleod & Company, p. 30.

66

Ship-Charter-Party-Demurrage-Discharging as customary" at Terminus Quay, Glasgow. A charter-party provided that a vessel should proceed with a cargo of iron ore to the Terminus Quay, Glasgow, and be discharged as fast as steamer could deliver, after berthed, "as customary." According to the custom of the port of Glasgow, iron ore must at the Terminus Quay be discharged into the trucks of the Caledonian Railway Company from the ship's side, and in no other way. The vessel was detained two days beyond the time necessary to discharge her according to the average rate of delivery, owing to failure of the railway company to supply a sufficient number of trucks. In an action for demurrage it was proved that the failure to supply trucks did not arise from the inability of the railway company to furnish them, but from their refusal or delay to do so owing to questions which had arisen between them and the charterers. Held that in a question with the shipowners the charterers were liable for the delay. Wyllie v. Harrison, October 29, 1885, 13 Ř. 29, and 23 S.L.R. 62, distinguished. Holman & Sons v. Harrison & Company, p. 47.

Discharge Charter-Party- Excepted Causes-Demurrage. A charter-party allowed forty-eight running hours for discharging cargo "except in cases of . . . strikes . . . detention by railway or any other cause beyond the control of the charterers which may impede the ordinary loading and discharging of the vessel," and stipulated for demurrage at the rate of 10s. per hour for any time expended over and above the forty-eight hours. The charterers failed to discharge within the stipulated time, and were sued by the shipowners for demurrage. The defenders alleged that the delay was due to the impossibility of getting railway waggons owing to a strike of railway servants. Held that the delay was not due to any of the causes specified in the charter-party, and that the defenders were liable in demurrage. The Granite City Steamship Company, Limited v. Ireland & Son, p. 115.

Charter-Party-Clause of ExemptionDetention by Railways-Demurrage--Relevancy. A charter-party contained a clause of exemption, which provided, inter alia, "that detentention by railways, of whatever nature and kind soever, during the said voyage was to be mutually excepted." The shipowners sued the charterers for demurrage, and averred that at the port of delivery the authorities discharged such vessels into trucks supplied by a certain railway company; that the railway company had trucks available for the work of discharge, but the defenders, in breach of

the regulations of the railway company, kept too many trucks unloaded in their works, and because of this the railway company refused to supply trucks for the delivery of cargo. This was the cause of the delay of the vessel. The Court held that, on the pursuers' statement, the proximate cause of the delay was the act of the railway company; that assuming the alleged fault of the defenders, it was too indirect to affect the present question; that the clause of exemption covered the case made on record; and dismissed the action as irrelevant. Letricheux & David v. Dunlop & Company, p. 182. Ship-Charter-Party-Bill of Lading--Construction-Lay-Days-Part of Day-Demurrage. The charter-party of a steamship provided, "the cargo to be brought and taken from alongside the steamer at freighter's expense and risk. . . . Eleven running-days (Sundays excepted) are to be allowed the said freighters for loading and unloading. . . . The 1885 bill of lading to be used under this charter, and its terms to be considered part thereof." Five and a-half days were occupied in loading the ship. The bill of lading was headed "Bill of Lading 1885," and provided-"All conditions as per charter-party. Five and ahalf (5) laying-days remain for discharging the whole cargo." It was a printed document with blanks, and the words in italics were filled in by the master. The steamship arrived at her port of delivery on the 26th December, and on the same day the agents for the owners at that port wrote to the consignee, the indorsee of the bill of lading, in these terms-"As advised, s.s. Archdruid' is now lying at foot of M'Alpine Street, where she will be ready to commence discharging at 6 a.m. to-morrow morning, and lay-days will commence then." Discharging commenced at 7 a.m. on the 27th December, and ended at 2 a.m. on the 6th January. Sundays were excepted by the charter-party; Thursday, January 1st, was of consent treated as a nonworking day; and during a certain portion of the time one of the steamer's winches broke down. The owners brought an action against the consignees for three days' demurrage from 12 p.m. on the 2nd January. Held (1) that the defender had five and a-half days for unloading, as by the charter-party the owners had directly empowered the master to fix the number; (2) that in terms of the letter written by the agents for the shipowners, these fell to be reckoned as periods of twenty-four hours from 6 a.m. on 27th December; (3) that an allowance of one day fell to be made for the breakdown of the winch, which extended the lay-days into Monday the 5th, and that only one day's demurrage was due. Allan and Others v. Johnstone, p. 321.

