rected that the residue of his estate should be divided equally among his children upon the youngest attaining majority. He postponed vesting until the period of division, but authorised his trustees to make advances out of the residue to his daughters on marriage, these advances to be deducted from their respective shares of residue upon the division taking place. The testator left four daughters, three of whom married before the period of division, and the trustees, besides making them advances on marriage, made each a yearly allowance after marriage. Held that in division of the residue, interest at the average rate earned by the trust-estate must be charged upon the payments made to the married daughters after marriage, these payments being unauthorised, but that no interest was chargeable upon the advances made on marriage. Baird's Trustees v. Duncanson

and Others, p. 862. Succession-Vesting-Destination-over. A testator directed his trustees to pay the liferent of his estate to his widow, under burden of maintaining his unmarried daughters and such of his sons as should require assistance; after her death to pay an annual sum equally to his sons, and the balance of income equally among his unmarried daughters, while two remained unmarried; after the death of the widow and the death or marriage of all the daughters but one, to dispone to his sons. certain heritable subjects, but each under the burden of an annuity of £15 to the surviving daughter, and to pay "to each of my daughters, married and unmarried, without restriction, and not exclusive of the jus mariti of their husbands, the sum of £1500 sterling at the first term of Whitsunday or Martinmas after the death of my wife, and after the death or marriage of all my daughters but one; and it is hereby specially provided and declared that the issue of a daughter predeceasing the period for payment of the aforesaid provision of £1500 shall have right equally among them to their mother's provisions." The sons were appointed residuary legatees. The testator was survived by his widow, one son, and three daughters. After the death of the widow and a daughter, the second daughter died leaving a settlement disposing of her share of her father's estate. In a question between her executor and the representatives of her brother, the residuary legates-held (Lord Young diss.) that a legacy or provision of £1500 from her father's estate did not vest in her, and that the sum of £1500 continued to form part of the residue of her father's estate. Pearson (Reeve's Executor) v. Pearson and others (Reeve's Trustees), p. 897.

Legacy Special Legacy Right in Security. Held, per Lord Kyllachy (Ordinary), that the legatee of a specific moveable subject must take it subject to any burden with which it may have been affected by the testator subsequent to the date of the bequest. Stewart v. Stewart, p. 907.

Succession Policy of Assurance-Special Destination. A special destination in a policy of assurance will be given effect to in a competition between the trustees named in the policy and the executor-dative of the assured, even although the policy was not intimated to the trustees and the assured died insolvent. Dickie and Others (Dickie's Trustees) . Dickie and Another, p. 908.

Clause

Vesting - Marriage-Contract Construction-Conditio si sine liberis. In an antenuptial marriage-contract the wife conveyed a sum of £4000 to trustees. The deed provided that in the event of the marriage being dissolved by the predecease of the wife leaving children, the husband should have an alimentary liferent of this fund, that after his death the capital should be paid over to the children of the marriage on their attaining majority, and that if there were no children alive at the dissolution of the inarriage, or should they all die before the terms of payment of their provisions as aforesaid, the husband should continue to have the liferent of the fund during his life, but that the whole capital should be subject to the wife's disposal by will. In the parallel clause

which dealt with the event of the husband predeceasing the wife, it was provided that the wife should have an alimentary liferent of the fund; that after her death the interest was to be applied for behoof of the children during their minority, and that on their attaining majority the capital was to be paid to them, but subject to the declaration that if "such children should all die before their mother, or . . . should they all die before attaining majority, and without leaving issue of their own bodies," the fund should continue to be held for the alimentary liferent of the widow; and it was further declared that in the event of the wife surviving her husband, and of the failure of issue of the marriage, she should have the right to test on the capital. It was expressly provided that the provisions to children should not be payable, or become vested interests, or be transmissible by them until after the death of the longest liver of the spouses, and until the children attained majority. The marriage was dissolved by the predecease of the wife, who was survived by one son, and left a will in which she made over all she possessed to her husband. In an action by the husband and son for payment upon the joint discharge of the £4000, held (rev. judgment of the First Division) that the trustees were bound to maintain the trust, not only for the protection of the husband's alimentary liferent, but also for the possible issue of the son. Hughes and Another (Edwardes' Trustees). Edwardes and Another, p. 911,

See Revenue.

