OF

CONTROVERTED ELECTIONS,

DETERMINED IN

COMMITTEES

OF

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

IN THE

SECOND PARLIAMENT

OF THE REIGN OF

QUEEN VICTORIA,

BEING THE THIRD PARLIAMENT SINCE THE PASSING OF THE ACTS FOR THE AMENDMENT
OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE.

BY

THOMAS FALCONER, ESQ., OF LINCOLN'S INN,

EDWARD H. FITZHERBERT, ESQ. OF THE INNER TEMPLE,

BARRISTERS-AT-LAW.

LONDON:

SAUNDERS AND BENNING, LAW BOOKSELLERS,

(SUCCESSORS TO J. BUTTERWORTH AND SON,)

43, FLEET STREET;

1839.

UBRARY OF THE

LELAND STANFORD, JR., UNIVERSITY

LAW DEPARTMENT.

a.55528 JUL 10 1901

LONDON:

RAYNER AND HODGES, PRINTERS,
109, Fetter Lane, Fleet Street.

THE writs to summon the Parliament to which these Reports relate were tested on July 17th, 1837, and were made returnable September 11th 1837. An obscurity in one or two cases, reported in this volume, will be removed by noticing these dates.

Since the remarks of Mr. Fitzherbert upon the law of Elections contained in the Introduction, were published, an Act has been passed, constituting new tribunals for the trial of Controverted Elections-an act that will be found deficient in not having settled some conflicting decisions upon the law, and in making no sufficient provision to produce an uniformity of decision, or to lessen the enormous expenses-especially in Scotch and Irish cases-of the present system.

By two provisions the most general causes of complaint connected with Election petitions might be removed.

First, by Committees giving authority to the first decisions made upon points of law. Discussions upon the same questions are raised upon every occasion, no matter how often they have been determined. The sittings of Committees are prolonged, not in hearing arguments upon new questions of law, but in hearing all the arguments that Counsel have ever heard of upon the same subject, repeated and refined upon. There is more than a mere chance that any former decision will be reversed. But if Committees adopted former decisions as authority, many discussions would be put an end to and some uniformity of determination might be obtained. If in every case, it was understood that a binding precedent was to be made which might subsequently affect the political interests of the parties making it, more caution and far less partiality