but it was also not unusual to load from lighters:Held, that the lay-days did not begin until the vessel had entered the dock to which she had been so ordered by the charterers, but that they began from that time, and were not postponed until the vessel's turn had arrived to go to the spout. And it was said that the rule is, that where a port is named in the charter-party as the port to which the vessel is to proceed, the lay-days do not commence upon the arrival of the vessel in the port, but upon her arrival at the usual place of loading in the port; not the actual berth at which she loads, but the dock or roadstead where loading usually takes place. And Bovill, C. J. noticed "that the stipulation relied on in argument to vary this general rule, was in this case not a stipulation to load with the customary or the usual despatch,' but to load in the usual or customary manner,'" and that, he said referred to the mode of delivery and not to the time of delivery. 2 In Strahan v. Gabriel, the named place was a quay. The ship arrived and found the only quay berth occupied by another ship. The shipowner offered to discharge across the ship which occupied the quay berth, if the charterer would pay for the stage and labour. The charterer refused and the shipowner claimed demurrage. It was held by Brett, L. J., that the lay-days did not commence to run until the plaintiff's ship was alongside the quay, the quay being the place named whereat the voyage was to end. 1 Tapscott v. Balfour, L. R. 8 C. P. 46; 42 L. J. C. P. 16, In Davies v. McVeagh,' the place named was the Wellington Dock. The ship was on a certain day admitted into the Wellington half tide basin, but was refused admission for a considerable time into the Wellington Dock, because the loading berths therein were full. The evidence showed that there were gates to the half tide basin from the river, and that at Liverpool the half tide basin was always treated as part of the Wellington and Bramley Moore Docks. It was argued that the charterers' liability began only when the ship was at the high level in Wellington Dock, which was the place of loading. It was held that the lay-days began to run when the ship was admitted into the dock, that is the half tide basin. The dispute in this case was whether the liability commenced when the ship was in the dock, or when she was at a loading berth. Since Randall v. Lynch,2 all the cases recognise the doctrine that where lay-days are allowed they begin to run when the ship is in the place named in the charter-party as that whence the carrying voyage is to begin, or where that voyage is to end, and that they do not begin until then. 3 In Brown v. Johnson, where the ship arrived at Hull, the port of her destination, on the 1st of February, and was reported; on the 2nd she entered the dock, and was given in charge of the dockmaster, but did not get to the place of unloading till the 4th, in consequence of the full state of the docks, the officer refusing to take her out of her 'L. R. 4 Ex. D. 265; 48 L. J. Ex. 686. 22 Camp. 352. 3 10 M. & W, 331, turn; and the discharge was not completed till the 22nd; it was held, that the lay-days were to be calculated from the period of her arrival in dock, and not at the place of unloading. By the stipulations of a charter-party, the vessel was to take in a cargo of coal at Newcastle, and proceed therewith to London, or as near thereto as she could safely get, and deliver the same to the freighters, or their assigns, &c. to be delivered in five working days, demurrage over and above the said lying days 21. per day. The vessel arrived at the port of London, off Gravesend, on the 9th March, and on the 10th the cargo was sold, and the vessel entered by the freighters for meter. On the 20th she received an order from the harbour master to proceed to the Pool: on Monday, the 22nd, she commenced working out her cargo, and was cleared on the 27th. It appeared that in consequence of the factor's certificate that she was a metered vessel, the harbour master had detained her at Gravesend till the 20th, when her turn arrived for her to proceed to the Pool and discharge her cargo, that if she had not been on the meter's list, this regulation would not have applied and she might have proceeded to the Pool at once; that it was occasionally the practice for factors not to enter such vessels in the meter's list, but that it was desirable that the cargo should be sold, subject to metage, by a sworn meter:-Held, that under these circumstances the vessel was not to be considered as having arrived at her place of discharge until the 20th, To proceed to a particular place in the dock, or a wharf. and therefore that the lying days did not begin to count till then.1 The place named for the loading or the discharge is generally some wharf, or dock, or river, or is named quay or described by an indefinite geographical name, as Alexandria, or the port of Alexandria. If it be a particular wharf, the ship must get alongside that wharf, before the charterer can be required to load or take delivery. And he will not be responsible for a delay, in getting alongside, due to the state of the tides. It was agreed by a charter-party that a vessel should load a cargo of coals, and proceed to Plymouth not higher up than Torpoint or New Passage, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and deliver the same. The ship loaded pursuant to the charter, and arrived off Plymouth at neap tides; the consignees, on receipt of notice that she was ready to discharge, ordered her to proceed to a wharf, which was within the limits stated in the charter-party, and was a usual place for the discharge of coals, and could be reached at ordinary spring tides by vessels of greater burthen; the master requested the consignees to send barges to lighten her, but, none being sent, she proceeded as she was towards the wharf, and became fixed on a mudbank till spring tides, when she got alongside the wharf. It was not the practice at Plymouth to use barges for the purpose of lightening ships :-Held, that, on the 1 Kell v. Anderson, 10 M. & W. 498, proper construction of the charter-party, and under the circumstances, the consignees had a right to name the wharf they did: and that the lay-days did not begin till the ship reached the wharf.' By a charter-party made between the plaintiff and defendant it was agreed that the vessel should take on board from the defendant a cargo of culm at Llannelly, and "proceed with all convenient speed to Coles's Wharf, Rochester, or so near thereto as she might safely get." The ship arrived at Rochester on the 24th of October, and was moored at a place called the Buoys, which was distant about 300 yards from Coles's Wharf. The master then gave the defendant's agent notice that the ship was ready to discharge the cargo; the defendant's agent ordered the master to proceed with the ship to Coles's Wharf. In consequence of the state of the tides and the want of water, the ship was then unable to get to Coles's Wharf, and the defendant's agent refused to send lighters to lighten the ship to enable her to do so. The ship did not reach Coles's Wharf until the 4th of November :-Held, that the defendant was not bound to unload the ship until she reached Coles's Wharf, and that the lay-days did not begin until the 4th of November. Neither will the charterer be liable for delay in getting alongside owing to the crowded state of the docks or the wharves being occupied by other ships. So where the ship was to load from the charterer's 1 Parker v. Winlo, 27 L. J. Q. B. 49. 2 Bastifell v. Lloyd, 31 L. J. Ex. 413. |