1864 (27 and 28 Vict. c. 53), sec. 18, sub-sec. 6, Schedule K, No, 6. The Summary Procedure (Scotland) Act 1864, sec. 18, sub-sec. 6, which provides the form of sentence for penalties for contravention of an Act of Parliament where the Act declares the penalty to be recoverable by arrestment, poinding, or distress, and sale or imprisonment, provides that "no warrant of imprisonment shall be issued upon a judgment in such form until after the period allowed for execution by arrestment or poinding." Under the relative schedule an exception is enacted-"If at the hearing it shall appear that the issuing of a warrant of arrestment, poinding, and sale, would be inexpedient," in which case the form is to run, "and in respect it is inexpedient to issue a warrant of poinding and sale, ordain instant execution by imprisonment." In a prosecution under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts Acts 1864 and 1881, for a penalty under the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, which provides that the decree for such penalty shall contain warrant for arrestment, poinding, and imprisonment in default of payment, the judgment of the Court ordained immediate imprisonment in default of payment, and did not contain the words of the schedule "in respect it is inexpedient," &c. Held that the sentence was bad. Simpson v. The Board of Trade, p. 603.

Summary Prosecutions. See Justiciary Cases.
Summons. See Process.

Superior and Vassal-Feu-Contract— Obligation to Build-Personal or Transmissible-Damages. A superior feued ground to three parties, and the survivors or survivor, and the heir of the last survivor, on condition, inter alia, that the vassals should build within two years and maintain dwelling-houses of a certain value, failing which the feu-contract and all following thereon should, in the option of the superior, become null and void. After the lapse of two years the last surviving vassal died in possession of the subjects without having implemented the obligation to build. His widow, his sole trustee, announced that she did not claim the subjects. The superior sought to have her ordained, as personal representative of her late husband, to erect the stipulated buildings or to pay damages. The Court assoilzied the defender, holding (1) that although there was a personal obligation on the last vassal to fulfil the conditions of the feu, this obligation existed as a condition of holding the subjects, and did not attach to his personal representative, who was not vassal therein; and (2) that as there was no obligation affecting the defender which could have been forced, she was not liable in damages. Observed (per Lord Kinnear and Lord Adam) that the claim of irritancy merely conferred an additional remedy by the use of which the superior might enforce the conditions of the contract. Macrae (Buchanan's Judicial Factor) v. Mackenzie, p. 127.

Casualty Composition - Implied Entry -Infeftment - Conveyancing (Scotland) Act

1874 (37 and 38 Vict. c. 94). The Conveyancing Act, sec. 4, sub-sec. 2, provides"Every proprietor who is at the commencement of this Act or thereafter shall be duly infeft in the lands shall be deemed and held to be as at the date of the registration of such infeftment. . . duly entered with the nearest superior to the same effect as if such superior had granted a writ of confirmation according to the existing law and practice." A vassal was infeft in certain heritable subjects, and the infeftment was registered on 19th May 1873. It was admitted that the last vassal died previous to 1873. In an action by the superior for a casualty of composition, held that the rental of 1874, the year of the vassal's entry, and not 1873, the year of his infeftment, must be taken as the standard for fixing the amount due to the superior. Houston v. Buchanan, p. 436.

In

Superior and Vassal-Casualty-Composition-
Entry-Trust. In 1810 an unentered proprie-
tor of lands, which he had inherited from an
ancestor who was a singular successor of the
last-entered vassal, and who held an uncon-
firmed a me infeftment, by an inter vivos trust-
disposition and settlement disponed the lands
to trustees, directing them to pay his debts,
and annuities to himself and his wife, and to
carry out the provisions of his deeds of settle-
ment in favour of his wife, children, or any
other person or persons. The trustees were
empowered to sell his lands, with his written
consent, for payment of debts, and were bound
to reconvey the remainder when the debts
were paid, or whether paid or not, at Martin-
mas 1814. The truster died in 1811.
1815 the trustees were infeft on a decree of
adjudication and implement obtained by them
against the truster's heir, and were entered
with the superior as trustees for the uses and
purposes of the trust-deed only, by charter of
sale, adjudication, and confirmation, narrating
the grounds of their right, and confirming the
dispositions and unconfirmed infeftments since
the date of the last vassal's entry. They paid
composition. In 1860 the last surviving trus-
tee reconveyed the remaining lands to the
truster's heir-at-law, who was infeft on the
conveyance, and was thereby in 1874 entered
with the superior by the operation of the Con-
veyancing Act 1874, sec. 4. The last surviv-
ing trustee died in 1863. The superior de-
manded a casualty of composition; the vassal
tendered relief-duty. Held (aff. judgment of
Second Division) that the heir was liable in
payment of composition in respect that the
trustees' entry did create a new investiture,
but even if it did not, the present owner was
not the heir of an investiture recognised by
the superior, for his ancestor had not been en-
tered, and the superior's confirmation of the
trustees' title was confined to what was neces-
sary to complete the new investiture, and had
no effect in confirming the truster's infeftment.
Johnstone v. Duke of Buccleuch, p. 915.

See Process.
Supervision Order. See Company.