Charter-Party-Delay in Taking Delivery -Rescission. By charter-party dated 3rd July 1891 the owner of a steamer, then being fitted out in the Clyde for the summer traffic, agreed to let her to a charterer till 30th September. The charter-party provided that the

The

charterer should "pay for the use and hire of the said vessel at the rate of £425 per month, commencing the day of delivery . . . whereof notice shall be given to the charterer . . . payment of the hire to be made in cash monthly, in advance, . . . first month's hire to be paid before the steamer leaves the Clyde. Charterer agrees to give a banker's guarantee for the due payment of the hire money." As soon as the charter-party was signed the owner began, through his broker, to press the charterer for the bank guarantee. charterer replied that he was not bound to give the guarantee until the vessel was ready to be handed over. The broker assented to this, but continued from 6th to 10th July to press the charterer daily to give the guarantee. The charterer made no answer to any of these communications until the 10th, when he replied that he was prepared to give the guarantee on delivery of the vessel. On 13th July the broker telegraphed that the vessel would be delivered in Glasgow on the 15th. charterer replied that he would leave Hastings for Glasgow on the night of the 15th to take delivery, but without notifying the owner he postponed his departure for a day, and did not reach Glasgow until the morning of the 17th, when he found that the owner had chartered the vessel to someone else. In an action by the charterer against the owner, the Court held (1) that the charterer had not committed a breach of contract by failing to take delivery on the day fixed; (2) that the charterer's conduct had not been such as to justify the owner in believing that he did not intend to fulfil his contract; and therefore found the charterer entitled to damages. Collard v. Carswell, p. 856.

Ship. See Reparation.

The

Ship in Course of Construction. See Reparation. Ship's Lien over Delivered Cargo till Freight Paid. See Charter-Party.

Shipping Law-Measure of Claim of Salvage. A steamer having grounded on a rock near the mouth of a harbour during a dense fog, a tug and two small boats came to her assistance. At the request of the master of the steamer each of the small boats carried a hawser from the steamer to the tug, and the steamer was then dragged off the rock by the tug and towed into port. The crew of the small boat which had first come to the steamer's assistance claimed £100 for the service rendered by them. It was proved that this service had been neither difficult nor dangerous, and might have been performed by one of the steamer's own boats; that the value of the steamer was estimated at £5500, and that it had been rescued from a position of considerable but not immediate danger. The Sheriff awarded a sum of £10. Held, on appeal (diss. Lord M'Laren), that this sum was not so inadequate a remuneration for the service rendered as to justify the Court in interfering with the award of the Sheriff. Walker and Others v. North of Scotland and Orkney and Shetland Steam

Navigation Company (Owners of "Queen"), p. 322.

Sinking Fund. See Burgh.
Slander. See Reparation.

Small Debt Decree. See Reparation.

Solatium. See Reparation.

Solum of Sea Lochs. See Crown.

Special Defence. See Justiciary Cases.

Special Destination. See Succession.

Special Legacy. See Succession.
Special Powers. See Trust.

Specialia derogant de generalibus. See Justiciary
Cases.

Specification of Qualification. See Election Law. Sponsio ludicra. See Horseracing.

Stables. See Revenue.

Stamp Duty. See Revenue.

Statement by Physician Called in to See Patient.
See Reparation.

Statement of Qualification. See Election Law.
Statement regarding Candidate for Town Council
by One Elector to Auother. See Reparation.
Statute. See Justiciary Cases.
Statutory Notice. See Police.
Statutory Offence. See Justiciary Cases.
Stipend. See Church.

Stock Exchange Transaction. See Contract. Stream-Pollution-Primary Purposes-Special Degree of Purity-Prescription--Mine-Right to Pump Water into Water Course. Held that a riparian owner, although he has for more than the prescriptive period used the water of a stream for a special purpose-e.g., the distillation of whisky-has no claim to have the water of the stream transmitted to him in a higher degree of purity than that of being fit for the primary purposes; but that a mineowner is not entitled by pumping to send even unpolluted water from his colliery into a stream, which it could not have reached by gravitation, to the injury of a lower heritor. Bankier Distillery Company v. John Young & Company, p. 878.

