Superior Courts: V. C. Turner.-V. C. Kindersley.-V. C. Stuart. Lambert v. Lomas. Nov. 19, 1852. SUITORS' IN CHANCERY RELIEF ACT. STAMPS ON PRINTED COPY BILL WHERE WRITTEN COPY FILED WITH STAMP. Order on Record and Writs' Clerk to receive and file printed copy bill pursuant to undertaking, without additional stamp of 11. thereon-the written copy filed under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 6, having been duly stamped. 115 point some person to represent the estate for all the purposes of the suit. The Vice-Chancellor said, the section referred only to some persons indirectly interested in the suit, and not to the person to administer whose estate it was actually instituted, and that an administration ad litem was insufficient, and a general administration must be taken out. White v. Cohen Injunction granted to restrain carrying on a noisy trade. 9.-Mayor, &c., of Basingstoke v. Lord Bolton Demurrer to bill allowed, without - THIS was a motion in this injunction case for an order on Mr. Murray, the Record and Writs' Clerk, to file a printed copy of the bill without a second stamp of 17. being affixed-costs, with leave to amend. the stamp having been duly paid on the written copy. Amphlett in support. referred to the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 87, s. 12 (printed p. 113, ante), and the 6th General Order of Oct. 25 last. The Vice-Chancellor, after consulting the other judges, rade the order as asked. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley. EQUITY JURISDICTION IMPROVEMENT ACT. Held, that the order under sect. 44, of the 15 16 Vict. c. 86, for the appointment of some person to represent the estate of any deceased party interested in the matters in question, only refers to parties indirectly interested in the suit and not to an intestate debtor to administer whose estate the suit was actually instituted; and held also, that a general administration and not an administration ad litem to his estate must be taken out. In this creditor's suit for the administration of the estate of an intestate debtor, it appeared that no administration had been taken out, and an order was sought under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 44, (printed ante, p. 37 note), to ap 9, 10, 11, 13, 14.-Murray v. BogueCur, ad. vult. Vice-Chancellor Stuart. M'Intosh v. Great Western Railway Company. Order made for production of certain documents under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 20, upon the affidavit of the defendant's solicitor of his belief that the plaintiff had those documents in his possession-excepting such as were privileged, and with liberty to the plaintiff to seal up, on oath, such parts as were privileged. THIS was a motion under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 20, (printed ante, p. 19, note,) on behalf of the defendants, who had put in a sufficient answer, for the production by the plaintiff on oath of certain documents in his possession. Bacon and Stevens in support, on an affidavit by the defendant's agent of his belief that the plaintiff had these documents in his possession. Russell and Bazalgette for the plaintiff, contrà, on the ground that, although he had some of the documents, their production would occupy much time and create great unnecessary expense, and citing Fiott v. Mullins, ante, p. 19. The Vice-Chancellor said, that in the case cited the motion was entirely unsupported by evidence; and an order was therefore made for production, except of such documents as were privileged to be specified by affidavit, and with liberty to seal up, on oath, such parts as were privileged. M'Intosh v. Grect Western Railway Company. Order made, on defendants' application, for the evidence to be taken under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, and the 39th Order of August 7, in a suit relating to mutual accounts, although the issue was joined in May last, and one of the witnesses had been examined de bene esse, under the old practice. 116 Superior Courts: V. C. Stuart.-Queen's Bench.-Common Pleas.-Exchequer Chamber. THIS was a motion on behalf of the defendants, for the evidence in this suit to be taken under the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, and the 39th Order of Aug. 7. It appeared issue was joined on May 18 last, and one of the witnesses had been examined de bene esse. Bacon and T. Stevens in support; Russel! and Bazalgette contrà. The Vice-Chancellor said, that the present case, which related to mutual accounts, was peculiarly within the view of the legislature in framing the statute, and made the order as asked accordingly. Dec. 8.