Suppression of Nuisances. See Justiciary Cases.
Suspension. See Justiciary Cases.
Suspension of Charge. See Bill.

Tank Unfenced and Unlighted. See Reparation. Taxation. See Expenses.

Teacher Appointed Prior to Education Act 1872. See School.

Tender. See Expenses.

Testament-General Trust-Disposition and Settlement-Codicils--Principal Deed Re-written in Similar Terms and Re-executed-Revocation. A testator executed a general trust-disposition and settlement upon 8th March, and two codicils upon 9th March and 14th March respectively. A doubt having arisen as to the validity of the execution of the principal deed, another deed was prepared in virtually the same terms and executed upon 9th April. Held that the two codicils were not thereby revoked. Dalglish's Trustees and Others, p. 149.

Thirlage. See Servitude.

Time Fixed for Implementing Decree. See Pro

cess.

Title. See Crown.

Title of District Committee as Local Authority under the Public Health Act 1867. See Justiciary Cases.

Title of Truster under Private Trust by Debtor to Sue for Reduction of Illegal Preferences. See Bankruptcy.

Titles Assigned to Lender. See Loan.

Title to Sue. See Process-Husband and Wife— Trust-School Board--Damage by Fire-Servitude.

Title to Prosecute. See Justiciary Cases. Trade Name-"Beecham's Pills"-Hired Evidence-Interdict. The sole proprietors and manufacturers of a patent medicine called "Beecham's Pills" brought an action against a surgeon to have him interdicted from selling in a shop kept by him, as Beecham's, pills not manufactured by them. At a proof, witnesses sent to the shop for the purpose of detecting any fraudulent dealing on the respondent's part, deponed to having asked for pennyworths of Beecham's Pills, and to having been supplied with pills which were not the complainers', whereas the respondent's assistant, who alone attended to the shop, denied ever having sold Beecham's Pills in such small quantities, or ever having sold as Beechain's, pills which were not truly so. The Court (Lord Young dub.) held (aff. Lord Kyllachy) that the complainers had established their case, but before granting interdict allowed the respondent an opportunity of lodging a minute undertaking that he would not in future sell pills as Beecham's which were not manufactured by the complainers. Cases of Bass & Company v. Laidlaw, May 22, 1886, 13 R. 898; and Thomson & Company v. Robertson, July 12, 1888, 15 R. 880, referred to. Observations per Lord Young upon the unsatisfactory character of hired evidence. Beecham v. Macgilvray, p. 1.

Hotel-Distinguishing Variation of Name.

Held that a person who had come as tenant to the "Palace Hotel" after it had been so named by the landlord, and had occupied it for thirteen years, was not entitled, to the prejudice of the business to be carried on there by the landlord's representatives, to take that name with him to other hotel premises in the same city; and that the prefixing of his own name did not constitute a sufficiently distinctive addition. Great North of Scotland Railway Company v. Mann, p. 848. Transference of Trust Property to County Council. See Trust.

Trespass. See Crown.

Triennial Prescription. See Prescription. Trust - Charity— Administration—Nobile Officium. In 1845 a sale of work was held by ladies of the Established Church in Prestonpans for the purpose of raising funds to provide an infant school in room of one which had been maintained by the kirk-session of the parish prior to 1843, but had been discontinued in that year owing to the Disruption. The proceeds of the sale were subsequently handed over to the kirk-session, and being insufficient for the intended purpose were applied by them towards payment of the school fees and the clothing of children of poor deserving persons. The fund having increased, and having been claimed by the school board, who proposed to devote it to educational purposes, a petition was presented to the Court by the kirk-session craving authority to apply it towards the erection of Sunday school premises in connection with the parish church. The Court, after a remit, rejected a scheme embracing the suggestions. of the school board, and approved of the petitioners' proposal as being more nearly "in accordance with the original purpose for which the fund was established." The KirkSession of Prestonpans v. The School Board of Prestonpans, p. 168.

A

Liferent-Irritant Clause-Construction --Bankruptcy-Trustee-Power of Sale. disposition and settlement which conveyed certain estates in liferent and fee, prohibited the liferenters from "selling, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing" of their interest, and provided that "such sales and mortgages" should be void, that "all deeds or instruments purporting to be a sale or mortgage of such interest or any part thereof" should be null and void, and that "all parties signing such deeds or instruments" should thereby forfeit their rights in favour of the person next in succession. Two of the liferenters granted trust-deeds for behoof of creditors, conveying their liferents. These trust-deeds were superseded by the sequestration of their estates. Held (1) that a trust-deed for creditors being neither a sale nor mortgage was not affected by the resolutive clause; and (2) that the trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to all the liferent interests without incurring any irritancy. Hoile v. Chaplin and Others; More v. Chaplin and Others, p. 190.