Street. See Reparation.

Sub-Contractor. See Reparation.

Subsequent Nomination of Trustees by One of Parties Alone. See Executor.

Subsequent Revocation. See Trust-Disposition and Assignation.

Subsequent Trust-Disposition and Settlement ly the Husband. See Succession. Succession -Fee and Liferent-Liferent of Whole Heritable Estate- Income of Mineral Field Opened but not being Worked at Date of Testator's Death. A husband directed his trustees to hold his whole heritable estate for his wife, and to pay her, in the event of her surviving him, "during her lifetime, the free annual proceeds of said estate, and of minerals therein." Certain parts of the estate had been opened by the testator in his lifetime with the view of being worked for minerals, but had ceased to be worked, and were not under lease at the date of his death. Held that the trustees were entitled to lease such portions without the consent of the person to whom the estate was to be conveyed upon the expiry of the liferent, and that the liferentr x

was entitled to the rents derived therefrom. Case of Campbell's Trustees v. Campbell, March 15, 1882, 9 R. 725-aff. July 6, 1882, 10 R. (H. of L.) 65, distinguished. Baillie's Trustees v. Baillie, p. 196. Succession-Settlement-Conditio si sine liberis. In his trust-settlement a testator left a legacy of £500 to his son John if he returned to this country within ten years after the death of the survivor of the testator and his wife, "declaring that at the end of the said ten years the said sum of £500 shall be divided equally among my surviving children." Elsewhere in the deed the testator made various provisions in favour of his other children and their issue. John did not return to this country within the ten years prescribed, and before the expiry of that period James, another son of the testator, died leaving issue. Held that the legacy was divisible among the children of the testator who had survived the period prescribed, and that the issue of James had no right to any share of it under the conditio si sine liberis. M'Ewan and Another (Carter's Trustees) v. Carter and Others, p. 347.

Fee or Liferent-Disposal of "Proceeds" of Estate-Failure to Dispose of Fee-Intestacy. A testator by his trust-disposition and settlement provided "(first) that one-half of the clear proceeds arising from heritable properties belonging to me, as well as interest accruing from all my moveable property, shall be assigned annually or half-yearly to my niece. . . and I also leave to her during her lifetime the use of my house with all the furniture therein; (next) that my trustees shall devote £10 annually to provide a bursary; (next) that the remaining portion of the annual proceeds of my estate shall be devoted to Home Mission work . . . under the management of the office-bearers of Free Martyrs' Church, Dumfries." Held (1) that he had died intestate quoad all the fee of the whole of his estate both heritable and moveable; (2) that his niece was entitled under the settlement to the liferent of the house, to the liferent of the furniture therein, and to payment during her lifetime of one-half of the clear revenue or income derived from the remainder of the truster's estate, both heritable and moveable, and that the office-bearers of said church were entitled to payment of one-half of the clear revenue or income derived from the said remainder of the truster's estate, both heritable and moveable, under deduction of £10 annually for said bursary. Henderson's Trustees, p. 356.

Vesting-Conditio si sine liberis-Division per Stirpes or per Capita. A testator directed his trustees to pay the income of his whole estate to three annuitants-his two sisters and a sister-in-law-"the families of the annuitants to get the interest of their mother until the death of the last annuitant, when at the ensuing money term the residue of my estate is to be divided into two parts, the one for the families of my two sisters (excluding the jus mariti of their husbands), and