-Great Northern Railway Company v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company -Injunction granted. 8. In re Midland Union, Burton-uponTrent, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, and Leicester Railway Company, exparte Pearson's Executors Motion refused, with costs, to remove names from list of contributories. 9.-Grote v. Byng-Application to appoint receiver to be made in Court, but at Chambers where in place of a former receiver. 9, 10.-Rawlins v. Daglish-Claim dis. missed, without costs. vult. 11, 13. Morgan v. Holford — Cur. ad. 13. Stand over. Attorney-General v. Attwood Common Pleas. Hamilton, appellant; Bass, respondent. Nov. FREEHOLDERS' 12, 1852. CLAIM ΤΟ HOW Held, that, in computing the annual value of Mellor, Q. C., in support, referred to 8 Hen. 6, c. 7; 10 Hen 6, c. 2; 19 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 5; and King v. Bermingham, Burr. Sess. Cas. 748; Colville v. Wood, 1 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 483. S. Temple, contrà, cited Copland v. Bartlett, 6 C. B. 18; 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 102; Beamish v. Overseers of Stoke, 2 Lutw. Reg. Cas. 89; 14.-Colombine v. Penhall; Penhall v. Lee v. Hutchinson, 8 C. B. 16. Colombine - Part heard. Court of Queen's Bench. Kipling v. Ingram. Nov. 9, 1852. LOCAL PAVING ACTS.-RATE ON OCCUPIER The Court said, the question was, what were the premises worth, and as it appeared a tenant would only give 591. if he had to repair, the qualification was insufficient, and the appeal must therefore be dismissed, with costs. OF PREMISES ABUTTING ROAD REPAIRED Collins, appellant; Thomas, Town Clerk of made on the occupiers of a house abutting on the City Road, which was kept in repair by the tolls taken thereon, was held bad. THIS was a special case. It appeared that the defendant occupied certain premises adjoining the City Road, which was kept in repair by trustees out of the tolls taken thereon, and that he had been rated by the paving commissioners of St. Luke's, under the 2 Wm. 4, c. xiii. s. 6, amending the 50 Geo. 3, c. cxlix. Crowder, Q. C., and G. Denman for the commissioners; Watson, Q. C., Lush, and Hawkins, for the defendant. Tewkesbury, respondent. Nov. 12, 1852. REFORM ACT.-QUALIFICATION OF VOTER. Held, affirming the decision of the revising THIS was an appeal from the decision of the revising barrister, on behalf of a claimant to vote in respect of a cottage and garden. The cottage alone was of insufficient value to qualify, and the garden was about 60 yards therefrom, but they were both rented at one time and of the same landlord. Ker contended the occupation was sufficient, The Court said, that the presumption was in Exchequer Chamber. Wesson v. Allcard. Nov. 30, 1852. ACCEPTOR.-PLEA OF BANKRUPTCY AND BILL OF EXCHANGE.-INDORSEE AGAINST Superior Courts: Exchequer Chamber.-Analytical Digest of Cases. Held, affirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer, that the indorsee of a bill of exchange was not barred of his debt by a plea of the bankruptcy of the acceptor where he had not received notice of the first sitting under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, although notice had been given to the drawer. THIS was an appeal from the Court of Exchequer, allowing a demurrer to the plea, to this action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, setting out that he was a trader, and had presented a petition to the Bankruptcy Court under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, and that the Court had appointed a sitting, .117 of which 14 days' notice had been given to all the creditors, including the drawer of the bill of exchange sued on, and stating that he did not know the bill had been indorsed to the plaintiff, or that he was the holder thereof. Watson and Fearson in support; Hugh Hill and Hawkins, contrà. The Court said, that the plaintiff was not barred of his remedy, because he had received no notice of the first sitting appointed by the Bankruptcy Court, as required by the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, and affirmed the judgment of the Court below accordingly. ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF CASES, REPORTED IN ALL THE COURTS. House of Lords. APPEAL. 1. Competency.-Pleading.-Dilatory defence. -A plea which does not merely raise an objection to a particular form of proceeding, leaving it to the plaintiff to proceed in a different form at another time, but which, if allowed, entirely bars the plaintiff from his remedy, is a peremptory, and not a dilatory, plea, within the 6 Geo. 4, c. 120, s. 5, and a decree thereon may be subject of appeal to this House. Geils v. Geils, H. of L. 280. 2. Petition to dismiss for incompetency. Right to begin.-Costs.-Where a petition to dismiss an appeal for incompentcy has been directed by the Appeal Committee to be argued at the bar of the House, the counsel for the petitioner is entitled to begin. The petition was dismissed, but the costs were reserved. Geils v. Geils, 3 H. of L. 280. 3. Questions of law to the Judges. This House is at liberty, without regard to the form of an appeal, or the points raised upon it, to put questions of law to the Judges. Bright v. Hutton, 3 H. of L. 341; Hutton v. Bright, ib. 4. Regularity of.-Right to begin.-When it is ordered that counsel be heard on a question as to the regularity of an appeal, the party objecting has the right to begin. Geils v. Geils, 1 Macq. 37. Cases cited: Gray v. Forbes, 5 Cl. & F. 363: M.L. 47. 5. Petition against receiving.-Case in which before the appeal was received a petition was presented by the party in possession of the judgment of the Court below, praying that such appeal should not be received, inasmuch as the interlocutor was one repelling a preliminary or dilatory defence without leave obtained to appeal. Report by the Appeal Committee that the appeal ought to be received, and order made by the House accordingly. Warrender v. Warrender, 1 Macq. 43. 6. Withdrawal of material parts of prayer at hearing. The House will not, at the hearing, allow an appellant to withdraw the material parts of his prayer, and retain something insignificant merely to save his appeal from dismissal. Anstruther v. East of Fife Railway Company, 1 Macq. 98. BANK. Agreement of surety for conduct of clerk.Discharge by fresh arrangement.-A. became surety for B.'s conduct as a clerk in a bank. B. was subsequently appointed to a better situation in a branch of the same bank, and A. extended his suretyship to this new situation. B. afterwards, while remaining in the same situation, undertook, on having his salary raised, to become liable to one-fourth of the losses on discounts. No communication of this new arrangement was made to A. B. allowed a customer considerably to overdraw his accounts, and thereby the bank lost a sum of money: Held, that the surety could not be called on to make good this loss, though it fell within the terms of the original agreement, as the fresh arrangement was the substitution of a new agreement for the former one, and A. was thereby discharged. Bonar v. Macdonald, 3 H. of L. 226. BURGH CUSTOMS. Bridge customs. Exaction of tolls from railway companies. - Certain roval grants authorised the Magistrates of Linlithgow to levy certain tolls and customs. These held to demandable from the Railway Company. On appeal, the cause ordered to be remitted, with directions for a "hearing in presence," and with liberty to open up the record, and to amend the pleadings. Opinions of the 13 Scotch Judges upon the question, how far, and in what sense, immemorial usage is to be taken as explanatory of a charter from the Crown; and how far, and in what sense, a consideration is necessary to render such charter effectual. Position of the record consequent on the remit. Edinburgh and Glasgow Railway Company v. Magistrates of Linlithgow, 1 Macq. 1. Cases cited: The Flesher's case, Morr. 10, 886; Brett v. Beales, 1 Moo. & M. 416; 10 Barn. & Cr. 508; Duke of Hamilton's case, 7 Bell, 1 118 Analytical Digest of Cases: House of Lords. CALLS. Action notwithstanding forfeiture and cancellation of shares. - Notwithstanding the forfeiture and cancellation of shares, and the issuing of new ones, the right to recover, in an action for calls, held to remain unimpaired in the company. Inglis v. Great Northern Railwas Company, 1 Macq. 112. Cases cited: East Lancashire Railway Company v. Croxton, 5 Exch. 287; Belfast, &c., Railway Company v. Strange, 1 Exch. 739; Great Northern Railway Company, v. Kennedy, 4 Exch. 417. COMPANIES' CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT. Register of shareholders.