Sale of Trust Property-Ultra Vires

...

county, and who held as trust-property for various county purposes a county hall erected about 1819, to be allowed to transfer the said hall to the council, and for exoneration and discharge, was granted. The Earl of Rosebery and Others, Petitioners, p. 865. Trust-Vesting-Discretion of Trustees to Retain Capital-Right of Trustee in Bankruptcy. A truster left all her estate, heritable and moveable, to trustees under direction "to hold, retain, and invest in their own names the residue and remainder of my said means and estate until my son attains the age of twenty-five years complete, at which time they shall ... make over to him the said residue and remainder. Declaring that my trustees shall be entitled, so long as they think it expedient to do so, to retain the said residue and remainder in their own hands, . . . and that even after my son shall have attained said age, and only pay him the annual produce or income thereof, it being understood that should they so retain it after he attains twenty-five years, and should he die without said residue and remainder and others having been paid to him, then the same shall be paid to his nearest heirs and representatives whomsoever, my intention being that the same should vest in him at said age of twenty-five." The son became bankrupt before reaching the age of twentyfive, and after he had attained that age, his trustee in bankruptcy claimed from his mother's trustees payment of the remainder and residue of the trust-estate as at that date, together with any income or revenue that had accrued thereafter. Held that the claim was sound and must be given effect to. Beatson and Others (Mackinnon's Trustees), p. 867.

Special Powers-Sale of Heritable TrustEstate. A truster directed his trustees to sell his whole heritable estate, excepting his heritable estate in L. and T. Held that that did not prevent the trustees being authorised to sell the heritable estate in L. and T. when that had become necessary in the interest of the beneficiaries, and for the preservation of the trust-estate against the diligence of creditors. The case of Whyte, January 10, 1891, 18 R. 376, distinguished. Gunn and Others (Sutherland's Trustees), Petitioners, p. 903.

See Petition · - Reparation — Charity — Superior and Vassal, Trust Administration. See Trust. Trust-Disposition and Assignation-Divestiture of Truster-Contingent Right of BeneficiarySubsequent Revocation. A truster by trustdisposition and assignation conveyed certain subjects, including certain policies of insurance, to trustees for the purpose, inter alia, of paying a sum of £500 to his nephew out of the proceeds of the policies to be received after his death. It was declared that the beneficiary should have no vested interest until payment. The truster bound himself to keep up the policies. He completely

divested himself of the estate conveyed, and reserved no power to revoke. Subsequently, on the narrative that the obligation in favour of his nephew was quite gratuitous, that his nephew's circumstances had improved while his own estate had become materially reduced, and that to give effect to the provision of the trust in question would unfairly prejudice his wife and children, who would now necessarily be seriously affected by the change in his circumstances, he revoked the said gift. The truster having died, and his trustees having received payment of the proceeds of the policies, it was held that the nephew was entitled to receive payment of £500, the truster having had no right to revoke the provision in his favour. Robertson v. Robertson's Trustees, p. 752.

Trust Deed. See Bankruptcy, Trust-Disposition and Settlement. See Succession. Trust for Behoof of Creditors. See Bankruptcy. Trust - Settlement - Pupils - Maintenance and Education Administrator-in-Law. In a petition presented by a father domiciled abroad, for himself and his two pupil children, craving the Court to ordain Scottish testamentary trustees to make an annual payment to the petitioner for the maintenance and education of his said children from the revenue of a fund held by the trustees for the children, the Court refused to grant the order craved, but intimated that they would be prepared to re-consider the application on being informed by the petitioner that steps were being taken to have the children provided with a legal guardian. Seddon Petitioner, p. 100.

Trustee. See Trust.

Trustee Partner in a Business forming part of the Trust-Estate. See Trust.

Two Appeals, Possibility of. See Process.

Ultra Vires. See School Board - Trust.
Unavoidable Delay. See Contract.
Unilateral Obligation. See Contract.
Union of several Counties into one Sheriffdom.
See Sheriff.

Unlicensed Carriage Let for Hire at a Railway
Station. See Justiciary Cases.
Unsound Meat. See Justiciary Cases.

Valuation Cases - Goodwill-Hotel. The proprietor of a hotel who had carried on business there let the hotel to a tenant upon a ten years' lease, the tenant paying a sum down for goodwill, fixtures, utensils, &c., and the proprietor undertaking not to begin business in the spirit line in the same town during the currency of the lease. The Assessor in valuing the premises took the rent in the lease and added thereto the tenth part of the whole sum paid for goodwill (the value of fixtures, &c., being first deducted). The tenant appealed to the Valuation Committee, and offered to prove that the sum arrived at was greater than the lettable annual value of the subjects. The Valuation Committee refused to hear evidence, and upheld the valuation.