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although the transactions between the shipowners and the defendants did not put the defendants in the position of shipowners, yet they had so conducted themselves, or so contracted with the shippers of the goods, as to make themselves personally responsible."

Every shipper is bound by the contents of a charter-party of which he has notice; and he cannot complain of want of such notice, where it is the result of his own laches in not applying for bills of lading within a reasonable time. If a person ship goods on board a vessel, knowing that she is chartered, the consignee of the goods can maintain no action against the owner of the ship, if the goods be injured by bad stowage.1

Where the agent of the charterers has notice of the charter-party, the terms and conditions of the same will be binding upon him.

Thus where A., the charterer of a vessel, shipped certain goods on board such vessel under a bill of lading signed by the master, by which the goods were to be delivered to B. or his assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods as usual. B. was A.'s agent to whom at the time of shipment A. was indebted for advances, and the bill of lading was handed by him to B., in order that the latter might apply the proceeds of such goods to the reduction of that debt; but B. took the bill of lading with notice of the terms of the charter-party-Held


Major v. White, 7 C. & P. 41; Blakie v. Stembridge, 28 L. J. C. P. 329,

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Where master is also the charterer.


that as B. was the agent of the charterer, and had
such notice of the charter-party, he was not entitled
to the goods without payment of the charter-freight,
which exceeded the amount of the bill of lading

It is an almost invariable practice and usage that
the owners of a ship, although they let it out upon
freight to a charterer do themselves appoint a captain
and the crew, the chartering of the ship not being
so much the chartering of the hull, as of the ship
fit for the purpose of mercantile adventure. There-
fore, the chartering of a ship in any particular case
to the master does not create any more respon-
sibility in the owner to the shippers of goods, where
such fact is made known to them, than if the ship
were freighted to an entire stranger. The master
by the terms of the charter-party is constituted, as
between him and the shippers, owner of the vessel
and contracts with them not as the agent of the
owner, but on his own account, and therefore he,
and not the owner, is liable to the shippers for the
non-delivery of their goods pursuant to the bills of


By the charter-party in Newberry v. Colvin, which case was carried to the House of Lords, the owner covenanted with Betham that he should be master, that the owner should be allowed to put on board 100 tons of iron for the outward voyage, and that the ship "should be put and continued in the

1 Kern v. Deslandes, 30 L. J. C. P. 297.

7 Bing. 190; Schuster v. McKellar, 26 L. J. Q. B. 281.

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service" of Betham for twelve months, with power to load such goods as he thought fit, and to trade to and from certain specified ports, the owner to man the ship and to provide stores and necessaries for the ship and crew during that period. Betham, on his part, accepted the appointment as master and covenanted to accept, receive, and take the said ship into his service for twelve months certain, and to pay freight for the use and hire of the ship at the rate of 258. per registered ton per month; and it was further agreed between them, that an agent of the owner should continue on board, with power in certain events, to displace Betham as master and to appoint another in his stead. It was held, that by this contract the charterer Betham was constituted owner pro tempore, and that the owner of the ship was not liable upon a bill of lading for non-delivery of the goods therein specified.


The principles by which juries ought to be guided Measure of in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract were laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale,' where the Court said,-" We think the proper rule is this-where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may

123 L. J. Ex. 179,

reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under those special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if those special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he at the most could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases, not affected by any special circumstances from such breach of contract. had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case, and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them."


A shipowner is entitled to be paid a lump freight, without any deduction for a loss of part of the cargo occurring during the voyage without the negligence or fault of the shipowner.1

In Robinson v. Knights, the charter-party provided The Norway, 12 L. T. N. S. 57.

2 L. R. 8 C. P. 465.

that the ship was to be loaded with a full cargo, and to have a deck cargo, and being so loaded was to proceed to London, and “deliver the same on being paid freight as follows:-a lump sum of 3157., the freight to be paid in cash, half on arrival, and remainder on unloading and right delivery of the cargo." The ship arrived in London with the whole of the cargo, with which the charterer had loaded her, with the exception of a deck load, which had been lost during the voyage by one of the excepted perils in the charter-party, and without any default on the part of the master or crew. It was held that the shipowner was entitled to the whole of the lump freight without deducting the proportion of freight payable in respect of the deck load which had been lost. And it has been decided that under no circumstances can the shipper insist upon deducting from the full freight the value of his goods wrongfully disposed of during the voyage. He must seek his remedy for that value, as distinct from their freight, by cross action.1

If an entire ship be hired, and the burthen thereof expressed in the charter-party, and the merchant covenant to pay a certain sum for every ton, &c., of goods which he shall lade on board, but do not covenant to furnish a complete lading, the owners can only demand payment for the quantity of goods actually shipped.2

Meyer v. Dresser, 10 L. T. N. S. 612; Dakin v. Oxley, 2 Asp. M.L.C. 6; The Salacia, 32 L. J. Ad. 43.

Lady James v. The East India Co., Abbott on Sh. 553.

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