--By the Companies' Clauses' Consolidation Act, the book containing the register of shareholders is required to be authenticated by the seal of the company; but this "book" may consist of a series of volumes, in which case it will be sufficient if the seal be affixed to the last; provided there be a reference to the preceding ones, so as to identify and connect them together. Inglis v. Great Northern Railway Company, 1 Macq. 112. COMPROMISE. Of doubtful rights. Title paramount. Upon a compromise of doubtful rights, a third party cannot come in and claim the fruits of that compromise by a title paramount. Lord Advocate for Scotland v. Hamilton, 1 Macq. 46. CONSTRUCTION OF ANCIENT STATUTES. Several statutes on same subject.-Ancient statutes are to be construed with reference to the state of things at the time of their passing. It is a rule that several statutes on the same M'Wilsubject are to be read as one statute. liam v. Adams, 1 Macq. 120. CONTRIBUTORIES. Who are?-Contract with creditor.-Con tributories are those only who have contracted, by themselves or agents, with a creditor, or who have agreed to indemnify or repay, in part or in all, those who have contracted with the creditor on their own account. Bright v. Hutton, 3 H. of L. 341; Hutton v. Bright, ib. See Provisional Committee-man. COSTS. CREDITORS. Legal mortgagees and specialty creditors.Covenant. Trustees for Crown. - C. & Co. were legal mortgagees and specialty creditors for a sum of 30,000l. on Y.'s estate. Certain official persons acting as trustees for the Crown paid off this debt, and received an assignment of the mortgage, and of a covenant therein contained with liberty to sue upon it, in trust for the Crown. Held, that the Crown was legal mortgagee and specialty creditor for the 30,000l. origi nally due to C. & Co. Attorney-General v. Сох, H. of L. 240; Pearce v. AttorneyGeneral, ib. 1. Costs.-Reversal of interlocutor, except as to costs. In a suit for a divorce a mensá et thoro, the wife obtained judgment in the Court That judgment was rebelow, with costs. versed by the Lords, on the ground that the remedy sought was not the proper one; but the interlocutor was allowed to stand so far as it gave the wife the costs in the Court below. The wife, however, was not allowed the costs of the appeal. Paterson v. Paterson, 3 H. of L. 308. 2. A mensá et thoro.-General principleNeglect, silence, shunning the wife's company, and declarations by the husband that he will never cohabit with her, do not constitute that "cruelty and maltreatment," in respect of which the law will grant to the wife a divorce a mensa et thoro. Where, in a case of this sort, the Court of Session had pronounced for a divorce, the Lords reversed the interlocutor. Actual personal violence, or the immediate menace of it, is not the only ground of maltreatment in respect of which such a divorce will be granted. Quære, whether constant revilings and ac cusations of all sorts of crimes made, and Against the Crown.-Refusal of the House falsely made, before friends and servants, to award costs against the Crown. State of the authorities regarding the rule that the Crown neither pays nor receives costs. Lord Advocate for Scotland v. Hamilton, 1 Macq. 46. And see Divorce, 1; Exceptions; Will, 1. COUNSEL. Where two respondents having separate interests. Where, in an appeal, there were two respondents, having distinct interests, the House allowed two counsel to be heard for each. Proper course in such a case. Parish of South Leith v. Allan, 1 Macq. 93. would constitute a ground for such a divorce. The general principle of the law as to divorce a mensa et thoro is the same in England and Scotland. But it seems that a special principle exists in the law of Scotland, which permits a divorce for a wilful desertion continued for four years. Paterson v. Paterson, 3 H. of L. 308. Cases cited in the judgment: Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Cons. Rep. 69; Colquhoun v. Colqu houn, Mor. Dict., vol. 15, app. Husb. & W. pt. 1, case 5, p. 10; Duke of Gordon's case, ib. vol. 14, case 112, p. 5,902; 1 Fownf. 