the other half to the treasurer" of a church, equally. At the death of the last annuitant the grandchildren of one of the testator's sisters, whose mother had predeceased the testator, claimed to represent their mother in her share, as being part of the family of the testator's sister, their grandmother. Held that (1) the word "family" included only the children of the testator's sisters alive at the time of vesting; (2) that the division of the residue among the families must be per stirpes and not per capita. Grant and Others (Low's Executors) v. Whitworth and Others p. 389. Succession-Antenuptial Contract of MarriageProvisions for Grandchildren, whether Onerous or Testamentary-Subsequent Trust-Disposition and Settlement by the Husband-Power to Increase Wife's Provisions. A husband by an antenuptial contract of marriage disponed his whole estate, heritable and moveable, to his wife in liferent and to the child or children of the intended marriage, and the issue of the bodies of such children, whom failing to his own heirs whomsoever in fee, under a declaration that if there was no child alive at the dissolution of the marriage the wife's liferent should be limited to £150. There was no trust created by this deed, and the husband retained his whole estate in his own possession until his death. He died, predeceased by his only child, and survived by his wife and one grandchild, leaving a trust-disposition and settlement executed a few years before his death under which his wife was given the unrestricted liferent of his whole estate. After her death his whole estate was to be converted into money, his grandchild was to receive a legacy upon attaining twenty-one years of age, and after payment of other legacies the residue of the estate was to be divided among the nephews and nieces of himself and of his wife. Held (rev. Lord Kincairney) that the provisions for children in the antenuptial contract of marriage were onerous and contracted only as regarded the children themselves; that as regarded the issue of such children these provisions were testamentary merely, and might be and had been validly revoked by the husband's subsequent trust-disposition and settlement; and that the restriction of the widow's liferent to £150 in the event of there being no child alive at the dissolution of the marriage was in the husband's favour, but did not oblige him to restrict her provision to that amount. Held further (aff. Lord Kincairney) that under the marriage-contract, there being no child but only a grandchild alive at the dissolution of the marriage, the widow's provision would have fallen to be restricted to £150. Case of Mackie v. Gloag's Trustees, March 9, 1883, 10 R. 746, rev. March 6, 1884, 11 R. (H. of L.) 10, commented upon and distinguished. Hall v. Macdonald, p. 465.

Disposition of Property under Conditions -Real Burden-Obligation. A person disponed heritable estate to persons in a certain

order of succession "under this declaration, burden, and condition, that in the event of any part of the said lands and estate that may remain unsold at my death being thereafter sold or disposed of or excambed by any proprietor or possessor of the same, or adjudged or attempted to be adjudged or carried away in any manner of way for his or her debt, that then and in any of these events there shall be paid out of the price of the lands. . . if and when sold, or created a real lien and burden upon the same if they shall remain unsold, to and in favour of such of the children of G. F. as may then be in existence, or to their heirs equally to and among them, the sum of £10,000.". . . One of the proprietors of the estate under this disposition gratuitously disponed it to a line of heirs so that shortly the estate would be given to a person not within the line originally pointed out. Held that there was an obligation upon such person on succeeding to the estate to create a real burden over it for the sum of £10,000 in favour of the children of G. F. or their heirs. Falconar Stewart v. Wilkies, p. 534. Succession--Destination in Will--Fee and Liferent --Parent and Child--To Parent in Liferent and Children not Named in Fee-Retention of Fee by Testator's Executor till Death of Liferenter. A testator directed his executors to pay his widow the free income of the residue of his estate during her life, "and after her death, or after my death if she shall predecease me, I leave and bequeath the liferent of the said residue or remainder to" his son "during the whole days of his life, and in regard to the fee of the said residue or remainder, I hereby leave and bequeath the same to the child or children of my said son, with power to my said son to apportion the said fee amongst his children in such manner as he may think right, and failing such apportionment the said fee shall be payable amongst the said children equally, share and share alike." After the death of the testator and his widow, survived by his son, who had issue-held (1) that the testator's son had no right to the fee of the residue, and (2) that the executor was bound to retain the residue in his own hands until the death of the son. Rait v. Arbuthnott, p. 595.

Legitim Obligation Undertaken by Father in Son's Marriage-Contract-Collation. A father in the marriage-contract of his son undertook to cause to be vested in the marriage-contract trustees a third part of the whole property which should belong to him at the time of his death. In his last will the father directed his executor to perform the obligation undertaken by him in the said marriage-contract. On the death of the father, held (1) that the son was entitled to claim legitim out of the residue of the father's estate remaining after performance of the said obligation, and (2) that in claiming legitim the son was not bound to impute thereto the provision made for him by the father in the