773; Letham v. Letham, 2 Shaw & Dunl. 284; Shand v. Shand, 10 Shaw & D. 384. Analytical Digest of Cases: House of Lords. 119 Held, that this plea raised a peremptory or substantial defence, and that a judgment thereon might be made the subject of appeal to this House. Geils v. Geils, 3 H. of L. 280. 3. In Scotland after divorce in England.-land, where the wife instituted a suit for diPlea in bar.-Upon a suit in Doctors' Com-vorce a vinculo. The husband pleaded the mons by the husband against the wife, for re-proceedings in the Arches Court as a bar to stitution of conjugal rights, she puts in a re- further proceedings in Scotland. sponsive allegation charging him with adultery, and praying sentence of divorce a mensá et thoro. Such sentence accordingly pronounced by the Court of Arches. She then institutes proceedings in the Court of Session in Scotland for a divorce a vinculo. Plea in bar, that she has already obtained redress. This plea repelled by the Court below, and leave to appeal not given. Appeal taken nevertheless. Objected to as incompetent, under the 6 Geo. 4, c. 120, s. 5. Right of appeal allowed. Geils v. Geils, 1 Macq. 36. EXCEPTIONS. INJUNCTION. Or interdict against railway company.—Obligation to complete.-Landowner.-Affirmance of a refusal to grant an injunction or interdict in a case where it appeared that a judgment negativing the right had been pronounced by the Court below, in an action of declarator brought after the refusal of the injunction. Quære, whether a landowner, having pro tion of which an act has been obtained, but in pursuance of which act nothing has been done, can compel performance of the work. Overruled. Costs. This house, in over-perty along the line of a railway, for the execuruling exceptions which had been allowed in the Court below, but which ought to have been overruled there, gave the costs in the Court below. Attorney-General v. Cox, 3 H. of L. 240; Pearce v. Attorney-General, ib. Quære, whether he can prevent the company from asking Parliament for an act of dissolution. Anstruther v. East of Fife Railway Company, 1 Macq. 98. JUDGE'S OPINION. Practice where one of the Judges differs in opinion.-The Judges were required to answer differed from the rest. The opinions of the a question put by the House. One of them majority were stated by one of their number, and, in the statement, the principle on which the dissentient Judge formed his opinion was set forth to his satisfaction. The House did not require him to state his reasons at length. Salmon v. Webb, 3 H. of L. 510. JUDGMENT. Alteration of former.-Quare, whether this House, like any other Court of Justice, may, in a subsequent case, overrule a previous decision of its own. Bright v. Hutton, 3 H. of L. 341; Hutton v. Bright, ib. JURY. Challenge of juryman.-Town councillor.Irish Jury Act.-A town councillor is, by the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 108, disqualified from being a special juryman. The name of a town councillor stood on a special jury list after it had been reduced. Held, that under the Irish Jury Act, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 91, he was liable to challenge for this disqualification, when about to be sworn. The right of challenge against a juryman is a Common Law right, which cannot be taken away, except by the express terms of a Statute, and quare, whether it is taken away by the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 91, except in cases where corporate bodies are parties, and kindred or affinity with a member of the corporate body is the ground of challenge. Plea of proceedings in Arches Court in bar of suit in Scotland for divorce a vinculo.-A Scotchman was married in England to an Englishwoman, and then returned to Scotland, where he was domiciled. Some years afterwards, the wife quitted Scotland, and returned to England, where she lived separate from her husband. He came to England, and instituted proceedings in the Arches Court for a restitution of conjugal rights. The wife, in It is not taken away by the effect of the 3 & her responsive allegations, charged him with 4 W. 4, c. 91, in respect of a disqualification adultery, and on that charge prayed for a di-created since that Statute. vorce a mensá et thoro. Judgment was given Where a challenge in respect of such disin her favour. The husband returned to Scot-qualification was made after reducing a special |